Special Issue: Theory/Policy

“In unoplures” (EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe
Cris Shore

The Judgment of Solomon: Global Protections for Tradition and the Problem of
Community Ownership
Dorothy Noyes

Cultural Heritage, the Swedish Folklife Sphere, and the Others
Barbro Klein

Intellectuals, Culture, Policy: The Technical, the Practical, and the Critical
Tony Bennett

Comentario by Toby Miller

Introduction by Valdimar Tr. Hafstein and Tok Thompson

Reviews by Keisha-Khan Y. Perry, Tok Thompson, Ann M. Ciasullo,
Rachel Patrick Conover, and Anthony Guest-Scott.

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Call for Papers

Cultural Analysis encourages submissions from a variety of theoretical standpoints and from different disciplines, including (but not limited to) anthropology, cultural studies, folklore, geography, media studies, popular culture, psychology, and sociology. We seek submissions for the following sections: research articles and review of works (books, films, exhibitions, websites, etc.). All submissions should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition. Please check our website or e-mail us for complete submission information.

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Theory/Policy: 
Introduction

As an interdisciplinary forum, Cultural Analysis interweaves and overlaps a variety of vantage points on expressive and everyday culture. This fifth volume stands at a crossroads where theory meets policy, and where academic and public interests converge. The contributors come to this intersection from the fields of folklore, anthropology, and cultural studies. All these fields have been interdisciplinary highways at one time or another, but they have also been torn by conflicts between "applied" or "public sector" practitioners and academic purists.

In the United States, the debate over the legitimacy of public folklore began in the middle of the 20th century. In seeking to establish the study of folklore as an autonomous academic discipline, Richard M. Dorson, director of the Folklore Institute and first American department of folklore at Indiana University, disparaged the "application" and "popularization" of the field in the public sphere (e.g., Dorson 1950, 1969; see also Bendix 1997, 188–194). Later, Dorson even went so far as to combat the creation of the American Folklife Center at the Library of Congress (Bulger 2003). The establishment of folklore in higher education in the latter half of the century, however, produced far more experts in the field than could hope to find academic positions. It has thus contributed to the expansion and sophistication of public folklore practice in cultural institutions and apparatuses, from museums to folklife festivals, and from the offices of "city folklorists" to the Smithsonian Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988; Baron and Spitzer 1992). Indeed, in spite of such tensions, the study of folklore has longstanding ties to the government of social life, going back at least to the 19th century, as an instrument for mapping populations and for representing provincial peripheries to metropolitan centers (Linke 1990; Noyes 1999).

The split between theory and public practice remains a leitmotif in the discipline, however, though the two are certainly no longer as bifurcated as they once were. In particular, questions of cultural politics and representation have created common ground between folklorists at universities, arts councils, museums, and various other public and private agencies and institutions. This theoretical reorientation has encouraged a reassessment of the division of labor in the field and has helped to heal the split between academic and applied traditions (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988; cf. Baron 1999).

As Barbro Klein demonstrates in this volume, similar tensions marked the development of the sibling discipline of folklife studies/ethnology in Sweden, in that case between scholars oriented towards social planning in the welfare state and those more concerned with historical analysis or cultural critique. Indeed, such debates are attested in various national disciplinary histories as well as those of international forums. Thus, for example, ethnologist Bjarne Rogan has brought to light how the International
Society for Ethnology and Folklore (SIEF) was born out of just such a creative tension between theory and policy, first as a subsidiary body of the Comité Internationale de Cooperation Intellectuelle (CICI) in Paris and of its successor, UNESCO, but later got rid of the policy agenda and refashioned itself as a "purely" academic organization (Rogan 2004). UNESCO, meanwhile, continues its ambitious cultural policy programs, which both re-present and refashion local culture as Dorothy Noyes reveals in her article here on "The Judgment of Solomon," where she examines some effects of the organization's efforts to safeguard "intangible cultural heritage" and the work of its sister organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in the field of folklore and traditional knowledge.

Anthropology, meanwhile, has perhaps made a smoother transition into the acceptance of the applied realm. Maybe this stems from its colonial past—after all, anthropology gained its institutionalized beginnings precisely from its promise to enable policy planning. Whether one considers the American Bureau of Ethnology (explicitly trying to both understand and control restive Native American groups, as outlined in the foundational report by its founder, John Wesley Powell, "The Need of Studying the Indian in Order to Teach Him" [1869]), or British social anthropology's emphasis on understanding power structures in its colonized territories (see, e.g., Asad 1973; Harris 1968; Leach 1984), anthropology has deep roots in practical applications (for a much fuller account, see Pels and Salemink 2000). Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), a tract on Japanese national character undertaken during World War II for the U.S. government, proved a sort of watershed. After the war, many anthropologists maintained strong misgivings on working in the interest of the state—an understandable position, given the frequent antagonism between states and the minority groups that provide the staple of anthropological studies.

Instead, the modern growth in "applied anthropology"—which is often to say those anthropologists working outside the academy—has emphasized working with indigenous groups, NGOs, and educational groups rather than with state governments (see, for example, the highly influential society and journal "Cultural Survival"). Applied anthropology continues to be a large and important part of the anthropological discourse, but is often left theoretically framed in terms of simple advocacy for minority groups.

It is on the French school of thought and Foucauldian notions of power (pouvoir: literally, "to be able to"), that most of the current anthropological work on policy has depended. Such work remains estranged from the mainstream, however, and there appears to be a dearth of dialogue dealing with this critical juncture (with notable exceptions, such as Cris Shore and Susan Wright's 1997 Anthropology of Policy. Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power). Cris Shore continues his work in this volume of Cultural Analysis with his article investigating the cultural policies of the European Union.
In cultural studies, the so-called "cultural policy debate" began in the 1980s and continued well into the 1990s, as the field was carving out an institutional niche for itself in academia (see, e.g., Bennett 1992, 1998; Cunningham 1992; Lee 1992; O'Regan 1992; Miller 1994). The movement towards a practical engagement with cultural reform came largely out of Australia, but spilled over to British and American contexts, and it emphasized productive relations between intellectuals at universities and intellectuals within cultural institutions, bureaus, and agencies.

The movement within cultural studies towards practical engagement met with particularly vitriolic response in some circles in the United States, epitomized in Fredric Jameson's 1993 review of Tony Bennett's contribution to a collection of essays on Cultural Studies (1992). Here, Jameson expresses repugnance at the prospect of "talking to the ISAs" (i.e., the Ideological State Apparatuses, a term borrowed from the writings of Louis Althusser), apparently oblivious to the fact that he is speaking from within just such an apparatus—the university.

It may be that the American context is particularly conducive to the sort of bifurcation of academic and practical concerns that is evident in the "cultural policy" and the "public folklore" debates. As Tony Bennett has suggested, "the sheer size of the higher education sector [in the U.S.] and the significant role of private institutions within that sector provide the kind of institutional conditions which allow critical debate to circulate in a semi-autonomous realm which might seem removed from those of government and administration" (Bennett 1998, 35). This is hardly the case elsewhere. In this volume, Tony Bennett challenges Habermas' theories on the public sphere, to assert that the dichotomization between academics and bureaucrats, between the theoretical and the practical, is overwrought; he argues that both belong in the more inclusive category of "intellectuals."

It has been said that the "cultural policy debate" produced more heat than light (Frow and Morris 1993, xxix), and much the same holds true of the debate surrounding public folklore. We think it is fair to say, however, that now that most of the heat has dissipated, what is left is a commitment to public engagement that has not corrupted or corroded the intellectual endeavors of either field but rather expanded and strengthened them. It is in this spirit that Cultural Analysis has undertaken this special volume. We believe that the past tensions and lacunae illustrate the need for an operational nexus between theory and policy, and for an open channel of communication between intellectual workers in higher education, in government, and in administration. Maintaining autonomy from advocacy as well as bureaucracy, critical engagement with cultural policy can contribute not only to a better government of culture and to a more effective contestation of that government, but also to the frameworks and tools of cultural analysis.

Each in its own area, the articles in this volume clear a space for critical thought within which cultural policies may be analyzed, explored, refined, reflected on, evaluated, questioned, and
contested. In part, this is the role played by the discussion piece—written on the volume's articles as well as its larger theme—by Toby Miller, who is one of those scholars who have led the way in the critical analysis and theorization of cultural policy. We invite our readers to participate in the exploration of these spaces, and we hope that this volume may contribute towards an increased understanding of this critical juncture between cultural theory and policy.

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"In uno plures" (?)  
EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe

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Cultural Policy and European Integration in Anthropological Perspective

Culture has an important intrinsic value to all people in Europe, is an essential element of European integration and contributes to the affirmation and vitality of the European model of society and to the Community's influence on the international scene.

European Parliament  
2000, 1

Although its goal is to develop a feeling of belonging to a shared culture, the EU is also keen to preserve the specific aspects of Europe's many cultures, e.g. minority languages.

CEC  
2002, 5

As the two quotes cited above indicate, the theme of Europe's "culture" (or "cultures") has become an issue of growing concern for the European Union (EU). Yet there is something curiously contradictory in the way the concept of culture is conceived and deployed in EU official discourses, a confusion that is perhaps symptomatic of a more profound philosophical ambiguity over the status and definition of the Union and its people(s). In short, is the European Union (or, to use its earlier incarnation, the European Community), one people or many? And what is, or should be, the relationship between peoplehood and culture in the EU's emerging system of supranational governance? Whereas the European Parliament's statement speaks of "the European model of society" and the "intrinsic value of culture" to "all people in Europe," a statement that belies a consensual idea of culture and society and conspicuously avoids the use of plural nouns, the European Commission's statement reminds us of the "many cultures" that the EU is "keen to preserve" and which constitute Europe's essential cultural unity. This contrast between Europe conceived as a unified and singular cultural entity, and Europe conceived as a space of diversity, an amalgamation of many cultures, and by implication, of many peoples and interests, also underlies some of the key political divisions in the way European integration is imagined. As I shall argue below, none of the EU's stock metaphors of "unity in diversity," "cultural mosaics," or "family of cultures" adequately address this fundamental contradiction between the foundational idea of Europe as an "ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe," understood as a plurality, and the idea of integration as a process leading to a "European people."

If the quotes above are indicative of an increasing official emphasis on the role of "culture" in the construction of the new Europe, they also epitomise the
important link between policy, identity-construction, and power or, to use terminology more typical of EU parlance, between "social cohesion," "European construction" and "governance." The drawing together of these themes around the notion of culture is of recent origin. According to modern myth, it was Jean Monnet, the celebrated French statesman and founding father of the European Communities, who first remarked, when looking back on a lifetime's work dedicated to creating a united Europe, that "if we were to start all over again, we would start with culture." In fact, Monnet never said anything of the kind, and none of the EU founding fathers had a vision of culture as a binding force for European unity. Like most myths, the significance of this story lies less in its historical accuracy than in its telling, and in the fact that it is still frequently cited by European Union policy elites to support the argument for increased European-level intervention in the field of culture. Monnet's oft-cited apocryphal quote is important for two reasons. First, because it is indicative of the growing political weight that European policy professionals, since the 1970s, have come to attach to the idea of "culture" as a key ingredient, indeed, a catalyst, in the integration process. Secondly, because it highlights a key point of this article: namely that the development of EU cultural policy cannot be properly understood outside of the context of the EU's wider political project of "European Construction" and its transition from a loosely structured free trade area into a fledgling, albeit ill-defined, supranational state. This has precipitated a progressively more interventionist and— notwithstanding the advance of neoliberalism or the repeated claims about respecting the principle of "subsidiarity"—a typically top-down and dirigiste approach by EU elites to the problem of European integration. What is also significant about the EU's "cultural turn" is that it is often seen, erroneously in my view, as marking a major departure from the traditional "neofunctionalist" approach to integration that prevailed during the 1960s and 70s. That approach, sometimes symbolised as the "Monnet method," was based on American social science assumptions that regional integration in Europe would follow almost automatically from the steady cumulative effects of small incremental steps towards harmonisation and regulation in relatively uncontroversial areas of national policy-making that, on the surface, pose little challenge to strategic national interests or sovereignty. The idea behind this plan was that the integration process would generate its own political dynamic—i.e. a "spillover" effect—whereby integration in one sector or policy field would generate momentum for integration in others (cf. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). How then should we make anthropological sense of the evolution of EU cultural policy, and what can the micro-history of this small field of policy tell us about deeper changes in the way the integration process is conceptualised by European Union officials and political leaders? Given the absence of references to "culture" in any of the founding treaties, we might also ask, what exactly is
EU cultural policy for, and what political functions does it serve? For anthropologists the very idea of a "cultural policy" raises epistemological dilemmas. Ever since the so-called "linguistic turn" and reflexivity of the 1980s, and arguably well before that, we have had to come to terms with the idea of contingency and the knowledge that our notions of "culture" are themselves abstractions or cultural constructions, and that ethnography—like nationalist historiography—is itself a technology for creating and reifying culture(s) (Wagner 1975; Clifford and Marcus 1986). In short, we invent "culture" in the very act of writing about it. This does not mean we should abandon the word culture as a vacuous fiction; rather, it should alert us to the fact that definitions of "culture" (English, Anglo-Saxon, Ruritanian, European or whatever) are a matter of ideology and politics, and to ask in each instance whose definition of culture is this?

The idea of "cultural policy" adds a further layer of complexity to this epistemological dilemma for by definition "policy" implies a course of action that is expedient, rational and goal-oriented; an objectified programme for penetrating and acting upon the social. This begs the question, what is "culture" that it can be transformed into an object of expediency and policy-making? As I hope to illustrate, one of the key consequences of turning the hitherto rather nebulous and undefined domain of European culture into a target of EU intervention is to enlarge the scope of EU governance and control. To put it in more theoretical terms, the invention and expansion of EU-wide policies towards "culture" is in itself a measure of the development of a new type of rationality of government; or what we might call, to adapt a term from Foucault (1991), "EU governmentality." In this sense, the study of EU cultural policy should be treated as part of what Foucault terms the "diagnostics of power."

To date, there has been little detailed analysis of EU action in the field of culture. This is partly because EU cultural policy, in the strict legal sense, is a relatively recent phenomenon: until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, culture was not a recognised area of European Community competence. However, it also reflects the lack of status political scientists and EU analysts have traditionally accorded to culture and the narrow definitions of culture they have traditionally employed. What I want to do here is examine the development of EU cultural policy from an historical and anthropological perspective by addressing three main questions. First, why has "culture"—a subject that prior to the 1980s was deemed of only marginal and esoteric interest—emerged as such a central concern for EU policy makers? Second, what are the implications of the EU's increasing intervention in the cultural domain for the future of the EU as a political and social system? Third, if the aim of EU policy elites in the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council of Ministers is, as they have often claimed, to promote the identity and external image of the Community through symbolic initiatives, "cultural action," and the creation of a "European culture area," what notions of "culture" underlie these strategies?
One of the main propositions I want to advance is that despite substantial changes in the content, breadth, and direction of EU cultural policy since the 1980s, the underlying aim and rationale that drives that policy—the imperatives of European construction—remain largely unchanged. Three overriding themes in particular have shaped, and continue to shape, the development of EU cultural policy. The first is the EU's search for legitimacy and popular consent. The second, related to this, is its concern with the question of European identity and the belief among many in the European Commission and Parliament that cultural policy can be used as an instrument for forging a common sense of heritage, history, and belonging—the goal being to turn member-state nationals into a "body politic," or European "demos." The third theme concerns the wider question of EU governance and the rationality of policy in a broader sense. As anthropologists have observed, policies can be usefully thought of as "political technologies," that is as instruments for ordering bodies in space and time and for acting upon human subjects and subjectivities (Shore and Wright 1997). Seen from this perspective, the creation of EU cultural policy can be seen as part of the EU's "will to power." By isolating and classifying a specific domain of "European culture" and then establishing programmes to intervene and order that sector for purposes of employment and social cohesion, EU cultural policy not only functions to bolster the legitimacy of the EU project, it also enlarges the scope of EU power and authority, extending its competences into new "occupied fields" of governance.

Since the 1990s, EU cultural policy, and the question of European identity more generally, has increasingly been framed around the idea of "unity in diversity." This policy motif has become extremely influential in attempts to define European identity in a way that avoids the pitfalls of both moral universalism and cultural particularism (Delanty 2003). It also offers a useful formula for countering the claims made by critics that the European Union is a nascent super-state engaged in nation-building practices similar to those that fuelled the rise of the nineteenth-century nation state (Laffan 1996; Shore 1996). Supporters and advocates of the EU project strongly reject that argument. They insist that the EU's "unity in diversity" approach points to a fundamentally different conception of identity politics, and to a European identity based on diversity and "the compatibility of contrasting identities" (Pantel 1999, 46). I suggest, by contrast, that "unity in diversity" is a bureaucratic formula fraught with ambiguities and problematic assumptions about the nature of culture, central to which is the question of how far, if at all, cultural diversity can be reconciled with the quest for unity. Let me begin, though, by considering why "culture" has become so important for EU elites, and what they mean by this overworked and misunderstood term.

**Why Culture Matters: Peoplehood, Identity, and the Problem of Cultural Legitimacy**

The theoretical background to this can be briefly stated. All political systems, particularly democratic ones, seek legiti-
macy in the cultural field (see Habermas 1992). In order to have legitimacy and authority, political institutions must enjoy the consent of the citizens in whose name they govern. The cultural foundations of modern citizenship, as Stephen Kalberg (1993) notes, are civic responsibility and social trust, both of which depend upon the sense people have of belonging to a political community. To date, however, lack of popular support for the EU remains a key obstacle to its project for European integration. Stripped to its basics, the problem is that the peoples of Europe have failed to embrace European institutions and ideals in the way that was hoped for; indeed, predicted by traditional theories of integration. According to influential theorists of integration, including Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963), popular loyalty to the European Communities would grow as each successive step towards ever-closer union demonstrated the material benefits to be gained by further integration. This instrumental loyalty, so the argument went, would provide sufficient "permissive consensus" to enable each subsequent step to be implemented (cf. George 1985; O'Neill 1996). Since the 1990s, however, that "passive consent" has withered and support for further social and political integration has declined throughout much of the EU, a factor some attribute to the deflationary policies adopted by those governments seeking to qualify for membership of the EU and the single currency, and others to the continuing revelations of fraud and mismanagement within the EU institutions themselves.

The challenge facing EU leaders is how to transform this remote "Europe of institutional structures" into a more popular "people's Europe"? Despite substantial increases in its legal authority and regulatory power, the EU still has no tangible or self-identifying "European public" to lend legitimacy to its institutions. As Graham Leicester (1996, 4) reminds us, the most successful federations of our time have a national body politic, a "demos" whose representatives are able to base their authority on the claim that they speak for "We, the People." The EU's problem is that a "union of peoples" is not a demos, and as Spanish MEP Miguel Herrero de Miñón (1996) notes, a democratic system without a demos is a contradiction in terms, or worse, simply "cratos" (i.e. power).

The legitimacy of EU institutions rests on their claim to represent the "European interest," but without a European society or body politic, such claims ring hollow and are likely to be seen as just a modern version of the old formula of raison d'état. The point here, as both Leicester (1996) and Herrero de Miñón (1996) concur, is that without the critical underpinning of a truly transnational democracy, the EU's attempt to impose a new constitutional order on the peoples of Europe will fail. The lack of direct connection between the European Union and its citizens is often referred to as the "democratic deficit." However, I suggest a more useful way to conceptualise the problem is in terms of a "cultural deficit"—or what Bruno de Witte (1993) calls the European Union's lack of "cultural legitimation."

All of this highlights a point made long ago by Ernest Gellner (1983) that if
political institutions are to be robust and legitimate, political and cultural identities must be congruent. As Gellner (1983, 86) put it, "[m]odern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture." If this is the case, a question worth pondering is towards what sort of culture might modern Europeans be loyal? This, however, raises yet another dilemma for the EU. If it does go down the road of using its cultural industries and cultural policy to create social cohesion around a putative shared heritage and common civilisation (i.e. using cultural action to forge a sense of "We Europeans"), it will be tinkering with the very foundations of European integration. EU constitutional expert Joseph Weiler sums it up succinctly:

one of Europe’s articles of faith, encapsulated for decades in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome...[i]s...that the Community and Union were about "lay[ing] the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Not the creation of one people, but the union of many. In that, Europe was always different from all other federal states which, whether the USA, Germany, Australia, and elsewhere, whilst purporting to preserve all manner of diversity, real and imaginary, always insisted on the existence of a single people at the federal level (Weiler 1999, 327).

In other words, the idea of forging a "European people" or of European nation building should be anathema from a strictly constitutional point of view. It is against this background that the full implications of EU cultural policy, with its emphasis on promoting awareness of Europe’s shared cultural heritage, begin to make sense.

EU Involvement in Culture 1957–1992: From Social Cohesion to forging a "People’s Europe"

The 1957 Treaty of Rome which laid the constitutional foundations for the EU contained only two minor references to culture, the first relating to "non-discrimination" and the second to exceptions to the free movement of goods where a special case can be made for "the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historical, or archaeological value." The absence of any specific treaty reference to culture meant that, prior to Maastricht, the EU had no legal basis for direct involvement in cultural affairs. Technically, there was no such thing as a European Community cultural policy; just various ad hoc "cultural actions" based on European Parliament Resolutions and agreements by Ministers of Culture. Despite this, both the European Parliament and Commission had already established several specialised committees related to culture, including a Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Media, and Sport. To circumvent the lack of legal competence, Community officials invoked economic arguments to achieve cultural and political objectives (Forrest 1994, 12). This was not difficult as there are no obvious or impermeable boundaries between economic and cultural affairs. As Delors summed it up in his first speech as Commission President to the European Parliament in 1985:

Under the terms of the Treaty we do not have the resource to implement a
cultural policy; but we are going to try to tackle it along economic lines. It is not simply a question of television programmes. We have to build a powerful European culture industry that will enable us to be in control of both the medium and its content, maintaining our standards of civilisation, and encouraging the creative people amongst us. (qtd. in Collins 1994, 90)

This is precisely what the Commission sought to do, using arguments about the need to promote and defend Europe's "cultural industries" while simultaneously arguing that Europe must define and encourage its "core values" vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This policy was helped by the Copenhagen summit of 1973 when, prompted by the oil crisis and the desire to revive the integration process, EC leaders adopted a communiqué on European identity and pledged to review "the common heritage" of the member states. As the historian Bo Stråth (2000) argues, this turn towards "identity" marked an important shift in the official discourse of European integration. Henceforth, ambiguous and contested terms like "Europe's heritage," "the European identity" and "European civilisation" were reified into major organising concepts in the discourse on European construction. In its 1987 "Fresh Boost" report, the European Commission went even further in its appropriation of outmoded terminology from the social sciences. In Durkheimian fashion, it not only proclaimed its mission as the quest for "social cohesion," it also affirmed the existence of a European "collective consciousness" (Pahl 1991; Collins 1994).

"Europe's cultural identity," it proclaimed, "is nothing less than a shared pluralistic humanism based on democracy, justice, and freedom" (CEC 1987, 5).

As one of the many European Commission-sponsored history textbooks produced during the 1990s declares:

anyone visiting Europe with open eyes can easily see that, over and above language differences and different life styles, we are bound together by a family spirit and share the great values in common.

Greece is the cradle of our European civilisation. Rome left its indelible mark on it; Christianity gave it a soul and modernity guarantees its future. We are, whether we like it or not, the heirs to that magnificent legacy. (Couloubaritsis et al. 1993, 180)

An essential European identity and unity was thus deemed to reside in certain "core values" and in the shared legacy of classical civilisation.

In many respects, the history of EU cultural policy provides an exemplar of the way European integration (and the Monnet method described earlier) works in a more general sense, and how EU institutions have manoeuvred to acquire increasing jurisdiction over the hitherto jealously guarded national policy domains of its member states. It also highlights the tension between the EU's desire to promote greater freedom of trade in cultural goods and services within Europe and those who wish to mobilise culture as a defensive shield to protect Europe from the perceived dangers of competition and globalisation from with-
The first budget lines specifically for culture voted by the European Parliament during the 1970s mostly concerned heritage matters and involved relatively small amounts of money. However, these budgetary inroads enabled the Commission in 1973 to create a small unit dedicated to cultural affairs, thus establishing a strategic bridgehead for advancing further claims for competence in cultural affairs. The Commission then used its initial activity to justify further activities. Through its various Communications on Community Cultural Action, it also set about re-writing the history of its involvement in culture, portraying this as a response to a "widely felt need for greater co-ordination." This was done, according to Terry Sandell (1996, 269), "by putting forward bureaucratic, quasi-Marxist definitions of culture in order to shoe-horn it into the framework of the Treaty." "Culture and the arts" thus became "the Cultural Sector" and "the Cultural Sector" became "the socio-economic whole formed by persons and enterprises dedicated to the production and distribution of cultural goods and services."

In addition to redefining culture to render it more amenable to Community intervention, the Commission exploited these new definitions to involve itself in cultural action of a more symbolic kind designed to promote "European identity" and bring Europe "closer to its citizens." Prompted by the low turn-outs in the 1984 European Parliament elections, the European Council established an ad hoc Committee for a "People's Europe"—the Adonnino Committee. Its brief was to suggest measures "to strengthen and promote the Community's identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world" (Adonnino 1985, 5). The Committee, which included both PR and marketing experts as well as senior Commission officials including its future Secretary General, David Williamson, subsequently produced two reports outlining cultural strategies for "promoting the European idea." These included, inter alia, a Europe-wide "audio-visual area" with a "truly European" multilingual television channel; a European Academy of Science; a Euro-lottery whose prize-money would be awarded in ECU ("to make Europe come alive for the Europeans", ibid., 21); the formation of European sports teams; the transmission of more factual information about Community activities and their significance for European citizens, including "the historical events which led to the construction of the Community and which inspire its further development in freedom, peace, and security;" the inauguration of school exchange programmes and voluntary work camps for young people; and the introduction of a stronger "European dimension" in education through the creation of new school books and teaching materials. (Adonnino 1985, 21–25).

The idea behind these populist measures was to help forge a collective European consciousness and identity by "Europeanising" the cultural sector. But the Committee went further. To create a "People's Europe," it argued, also required new symbols for communicating the principles and values upon which the Community is founded. Foremost among these were the new European
logo and flag: a circle of twelve yellow stars set against a blue background, a design taken from the Council of Europe; the "harmonised" European passport and European driving licenses; the creation of European car number-plates; and a new European anthem, the rousing "Ode to Joy," taken from the fourth movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.

To boost the Community's image, the Adonnino Report also recommended EC-sponsored sporting competitions and awards, "public awareness" campaigns, and a host of high-profile cultural initiatives from the conservation and restoration of the Parthenon and the formation of a European Youth Orchestra and Opera Centre, to the formation of a "European literature prize" and hundreds of "Jean Monnet Awards" for creating new university courses and posts in European integration studies with the aim of "Europeanising" university teaching. The Commission also attempted to reconfigure the ritual calendar by creating new festive "European Weeks," "European Culture Months," and a series of "European years" dedicated to the promotion of certain EU-chosen themes, such as the "European Year of Cinema," or the "European Year of the Environment." It also proposed that May 9, the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, be designated official "Europe Day" and a public holiday. Added to these was the highly successful "European City of Culture" initiative; a move that effectively united European Community cultural policy with regional policy, thus giving a clear spatial dimension to the former.

Behind these seemingly mundane cultural initiatives lay a more profound objective: to transform the symbolic ordering of time, space, education, information, and peoplehood in order to stamp upon them the "European dimension." In short, to reconfigure the public imagination by Europeanising some of the fundamental categories of thought.

EU Cultural Policies Since 1992: The Politics and Semantics of "Unity in Diversity"

By 1992, official EU cultural action still amounted only to a random collection of low-key projects based on Council resolutions for which the Commission could find small amounts of money under its own authority. These included audio-visual programmes, book projects, networking of cultural organisations, harmonisation of controls on export of cultural goods, restoration projects on symbolic sites of archaeological heritage, and various small schemes to sponsor cultural exchanges, training, business sponsorship of the arts, the translation of important works of European culture, and the admission of young people to museums and cultural events. By contrast, unofficial, or indirect, cultural action now involved the activities and spending of seven other Directorate-Generals—and an estimated budget of Euro 2.47 billion in the period 1989–93, an average of Euro 494 million per annum (see Sandell 1997, 272).

This situation changed with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union (TEU). Among its innovations, the TEU created the European Union and introduced "European Citizenship" as a legal category—but another idea first
advocated in the 1985 Adonnino reports. It also brought several new areas within the Community's jurisdiction, including education, youth, consumer protection, public health, and culture, thereby substantially enlarging the EU's sphere of governance. By placing culture de jure as a treaty matter, it also legitimised the EU's earlier cultural activities and interests. Although culture occupied relatively few words of the Maastricht Treaty, giving culture its own chapter was highly significant. As Article 128 declared:

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(1) The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

(2) Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audio-visual (CEC 1992, 13).

According to former European Council official Alan Forrest (1994, 18), Article 128 represented "a model application of subsidiarity" as it gave the EU no legal mandate to lead or control policies in the cultural sector, simply a requirement to "encourage" cultural co-operation between states and support and supplement their action "if necessary." Paragraph four also stated that "the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaty," thus recognizing that culture is a crosscutting issue relevant to many other areas of policy. To prevent any centralisation of cultural policy, paragraph five declared that any harmonisation of laws under Article 128 is ruled out, and that the Committee of the Regions must be consulted before any action is taken.

One criticism of Article 128, however, is that its terms of reference were extraordinarily vague, and that phrases like "contributing to the flowering of cultures" are not justiciable. Another is that EU cultural policies, like those of most member-states, are often contradictory in practice. How does one celebrate national and regional cultural diversity while simultaneously "bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore"? And what exactly does this shared "European cultural heritage," which European citizens seem curiously unaware of, actually entail?

These questions are particularly germane to debates about cultural diversity. Since the 1990s, and largely in response to these questions, the EU has adopted the slogan "unity in diversity" as its central policy motif. Precisely when this phrase was adopted is unclear, but it is hardly original. The Indian Prime Min-
ister Nehru used it long ago to define Indian national identity. Western European Communist parties also used it to promote the idea of "Eurocommunism." So what does "unity in diversity" mean in the European context? From the EU's perspective, it is intended to project the idea that the EU seeks to celebrate and promote cultural pluralism. This is consistent with its repeated emphasis on the idea of Europe as a "mosaic of cultures," and a "culture of cultures." But it also suggests that the EU offers a new layer of identity under which the regions and nations can unite.

The message conveyed in various official reports and documents is that "we" Europeans are bearers of a common history and shared heritage; together, we belong to a unified "European culture area." As one mass-circulation EU pamphlet puts it: "the city of Venice, the paintings of Rembrandt, the music of Beethoven, or the plays of Shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of Europe" (Borchardt 1995, 73). These ideas are powerfully captured in the 1993 "Committee of Expert's Report on EU Information and Communication Policy." Drawing explicit parallels with the nation-building strategies of the United States, the report states:

The United States of America recognized the need for symbols to rally many disparate peoples and cultures to a common cause, to reaffirm and reinforce its unity summarized in its national motto: "E pluribus unum."

At first blush, "unity in diversity" seems to suggest that EU policy-makers have embraced a more pluralistic and less instrumental approach to culture. Closer analysis indicates otherwise. The rationale underlying EU cultural policies appears to be less about celebrating "difference" or embracing multiculturalism than about promoting the idea of Europe's overarching unity through that diversity. National and sub-national cultural differences are typically represented as the fragmented elements of a shared "civilisation," whose origins are located in ancient Greece, Rome, and Christendom.

These ideas were further developed through various EU-funded initiatives to design textbooks that portray history from a "European perspective," thereby challenging the hegemony of nationalist historiography. This EU-sponsored
attempt to re-write history is epitomised by Jean-Baptiste Durosselle's *Europe: A History of its Peoples*, although other historians including Brugmans (1987) and Couloubaritsis (et al. 1993) have also made notable contributions. Durosselle's 416-page magnum opus, part textbook, part manifesto, presents the last three thousand years of European history as the story of Europe's faltering journey toward political union and federalism: a gradual coming together in the form of the EU, or what politicians call Europe's "vocation federal" ("Federal destiny"). The chapters portray European history as the unfolding of an evolutionary chain of events, starting in the Neolithic period, then moving forwards in a march of progress from Classical Greece and Rome, to Christianity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, European conquest and discovery, individualism, and the rise of liberal democracy. This EU historiography is both teleological and highly selective in what it includes and excludes from this canon of elite references. The result is a sanitised and extremely Eurocentric construction of the past, which largely ignores the darker side of European modernity, including Europe's legacy of slavery, imperialism, and racism. In the words of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1991, 4) "[O]fficial European culture, reproduced in declarations, textbooks, media programmes, continues to be the culture of imperial Europe."

Philip Schlesinger (1994) makes similar observations; EU constructions of European culture, he claims, privilege an elitist, bourgeois intelligentsia vision of culture. This claim is borne out by the main EU cultural programmes between 1996–1999, such as KALEIDOSCOPE ("programmes supporting artistic and cultural activities with a European dimension") ARIANE (translation of European literature), and RAPHAEL (cultural heritage project, notably restoration of the Acropolis, Mount Athos, and Burgos Cathedral). Other specifically named recipients of EU cultural support include the European Community Chamber Orchestra, the European Youth Opera Foundation, and the European Opera Centre. Clearly, "high culture" (opera, classical music, and grand architecture) features prominently in EU conceptions of cultural action.

What is striking about the way EU documents describe Europe's cultural heritage is that they make virtually no mention of the contribution of writers, artists, scholars, and cultural practitioners of non-European descent. An estimated 17 million Muslims live within the EU, but as Yasmin Alibhai Brown argues (1998, 38), "they do not yet see themselves as part of the [European] project in any meaningful sense." This is hardly surprising, she adds, when Europe's identity is being constructed around assumptions about shared Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots, and Beethoven's Ninth symphony. As critics argue, the flip side of Eurocentrism today is "Islamophobia" and a right-wing agenda that seeks to exploit fears about the threat to "fortress Europe" posed by criminals, Muslim fundamentalists, illegal immigrants, and "bogus" asylum seekers (see Runnymede Trust 1997 for a well documented analysis of this).
It is not only black, Asian, Muslim, or Third World peoples who are excluded from the canon of "European" culture, but also those from the United States, which is somewhat surprising given the appetite European consumers seem to have for Americana. While the Commission's own think-tank on audiovisual policy concluded that "if Europe has a common film culture, it is that of American films" (Vasconcelas et al. 1994, 60), EU politicians and officials view this with alarm. In their view, Hollywood and American TV exports represent a form of cultural imperialism that threatens to undermine the integrity of European culture. Successive French governments in particular have made the defence of European culture against globalisation (often construed idiomatically as "Americanisation") a major policy priority. This stance is exemplified in debates about imposing quotas on the "European content" of public broadcasting, which critics claim is anti free trade and serves merely to mask a protectionist agenda. However, cultural factors may be more important here than simple commercial calculations. EU policy elites still view Hollywood movies, hamburgers, blue jeans, jazz music, and Japanese consumer goods as objects that stand outside of "European culture." By contrast, old Dutch Masters, the plays of Shakespeare, and Beethoven's symphonies represent the quintessential European heritage and, moreover, are regarded as part of our treasured common patrimony. In practice, ideas of popular culture, multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, and hybridity appear to be anathema to official conceptions of European culture.

Conclusions: Unity-in-Diversity or the Governmentalisation of Culture?

It is, as Marx noted, one of the characteristics of representative systems . . . that all that is solid melts into air. But the reverse can also be true—representation can make even the most vapid connection between people real enough to endure. (David Runciman 2001, 5)

We began this discussion with the question "what is EU cultural policy for?" The official answer usually given is to "promote artistic and cultural cooperation" and create a "common cultural area characterised by its cultural diversity and shared cultural heritage" (CEC 2006). However, the evidence clearly points to another, more political agenda in which "cultural action" and EU cultural policy provide both instruments and legitimation for increasing European-level intervention into the social. This is what Clive Barnett (2001) has aptly termed the "governmentalisation of culture": it is effectively a continuation of the traditional Monnet-method for forging sectoral integration, only this time the emphasis is on the instrumentalisation of "culture" rather than the economic or the single market as the political arm of nation-building at the European level. As I have tried to show, however, the dilemma for the EU is that its approach to culture contains some fundamental contradictions that violate the very telos of European integration that was enshrined in the preamble to the EU's founding treaties. These tensions are again evident in the European Commission's recent pamphlet, "A Community of Cultures,"
and in the way it tries to promote "European citizenship" as the new container concept for the "unity in diversity" principle:

Creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. These words may be a bit dry (these are taken from the preamble to the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992), but the intention is to create a "Europe of the peoples." And that means using culture as a vehicle. . . . The Treaty on European Union also created "European Citizenship—to supplement, but not replace, national citizenship. This idea of European citizenship reflects the fundamental values that people throughout Europe share and on which European integration is based. Its strength lies in Europe's immense cultural heritage. Transcending all manner of geographical, religious, and political divides, artistic, scientific, and philosophical currents have influenced and enriched one another over the centuries, laying down a common heritage for the many cultures of today's European Union. Different as they are, the peoples of Europe share a history which gives Europe its place in the world and which makes it so special. (CEC 2002, 3)

European identity is thus portrayed simultaneously as a transcendental historical given founded upon "fundamental values" that are distinctly "European," and at the same time as something so insipid and non-existent in the mind's eye of ordinary Europeans that it has to be created instrumentally by elites, "using culture as a vehicle." The overriding objective that informs EU cultural policy therefore seems to have changed little since the 1980s. The goal is not "diversity" but "unity": not "ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe" but the creation of a "European people" through the bread-and-circus antics of its various "People's Europe" campaign initiatives. The positioning of the apostrophe in this stock EU epithet is revealing. Where cultural diversity is promoted, it is invariably within a conception of a greater, composite, pan-European whole. The assumption is that national cultural differences can be brought together and blended, in Gestalt fashion, to create a higher, overarching European identity that is greater than the sum of its parts, and that a supranational tier of identity can be created over and above existing local, ethnic, regional, and national identities, like so many Chinese boxes. This is the "family of cultures" that collectively define the "European cultural area" and the distinctiveness of European values. The phrase "European civilisation" may no longer be used, for reasons of expediency and political correctness, but it is still implied. Unfortunately, the European tier of identity is characteristically thin, ersatz, and elitist, and no substitute, either morally or practically, for national affiliations.

"Unity in diversity"—like the Latin motto, "in uno plures"—offers EU policymakers a convenient rhetorical mediation between the incompatible goal of forging a singular European consciousness, identity, and peoplehood on the one hand, and claims to be fostering cultural pluralism on the other. However, the tension between these contradictory impulses is not reconciled by this verbal
sleight of hand. As Gerard Delanty (2003) points out, "unity in diversity" is not the same as unity and diversity, and the idea that Europe’s unity lies in its diversity is not as liberal or pluralistic as it seems. What it reflects is a kind of "postmodern communitarianism" designed to overcome the pitfalls of previously essentialist and Eurofederalist conceptions of Europe. Delanty suggests that this represents the emergence of a new ideology of culture in the EU in which the principle of unity is no longer posited as a universalistic or higher unity, but as an "inner unity" constituted through diversity. It would seem as if "diversity" is to be encouraged, but only if it does not obstruct the quest for unity or further integration. Thus for Delanty, "unity in diversity" is a deeply problematic concept where it is not a meaningless piece of rhetoric suggesting intercultural understanding. Here I concur. However, Delanty’s conclusion that the really common European value is the enduring and pervasive Europe-wide belief in "social justice" and the "European social model" I find just as rhetorical and ideological.

Where the Commission has actively encouraged cultural pluralism and greater local autonomy in the form of a "Europe of the regions," I think this policy too is largely shaped by a neofunctionalist ideology of integration and a desire to undermine the hegemony of nation-states by developing a supranational alternative to the national principle.

In its 1996 "Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community Action," the Commission concluded with the statement that:

Cultural policy forms part of the European enterprise and, in this respect, is an integration factor within an "ever-closer union between the peoples of Europe’s . . . cultural policy must make a contribution to strengthening and to expanding the influence of the "European model" of society built on a set of values common to all European societies. (CEC 1996, 102)

Leaving aside the question of what "the European model of society" entails in practice, or whose definition of the European model we are talking about, a key problem with this claim—and with much of EU cultural policy in general—is the assumption that "culture" can be harnessed as a tool for advancing the EU’s project for European construction. Leaving aside the question of ethics, the very idea that European identity needs to be invented, or more correctly, "rebranded," in order to advance the EU’s programme for "building Europe" represents a project of social engineering uncomfortably reminiscent of other failed modernist ideologies of the twentieth century. That project could easily backfire should culture be perceived as a domain that is becoming too overtly politicised. It also assumes consensus for a "European model" of society that does not exist and which, even if it did exist, would be of questionable value to democracy in a modern transnational and multicultural context. The attempt by EU elites to invent Europe at the level of popular consciousness by unifying European citizens around a supposed common cultural heritage or civilisation will invariably be at the cost of excluding "non-Europeans;" those peoples and cul-
tures that fall outside the EU's somewhat selective representations of Europe's cultural heritage. This problem is compounded by the fact that the category of "non-European citizens" is often conflated with terms like "aliens," "illegal immigrants," "asylum seekers," and undesirable "extracommunitari." The danger here is that promoting European culture could, inadvertently, help to fuel racism and xenophobia by providing what Stolcke (1995) calls "new rhetorics of exclusion" and forms of cultural chauvinism.

EU supporters insist that the goal is not to "invent" a new European identity but rather to stimulate what Jacques Delors called "a renewed awakening of European awareness" (CEC 1987, 4-5). What is seldom asked, however, is why Europeans need to be made aware of their cultural Europeanness in the first place, or why EU elites have arrogated to themselves this exalted role.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a keynote address at the May 2003 conference of Nordic Ethnology in Helsingør, Denmark. I wish to thank the participants and organisers of that conference for their comments and responses. The ethnographic research upon which this paper is based was carried out in Brussels between 1995 and 1996. I would like to express my thanks to the ESRC for their generous help in supporting this work.

2 For a more detailed anthropological analysis of the EU's project for "European construction," see Shore 2000.

3 For a useful overview and critical analysis of neofunctionalism, see the contributions to O'Neill 1996 and those in Nelson and Stubb 1998.

4 The main definition of the term "policy" given in the Oxford English Dictionary is "a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, party, ruler, statesmen, etc; any course of action adopted as advantageous or expedient" (http://dictionary.oed.com). The question here though is "advantageous for whom?"

5 See the Commission’s 1996 report (CEC 1996) for a more considered debate about the potential scope of the culture concept.

6 A good illustration of the way this motif has been appropriated as a vehicle for discussing European identity today is Taylor's (2001) edited reference book, Unity in Diversity—a 450 page glossy compendium of short essays by leading political commentators and academics.


8 The Commission’s narrative regarding the evolution of its cultural policy is exemplified in a number of its key documents, including New Prospects for Community Cultural Action (CEC 1992) and First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community Action (CEC 1996).

9 As used by the EU, this term typically includes information, communication, audiovisual, heritage, sport, and the arts. Earlier definitions also included education and "youth."

10 The 1976 Tindemans' Report on European Union represents the first embryonic statement of Community cultural policy. Significantly, this developed the new catchword of "Citizen's Europe," although it was not until
Maastricht, sixteen years later, that this idea was translated into the legal concept of Citizenship of the Union. A second key event was the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union signed by the European Council in Stuttgart. This introduced the idea that European co-operation should extend to cultural co-operation, to be pursued not for its own sake but "in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity" (qtd. in de Witte 1987, 136).

11 In fact, the overall electoral turnout in 1984 was 61%, the second highest vote ever recorded in a European election. Subsequent elections have produced successively lower turnouts, 59% in 1989, 57% in 1994, and just 49% in 1999.

12 For a more detailed anthropological analysis of these symbolic initiatives and cultural actions, see Abélès 2000 and Shore 1996 and 2000.

13 The Treaty of Amsterdam modified article 128 to read: "The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures."

14 Gerard Delanty (1995, 111) makes a further point: "It has conveniently been forgotten today that fascism and anti-Semitism were two of the major expressions of the idea of Europe."

15 The "Culture 2000" initiative (with a budget of 167 million ECU over a five-year period from 2000 to 2004) represents the next step in this agenda. This programme builds on the work of Kaleidoscope, Ariane, and Raphael and aims to develop what is termed a "common European culture area" through the facilitation of co-operation between creative artists, cultural operators, and member-state institutions involved in the "cultural sector."

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The Judgment of Solomon: Global Protections for Tradition and the Problem of Community Ownership

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In the absence of local knowledge, global judges depend on wisdom. King Solomon, ignorant of the history of the two rival claimants to a baby, was confident of the principle that mothers are naturally loving. Bertolt Brecht, revising the story, argued that the birth mother might not be the best mother, particularly when vested privilege made her overconfident of her entitlements. As a good communist, he mistrusted the Lockean tradition of possessive individualism that equates origins with ownership (Hafstein 2004a, 306). But as a good modernizer, he had global assumptions of his own. In the frame story to his Caucasian Chalk Circle, a Party representative helps two village councils to resolve a dispute over the possession of a valley. The goatherders who have made cheese in the valley since time immemorial agree to surrender it to an agricultural cooperative that has a plan to irrigate it for orchards, a more productive use of the land.¹

Stalinist agricultural reality, in turn, tragically undermined Brecht’s assumption that modernizing planners always know best (Scott 1998). In fact, judges’ wise assumptions are often undone by historical outcomes. In this article I address a more recent debate over possession: who owns tradition? (Brown 2003; Rikoon 2004; Hafstein 2004a). I suggest that some of the assumptions of global advocates for local communities in current intellectual property struggles may be equally ephemeral.

I speak primarily from the experience of my own discipline, folklore. Since the history of commercially recorded music and more with the post-1960s growth of
a market for traditional arts, folklorists have repeatedly become involved on an ad hoc basis in disputes over the rights to a particular tradition. Many of these disputes impinge on copyright and other forms of intellectual property law (Cohen 1974; Jabbour 1983; Evans-Pritchard 1987). Others take place in the context of heritage preservation efforts. Folklorists were involved in UNESCO's efforts to establish model provisions for the protection of tradition in 1980 and again in 1989 (Jabbour 1983; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). With UNESCO's Intangible Heritage initiatives since 1972 and with the creation in 2000 of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore, folklorists have been participating more intensively as what John Kingdon calls "policy entrepreneurs" in global initiatives to protect local tradition (1995, 122–24). While we are, as Kingdon says, motivated by a sense that our expertise can contribute important to a debate that concerns us closely, some of us may admit that we also fit another of his categories, "policy groupies," eager to be where the action is. And in fact we are gaining a place at the table. Some of our colleagues sit on UNESCO's Intangible Heritage Committee, two representatives from the American Folklife Center of the Library of Congress serve on the U.S. delegation to WIPO, and the American Folklife Society and the Société Internationale d'Ethnologie et Folklore are accredited NGOs at the IGC sessions. Representatives of both of these societies along with individual folklorists (myself included) have had the opportunity of informal exchange with members of the WIPO Secretariat, who have exercised an admirable determination to consider the perspectives of both scholars and local actors.

To date, a major emphasis of North American folklorists' advocacy has been the insistence that protection regimes should give control of tradition not to the paradigmatic political agent, the nation-state, nor to the paradigmatic economic agent, the individual. Rather, it is argued, folklore is created and therefore owned by communities. In consequence, initiatives should be designed to give communities control over the use of their traditions at the most grassroots level possible (Jabbour 1983; American Folklife Society 2004; Rikoon 2004). In this article I suggest some of the risks to be borne in mind as this generally laudeworthy insistence on local control moves toward implementation in policy. My primary concern is with the emotional and political force of the idea of "community." Community is so powerful symbolically that we can hardly assess it empirically. I discuss the modern assumptions that foster global enthusiasm for community but impede understanding of its real dynamics. I ask how judges will recognize the authentic guardians whose right and duty it is to watch over tradition, and who, in turn, will watch the watchers. Finally, I suggest that the reification of tradition as community-managed heritage tends to undermine one of the most important uses of local tradition, the collective negotiation of intracommunity conflict—such that our global Solomons are likely to be called upon to judge more and more local disputes.
Tradition and the Culturalist Moment

The care and feeding of tradition is a matter of pressing current concern to intergovernmental organizations, caught as they are between northern and southern nation-states and between multinational corporations and the wretched of the earth. I will refer in this article to UNESCO and WIPO, which may be taken as proxies for two cardinal approaches. For UNESCO, with its language of "safeguarding" and "preserving" living cultural heritage, tradition is the baby of the Bible story, to be guarded and nurtured. For WIPO, with its language of "protection" from unauthorized third-party uses, tradition is Brecht's valley, to be developed for the collective good. At the time of this writing, both organizations are strongly engaged in protective efforts. UNESCO is lobbying for member state ratification of its 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. The WIPO Inter-Governmental Committee's Seventh Assembly in November 2004 discussed a draft of core principles and objectives for the protection of folklore, and the General Assembly has directed the Committee to accelerate the development of an international instrument towards this end.

Tradition, folklore, or intangible heritage, as one prefers, is assumed to stem from and therefore to belong to "communities." The label of "community" is accorded by both WIPO and UNESCO to indigenous groups in the first instance and by extension to other minorities within and between nation-states (UNESCO 2003, 1; WIPO 2004, 12–13). Descent is assumed by default to be the unifying basis of community, although religious and other principles of affiliation are secondarily acknowledged. As a rule, groups represented as "communities" are comparatively isolated, subaltern, and not considered to be viable autonomous collective subjects. Indeed, "community" is in part a euphemism conferring dignity and value on groups in a negative position: it is a verbal gift from the rich to the poor. At the same time, insofar as the label implies a refusal of individualism, it distances its referent from modernity (cf. Bauman and Briggs 2003).

Folklore is assumed to be what communities have got amid all they have not got. It is both identity and resource, both baby and valley. Just as the nation-states of the nineteenth century built national cultures out of their folklore, so both new states and subaltern groups within them must make cultural capital out of their own. In the culturalist new world order, folklore also provides the face by which communities represent themselves and claim rights in the political arena. Moreover, in a global economy full of consumers hungry for exotic experience, folklore is a cultural resource comparable to the natural raw materials on which poor countries have so often depended for export income (Yúdice 2003).

Both UNESCO and, within the context of folklore protections, WIPO have supported the insistence of developing countries that communities be allowed the free exercise of their tradition in an autonomous space, the boundaries of which should be breached neither by the unwanted invasion of foreign culture nor by the expropriations of foreign cultural
The first of the guiding principles proposed at the IGC's Seventh Session in November 2004 is "responsiveness to aspirations and expectations of relevant communities" (WIPO 2004, Annex I, 2). Elsewhere the document states that protection of tradition is not an end in itself, but intended to benefit communities (Annex II, 1). Throughout the WIPO Secretariat's documents discussing objectives, principles, and policy options for the protection of tradition, it is emphasized that, while protections are likely to be instituted by nation-states, they should be designed to reflect community practice and wishes, avoid interference with community-generated initiatives, and accrue advantage to the community above all other stakeholders. The UNESCO Convention, which privileges the cultural expressions themselves, nonetheless identifies communities as the makers and custodians of heritage (UNESCO 2003, 1) and prescribes that communities participate as fully as possible in safeguarding measures, again understood by default as the province of state actors (Article 11b; Article 15).

The developed countries are unlikely to put up much fuss. Letting communities earn money on their folklore is a relatively minor concession. It may smooth the way for the more controversial and economically more consequential debates over "traditional cultural knowledge" (most urgently ethnobotany and medical practice) and "genetic resources" (both human and territorial). In addition, giving the southern countries a stake in existing intellectual property legislation may conceivably soften resistance to a system that overwhelmingly benefits the developed countries. This is of particular importance in light of the "Development Agenda" recently proposed by Brazil, Argentina, and other southern countries to the WIPO General Assembly, demanding a global rethinking of the intellectual property regime as an instrument for general economic development rather than the protection of existing interests (Proposal 2004). The North's culture industries, furthermore, depend upon diverse and renewable global cultural resources to provide the constant novelty that stimulates ongoing consumer demand. It is thus in their interest to give the makers of "authentic" and "indigenous" culture some incentive to continue to create; and this provision of incentive is of course the core justification of the existing intellectual property regime.

The solution to global inequality, political and economic, has become "Let them eat culture." Culture is increasingly proffered as the bridge across socioeconomic divides and the oil to the wheels of globalization. If globalization painfully widens the gaps between us, world music gives us one beat to dance to—and it is, notably, the gift of the poor to the rich. For it is famously the poor who have rhythm: indeed, the ideology of modernity posits an inverse relationship between material and cultural wealth. The individualist and rational-instrumental behaviors that foster capitalist development are imagined, in the newly revitalized Herderian tradition, to be iminical to the leisured communal environment in which authentic art emerges (Bauman and Briggs 2003). Once the rich have all modernity can offer, how-
ever, they begin to hunger for authenticity too (cf. Bendix 1997; Cantwell 1993). This gives them an affective as well as economic interest in the poor and creates one domain in which the playing field is apparently more level, a compensation for the southern countries' manifestly inferior bargaining power in all other respects. With culture, for once, the poor have what the rich need and cannot produce it under conditions of forced labor.  

The projection of culture and community onto poverty has economic consequences that will in turn shape policy. Local culture has become sought-after raw material, extracted by multinational corporations for refinement into cultural commodity. As with the environment, the extent to which local culture is a renewable resource is unclear and much-disputed. The ideological opposition between modernity and authenticity suggests that the best culture is proper to a disappearing premodern world. The criterion of authenticity turns culture into a scarce resource and a rival good, creating competition to define one's own lodes as purer and deeper than those of other communities. Cultural hybrids such as world beat music and tourist art, which are renewable, typically command lower unit prices but are open to mass production and distribution, complicating the economic tradeoffs to be considered in "developing" a tradition.

Local communities recognize culture as their capital and seek to develop it themselves, arguing that they, not the multinationals, ought to reap the profits of their tradition. This position is endorsed in the WIPO draft policy objective (2004 Annex I, 2) of promoting "community development and legitimate trading activities." Local actors will thus compete with global ones to "develop" traditional culture, but also with one another.

Community Imagined and Lived

"Community" is the magic word around which consensus can take shape in international tensions over the uses of tradition. "Community" speaks to the moral concerns of the larger publics to whom policymakers must answer (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1987, 293, 295 n.8), indexing both the metropolitan romance with authenticity and subaltern demands for justice and agency. As advocates of local or subaltern interests present their case to global judges, they tend to idealize community in characteristic ways:

- Contrasting it to the competitive individualism of global capitalism, they typify community as solidary and economically disinterested.
- The representative anecdote of threat to traditional culture depicts a multinational corporation appropriating the creation of an isolated indigenous group. Community/noncommunity thus appears to be a clear binary. Consider, for example, the current WIPO draft's distinction between "exploitation" from without and "use" or "development" from within.
- Communities are spoken of as bounded individuals—a root metaphor that naturalizes the biologically-defined community—such that their traditions...
are distinctive and indeed unique (Handler 1988; Magliocco 2004).
Folklorists are hardly immune to these rhetorical temptations, especially in the heat of activist struggles. But our accumulated disciplinary learning inclines toward a very different set of generalizations:

- Power relations exist within communities as well as between them. Small dense communities, especially poor ones, are usually places of fierce competition for scarce resources, including prestige within the group. Folklore is a key resource for intra-community politics. Folk performance is a means of cultivating prestige and other kinds of social power: performers (and their patrons) vie against rivals for the approbation of an audience.  
- Most cultural borrowing takes place not across great divides but between near neighbors, sometimes arriving by this process to a cross-continental reach (e.g. the Märchen). Such borrowing takes place even between supposedly isolated indigenous communities in regions such as the Amazon or the pre-colonial northwest Coast (Boas 1927; Seeger 1987, 19–20, 133–34). In fact, most folklore is highly mobile (consider "Cinderella," urban legends, and hiphop) and, one might say, designed to be so.  
- By extension, cultural creation does not take place within closed communities or under conditions of consensus, but through competitive social exchange. Indeed, Steven Weber's description of collective creativity in open-source software development (2004) applies perfectly well to ballads, festival, and other "folk" forms, viz: simultaneous reworkings by multiple actors (a.k.a. "parallel distributed processing") in an open social network under conditions of publicity. Community membership and the status of individuals within the network are defined by participation. Competition regulated by community norms stimulates engagement and innovation (cf. Noyes 2006).  
- Communities are not always defined by descent. Residential proximity and trade or political interactions provide other bases for culturally productive affiliation, and still more important for the production of self-conscious identities are voluntary or consent-based communities.  
- Community is not a clearly bounded, objectively identifiable group of individuals. "Community" is a convenient label for the work of collective representation and action that emerges from the heart of a dense, multiplex social network (Noyes 2003a). Networks perform themselves as bounded groups to serve collective goals, including the stabilization of their own fluid life; and this autotelic work is increasingly the work of community in modernity. Indi-
viduals, to be sure, pressure others towards collective action for a wide range of private purposes, and the internal play of power shapes any performance of community. Some social actors have far more investment in community than others; consensus on its importance and its definition tends to increase with an external threat. 19

- Even folklore explicitly framed as a display of differential identity (e.g. costume, festival) is very similar from place to place within a given cultural area. Indeed, the folklore of difference is particularly inclined to formal uniformity (Bauman and Abrahams 1981; Lau 2000). The narcissism of minor differences plays an important role here: that is, boundary-keeping shibboleths are more salient than internal structural distinctiveness. Within European modernity, a code for signifying the local emerges such that all locals look rather alike. 20 The initial purpose of performing locality is to compete for attention from the state, although typically the performances assert simultaneous emotional resistance to dependency. The local may be understood as a modular form comparable to the nation, multiplying more intensely of late as the limitations of the nation have become more acutely felt. To assume that folklore’s primary purpose is the assertion of local or group identity (as folklorists sometimes do without thinking and as is implicit in both UNESCO and WIPO documents) is arguably ethnocentric and presentist.

The Needs of Policy
If the historical moment of neoliberal globalization tends to promote an understanding of community as the nation-state in miniature, the needs of legal regimes will treat it as the individual writ large. 21 Convenient homologies lie to hand, straight from the Romantic version of modernity that shaped them both. Authenticity is to community as authorship is to the individual. 22 And, over time, heritage is to community as inheritance to the individual. The community may therefore, by analogy, be treated legally as the owner of tradition.

Although the WIPO documents recognize that authenticity is a theoretically problematic concept (WIPO 2004, 16), it is nonetheless invoked in the core principles for the protection of folklore (ibid., 16–17), and participating folklorists have not to date made loud noises in protest of this or about the comparable use of “heritage” by UNESCO. This should surprise us, given that both authenticity and heritage have been subjected to nearly forty years of energetic historicizing and critique within our field. 23 It can be surmised that tolerance of these concepts, as of the reification of community, is strategic essentialism on the part of folklorists forced to recognize where their bread is buttered ideologically and hoping that the gains in local agency to be achieved through these concessions will allow the term to be deconstructed later. Arguably,
accommodation to "folk" culture concepts (in this case those of an elite folk) is necessary to succeed as a culture broker.\textsuperscript{24}

To understand these concepts and recognize their appeal is certainly vital; that is not the same as adopting them. I would rather suggest that it is dangerous to resurrect as policy what we have already buried as theory. Once our strategic essentialism has created legal realities we will be stuck with them—and it.

The problem lies in how community may be represented under modern legal and administrative regimes. Legal rights such as ownership can be held only by legal persons, whether "natural" (human beings) or "juristic" (corporations, states, and other constructed entities) (Martin 2002, entries "legal person," "juristic person"). In order to hold rights in tradition, a community will have to be represented as a legal person. As the metaphor implies, this legal person will speak in one voice and act as one entity.

For this purpose, an established representative body (such as a municipality or a tribal council) may be designated, or a new one created. In the case of already bureaucratized indigenous groups in developed countries, the assignation of ownership becomes legally straightforward. Individuals will derive rights from verifiable group membership. Whether an individual is entitled to practice and sell a protected genre of artisanal work, for example, may be determined by her presence in a tribal registry. In some cases this will entail the exclusion of persons of mixed ancestry or external ethnic origin, regardless of their mastery or acceptance by other practitioners of the tradition (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1987, 291). Legal solutions require clarity and simplicity. Genetic ancestry being the most objective determinant of group membership, it is likely to be favored, and racist conceptions of culture are bound to be reinforced.

To be sure, representation could also take shape through self-governed bodies such as artists' cooperatives, although this kind of solution has been little-mentioned in the WIPO documents. Insofar as tradition is understood as the property of "communities" rather than practitioners—and certainly patrons and users are as vital to the meaning of a tradition as the makers—this sort of solution is precluded. In any case, the most probable lobbyists for protection of a tradition, in the case of UNESCO the default lobbyists, are nation-states, generally in cooperation with lower-level political units: it is therefore they who will control the protected resource.\textsuperscript{25}

Once ownership of the tradition is established, responsibility for its management devolves upon the owner. In a further abstraction of "community," the representative body will typically delegate administration of the tradition to a designated bureaucracy, a.k.a. an "instrumental legal personification" such as a foundation or commission (Martínez-Alonso Camps and Ysa Figueras 2001). Both WIPO and UNESCO's Intangible Heritage process anticipate this move.\textsuperscript{26} Thus the tradition that circulates within a fuzzy-edged network of variably positioned persons may in practice end up under the control of a twice-removed and very small subgroup, whose representative status is unclear.
Local Cultural Bureaucracy in Practice

The quickest mother will get the baby. Once procedures are set in place for according ownership of tradition and designating representative bodies, those actors out to capitalize on local tradition will be ready to make their claims, as they already are with UNESCO and lower-level bodies according heritage designations. These are, of course, the actors most savvy in global matters and therefore, according to the ideology that justifies protection in the first place, the least "authentic."

For global judges have little knowledge of local realities, and will not themselves be initiating protective measures. There is no globally maintained and updated survey of world folklore that would allow international organizations to target those local traditions most at risk. Nor can they go out and seek culture-appropriate solutions on a case by case basis. The economic and human resources for ongoing global-local collaborations do not exist. Rather, as currently with UNESCO heritage designations, local actors will petition for recognition and put forward a plan for protection. Supervision from above, whether from global bodies such as UNESCO or the national governments WIPO expects to implement its provisions, will not be close, informed, or ongoing. Those actors who purport to represent the community are likely to be accepted as doing so, and their actions are unlikely to be scrutinized thereafter.

Thus the best-placed local actors will claim the tradition. They will furnish and run the administrative body with a relatively free hand. The predictable results, in the aggregate, will be the further commercialization, corruption, and control of local traditions. All these will stem from the bureaucratic predilection towards intervention.

- Intervention. UNESCO will give the valley to the irrigators. That is, a tradition is not "protected" if its practitioners simply continue to do what they do. Rather, a plan for "managing" the tradition is a requirement for winning an Intangible Heritage designation. Moreover, even when UNESCO's eyes have turned elsewhere, the administrative body must justify its ongoing existence to the local public. This it does by the construction of threats, needs, and lacks requiring its intervention, and more generally by the show of activity (Edelman 1977). Once created, bureaucracies notoriously expand (Beetham 1987, 58).

- Commercialization. A bureaucracy seeks rents with which to maintain itself. With the dominant neoliberal preference for markets in lieu of public funding, commercializing the tradition offers a surer and larger return than a state subsidy. The more the bureaucracy expands (as per above), the more funding it requires. While commercialization is likely to increase overall, then, the portion going to artists and performers will be reduced by bureaucratic skimming of the cream.
• Corruption. The "instrumental personification," existing in theory only to implement the community's will, is in practice constituted of natural persons who are (and, naturally, should be) stakeholders and participants in the tradition. The stronger the institutional authority conferred on them, the more opportunities to advance their individual interests.\(^{27}\)

• Control. The actors granted bureaucratic authority are likely already to possess some other kind. Depending on the situation, they will be some combination of senior men with traditional authority, elites with political authority, or entrepreneurs with economic power and the prestige of modernity—which in the present climate is charismatic authority of a kind. The resulting concentration of power is likely to foster the reshaping of tradition in furtherance of ideological goals.\(^{28}\)

Is this summary unduly alarmist? The past few years have made me take alarm, so I offer an example, one that is of no particular transcendence and does not present the most difficult scenario, but is close to my heart and important to those involved.\(^{29}\) I present it with pain and hesitation: I am criticizing the actions of people who have been kind to me, and in writing this I will make local enemies. But local divisions will be a consequence of this (literal) valorization of community when local tradition, the medium of accommodation, is translated into economic resource, a basis of competition. Because this change is in process, I speculate about the future based on my knowledge of the past. I write with scanty details, as the facts are not easy to establish, and my purpose is to suggest the kind of thing that happens rather than to assess Berga per se.

A Case: The Patum of Berga

Some communities are better organized than others for claiming national or global notice, and may try to take advantage of this primacy to repress rival claimants to a valued tradition. In Berga many locals have long insisted that the fire festivals in other Catalan towns are "copies" of their festival, the Patum. This discourse of authenticity and plagiarism acquires new potential now that the city has successfully pushed to put the Patum forward as Spain's next candidate for a UNESCO Intangible Masterpiece designation and to trademark, at the city's expense, "the most distinctive elements" of the festival—a process now moving through the courts. The movers behind these developments will certainly be watching any WIPO initiatives closely. Though it is now certainly too late to suppress a rival of more than twenty years' standing, some people would have been thrilled to have had the legal grounds for attacking the fire festival of a larger neighboring city, Manresa. (Some would also still like to suppress certain "copies" of the Patum within Berga, small-scale neighborhood versions that have become very important to the social integration of new immigrants and other marginal actors.)
Young Manresans did indeed attend the Patum in large numbers in the 1960s and 70s when it was one of the few large street festivals tolerated by the Franco regime and had become a focus of political resistance. The restoration of municipal democracy in 1979 led to an explosion of new and "recuperated" festivals in the early 1980s, created by young activists who could now turn from the serious to the ludic and from resistance to the reconstruction of community. The Patum was a salient model for them in both its formal features and its social effects. As happened in many other cities, the creators of Manresa's Correfoc copied the Patum, but they also did extensive historical research on the lost festivals of Manresa. Above all, they invented new performances, based on the old common vocabulary of devils and dragons and fireworks but wittily incorporating both new technical possibilities and more recent local symbols. The current Correfoc is visibly related to the Patum and visibly not the Patum. Moreover, for centuries the lines of influence ran in the other direction, from the center to the periphery. Manresa had an elaborate Corpus Christi festival in the seventeenth century, and in that period there is every reason to suppose that Berga imitated Manresa's festival, as it demonstrably did those of Barcelona and other important cities. That is how traditional cultural creativity works. Communities do not create their culture sui generis from their unique soil: they select and combine forms in general circulation according to their possibilities and with a competitive eye on the creations of their neighbors.

Economic and political rivalry between local communities has been an important spur to collective creativity. In addition, social tensions within Berga have shaped the Patum (Noyes 2003b). The festival centers on a series of danced combats in which, despite nominal victors and vanquished, everyone lives to fight again. Its Turks and Christians, angels and devils, dwarves and giants, hieratic eagle and violent mule-dragon sum up four centuries of social conflict in Berga and continue to index in the present the principal coordinates of social difference: male and female, old and young, boss and worker, native and immigrant, submissive and rebellious. The festival's unity is one of dynamic tension and precarious accommodation. Historically, certain elements were imposed from above; others were forced in from below and won sufficient popular acceptance that they had to be tolerated by the authorities. Everyone has a point of entry into the festival, and everyday irritations are both expressed and surmounted within it. As the dances are endlessly repeated in the course of five days in which no one sleeps or stops dancing, fired by drink and drumbeats and the thick falling sparks of slow-burning firecrackers, pain becomes pleasure and divisions dissolve. Because of the festival's capacity for both representation and transcendence, every faction in the town is engaged in it; everyone's energies have been given to it. A Catalan proverb declares "we won't die united, but we'll die assembled," and the passionately participatory Patum is the festival expression of this principle. The Patum is, in short, the collective perfor-
formance by which Berga struggles to achieve community; and community is all the more valued for being hard-won.

As in most small towns with a history of scarce resources, tension and mistrust within Berga are considerable. The multivocality and indirection of folk performance foster a delicate equilibrium, temporary but memorable enough to keep things going until the following year. The difficulty of this achievement increases and the sources of competition intensify when outsiders begin to pay attention to this local folklore. Now folklore presents political and economic opportunities. It creates opportunities for the community as a whole to improve its fortunes, but simultaneously offers opportunities for individual advancement. The intellectual who can interpret local culture to the metropolis in ideologically attractive terms, the artist who is singled out as a master, the patron who can claim to have preserved an age-old tradition for posterity, can all be taken up and celebrated by enthusiastic metropolitans with little local knowledge, and their self-representations are unlikely ever to be questioned.

In Berga in the early 1990s, a certain group of festival participants well-connected in City Hall created a foundation, a Patronat for the protection of the Patum: a festival with thousands of passionate adherents that is in no conceivable danger of dying or of losing its formal integrity. The governing junta of the Patronat and its "technical" personnel are not directly elected either by the citizens of Berga or by the performers in the Patum. Some are ex officio city council members and others are nominated. Some heads of the comparses—the individual performing groups within the festival, in which participation has long been internally regulated by custom—have been nominated; others, with different views about the festival, have not been. The structure of rotation in office is not explicit. No outsider, however, has any reason to doubt that the Patronat represents the community: UNESCO is dealing with them, as are the Catalan Department of Culture and the Spanish Office of Patents and Trademarks.

The Patronat has been working intensely to promote the Patum as a tourist event, an agenda that has long been controversial in Berga. From the 1960s through the end of the 1980s public opinion ran strongly against it. Today the community is deeply divided, particularly among comparsa members. Thanks to intensive lobbying, the Patum is Spain's current candidate for the UNESCO designation of Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Patrimony of Humanity. In general, the population of Berga and the surrounding region are enthusiastic about this possibility. In some cases, their motives are economic. The Patum is a major expense in the municipal budget, and both the city administration and many comparsa members expect better access to Catalan government subventions (which have indeed been forthcoming as far as the campaign itself is concerned) and even direct subventions from UNESCO. Intertwined with the economic motive is one of local pride. There is a widespread sense that the festival deserves this prestigious international recognition; there is excitement at the possibility that local
perceptions and priorities might, just once, find not just national but international validation.

An important minority of the community, however, is not enthusiastic. They are some of the central Patum performers and some of the people most active in the transition to democracy in Catalonia. In the 1980s they were out to revive local culture after the dictatorship and to recover a sense of local control and autonomy. In that context, they participated in an earlier campaign to protect the Patum from external commercial influences. Now many of them feel the battle is lost, and that globalization will defeat them as Franco did not: the Patronat is rushing to turn them into what they swore they would never be, "an Indian reservation." (Noyes 2003b, 194, 276)

Their pessimism may not be justified, but the important point is that they are withdrawing their labor: they've stopped arguing and have on the whole retreated from participation in Berguedan public life. In a small, economically fragile community where the effort of all is needed to maintain local cultural and social vitality, some of the most talented actors have surrendered control to the bureaucrats. Moreover, these bureaucrats are, frankly, provincial, and their expensively produced cultural enhancements do not meet metropolitan standards of design, scholarship, museology, and so on. So the Patum may suffer locally without profiting globally.

The Patronat, on its side, has begun to use its arrogated powers for commercialization, corruption, and control. This is of course too violent a phrasing. Nevertheless, the trademark registrations have to be paid for and the salary of the "technician," a historian whose job description is rumored to include "determining the true origins of the Patum," has to be paid. In addition to seeking subventions from the regional government, the Patronat has begun licensing commercial products such as t-shirts and champagne with its seal of approval. As the trademarks come into effect, they plan to take action against unauthorized commercial users of Patum imagery.

The Patronat maintains physical control of the elements of the Patum. While one local ensemble's recording of the festival music is advertised on the municipal government's Patum website, another group of musicians—who have played for the Patum for thirty years, whose former conductor was a major figure in the musical history of the festival, and who, moreover, have good connections in Barcelona and the possibility of reaching a wide audience—were recently denied the use of the Patum's great bass drum for a recording. Permission to take out certain effigies and costumes for use in photographs is similarly rumored to have been denied to more than one rival of the photographer allied to the Patronat. To be sure, the Patronat's photographer owns the best-equipped and longest-standing studio in town, which by virtue of its archive alone takes the inevitable lead in Patum documentation. But as Lessig observes in another context, the status quo is being reinforced by giving the existing commercial leaders the authority to decide the terms on which their competition will be admitted (2001, 212–13). The exclusion of the
established musicians is more egregious. In this case a longstanding rivalry of the kind that has always energized the festival has had its stakes raised. As the Patronat supports one side and the other develops alliances in Barcelona's folk music community, the rivalry becomes more institutionalized, less interactive, more a question of separate spheres, and this also will tend to diminish the face-to-face creative tension that has kept the festival vital for four centuries. In general, there is at least a strong appearance of contradiction between the Patronat's actions and its explicit agenda of promoting the festival through quality local cultural products.

Social control is a further question. The Patum has served as a vehicle of intense political and class contestation from its emergence in the seventeenth century. It has also served, since the first period of large-scale immigration in the 1950s, as a means of incorporating new Berguedans into full community membership. The members of the Patronat stem from the "respectable" wing of Patum opinion, and in many incidents over the years this wing has attempted to control participation with a view to controlling the Patum's potential for shaping social change. There are indications that this control, while far more discreet than the commercialization, is part of the Patronat's agenda. For example, recently a system of "points" was created for designating the festival administrators, an honorific office accorded every year to four newly married couples. Among other things, points are given for having been born in Berga and having been married in church. In a city with a large immigrant population and in which the working class is historically anti-derical, these are highly divisive criteria. People murmur—there is as yet no evidence to substantiate the murmurings—about intentions to interfere with the comparses' control of their membership; they speculate about the development of a lottery system comparable to the one instituted in the 1990s to allot places in the Children's Patum, a far more domesticated event that, for many, foreshadows the shape of things to come. Furthermore, the Patronat's explicit interpretations of the festival and insistence on its character as a survival from time immemorial deny its contestatory elements, a strategy that was necessary during the Franco regime but resonates differently today. Although they overstate the case, many locals believe that the Patronat intends to take a living festival and freeze it into heritage. Such fears become self-fulfilling prophecies, fostering the disengagement of those actors who feel excluded. In fact, my observations of the most recent years suggest that the festival is becoming at once more liturgical in execution and more "lite" in feeling.

Many aspects of this situation are not new, merely enhanced by the higher stakes of UNESCO and trademark law. In Europe the provincial intellectual who articulates local tradition for and with the state has been an important figure since at least the early seventeenth century, and tradition marked and marketed as local has long been an important economic resource for even the humblest social actors (Jeggle and Korff 1986). But under globalization the phenomenon
has burgeoned; cosmopolitan artists and intellectuals who can claim to represent an exotic local culture may do extremely well for themselves (Franco 1988; Gabilondo 1999).

The rivalries between local communities for metropolitan attention are of equally long standing, and in Iberia the center has conferred commemorations on the periphery for its preservation of traditions since the late nineteenth century. Under the Franco regime, declarations of “Fiesta de Interés Turístico” multiplied as the tourist economy boomed; after 1979 the Catalan government assumed control of this designation within the region, now purified or perhaps euphemized as “Festa d’Interès Nacional.” One ethnologist who has served on the Generalitat’s committee noted the problem of the designation’s politically-driven proliferation and consequent devaluation; the UNESCO Intangible Heritage process, she observed, will reproduce the problem on a global scale (Josefina Roma, personal communication, June 2004; cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). The Patronat’s historian has ignored compelling arguments for the nineteenth century fabrication of a supposed medieval document, speaking without qualification of the Patum in the fourteenth century, and also argues strongly for the persistence of pre-Christian elements in the festival, on what is necessarily shaky evidence. This insistence on continuity since time immemorial is part of the need to construct the Patum as unique among Catalan festivals, and as such it is a legitimation device common to localities throughout Europe and dating from ... time immemorial.

For the conservative discourse of authenticity, used in this case by both the Patronat and its critics (myself included), is not exclusive to the modern nation-state and elite actors. On the contrary, the provincial intellectuals who made the nation-state are those most deeply invested in it as a discourse of value. Everyone who controls part of a valued tradition resists changes in it as potential threats to his or her own position; everyone sees the present realization as a falling-off corrupted by the times; and the actors who denounce change most vociferously are of course the same ones involved in the promotion and instrumentalization of the tradition. The authenticity discourse has long been so prominent an elite framework for the Patum as to be widely parodied: “Accept no vulgar substitutes,” the carriers of the Patum mule told my American husband as they poured barreja, a potent mix of anise and muscatel, down his throat from their leather flask. To be sure, from the 1960s through the 1980s the point was to resist commercialization; now it is to protect the brand. To counter the powerful anti-consumerist and isolationist position still held reflexively by many Berguedans, the Patronat’s historian has recently reminded the public of the festival’s long-standing attempt to attract outsiders, without commenting on the most recent and vigorous phase of this promotion during the dictatorship (Rumbo 2004). Suddenly, and for the first time in the festival’s history, tourism is authentic.

Finally, accusations of secrecy and mishandled funds are a routine part of life in Berga; there is a longstanding cul-
ture of mistrust. If the Patronat were not accused, others would be: indeed the comparsa of the devils has long been popularly understood to sell off performing rights, although I know of no verifiable instance. "L'enveja...," they lament: envy rules. But it exacerbates rumor and suspicion to have extralocal authorities involved. Not without foundation, Berguedans take for granted a high level of corruption in both the Catalan and the Spanish governments, and the UN is of course not immune to such perceptions. After centuries of abuses and exploitation, the culture of democratic trust is precarious—Spain being anything but unique in this regard. For debate and decisions to carry any legitimacy in such settings, they must be public. With the creation of the Patronat, matters that would once have been addressed in municipal plenaries have gone behind closed doors and, more importantly, matters that would have been resolved in everyday practice and been communicated through the ordinary gossip network have also gone behind closed doors. Gossip becomes more aggressive, beating at the doors, when its access to information is reduced.

AFTERTHATH

Extrapolating from the situation in Berga, I predict that when the government of tradition is wrested from informal negotiation between competitive actors to formal administrative bodies, certain consequences may be anticipated: 38

- The displacement of conflict from the tradition itself to its conditions of practice. That is, rather than working out difference within the codes of the tradition, through the manipulation of symbols, performance style, and so on, the performances themselves will become increasingly fixed and conflict will take place over personnel, scheduling, audiences, etc., or more generally over equity and ideology in administration. In consequence, the density of meaning within the tradition and its level of integration with ordinary life will fall off. 39 (A telling cartoon in 2004 depicted the Patum effigies up in the mayor’s balcony as spectators to the crowd event below.)
- The withdrawal of some actors, either from alienation or in order to prevent conflict within a valued tradition ("give her the living child and in no wise kill it"). Contrarian characters, who for some reason find themselves at odds with their surround, often find a social place within the practice of tradition that they cannot find within institutions, and give traditions much of their vitality and critical edge, as well as gaining a socially constructive outlet for their energies. They are the first likely to withdraw. Apart from the more general negative social effects of such withdrawal, a lessening of engagement and of innovation within the tradition may be expected.
- Fragmentation. Some will retreat to set up competing practices in a differently defined framework. The multiple rival versions of the
tradition, refusing the ambiguities that foster coexistence, will become increasingly explicit and monologic. The tradition as a whole may lose richness, flexibility, and integrative capacity.

- Potentially an increase in social conflict. Not only contrarian characters but also socially dangerous groups are key figures in public traditions. European peasant communities made young men the guardians of tradition, a way of channelling their volatile energies to useful ends. Young men performed the charivaris and the mummers’ plays. Still economically and to some extent sexually excluded today, young men are, as ever, the most probable recruits for extremist groups. In twentieth-century Berga the most enfranchised members of the working class supplied certain comparses in the Patum, giving them protagonism and a stake in collective life. More recently, in the neighborhood Patum del Carrer de la Pietat, frowned upon by many defenders of authenticity, young immigrant men of the kind feared by teachers have been taking a lead in the comparses and can be seen caring for the effigies and teaching young children how to participate. The bureaucratization of participation may bar those who benefit most from it and increase an existing sense of exclusion.

In Albert Hirschman’s terms, we may expect an overall move from the political strategy of “voice” to the economic strategy of “exit” (1970). That is, those excluded from the decision-making process will not argue but detach themselves from the tradition. Both cultural coherence and social cohesion will be damaged by such a process. I repeat: The Berguedan situation is not earthshattering, saddening as those involved find it; these are prosperous Europeans with other resources beyond folklore. But it suggests what can happen in more contentious and vulnerable communities.

**Conclusion**

If we are not careful in defining what we mean by community control, instead of King Solomon we will end up with Brecht’s Azdak. Raised up over his fellows by an inattentive central authority, this local judge is by turns corrupt, compassionate, arbitrary, and inspired. Azdak will be a change and perhaps an improvement on Solomon; if nothing else, the process will bring grist to the ethnographer’s mill.

But I would urge us—and WIPO—not to be too hasty. To assume that glaring inequalities and compensatory identity politics will be with us forever is one way of perpetuating them (cf. Magliocco 2004, 235). Before we create instruments that, once adopted, cannot easily be changed, we should carefully consider alternative frameworks to that of heritage/ authenticity/community. Zeitgeists come and go, but bureaucracy is forever. "Let them eat culture" should not be engraved on its portals.
More generally, I propose a maxim for our field as we negotiate the temptations inherent in winning a place at the table and having at last some power of advocacy. Good policy cannot be made from bad theory. The rapidly increasing stranglehold of intellectual property law, which benefits corporate owners in the short term but stifles innovation in the long term by creating huge disparities of access, shows us one example of the destructiveness of inflexible regimes. Formalized from a conception of authorship peculiar to Western modernity, existing intellectual property law cannot capture the cumulative and collaborative character of creativity even in literary texts, much less technological processes or jazz music. But we will not correct the conceptual flaws of author-based IP law by adding to it a conceptually flawed special regime for communities (cf. Bauman and Briggs 2003, 307–308). Rather than adding Ptolemaic circles to an obsolete cosmology and so increasing its inertia, those of us interested in traditional creativity should be involved in the experimentation with new formulations and the global rethinking of intellectual property regimes. A burgeoning movement among alternative globalizers proposes a revival of the commons as an alternative. Other critics advocate a period of experimentation and the pluralization of governance regimes according to the nature of the resource (e.g. Lessig 2001, Brown 2003). Regardless, it is high time for the so-called residual to join hands with the so-called emergent in the revision of the modern.

It should be understood that I am not in the least dismissing the goals of building solidarity, respect, and recognition between North and South, or the very real contribution that cultural exchange can make towards this end. But I believe that successful imagined communities, local or international, must be built upon stable social foundations. Recognition is no substitute for equality; heritage is no substitute for autonomy. To institutionalize traditional cultural production as distinct from other kinds, necessitating a regime of its own, is to create separate and anything but equal access to the knowledge economy.

This is not to lead us back to neoliberalism. Like all binary oppositions, that of liberalism and communitarianism blinds us to alternative constructions of the problem. Both ideologies rely on a dubious modern epistemology that "entitizes" its objects, attributing the integrity, fixity, and boundedness that commonsense perception confers upon material things to the sociocultural constructs of the individual, the community, and the nation-state (Handler 1988). The newly fashionable network model, although no doubt it will prove to have problems of its own, gives us an alternative framework for experimentation and a starting point for more flexible thinking. Nor does deconstructing community force us into poststructuralist indeterminacy: there is a longstanding tradition of empirical network analysis that holds up to scrutiny rather better than most assertions of bounded community (e.g. Lipp 2005).

This is a moment of great importance to the field, both for our deepest commitments and for our advancement as a
profession. All the more reason for caution. Folklorists once put a human face on nationalism; we're in danger now of providing the same service for globalization. We need to stand back a little from identity politics and put first things first. For ourselves, that means the primary research which is the foundation of our credibility as advocates. For the makers of traditional culture, that is the material and existential security in which humane cultures take shape. Where there is economic and political agency, culture can take care of itself.

A Double Coda

June 2005. This article was drafted prior to the 2005 Patum, eagerely promoted as "Candidate for Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Patrimony of Humanity." After this Patum, local realities have for the time being displaced UNESCO dreams in public attention.

Berguedan anarchist and alternative collectives, populated by young people of Catalan-independentist tendency, sponsor an increasing number of activities on the fringe of the Patum—an instance of the tendency toward a more fragmented social creativity. On Friday May 27th, the middle night of the Patum, a concert sponsored by these organizations was violently interrupted by a group of young men of diverse immigrant origins and generations. All of the 18 later arrested are resident in Berga, and all, according to vociferous local opinion, are habitual disruptors of public life, in several cases with long criminal records. Two concert attendees received knife wounds, and one, a dancer in the comparsa of the New Dwarves of the Patum, was killed after multiple stabblings. This unheard-of public violence, cutting into the heart of the community, received Spain-wide media coverage and has traumatized the city. After two weeks, multitudinous protests gave way to painful and, in a small city, unavoidable daily face-to-face confrontations between police (accused of slow response), long-assimilated immigrants and ethnic Catalans (whose generational disagreements have for the moment been elided), and the accused and their families, with other immigrants caught in a tense interstitial position.

The crisis has brought into relief the gradual collective retreat from street life and the consequent erosion of everyday social control, along with the emergence of distinct youth subcultures at odds with the police as well as one another. Calls for convivència and dialogue are meeting with powerful emotional resistance on all sides. In short, underneath the dramatic disruption of Berguedan imagined community in the Patum lies the slow dissolution of community's base as a dense network of interaction. It is too early to tell whether this tragedy will influence public opinion to revive the understanding, so generalized in Berga in the 1970s, that the Patum is more valuable to the community as a vehicle of local social accommodation than as an item in the global cultural display case.

March 2006. The question is now moot. In the months after the killing of Josep Maria Isanta, the Platform for Convivència in the Berguedà, a coalition of civic organizations, energetically organized demonstrations, raised money, assembled a website, and made declara-
tions. In the course of the autumn the coalition fell apart, with factions accusing one another of politicizing the discussion, while street life in Berga remained tense. In the meantime, on November 25, 2005, the Patum was named Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Patrimony of Humanity by the Director-General of UNESCO in a ceremony in Paris. "Where do we pick up the check?" quipped one of my Berguedan friends. The Catalan media coverage emphasized the regional triumph: "The Patum defeated flamenco" (Uría 2005). (To be sure, the Patum now appears throughout UNESCO’s website and publicity materials as "the Patum of Berga, Spain": one has to delve deep into the site to find the adjective "Catalan.") UNESCO’s blurb explained the threats justifying the festival’s protection:

The continuity of the celebration seems to be ensured. The Patum of Berga is however threatened by transformation, distortion and loss of value in a general context marked by strong urban and tourist development that tend to reduce the Patum to a mass phenomenon. These factors risk denaturing the Patum ritual by encouraging its organization in areas and at dates that are not authentic. Moreover, the hundred year-old Patum figures that require care and restoration by artisans who possess specific secular knowledge and know-how, risk being replaced by modern replicas devoid of all artistic and historical value. (The Patum of Berga 2005)

Protection on the ground looks rather different. Safeguarding the authenticity of the Patum figures: this matter has created a series of minor crises in the years since the Patum declared itself a candidate, for the local people who have always done repainting and minor repairs lack academic credentials in restoration and are no longer allowed to do the work. Preventing Patums out of season: on the day after the UNESCO proclamation, the Patronat held a meeting to discuss holding an extraordinary Patum for Berga’s December patronal festival in order to commemorate the designation; this proposal was defeated by one vote following tense and prolonged debate. The dangers of increasing touristic development: the news stories announcing the award explained that the designation would help to realize the city’s plan to create a 4,500-square-meter "Guggenheim-style museum" (Rosí 2006). The director of Catalonia’s UNESCO office, Agustí Colomines, was at least somewhat conscious of the ironies. "You can be sure that from this day on you’ll have an avalanche of tourism: be careful it doesn’t spoil the festival," he warned Berguedans (ibid.).

Or maybe not. The Patum was one of 43 winners out of 64 candidacies in 2005, almost equalling the 47 total designations awarded in 2001–2003, a rush to divide the spoils of a vanishing system of distinction. The 2005 proclamation will be the last. On January 20, 2006, Romania became the thirtieth nation-state to ratify UNESCO’s Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, thus bringing it into force (Convention 2006). The list of Masterpieces will now be replaced with a Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, the criteria for which
will be determined by an intergovernmental committee constituted by representatives of the signer nations, of which Spain is not as yet one. It is expected that only those Masterpieces from the signer nations will be transferred to the new list (Valdimar Hafstein, personal communication, 26 January 2006)

For the city's patron saint's day festival in December, there was no extraordinary Patum, but a Mass by a local composer adapting music from the Patum was premiered and the Dance of the Eagle was played in the main square with a small fireworks display—familiar instances of a civic liturgy of the Patum which began with the festival's first self-conscious projection to outsiders in the 1890s (Noguera 1992). The latest hubbub, in March 2006, has come with the disappearance in the Spanish ambassador's diplomatic pouch of the UNESCO certificate of the Masterpiece designation. UNESCO has promised to send within two or three months a replacement which will be "just as authentic" as the original; this will be displayed in the "remodeled municipal museum," no longer spoken of as a Guggenheim in the making (Perden el diploma 2006). As with many of Berga's serial investments in the deus ex machina of the moment over the years, the UNESCO adventure seems for the moment to have fizzled—though the Patronat, of course, remains. This is the way folklore ends: not in catastrophic loss but in slow self-estrangement; not with a bang but a whimper.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2004 American Folklore Society Annual Meeting in Salt Lake City and as the Laura Bolton Distinguished Lecture in Ethnomusicology at Indiana University in April 2005. Thanks to the audiences at those presentations and to Roger D. Abrahams, Lluís Calvo i Calvo, Valdimar Tr. Hafstein, Jason Baird Jackson, Elliott Oring, Tok Thompson, Srdjan Vucetic, and Bill Westerman for their insights, too rich to be fully incorporated here. Thanks above all to the people of Berga for their longstanding and generous tolerance of my presence in their collective life. Research was supported by the Mershon Center and the College of Humanities of the Ohio State University.

1 It is worth noting that in this play the traditionalists are persuaded to surrender their land by means of a staged performance of a traditional narrative sponsored by the modernizers. "Heritage" at work.

2 Compare Shuman 1993 on the essentializing of the local. My specific concerns as to "who will judge" and the dangers of assuming that the only tensions are local-global were anticipated by Jabbour (1983, 13–14).

3 For broader imbrications of traditional culture in policy spheres, see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004 on trade policy and Rikoon 2004 on human rights.

4 For the distinction between "safeguarding/preservation" and "protection," see WIPO 2004, 12

5 Each of these terms is notoriously problematic, the last one so much so that I am unwilling to use it. UNESCO and WIPO both recognize the difficulties of terminology; for convenience they have resorted, respectively, to "intangible cultural heritage" and "TCEs/ EoF," that is "Traditional Cultural Expres-
sions/ Expressions of Folklore." For my own convenience I will refer to "tradition" or "folklore" without bothering to clarify the definition: it is precisely its lack of clarity that sends policymakers back to default assumptions (see, however, Noyes 2004, and for the UNESCO-WIPO definition see UNESCO and WIPO 1985). As with the U.S. government's definition of pornography, it's enough for the present purpose that we all know folklore when we see it.

6 In WIPO's case the citations justifying this inclusion come from the American Folklore Society and other such sources. Since the 1960s, American folkloristics has sought to undo the traditional/modern divide through the famous definition of a folk group as "any group of people whatsoever who share a common factor" (Dundes 1965, 2). But this runs directly counter to the efforts of indigenous groups to transvalue their ascribed exceptionalism and make it the basis of rights claims. Indeed, the broadest definition of "folk" sits uneasily with identity politics, for when all are communities and all have tradition, then claims of uniqueness calling for special protections become at best devalued, at worst inadjudicable. We need to begin to discuss seriously whether or not some communities are more equal than others.

7 Culturalism, that is, the use of culture as an explanation for and legitimation of political and economic difference, has been much discussed of late, particularly in relation to Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis. A good sampling of culturalism in U.S. policy circles may be found in Harrison and Huntington 2000. For large-scale accounts and critiques of the culturalist turn from a variety of perspectives, see Handler 1988; Kuper 1999; Al-Azmeh 1996; Benhabib 2002; Yúdice 2003. For culturalism as it affects folklorists most directly, Kaschuba 1999.

8 To be sure, such violations are envisioned as coming from outside state boundaries. The relationship of the state to its communities is less often problematized, cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; indeed the African countries in the most recent IGC meeting insisted strongly on the role and rights of the state in administering local tradition (Hafstein 2004b, 10). In WIPO and UNESCO documents as a whole, states are generally understood to be aligned in interest with communities rather than in potential opposition to them.

9 My colleague David Huron suggests that this is a mistaken assumption: the music industry in the US is as big as the pharmaceutical industry and entertainment is of course a leading US export.

10 The presuppositions inherent in the IGC's grouping of genetics and tradition speak for themselves. The distinction drawn between folklore and traditional knowledge (which, needless to say, is theoretically unacceptable to folklorists, as well as to certain state delegations) is between aesthetic and practical activity. Religion is included with the former.

11 Playing off Sigmund Freud's reading of the Solomon story (cf. Freud 1966–1974, v.18, 121), Elliott Oring suggests that a deep envy drives the growing western willingness to incorporate traditional culture into IP regimes. Our baby is already dead; why should not the south also have theirs sliced up into partible commodities?

12 Note that I am referring to culture not in the Arnoldian but in the anthropological sense, which dominates the culturalist discourse.

13 To be sure, the scales can tip back again and modernity itself be recuperated as culture: in what seems an inevitable pattern of ecological succession, heritage is replacing industry in a variety of Western regions.

14 But this poses a real problem of sustainability. Although the North continues to imagine Southern poverty as underem-

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ployment that leaves plenty of time for dancing under the palm trees, the reality is increasingly of long hours in brickworks, maquiladoras, and sweatshops, which leave minimal space for sustaining personal existence, much less complex cultural creation.

15 The current WIPO draft foresees difficulty with rival claimant communities but not rivalries or competition within communities (2004, Annex II, 18).

16 The performance approach strongly emphasizes the achievement of honor and reputation through oral performance, e.g., Bauman 1986. To be sure, much folkloristic research has argued that such competitive performance is typical of high-ranking men, and that strong patterns of reciprocity and cooperation may be found in the traditions of women, working classes, and other subalterns. But one generalization is at least as defensible as the other, and the traditions likely to be visible and of interest to an external audience are often the most performative and competitive: the most politicized.


18 "Multiplex" refers in network theory to multi-stranded social relationships, for example a friendship that develops between coworkers who also share the same religion.

19 This is the understanding that underlies my use of the word "community" in the rest of this article, where for want of a better term I will follow everyday usage in applying the word to dense multiplex networks, usually place-based, in contexts where they are acting as or recognized as communities. Although this fuzziness is analytically regrettable, network and group image cannot conveniently be separated. Communities are not sustained in imagination without lived interaction to give them emotional and cognitive support, nor do networks stabilize and reproduce themselves without common imagery to focus them. As with "folklore," the concept of "community" derives its social power from being both ambiguous and unavoidable.


21 There is of course no contradiction, only a differentiation of levels. Beneath both the nation-state and the individual-proprietary regime of modernity lies the ideology of individualism described in Dumont 1986.

22 Cf. Feld 1994, 273, on the covert linkages of copyright regimes and authenticity discourses: economic and curatorial control are aligned in world music.


24 Bendix, however, protests the tendency (1999, 215).

25 In some cases in opposition to traditional artists within their own nation. Ghana recently updated its copyright law to nationalize all folkloric expression, claiming to follow WIPO’s recommendation in so doing. One clause imposes "a fine, jail or both on any Ghanaians who commercially use, sell, or distribute Ghanaian folklore or translations without Government’s permit" (Expert Criticises Copyright Bill 2005). This regulatory process is, to put it mildly, unlikely to encourage local entrepreneurship or further national economic growth.


27 While WIPO will not be dispensing money and UNESCO does so in a limited way, both will be providing means for the reconstruction of local traditions as resources for development. The extensive literature on corruption and development might therefore suggest ways in which not to repeat the mis-
takes of the past. In addition, much may be learned from the first large-scale bureaucratization of local tradition for commercial purposes, the ever-expanding system of controlled-appellation designations in European wine and food.

28 Jabbour 1983 and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004 note this problem particularly in the relationship of indigenous groups to national governments: there is a strong potential for "power grabs" (Jabbour 1983, 14).

29 For a similar case of longer standing, see Scher 2002. This article came to my notice after I had drafted this one; it anticipates me in raising the problem of local representation and appropriation from within. See also Silverman 2005, 7–8; Brown 2003, 18–21.

30 Literally and more wittily, "no morirem units però morirem reunits."

31 For example, over ninety percent of bar owners are in favor (Espelt 2004, 25).

32 In contrast, the tour guide at a UNESCO World Heritage site in southern Catalonia shook her head over the effects of the designation and told me, "Molta norma i poca pela." (Lots of rules and little money).

33 A first action has already been taken against a winner of the poster prize who then put the design on a t-shirt. In this case the norms of the contest explicitly stated that the designs would remain property of the municipality, but several Berguedans nonetheless took delight in wearing the "contraband" t-shirt during the 2004 Patum, in protest of the trademarking ventures.

34 They also break with recent tradition. Since the mass immigration from Southern Spain in the 1950s and 60s, the Patum has served as a crucial vehicle of integration and been celebrated as such by local authorities (Armengou i Feliu 1994, 124).

35 The word in Catalan is "light," usually written in italics and derived from the product marketed in Spain as "Coca-Cola Light."

In the 1980s the term was more often "descafeínat" (decaffeinated), similarly derived from American commercial influences.

36 A comparable devaluation of the controlled-appellation designation for European wines has resulted from its overextension (Robinson 1994, entries "Appellation Contrôlée" and "Denominazione d'Origine Controllata")—although it can be argued that in the long run the system has raised quality overall.

37 Cf. Noguera i Canal 1992 on the "potentiation" of the Patum in the late nineteenth century. I came too late upon Herzfeld’s intricate discussion of the close link between culturalism and bureaucratization to incorporate his argument into my own, but particularly germane here is his assertion that the reification of tradition as culture entails its loss as social practice; to wrest it back requires a powerful struggle against the inertia of institutional categories (1992, 182–183).

38 I do not address here the more general effects of freezing the tradition process as heritage, a theme sufficiently covered in the literature. To summarize them: You can’t have your folklore and eat it too.

39 Thanks to Roxann Wheeler for helping me to articulate this point.

40 It is surprising that, with the exception of Mary Hufford (2000), few folklorists have as yet looked to the commons as an alternative model of governance, nor paid attention to the intensive sociocultural innovation taking place under the aegis of the "creative commons" (www.creativecommons.org).

41 Folklorists can help by documenting social processes in a wide range of traditions and considering how they might be abstracted into flexible ideal types—for if concerns about reductionism make us hesitate to build models ourselves, we will have to live with models made by others. For the next step, translating ideal types into models of policy, we can learn from the example
of open-source software; as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has long urged us, we should be in conversation with this field. For experiments in formalizing the governance of the open-source creative process and the distribution of use rights, see Weber 2004.

42 See Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2003 for how the best-intentioned categorical protections can blind professionals to the actual needs of a given group of social actors.

43 Ultimately, of course, we may need to think about tradition as both wave and particle.

44 The quarterly broadsheet of one of these collectives is, incidentally, to my knowledge the only public medium ever to have expressed disapproval of the Patum’s Unescoification (Jo al Fòrum no hi participo 2004).

45 Alluding, of course, to the tourist-driven revitalization of Bilbao.

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Cultural Heritage, the Swedish Folklife Sphere, and the Others

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We are in the midst of a global "cult of heritage," asserts English geographer, historian and professor of heritage studies, David Lowenthal (1998, 1-30). Indeed, cultural heritage (or simply heritage) and its many equivalents or near equivalents, such as kulturarv (Swedish, Danish, Norwegian), Erbgut (German), patrimoine and héritage culturel (French), menningararfur (Icelandic), turath (Arabic), and the recent Chinese coinage wenhua yichan, are becoming increasingly dominant in cultural politics the world over. This happens at the same time as people and ideas circulate at an unprecedented pace, as many countries are receiving more refugees and migrants than ever before, and as more and more minorities and indigenous peoples are vying for self-determination. In what way is the ascendancy of cultural heritage as term and phenomenon linked to the ascendancy of intense multicultural co-existence? How is the heritage of various ethnic Others to be understood in relationship to that which is regarded as Our Own? These questions are unresolved and controversial in many countries, not least in the one which is at the center of this paper: Sweden. As recently as the 1970s, Swedes regarded themselves as exceedingly homogeneous with respect to culture, religion, and language. However, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain such a self-image: during the past twenty or thirty years Sweden has received refugees and immigrants from all over the globe to such an extent that now almost one fourth of the 9 million inhabitants were born outside the country or are children of recent arrivals from afar.

On the next few pages I will discuss the rise of the Swedish word for cultural heritage, kulturarv, in a fairly long historical perspective. I will concentrate on an area of public culture that might be called the "sphere of the vernacular" or the "folklife sphere" (Klein 2000a). Included in this sphere are a variety of "folk" museums and "folk" disciplines, such as folklore, folklife studies, and ethnology, and such activities and phenomena as the homecraft and folk music movements. I will pay particular attention to the relationship between kulturarv and a few other terms and ideas, notably "folk," compounds with "folk," and "cultural difference." For the sake of concentration, the discussion will be linked to the Nordic Museum in Stockholm and to the scholarly disciplines that evolved out of the concerns of this museum.

In some ways, this paper can be read as an historical review of a cluster of concepts in relationship to ideological, political, and social changes. To some readers the discussion might seem to be mostly a disciplinary history touching on well-known as well as less well-known ideas. Yet, in a broad sense, this text is an attempt to enter the field of conceptual
history and to address the question of how a term emerges and how this emergence affects other ideas, phenomena, and concepts (Koselleck 2002). In a still broader sense, this article is concerned with cultural politics. I wish to point to some of the forms of political activism and social planning in which the Swedish folk life sphere has been involved ever since its appearance and to point to some of the forms at issue during the current ascendency of cultural heritage.

A Grammar of Forms to Glorify the Fatherland

As early as the 1600s, at the height of its imperialist ambitions, Sweden instituted legislation aimed to protect its monuments, churches, and other remains and traditions. The ultimate goal was to glorify the royalty and the nation-state and, in 1666, the Antikvitetskollegium ("Board of Antiquities") received the task to search all around the kingdom to find (upspana) and preserve not only material antiquities but also orally performed legends and ballads. As time went on, these ambitions were modified and, during the 1700s, the official interest turned to searching out and describing that which was economically useful for the country; in particular, Linnaeus’ explorations and travelogues contributed to a new sense of discovery of the land.

The second half of the 1800s constituted yet another era with a heightened interest in locating and protecting the cultural achievements of the nation. But now the conditions were vastly different from what they had been before. In Sweden as well as elsewhere, this was a period of immense societal transformations: agricultural restructuring, population increase, urbanization, industrialization, crop failures, emigration, workers' movements, temperance movements, struggles to achieve universal suffrage, and new communication technologies such as the railroad and the telegraph.

This was also a time when new scholarly disciplines were created; some of them, such as art history, archeology, natural history, and ethnography, evolved in part because of the needs of the museums. Both the museums and the disciplines were established to serve the nation-states and their modernization. But the nation-states were no islands. Rather, museums and other scholarly and scientific establishments were developed in a spirit of international cooperation and competition. To "have" culture "was one of the main duties of a modern state" (Beckman 1998, 17) and the cultural achievements of nations were repeatedly compared in international congresses and world's fairs.

Artur Hazelius (1833–1901) was one of several learned and enthusiastic museum founders and system builders. As a young man he wrote a doctoral dissertation on Old Norse literature and, in 1873, he founded the Scandinavian-Ethnographic Collection, which in 1880 was renamed the Nordic Museum (Nordiska museet). At the beginning, it was by no means clear what kinds of materials were to be emphasized: skulls and craniums were among the possibilities. Eventually, it was decided that the Nordic Museum was to concentrate on the cultural history (kulturhistoria) of Sweden. All social classes, groups, and geographical
regions were to be represented: the nobility, the urban bourgeoisie, the tradespeople, the exotic Saami, and the peasantry (the growing numbers of urban/industrial workers were not considered as possibilities). Thus, in a broad sense, Hazelius was involved in a multicultural experiment. Yet, in actuality, he gave priority to varieties of peasant (almoge) or rural culture. Initially, this priority met with resistance from official quarters, but Hazelius prevailed and, in 1891, when the open-air museum, Skansen, welcomed its first visitors, the emphasis on the peasantry was evident.4 Placed on a hilly area of Stockholm, not far from the spot where a new and grand Nordic Museum building was to be built, Skansen was organized as a miniature of Sweden containing animals, houses, people, and industry typical of most of the provinces from north to south.5

The emphasis on peasant culture was, of course, entirely in keeping with Romantic Nationalism and with Hazelius’ own fascination with peasant customs and, in particular, with peasant costumes. This emphasis became even more pronounced during the first years of the 1900s through the influence of one of the few academically trained employees at the museum, Nils-Edward Hammarstedt (Hammarlund-Larsson 2004, 33). To him, to Hazelius, and to others, a nation was "naturally grown" and the peasants were closer to its spirit, soul, and soil than other social classes. Hazelius thought that if he could open the eyes of all Swedes—particularly the urban middle classes—to the beautiful sides of peasant life, their feelings for the fatherland would be awakened and maintained. To teach all Swedes to "know themselves" was the great task of the museum, and Hazelius pronounced the spiritual and material traditions of the peasantry as the base upon which the future cultural repertoires and moral standards of the nation were to rest. To that end, he and his collaborators engaged in a massive harvesting of peasant material culture and traditions.

But peasant creations could not be exhibited in an urban public sphere in their pristine condition. They had to be made pleasing, aesthetically and morally, to suit refined tastes and discriminating audiences. The shaping of a beautified repertoire of peasant traditions was part of a reform project to educate all citizens, to make them better, more ready to become moderns (Eriksen 1993). What took place was simultaneously an act of preservation and modernization. Historians, artists, crafts enthusiasts, and others participated in the massive efforts to study, preserve, exhibit, celebrate, present, beautify, promote, or sell the most aesthetically pleasing of the costumes, tools, furniture, and other arts of the country folk.

In the context of this article, two aspects of the activities are of particular interest. One is the terms that were used. For example, while Hazelius and his collaborators frequently emphasized that the new museum was concerned with kulturhistoria (cultural history), I have found no instances in which they used kulturarv. The word did exist, however. It is said that Victor Rydberg, a celebrated novelist who also called himself a "cultural historian," introduced it into Swedish in 1883 (SAOB 1939; Svensson 2003).
Hazelius often spoke about arvet (the inheritance) from our fathers but not about kulturarv. Nor did he use folk or compounds with folk (such as folkvisa or folksaga) nearly as frequently as scholars tend to assume. He preferred such words as allmoge (peasantry) or börder (farmers). Above all, he and his colleagues did not debate or theorize the folk or folk compounds. Indeed, “folklife research” had not yet been invented. Nevertheless, one might speak about the last few decades of the 19th century as a period when an inchoate folklife sphere was being shaped, i.e. a sphere in which facets of the life of peasant farmers were drawn into a bourgeois public sphere (Klein 2000a).

Another aspect of particular interest here is cultural difference. It is important to emphasize that Hazelius and other intellectuals did not aim to erase such differences, when they made peasant culture part of a public sphere. On the contrary, they were eager to select and celebrate the best and the most original local and regional traditions. Of all the regions, Dalarna became the mostvalorized. Since the Reformation, the peasantry of Dalarna, had played a special role in Swedish legendary history and now artists, composers, art school teachers, economic reformers, literary luminaries, and other intellectuals moved there in unprecedented numbers, thereby aiding Hazelius in his mission. The midsummer celebrations, costumes, houses, and paintings of the region were selected and transferred to Skansen, where they were highlighted as the best that Sweden had to offer. But neither Hazelius nor the artists and intellectuals thought that preservation was their only goal. Most of them also emphasized that they wished to create something new on the basis of inspiration from peasant culture, something that was modern in spirit and would appeal to contemporary middle-class buyers or readers. Nor did reformers such as Lilli Zickerman, the forceful creator of the Swedish homecraft movement (hemslöjdsrörelsen), romanticize the peasants; rather, the peasants had to be taught to recover some of their forgotten skills to suit a new era (Klein 2000b).

But it was not only Dalarna and other favored regions that were given priority in the selection processes. Included in the canonized cultural history were also the cultural expressions of the country’s most exotic group, the Saami (until the latter half of the 20th century, referred to as Lapps) who had long played an important role as Sweden’s conquered exotic Others. When Skansen opened in 1891, the Saami were represented with a camp of their own, complete with reindeer; that camp is still there. However, the culture of other minorities was not similarly exhibited. The nomadic Roma (or Gypsies) were largely excluded, even though a gypsy-camp was temporarily arranged at Skansen in 1904. But the Roma were considered too foreign to receive a permanent space there and they were long excluded from most public arenas. Until the end of the 20th century, Jews and Jewish culture were, by and large, also surrounded by silence in the folklife sphere (Klein 2004). And, as noted, industrial or urban workers were largely excluded from this sphere until at least the 1930s.
In spite of the many exclusions and silences, Hazelius and his collaborators performed a bit of magic. They assured Swedes that they aimed to give them a sense of cultural wholeness at the same time as they would preserve provincial customs and dialects. In other words, maintaining difference was simultaneously an act of unification. At Skansen regional diversity stood out as a mosaic of differences, enclosed into one unit and surrounded by a high fence. These efforts to produce unity out of diverse rural traditions became the basis for the development of a special cultural repertoire with a distinct "feeling tone" or "structure of feeling" (Williams 1984, 64–88). And to this repertoire—easily recognized by all insiders—were gradually added other phenomena so that diverse peasant traditions came to coexist with flags, selected literary works, archeological remains, and many other phenomena. With much help from the mass media, Swedes have continued to add pieces to their national repertoire. It is remarkable that this conglomerate of add-ons and redos continues to produce such deep feelings: tears of joyful recognition as well as ironic jokes (cf. Billig 1995). To some Swedes this repertoire is not only silly and embarrassing but also a sign of murky chauvinism. But to many others it continues to play a powerful role, not least in providing logos for the tourist industry and symbols of Swedish business around the globe, i.e. in "branding" the country (cf. McCrone, Morris, and Kiely 1995).

In a still broader perspective, we are speaking about a complex (and still partially unwritten) chapter in the history of modernity, a chapter that involves all peoples, albeit in different ways. Despite historical differences, different countries have followed, and continue to follow, a "grammar" of customs and traditions similar to the one that was shaped in Sweden. With Orvar Löfgren (1993) we could perhaps speak about a "tool-kit" of symbols. All countries need costumes, dances, tunes, celebrations, stories, and festivals, just as much as they need flags, national anthems, automobile companies, weather systems, and ancient monuments. If they do not have them, they had better make them up.

The Folk Home, Folklife Research, and Cultural Analysis

The tool-kit or grammar also furnished the basic genres of phenomena that were studied within the new scholarly discipline called "Nordic and Comparative Folklife Research" (Nordisk och jämförande folklivsforskning). Although the name was coined as early as 1909 (Hultkrantz 1960, 133), the discipline as such can be said to have been founded in 1918, when the Nordic Museum, thanks to a private donation, instituted a professorship in the field. In other words, the discipline was created because the museum needed researchers who could study the now vast collections of artifacts and texts. The first holder of the new position was Nils Lithberg, but it was in 1934, when Sigurd Erixon—the future giant of Swedish folklife research—was invited to hold the position, that the discipline and the two museums established themselves as true forces in the Swedish academic and political landscape. This was done in ways that differed considerably from Hazelius' vision.
However, while kulturhistoria continued to be an important word, neither Sigurd Erixon nor any of the other eminent scholars of his cohort or slightly younger than him—such as Sigfrid Svensson—used kulturarv. The word was not banned from their vocabularies, but it was seldom used and, above all, not a subject of conceptual debates. Instead, the important words to them were tradition, culture and, in particular, folk and various compounds with folk. In fact, the word "folk" was used and debated much more at this time than during Hazelius' lifetime. To some extent, its prominence from the 1920s through the 1950s was doubtless the result of influence from German museums and German scholarship. Not all the inspiration came from Germany, however. Erixon and his followers also studied British social anthropology, North American cultural anthropology, and sociology.

In particular, the new discipline of sociology came to have a strong impact on Erixon and some of his students. As a field, sociology was concerned with social planning, a political activity in which Erixon, along with many other academics, was involved during the 1930s and after World War II. This social planning was part of a monumental effort to create a welfare state or a folkhem ("folk home") to use the phrase once proposed by radical conservatives in their efforts to unite Swedes, a phrase which, in 1928, became a powerful metaphor for the efforts of a succession of Social Democratic governments (Wittrock 2004, 56). And so, the "folk" discipline, "Nordic and Comparative Folklife Research" went hand in hand with the shaping of a modern "folk home." As Bo G. Nilsson (2004) observes in an important essay, the period from 1930-1970 constituted the Swedish "folk era," not only in terms of governmental politics as a whole, but also insofar as Sigurd Erixon and his successor, Mats Rehnberg, placed the discipline of folklife research in the service of state social planning. Both Erixon and Rehnberg were members of various planning committees and, for a while, Erixon collaborated with Alva Myrdal who along with her husband, eminent economist Gunnar Myrdal, was one of the architects of the Swedish welfare state. It was during Erixon's era that a true "folklife sphere" can be said to have flourished.

Erixon argued that folklife research offers "the kind of information in support of the building of a democratic society that cannot otherwise be had" (Nilsson 2004, 75). Folklife research was not to be conducted for its own sake; rather, researchers were to help the planners of a modern society to avoid mistakes committed in the past, for example during the break-up of traditional villages. Where modern planners ignored "the human factor," folklife scholars could step in to fill the gaps. To Erixon and his colleagues, the first task of the folklife scholars at the Nordic Museum was to investigate the life of rural and urban common people during the approximately 200 years preceding their own time; the scholars were to strive to reach back to "the oldest structure of the contemporary period" (Nilsson 2004, 71). In particular, the immense documentation of traditional housing and village structures undertaken by Erixon and his
collaborators was potentially highly useful when new housing was to be built for all the members of the rural proletariat who had migrated to the cities in search of jobs.

In order to further increase the supply of knowledge, Sigurd Erixon (together with Gösta Berg and Sigfrid Svensson) began, in 1928, to send out open-ended questionnaires to a network of respondents all over Sweden, an activity for which he had obtained substantial state funding. In the 1940s and 1950s, Rehnberg, in collaboration with different unions, followed up this effort by distributing questionnaires to urban and industrial workers. His and Erixon’s efforts inaugurated an increasing acceptance of working class life into the folklife sphere and Erixon further contributed to this with a book he wrote on harbor workers of Stockholm (Erixon 1949). Yet, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie continued to have a presence at the Nordic Museum, not least due to the work of art historians, such as Sigurd Wallin. Thus, in a limited sense, the "upper classes" were included in the folklife sphere.

Yet, in the actual investigations, peasant material culture before the "structural transformations" of the 20th century remained the most important topic of folklife research. With the exception of research devoted to traditional Saami culture and a few investigations of the conditions of Roma and travelers—conducted with the aim to further their assimilation into Swedish life—little was written by folklife scholars about "ethnic" diversity in customs and traditions. Indeed, the 1950s seem to have constituted a peak period for the idea that Swedes were extraordinarily homogeneous. For example, in 1953, a widely distributed encyclopedia unabashedly stated that the Swedish population "with regards to race, language, and religion, is more homogeneous than the population of most other countries" (Bonniers Folklexikon 1951–1953).

The Social Democratic planning ideology during the 1930s–1950s had given folklife researchers and employees in cultural historical museums a special role in social planning. Yet, a few years later another scholar was to give folklife research an even more pronounced role in these activities: Åke Daun. He achieved great visibility as an often highly critical member of governmental committees and as a media personality. His influence was considerable during the late 1960s through the early 1980s, when he was involved with community planning and housing policies. But where Erixon had argued that folklife scholars were useful because of their familiarity with the housing traditions of the past, Daun maintained that they were useful because of their understanding of contemporary social life.

Inspired by Fredrik Barth, Daun fashioned a new kind of "anthropological" folklife research. To him and his followers the "folk" terminology was detrimental to the development of an academic discipline. He worked hard to eliminate it and was in favor of the name change at all Swedish universities during 1971–1972, when Folklife Research became European Ethnology or (in daily parlance) Ethnology. Yet, at this very time, "folk" and folk cultural research under-
went an unexpected popular renaissance. Folk music, "back to rural life" movements, and leftist radical movements stood at their height and university courses in folkloristics attracted great numbers of students. However, the emphasis in these courses remained historical; it was primarily rural traditions of the past that were taught. Nevertheless the meaning of the word "folk" had changed. It now referred not only to peasant culture but, even more, to the culture of the industrial proletariat, i.e. the children of the once impoverished rural dwellers who had moved to the cities or emigrated a few decades earlier. However, the young radicals of the 1970s who studied folklore (in the sense of oral traditions) and sympathized with a "folk" did not really include studies of minorities and ethnic groups in their vision. And while some had begun taking an interest in the situation of new immigrants, this interest seldom included customs or oral traditions. Nor did the young radicals contemplate a broadening of the concept of the folk to encompass "us all," i.e. the kind of broadening that Alan Dundes (1965) introduced in the United States.

Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the term kulturarv was hardly ever used by ethnologists. In Daun's opinion, ethnologists were not at all in the business of "preserving and presenting," neither folk culture nor any other kind of culture of the past or the present. In his view, the task of ethnologists was to describe contemporary social life in order to bring about political changes. To him and to those influenced by him, the past history of the field, in particular its links to National Romanticism and to cultural historical museums, was a heavy burden to be shed.

However at Lund University, the seat of the second major Swedish department of Folklife Research/ European Ethnology, the situation was different. Here Sigfrid Svensson (who had once worked at the Nordic Museum with Sigurd Erixon) and his successor, Nils-Arvid Bringéus, continued to emphasize the rural culture of the past and its links to the present. But at the same time, the concept of culture was increasingly in focus. It was "culture" that was debated in Lund in the 1970s, not the "folk" or "tradition," and certainly not "cultural heritage." This is true of Bringéus' influential introductory textbook, Människan som kulturvarelse ("Man as cultural being"), first published in 1976 and reissued many times. And culture is even more in focus in a seminal book by Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren (1979), translated into English as Culture Builders. A Historical Anthropology of Middle Class Life (1986). Spirited and full of ideas, this book combines British anthropological structuralism, the thinking of Norbert Elias, and of sociologists such as Richard Sennett into an entirely fresh mixture; the book inaugurated a special Swedish ethnological brand of cultural analysis in which the works of Clifford Geertz were also central (see also Ehn and Löfgren 1982).

The new kind of cultural analysis became more influential among young scholars than Daun's emphasis on social planning, not least because of Billy Ehn's inspired field investigations of daily life in medical companies, day-care centers,
and other places of work (Ehn 1981, 1983). "Cultural analysis" was in principle not adverse to museum work or studies of cultural history. But even so, the proponents of ethnological "cultural analysis" of the 1980s and early 1990s clearly distanced themselves from "the old folklife research" and its emphasis on the material traditions of what was often ironically called "the old peasant society" (det gamla bondesamhället).

Furthermore, the term kulturarv played no role in the cultural analysis developed by young ethnologists; if it was used at all, it was in an unmarked sense. And in many ways, these attitudes prevailed through most of the 1990s: the ties between the discipline of ethnology and the cultural historical museums were brittle. At the same time, many ethnologists became actively concerned with studying the migrations that within a few years had transformed Sweden into an intensely multilingual and multicultural country. Yet, few if any of these ethnological studies concerned cultural history, folklore, or material culture of the kind that Hazelius and, to a great extent, Erixon too had placed at the center of their work. This was also true of the studies of immigration and the multicultural society conducted within sociology, anthropology, history, political science, and other fields. Research efforts concentrated on employment, education, and health care, not on the arts, traditions and cultural history—vernacular or otherwise—of the new arrivals.

At the same time, a cultural historical museum, such as the Nordic Museum, was struggling to maintain its task to preserve and present 400 years of Swedish cultural history and simultaneously make room on its agenda to include the culture of immigrant groups and the cultural mixtures that were being shaped in Sweden. The task did not become easier when, in 1995, the cultural historical museums—like all other public institutions—were given an official "diversity mandate" (mångfaldsuppdrag) (Högdahl 2004; Högdahl and Svensson 2004) and were enjoined by the government to take into account in all their activities that Sweden is now multicultural. To make things even more difficult, the museums received little support from the ethnologists with whom they were historically linked. Rather, there was suspicion on both sides, and the Nordic Museum, (along with other cultural historical museums) had to look elsewhere for inspiration. Its old research ally—an ally that the museum itself had spawned—was no longer a trustworthy partner.

Cultural Heritage Ascendant

It was in this atmosphere that the terms kulturarv (cultural heritage) and kulturarvsskapande (heritage-making) made an entrance. Undoubtedly, the impetus came from the use of "cultural heritage" in English speaking discourses, a use that began with UNESCOs heritage initiatives after the Second World War and increased during the 1970s and 1980s. In some ways, it could be said that the Nordic Museum and Swedish folklife scholars had been in the business of heritage-making all along, as had the antiquarians in the 1600s. But, as repeatedly emphasized on these pages, these
earlier efforts were not discussed in terms of kulturarv. While the term had occasionally figured as early as the 1970s—together with kulturminne ("cultural memory") and kulturmiljövård ("care for the cultural environment")—in texts produced by the Department of Culture and the Board of National Antiquities (Riksantikvarieämbetet), it was rarely used within the cultural historical museums, the discipline of ethnology, or other discourses until the middle of the 1990s. For example, it is not included in the comprehensive national encyclopedia (Nationalencyklopedin) that was launched in 1993. Then in 1994 and 1995 kulturarv appeared as a (fuzzily defined) key concept in government bills concerning cultural politics (Bohman 1997, 40), the very same bills in which museums were given the "diversity mandate" mentioned above. Not long afterwards, kulturarv was everywhere and it was used about a variety of phenomena deemed worthy of preservation, not only archeological remains and historical sites: children’s jokes, Swedish jazz, the literary classics. Indeed, kulturarv was speedily adopted by all kinds of people, not least by members of parliament and the government, to describe some of the most positive and morally praiseworthy forms of social action in a democratic society. In 1998, the Riksantikvarieämbetet changed its official translation into English from the Central Board of National Antiquities into the National Heritage Board.

In Sweden, as well as in other countries, kulturarv is now increasingly spoken about in terms of human rights and sustainable cultural development (cf. Hafstein 2004; Turtinen 2006). Suddenly, it is taken for granted that all human beings have a right to their own cultural heritage. In other words, cultural heritage and cultural diversity are deeply linked to one another. If in the year 1900 all nation-states had to have Culture, in 2000 all human beings have to have a Cultural Heritage. Heritage has swiftly become the valorized term for all the "threatened facets of the world" (Hufford 1994, 4) deemed worthy to be selected for preservation, protection, and presentation in public arenas (cf. Klein 1997, 19).

In theory, at a given present all individuals can select their own heritage. In Sweden, as well as elsewhere, heritage is "a new mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, 149, cf. 2004). These new forms of cultural production are often linked to powerful emotions and values.

But why is the term so attractive at this point in time? The explanations are legion (Bendix 2000; Lowenthal 1998). Undoubtedly, one factor is the rise of interest in history, historical memory, and "roots," an interest that has different ideological parameters in different parts of the world. But this explanation is related to a host of others. Let me point to two of them. One can be called the catalog of the ills of late modernity. In an era of seemingly incessant destruction of past ways of life, an era of increasingly speedy mobility of humans across the earth, an era of global greed in which nature and culture are targets of endless exploitation, efforts to preserve the natural and cultural heritage are seen as moral imperatives. To be engaged in the preservation of nature and culture is a
form of political action necessary to protect life in the future. In that sense, cultural heritage and heritage-making stand for something normative and binding.

A second set of explanations for the attractiveness of cultural heritage is linked to the first, not least in terms of economics. I am speaking about tourism. Many of the most precious heritage forms and practices could not survive without the growth of tourism, increasingly one of the world's most profitable industries. As Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998) reminds us, heritage and tourism depend upon one another in creating "high density" heritage geographies and spots to visit or live near: museum rows, eco-museums, world heritage areas, nature reservations. And thanks to all these heritage geographies and other commercial enterprises people are able to enter creative dialogues or "involvements" (Lowenthal 1998, 250) with their own past or the pasts of others the world over. In a liberal market economy, a symbiosis has developed between cultural preservation, entertainment, and money-making, a symbiosis that builds on processes began long ago by such museum founders as Artur Hazelius and takes these processes to ends of which he and his contemporaries could not have dreamed.

This leads us back to the current popularity in Sweden of the term kulturarv. At this point in time the word is often used where, not long ago, kultur alone would have sufficed. New professorships in kulturarvsvetenskap (heritage studies) have been instituted at Linköping University, in some respects following a British model, and more or less formalized institutes and programs are being discussed in a number of contexts (cf. Bolin 2001). And, imperceptibly, in such a way that, at first, nobody seems to have noticed, kulturarv crept into the cultural historical museums as well. Employees at the Nordic Museum discovered that the term very well describes what they had been doing all along. Suddenly, it seemed self-evident to use the word and no real discussions regarding its meanings appeared to be necessary. Museum curators now seem to find it self-evident that museums of cultural history work to discover, select, protect, and preserve cultural heritage and that they do so to serve democracy. Furthermore, kulturarv is now increasingly used by many university-based ethnologists who not so long ago denied that their field had anything at all to do with efforts to preserve and present culture or with any other activities tainted with the worst aspects of "the old folklife research." Even the long marginalized study of folklore (in the sense of oral traditions) has now, almost unquestionably, been absorbed into the study of cultural heritage, which in this context is regarded a component within "cultural history," a field that is making a victorious comeback, and not only in Swedish academe (cf. Burke 2004). To some Swedish ethnologists, it now appears that cultural heritage combines the best aspects of ethnological cultural analysis and the study of cultural history.

The increasing acceptance of kulturarv within Swedish ethnology also has other dimensions. One has to do with the discipline's entanglement with political action and social planning. In particular...
as a result of Daun's work during the 1970s and 1980s, folklife research/ethnology developed an ongoing tension between museum work and cultural preservation, on the one hand, which were regarded as non-political activities, and social analysis and social planning, on the other hand, which were regarded as highly political activities. It seems to me that kulturarv is attractive because it dissolves this tension. The term highlights the idea that protecting and preserving a vanishing past is just as praiseworthy a form of political action as is involvement in the politics of housing, health, and primary education. A second dimension is that the term is appealingly broad in its implications. To study cultural heritage is to study much more than "tradition," for example. Cultural heritage involves places, concrete objects, and concretized memories preserved in archives. In that sense, the study of cultural heritage speaks to current ethnological interests in places and place-making. Moreover, a number of phenomena can be included under the heading "cultural heritage" but not under "tradition." You can hardly speak about the "Holocaust tradition," but call it the "Holocaust heritage" and you have thereby indicated that the Holocaust has something to teach to humankind and to warn it against. Heritage speaks to contemporary concerns and it is in this sense that it has moved in so easily also into the folk/ethnology sphere. What is missing so far is a broader conceptual debate.

Furthermore, kulturarv makes more sense than folktradition and other "folk"-compounds. In a post-"folk home" era, the term "folk" is a burden. As noted, American folkloristics turned everybody into the "folk." But in European countries, including Sweden, a semantic shift of that sort never occurred and could not occur. Six decades after the Second World War, the "folk" has increasingly become a burden, even though this has not been quite as clearly articulated in Sweden as in Germany (cf. Bendix and Eggeling 2004). Now, for more than many decades, the Nordic Museum emphasizes, in the spirit of Hazlilus, that it is a museum concerned with the kulturhistoria of all social strata, groups, and geographical regions in Sweden. And now "all" potentially includes recent immigrants.

The ease with which kulturarv has been broadly accepted in Sweden indicates that it says something important to many. But it also appears that the term is on its way to become ideologically and politically charged in ways that may not have been foreseeable a few years ago.

**The Heritage Sector and the Others**

The large-scale immigration of the last few decades has had a profound effect on all aspects of Swedish life, on institutions, education, healthcare, and the labor market. It has also changed the Swedish self-perception so that Swedes now often say that not long ago they were exceedingly homogeneous culturally, religiously, and linguistically but that this is no longer true. But, as was just emphasized, it was not until the mid-1990s, that the government enjoined all cultural institutions, including that which is now called the "heritage sector," to take into consideration that the country is now "multicultural." How was this to be done in the face of the idea of basic
homogeneity with which the sector had lived for so long and in the face of the widespread feeling that the symbolic repertoire shaped in the late 19th century still stands for something basic and profound? How was it to be done when so little research had been conducted on the cultural aspects of the multicultural society? The unease was great.

To meet the new political demands, the National Heritage Board inaugurated in 1996, with governmental support, a program entitled Agenda kulturarv (Agenda Cultural Heritage). This program was designed to broaden the concerns of the sector, away from the strictly antiquarian and towards the multitude of forms of heritage-making in a culturally diverse society. What quickly happened within the program was an expansion of the idea of "cultural diversity" to include gender, generation, social class, disability, and sexual orientation, not only ethnic diversity. The new ideas were expressed in phrases such as the following, in which one of the architects of the program writes that "the great social responsibility with regards to history and cultural heritage is to guarantee diversity and richness, knowledge and depth, holism, and broadmindedness" (Lindvall 2002, 16). In other words, a broadened notion of "cultural diversity" and a broadened notion of "cultural heritage" have now simultaneously become official ideologies. They have both become governmental responsibilities; sometimes it is also stated that both are essential to efforts to achieve "integration." A genda kulturarv has been rather successful insofar as the unease within the heritage sector a few years ago is now changing into a realization that it will have new and important responsibilities.

Still, one can wonder why the government thinks it has to be involved in promoting cultural diversity (cf. Beckman 1998). Granted, Sweden has a long history of political planning of details in everyday life, an activity that stood at its height during the social engineering of the "folk home." All the same, one might legitimately wonder why the government and its agencies believe that they have to be involved in actions to promote and protect that which is frequently called the culture of "the new Swedes." After all, at present, immigrants (as well as many others) create a multitude of art forms and stage a variety of cultural activities without any intervention whatsoever from the government or an Agenda kulturarv. Several accomplished authors who were born abroad create works in Swedish and other languages, among them Theodor Kalifatides (born in Greece), Mehmet Uhsun (born in Iraqi Kurdistan), and Rawia Morra (born in Palestine). Furthermore, immigrants in Sweden, as well as elsewhere, create and perform a great many vernacular forms relating to their past and present. Indeed, one can argue, as folklorists in North America have done for a long time, that traditional songs, celebrations, and holiday foods are so flexible and adjustable that they can play a particularly important role in situations of migration and resettlement (Klein 2001). These forms are embodied and sensory: they live in gestures and color combinations, when people move together to the sound of familiar music, or when the aroma of selected foods...
wafts through the air. Through such repeated expressions and performances, images of the past are "stored" in bodily memories (Connerton 1989) and transported across oceans. For people who have fled from one part of the world to another, a lullaby or a dish of food can incarnate a precious inheritance that must be preserved or reconstituted. As North American folklorists have repeatedly observed, immigrants from far away—sometimes even more than people who have lived in one environment for generations—use vernacular expressive forms as special resources to debate, understand, or joke about their lives. They use them to enter into dialogue with their history and their senses of themselves. Indeed, when people of the "second" generation no longer speak the languages of their ancestors, dances, foods, festivals, and other forms that do not depend on language proficiency can become especially important.

Great varieties of cultural forms are currently shaped among immigrants in Sweden. Many groups, such as Croatian-Swedes and Ethiopian-Swedes, create their own more or less private museums in order to celebrate their history. It would be an interesting task, indeed, to compare these museums with those of Croatian or Ethiopian immigrants in other countries. Many Swedish-born Assyrians (who are Christians and whose parents have often fled from south-eastern Turkey or north-western Syria) have long been engaged in establishing symbols of a new homeland, an Assyrian nation. It is a homeland they can visit primarily on the internet where many of the Assyrian sites were long produced in Modesto, California. Many other forms of heritage are created or maintained diasporically on the internet. In fact, debates on the net suggest that creating heritage forms is sometimes more important than the realization of political hopes.

Another example of heritage-making is the so-called "Wednesday feast" or charshanbé soori with which Iranians in Sweden conclude the old year and inaugurate the celebration of the new. A highlight of the feast occurs when people jump over little fires to cleanse themselves of the pollution they have accumulated during the past year. Since the 1980s, many thousands of Iranian-Swedes (and increasingly their Swedish guests) have celebrated this event on a big football field outside of Stockholm. Many older immigrants from Iran assert that a mass event of this kind does not take place there—at least it did not when they grew up. Jumping over little fires was a tradition linked to the family, the neighborhood, or the village. Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, the tradition has officially been frowned upon or forbidden as pre-Muslim or Zoroastrian. But outside the country it has assumed importance as a large-scale political protest against the present regime (Klein 2001). Recently, there have been reports that charshanbé soori has turned into a ritual of political protest inside Iran as well. The development from village ritual in the old country, to a celebration of "our" heritage among exiles, to a large political manifestation among exiles around the world, and the return back to Iran as a political manifestation is an intriguing example of developments that can take place in a globalized world.
Yet, the research on symbolic events such as this remains remarkably sparse in Sweden. The few scholars who call themselves folklorists often do not consider themselves competent to work with "immigrant" materials and general ethnologists do not see themselves as students of vernacular performances. For a long time, some even stated that they wanted to be concerned with more important things, such as education, employment, and health care, and not with "culture's Sunday varnish" (kulturens söndagsfernissa). Nevertheless, recently some museum professionals and other heritage workers are beginning to recognize the significance of doing research in areas in which they have never before been involved. A few recognize that the "creation of cultural heritage is a process that takes place all around in society and not only through the activities of museum professionals" (Silvén 2004, 209). Some museum professionals are eager to conduct research on the cultural heritage of immigrant groups, because they think that through such research they can help to combat xenophobia and foster integration into Swedish society.

A great deal has happened in Swedish museums in just a few years and, no doubt, there are better solutions regarding exhibitions and presentations of the cultures of the Others today than there were some years ago (cf. Klein 2000a). Furthermore, ambitious exhibitions can be expected at the new Museum of World Culture that opened in Göteborg in December 2004. In the meantime, a few recent exhibitions and events in other museums have focused on the rituals and clothing of diverse groups in Sweden, one example being "The Art of Celebrating New Year Nine Times" at the Stockholm City Museum in 2002, in which Jewish, Sikh, Chinese, Hindu, Muslim, and other forms of New Year's celebrations in Sweden were appealingly displayed. A comparable example is furnished by Skansen which, for many years, has staged an annual costume parade. For a long time, the first to enter in the parade were people from different Swedish regions whose costumes were explained in elaborate terms. Toward the end came "South African" costumes or "Thai costumes" which were sometimes barely commented on at all. Events such as these, i.e. parades of cultures within a Swedish frame, are similar to the mosaic of diverse Swedish regional customs once created by Hazelius or the "immigrant parades" that have a long history in the United States (Eaton 1932; Bronner 1998, 414–423). Indeed, the basic idea is not unlike the "commonwealth of cultures" within one frame (Hufford 1991) that is being created at the Smithsonian Folklife Festival (formerly the Festival of American Folklife), staged annually on the Mall in Washington, D.C. In the latter case, the aim is to include all kinds of peoples in a celebration of diversity within an American heritage umbrella. The grammar has remained the same through decades and centuries and despite cultural differences.

Still, as many scholars and museum employees recognize, there are difficulties with attempts to re-establish the old grammar of genres (albeit in a new format). There are difficulties involved, when colorful vernacular practices of
immigrant groups are to be exhibited and celebrated and made into heritage in such public arenas as cultural historical museums and when immigrant traditions are turned into components of the symbolic system of the new land. As anthropologist Mikael Kurkiala (2002) remarks, such ambitions can also be detrimental to the discussion of true differences. "Diversity is celebrated, difference is shunned," he says, as a sort of "feel-good" diversity is established. It seems to me that this has often been true within the heritage sector. Indeed, given the broadened understanding of cultural diversity that is guiding a program such as Agenda kulturarv there is a risk that ethnic differences disappear among a multitude of diversities and identities and are made invisible. The reason for the reluctance to single out ethnic difference can be laudable: scholars or curators wish to avoid stereotyping, "culturalizing" or exoticizing the Others. Yet, the upshot can also be that other cultures, religions and languages stand out as something disagreeable that should be avoided. In this context, we can find many examples of the observation that heritage processes can trivialize, debase, ignore, or simplify difficult issues (Bendix 2000; Ronström 2001).

In a provocative article published in 1999, Per Rekdal of the University Ethnographic Museum in Oslo wonders why it is important to the government in a country such as Norway that museums include immigrant cultures. After all, says Rekdal, the desire to be included in a cultural historical or ethnographic museum often does not come from immigrants themselves but from "the political establishment" or the "intelligentsia." He suggests that a partial answer to the question could be that "by including the immigrant cultures in the museums, the majority culture could also include them in... their own value hierarchies, thus making the display of cultural difference an expression of overarching equality" (Rekdal 1999, 116; cf. Klein 2000a). There is a great deal to this observation and to the critique it implies. Indeed, Rekdal’s observations apply to many of the processes of heritage-making in Sweden, Norway, and other countries from Hazelius’ era and onwards. But, as Rekdal himself seems to recognize, the question is: what alternatives are there? If people live in a new country and become citizens of it, should they not also be included in its public institutions? It seems to me that inclusions and invitations into the public sphere must take priority over exclusions and silences. This does not mean that museums or other institutions should impose upon immigrants (or anyone else) forms of representation that they do not want. Rather it means that immigrants—just like other citizens—are to be given an opportunity to be included in the cultural political efforts of their new country, if that is their wish. After all, both Norway and Sweden say that they are willing to protect the cultural heritage of all as long as it does not infringe upon the rights of others. The questions involved here are fraught with difficulties and balance between exclusion on the one hand and forced inclusion on the other.

Perhaps some of the difficulties will be resolved when immigrants and their descendants themselves become in-
volved in the Swedish heritage sector, something which is likely to happen when they have accumulated a history in Sweden. Many are likely to come forward wishing to study and display their cultural heritage as it has been shaped in the new country and in the diaspora. This is a process that has already taken place in "older" immigrant nations, such as Australia and the United States.

**Concluding Remarks**

The Romantic Nationalism of the days of Hazelius may be long gone, the folk and the "folk home" may be dying, folklife research may no longer exist, and folkloristics as a field may be marginal in an era in which the heritage paradigm is taking over some of the older terms and concerns and as new disciplinary alliances and allegiances are being shaped. One such alliance that is currently taking shape in Sweden combines ethnology, archeology, history, cultural geography, business management, and tourism studies.

Yet, the remarkable thing is that through all the transformations, the grammar of genres, established by the world's fairs and by museum builders such as Hazelius, is still being used and debated, when the cultural heritage of new immigrants is to be included in an "Us." Costume parades, dances, festivals, and food displays remain viable alternatives now, just as they were, when Skansen and other museums incorporated different rural Others into an urban, bourgeois public sphere. What is happening now is a process similar to that which took place then: inclusion of the recognized Others in a harmonious diversity encircled by a fence. Moreover, immigrants themselves often select a similar grammar of forms and use the same toolkit when they display their vernacular cultural heritage in the Swedish public sphere. On the heritage stage, the idea of a nation full of appealing diversity is on display and some of its features will undoubtedly be added to the Swedish repertoire of add-ons and redos. It is highly uncertain to what degree the established nation grammar will be broken up to include "more diverse arts, cultures, and traditions . . . in a multiplex public sphere" (Clifford 1997, 214). Furthermore, while many conversations take place between the heritage sectors in separate countries and such supranational institutions as UNESCO, the actual effect of these conversations on the national agendas is unclear.

Another point concerns the extent to which there is now a new reformist heritage ideology, every bit as moralistic as the various agendas that inspired Hazelius, Erixon, and Daun. In government circles the protection of cultural heritage is seen as an unquestionably moral good, as a democracy issue of high dignity, as an important part of a civil society, and as a human right. Heritage issues are entangled with hopes for improved integration and, therefore, representation in such public arenas as museums is seen as a task of importance to all. Yet, as has been noted, one must ask to what extent inclusion in these arenas will serve to hide actual inequalities in order to celebrate a harmonious diversity? And what happens to all those (primarily young) people
who regard themselves as mixtures of all kinds of cultures and backgrounds? Will they forever be stereotyped in the heritage sector as examples of the exciting youth cultures brewing in "our" immigrant suburbs? Will the traumas and stigmatizations suffered by some groups be endlessly trivialized in new forms of exploitation not unlike those that have taken place as some memorials of trauma (such as Holocaust memorials) have become tourist attractions (Finkelstein 2000)? What happens to all those forms of heritage that are offensive, frightening or incomprehensible?

Cultural heritage—as phenomenon, concept, and discourse—does not pose danger in and of itself; in all likelihood, it is here to stay for a long time. The dangers lie in a naïve, uncritical, unhistorical, and untheorized understanding of cultural heritage and its ideological parameters in an era in which the boundaries "between culture and politics and between cultural production and the market" are becoming increasingly blurred (Bendix and Welz 1999, 123). This holds true whether we are dealing with a "vernacular sphere" in one specific country, as has been the case in this paper, or expand our concerns to cover a greater spectrum of heritage issues. The term heritage is not innocent; we must ponder its role in the ongoing worldwide remapping of ideological, political, economic, disciplinary, and conceptual landscapes.

Notes

1 This text is based on a workshop and a lecture given at the Reykjavik Academy in January 2004. Many thanks to Valdimar Tr. Hafstein and Ólafur Rastrick for inviting me and many thanks to them and to the other participants on these occasions for the stimulating discussions. The article is to be seen as one result of the project "Folklore, Heritage Politics, and Ethnic Diversity," which I directed in 1997–2000 together with Anna-Leena Siikala, Pertti Anttonen, and Stein Mathisen. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

2 In part, the discussion in this section draws on the following: Aronsson 2004; Beckman 1993a, 1993b, 1998; Bohman 1997; Ekström 1994; Eriksen 1993; Frykman and Löfgren 1986; Hammarlund-Larsson 2004; Klein 2000a; O'Dell 1998; Stoklund 1993; Sörlin 1998.

3 In 1919, it was officially decided that the Nordic Museum was to be responsible for Swedish cultural history from the 16th century and onwards. Thus, the beginning was set at the period of King Gustav Vasa, i.e. at the Protestant (Lutheran) Reformation. The Historical Museum was to be responsible for earlier periods, i.e. the Pagan and Catholic eras. Long housed inside the National Museum, this museum was moved into a building situated a few hundred meters away from the Nordic Museum in 1943.

4 See Beckman 1998, 17. It is not unimportant to take note of this resistance: many contemporary scholars seem to take it for granted that the inclusion of the rural folk in 19th-century public arenas was universally greeted with jubilation.

5 Skansen is frequently called the world's "first" open-air museum. However, this is probably an overstatement. As Bjarne Stoklund (1993) shows, precedents can be found, not least in 19th-century international exhibitions.
Observations in this paper regarding the frequency with which a word is used by a particular author or during a particular period are based on impressions formed in the reading of relevant texts, not on close textual analysis or statistical evidence.

Dalarna is comparable to Karelia in Finland, Hardanger in Norway, Appalachia in the United States, Dogon land in Mali, and other "old-fashioned" or "relic areas" far away from a capital. This is one of the senses in which ethnology, folklore, and related efforts can be said to have been "born in an act of love between the province and the nation-state" (Noyes 1999, 258).

As early as the late Middle Ages, it was customary to bring reindeer and accompanying Saami as diplomatic gifts during state visits abroad. Saami were also featured at a number of the world's fairs and, in many respects, it was self-evident that they would be included at Skansen and the Nordic Museum from the very start (Klein 2000a).

Since 2000, five groups in Sweden are officially designated minorities, whose members speak five officially recognized minority languages: Saami, Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish), Finnish, Romani, and Yiddish.

There are considerable differences in the historical circumstances that have led to an emphasis on certain materials over others, as countries have built up their national repertoires. In Iceland the saga manuscripts came to play an early and central role whereas in Finland and Estonia the shaping of national epics on the basis of oral traditions had overarching importance. Indeed, in Estonia and other countries in Eastern Europe, the national symbolic repertoires were essential during the processes of reconstruction after the years of Soviet rule.

Folklife research is, of course, one of many names for the "folk disciplines" in different countries. In Sweden alone a multitude of names have circulated. From 1912 to 1944, a lecturer (docent) in "Folk Memory Research" (folkminnesforskning) was active at Lund University: Carl Wilhelm von Sydow. Then, in 1946, Lund University received its first chair in "Nordic and Comparative Folklife Research" and, one year later, a department with the same name was founded at Uppsala University. In 1972, "European Ethnology" (etnologi, särskilt europeisk) was adopted at all Swedish universities and Folkloristics was named a subfield thereof. Unlike other Nordic countries, Folkloristics has never been a separate discipline in Sweden, although Uppsala University cultivated such a specialization until the middle of the 1980s.

One can detect parallels here to developments in the United States, where folklore study expanded after World War II. This expansion is linked to President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Federal Writers Project, unionizing, and the folk song movement (cf. Abrahams 1999).

My comments on Daun are in part based on his fascinating recollections of the development of Swedish ethnology during the 1960s and 1970s (Daun 2003).

According to David Lowenthal (1998), the first documented use of “heritage” is to be found in the St James Bible (Psalms 16:6: “I have a goodly heritage”). Margaret Thatcher’s inauguration of the National Heritage Act in Britain (in 1983) and Ronald Reagan’s prominent collaboration with the Heritage Foundation (founded in 1973) in the United States most likely contributed to the world-wide increase in the use of “heritage” in the 1980s.

I will not attempt here to discuss the exceedingly complex issues at hand. It has been argued that modern societies need this kind of functional differentiation, since they can
no longer attempt to integrate all members within one overarching human value system. They need systems of rights in plural. However, in his recent work on the origin of human rights, sociologist Hans Joas (in press) is critical of this functionalistic explanation.

17 See, for example, Selberg 2002. A great deal has been written on the distinctions between the concept of history and the concept of heritage (Lowenthal 1998). However, the distinctions are often difficult to grasp, in particular in discussions comparing cultural heritage and historiography.

Contemporary China constitutes one example of the multiplex use of cultural heritage in the creation of a new ideology. I am indebted to Marina Svensson, Department of East Asian Languages, Lund University, for her insightful comments on the politics of heritage in China today.

18 For example, folklorists and ethnologists at the University of Oslo in Norway now work within a Section on Cultural History and, recently, Arne Bugge Amundsen, as editor of the pan-Nordic journal Arv, replaced the journal's emphasis on folklore with a focus on cultural history, including cultural heritage. One might well wonder, if such a shift will spell the end of folkloristics as a field in the Nordic countries. The absorption of folklore/folklife into cultural heritage/cultural history can be observed all over Europe. For example, the recently (2000) launched Hungarian yearbook, Hungarian Heritage, contains articles on the kinds of topics that, not long ago, were called folklore and folklife.

19 Also, I have been told that Skansen has plans to invite a variety of ethnic and religious groups to celebrate their traditional festivities there all around the year.

20 This is to some degree true of the unprinted document "Kulturarv är mångfald! ("Cultural Heritage is Diversity"!), circulated by the Swedish Heritage Board (Riksantikvarieämbetet 2004).

Works Cited


Cultural Heritage, The Swedish Folklife Sphere, and the Others

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Barbro Klein


Hungarian Heritage. 2000–.


There are now ample signs that cultural policy is emerging as an increasingly important area of theoretical and practical engagement for intellectuals working in the fields of sociology and cultural studies. This has occasioned a good deal of debate concerning the roles of intellectuals and the relationships they should adopt in relation to the bureaucratic and political processes through which cultural policies are developed and put into effect. It is with these debates that I engage here with a view to distinguishing the light that might be thrown on them by different accounts of the social roles and distribution of different kinds of intellectual function. My concerns here will centre on the relations between two traditions of social theory. The first derives from Jürgen Habermas's classic study of the public sphere (Habermas 1989) and theorizes the role of intellectuals in terms of the distinction between critical and technical intellectual functions which characterizes Habermas's construction of the relationships between different forms of rationality. The second comprises the tradition which, following in the wake of Michel Foucault's essay on governmentality (Foucault 1978), has concerned itself with the roles of particular forms of knowledge and expertise in organizing differentiated fields of government and social management.

My starting point will be with the Habermasian tradition. The concept of the public sphere is, of course, one that now need no longer be constrained by its Habermasian lineage. In its post-Habermasian history, moreover, the concept has made positive contributions to both the theory and practice of cultural policy. It has supplied the language through which governments have been called on—with some success—to develop forms of media regulation that will inhibit the oligopolistic tendencies of media industries by providing for at least some semblance of democracy and diversity in the role of the media in the organization and circulation of opinion. The differentiation of Habermas's singular public sphere into plural public spheres—feminist and indigenous, for example—has also been important in legitimating claims on the public purse which have helped in winning new forms of public, and publicly educative, presence for groups excluded from the classical bourgeois public sphere. My concerns, however, are less with these adaptations of the Habermasian concept than with Habermas's own account of the public sphere and the role it has played in subsequent debates, when viewed in the light of the splitting of intellectual work...
between the differentiated functions of critique and praxis which he proposes.\textsuperscript{5}

My engagements with this tradition of work will be of three kinds. First, I shall argue that Habermas's polarizing procedures do not offer us a cogent basis for debating and assessing the politics of contemporary intellectual practice. Their main weakness is that of dividing reason into two without then being able to offer any means of reconnecting its severed parts except through the endlessly deferred mechanism of the dialectic. Second, I shall argue that Habermas's account of the development and subsequent deterioration of the bourgeois public sphere seriously misunderstands the role that the main institutions of public culture have played in the development of modern practices of cultural governance. A Habermasian theoretical world-view, to come to my third concern, also fails to see how the roles played by the personnel of culture in managing cultural resources involve attention to questions of a technical kind in ways that do not automatically entail that such personnel should be cast in the role of critical reason's bureaucratic other.

The vantage points from which I pursue these three concerns are ones supplied by different branches of the post-Foucauldian literature on governmentality. In developing the first argument, I draw on work which stresses the ethical comportment which characterizes the conduct of bureaucratized intellectual functions. This aspect of my argument serves to undercut the view that the exercise of practical intellectual functions within bureaucratic contexts can serve as an "ethics-free zone" in counterpoint to the ethical purity of the critical intellectual. The second point is developed by looking again at Habermas's historical account of the public sphere through the lens of post-Foucauldian inquiries into the development of modern forms of government and culture. In developing my third argument I draw on Foucauldian perspectives on the relationships between expertise and government to identify the wide range of functions performed by the personnel of culture as parts of governmental programs aimed at deploying cultural resources as a means of acting on the social.

The Critical and the Practical

Jim McGuigan's Culture and the Public Sphere offers a convenient point of entry into the first set of issues. This closes in posing two questions: How can critical intellectuals be practical? And how can practical intellectuals be critical? By critical intellectuals McGuigan has in mind intellectuals whose work is academic in the sense that the conditions in which it takes place disconnect it from any immediate practical outcomes for which those intellectuals can be held responsible. The problem for such intellectuals, then, is that the opportunity for critically reflexive work which such conditions make possible is purchased at the price of a loss of any immediate practical effectivity. The practical intellectuals McGuigan refers to are cultural workers "engaged in some form of communication and cultural management" in practical contexts where, as he defines them, "the
possibilities of critical knowledge... have already been closed off" by the need for "recipe knowledge" (McGuigan 1996, 190). Two kinds of intellectual, then, each of whom, at least at first sight, seems to lack what the other possesses. It becomes clear on further inspection, however, that the relations between these different categories of intellectual are not, and cannot become, relations of exchange. Rather, they take the form of a one-way street in which the task enjoined on the critical intellectual is that of dislodging the forms of reasoning—the "recipe knowledge"—which govern the contexts in which practical intellectuals do their work. The most that can be asked of practical intellectuals—parties to a gift relationship in which they can only be receivers—is that they should be prepared to jettison those forms of reasoning which spontaneously characterize their work in favor of the essentially different forms of reasoning represented, and selflessly donated, by critical intellectuals.

How is it that these lowly servants of a mere "recipe knowledge" find themselves placed on the opposite side of a divide separating them from the realms in which critical intellectuals operate? This separation is the local manifestation of a more fundamental division between critical and instrumental reason which has its roots in Habermas's account of the division between system and lifeworld and their opposing principles of rationality. In the latter, where communication is relatively undistorted by uneven relationships of power and where there is a common interest in shared horizons of meaning arising out of shared conditions of life, communicative rationality is orientated to mutual understanding. By contrast, the instrumental rationality which characterizes the world of system is one which displaces questions of human value and meaning in favor of a means-end rationality whose direction is dictated by existing structures of class and bureaucratic power. This opposition between system and lifeworld is most economically represented in the terms of Habermas's distinction between praxis and techne. The first of these, as Habermas glosses it, is concerned with the reasoned assessment of the validity of norms for action whereas techne is concerned solely with the rational selection of the best instruments for achieving particular outcomes once the normative goals for social action have been determined (Habermas 1974, 1–3).

When these broader aspects of the argument are taken into account, it is clear that the form of mediation that McGuigan proposes for overcoming the separation of critical and practical intellectuals would extend the sway of praxis, whose spokesperson is the critical intellectual, beyond the lifeworld into the world of system where it would ideally displace, or provide a superordinate context for, the application of techne. At the same time, however, the prospects of this actually happening are not good to the degree that the conditions of work of intellectuals located within the world of system predispose them to focus exclusively on narrowly technical forms of reason and action. Thus lessons of praxis, since they do "not tell us directly what to do," will "always be regarded as
unsatisfactory by those who prefer to act without thinking; in effect, those who want recipe knowledge but not critical thought, information but not ideas" (ibid., 187). McGuigan seems not to notice the paradoxical effects of a body of theory which, on the one hand, holds out the possibility of universally valid norms of communication and mutual understanding arising out of the shared conditions of the lifeworld while, on the other, dividing reason into two antimonial realms—praxis and techne—whose separation, once established, cannot be overcome except by imposing the values of one on the other. What is perhaps more harmful, however, is the mapping of this opposition between different kinds of reason on to the relations between different kinds of intellectuals working in different contexts.

The dubious value of this procedure is all the more evident when it is considered that, in most other regards, the differences between these so-called critical and practical intellectuals would seem to be so slight. From everything that we know of the demographic characteristics and shared occupational cultures of academics and cultural intermediaries and policy professionals, it might have been thought that they would be able to communicate effectively with one another on matters of common practical and intellectual concern from the perspective of a shared horizon of professional, social, and cultural understandings. Indeed, I would contend that this is so, except in the world of the dualities generated by critical reason where it cannot be so. For even assuming that they deign to do so, once critical intellectuals take it upon themselves to connect their work to the realm of system, the democratic norm that all parties to any communicative interaction should be treated as equal is abandoned as the critical intellectual assumes a discursive position—a capacity for critical independence and detachment—that is, by definition, superior to that of the purely technical competence of the administrator or manager. This superiority is invested with further normative significance in the related assumption that the "culture of dissatisfaction" that results from the restlessly self-reflexive persona of the critical intellectual is the sole source of progressive change within the administration of culture, and one that is pitched constantly against the inertia and conservatism of the agencies and personnel that are actually responsible for the development and implementation of cultural policies. As McGuigan puts it:

The culture of dissatisfaction is the perpetual bugbear of any official cultural policy: the very officialness of governmental policy, in effect, makes it conservative, the upholder of the status quo, from the point of view of a restless dissatisfaction with the way things are presently constituted .... The new ideas and most important issues are always engendered by a sense of dissatisfaction coming from outside the currently official system. Official institutions and practices of cultural policy are like authoritarian states ultimately doomed when they are
closed to the constant pressures exerted by cultural dissatisfaction. (ibid., 50)

It is easy to see how the dualities informing this passage have an element of self-fulfilling prophecy built into them. For if McGuigan's purpose really is to build bridges between critical and practical intellectuals, the Habermasian spin he gives to this task makes him a poor diplomat in his own cause. For what are the chances that the communications and cultural managers who do read his book might feel parties to an open and unconstrained dialogue in which the positions, perspectives, and experiences of intellectual workers situated in different contexts might be regarded as matters for genuine debate? Not strong, I'd have thought, given that they have been defined in wholly negative terms as the source of a lack owing to their incapacity for critical or independent thought.

This is a pity, and especially so as there are no good reasons for taking the virtues of critique so much for granted. There is now a substantial body of work which, far from taking critique to be a transcendent and self-subsistent norm—and so being above criticism, so to speak—historizes and relativizes it in ways which seriously question its ethical, epistemological, and political credentials. A significant case in point is Bruno Latour's recent questioning of emancipatory rhetorics. Contending that the prospect of revolutionary simplifications of the social has now ceded place to the challenge of "coexistence between totally heterogeneous forms of people, cultures, epochs, and entities," he argues that the complexities this entails mean that the arrow of time can no longer run from "slavery to freedom" but only from "entanglement to more entanglement" (Latour 1999, 13–15). From perspectives of this kind, it becomes possible to read the tradition of critical sociology, to which Habermas's work belongs, as itself a powerful form of "recipe knowledge." As heir to the tradition of post-Kantian philosophy, it guarantees a continuing role for critique by its formulaic construction of the historical process as one which establishes divisions (in this case, between praxis and techne and its various derivatives) which have then to be overcome and reconciled with the aid of the philosopher-sociologist's critical intellectual mediation. It is by means of this operation that critique, as a stylized intellectual practice, is substituted for more grounded forms of critical inquiry in making an entirely predictable set of intellectual routines whose form, moves, and conclusions—in setting up oppositions and projecting their reconciliation while simultaneously regretting the factors which impede the unfolding of this ideal dialectic—stand in the place of an analytical engagement with the recalcitrant positivity and dispersed diversity of social relations and forces.

I am more concerned here, however with the other side of the Habermasian division of the sphere of reason into two. For the purely means-end rationality of bureaucratic reason can be rescued from the terms of Habermas's condemnation by recognizing that it can lay its own
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claims to virtue on grounds that are simultaneously ethical, critical, and historical. Ian Hunter's spirited defense of the bureaucratic vocation will serve as a good point of entry into these concerns. For in restoring an appropriate degree of virtue to the bureaucrat, Hunter also calls into question the absolutist forms of authority which those who speak in the voice of the critical intellectual spontaneously and unreflectively claim as their own. In doing so, he strips critique of its pretensions to universality in both circumscribing the spheres in which it can operate while also severely limiting the kinds of influence it can exert on the practical conduct of human affairs.

Hunter takes his initial bearings from those ways of depicting the persona of the bureaucrat which project it "as 'one side' of a full moral personality, the other side of which is represented by the 'humanist intellectual' who is the mirror image of the bureaucrat in espousing "a commitment to substantive values" while lacking the "technical means for realising them" (Hunter 1994, 146). While this division of the world of reason into two rests on Weber's neo-Kantian distinction between instrumentally rational and value-rational forms of social action, Weber's position differed from Kant's in refusing to make the humanist intellectual the ultimate arbiter of value-rational action. Weber's stance was rather pluralistic and sociological, regarding the ends of value-rational action as being multiple and specific to particular spheres of life and giving rise to distinctive ethical dispositions and capacities. This included, Hunter is shrewd to note, an assessment of the bureaucracy's commitment to instrumentally rational action as itself constituting a distinctive ethos of office requiring particular ethical capacities rather than figuring as a sphere of moral vacuousness and critical emptiness.

This leads Hunter to suggest that what Habermas devalues as mere techne is the result of a specific ethical training rather than a form of ethical lack. The bureau, he says, is not something that has been separated off from critical reason as a result of some split in the lifeworld or the opening of some historical chasm in the organization of public life. Rather, it is the site for the formation of a distinctive ethical persona in the sense that "the office itself constitutes a 'vocation' (Beruf), a focus of ethical commitment and duty, autonomous of and superior to the holder's extra-official ties to kith, kin, class or, for that matter, conscience" (ibid., 156). The construction of this persona and the associated routines of office, Hunter suggests, need to be valued as "a positive organizational and ethical acquisition, involving an important augmentation of our technologies for living" in view of their capacity "to detach governmental decisions from personal loyalties and religious passions" (ibid., 155). From this perspective, to denounce the instrumentalism of bureaucracy for its apparently amoral indifference to
qualitative ends is to fail to appreciate the historically distinctive form of morality which such an ethos of office represents:

The ethical attributes of the good bureaucrat—strict adherence to procedure, acceptance of sub- and super-ordination, esprit de corps, abnegation of personal moral enthusiasms, commitment to the purposes of the office—are not an incompetent subtraction from a "complete" (self-concerned and self-realizing) comportment of the person. On the contrary, they are a positive moral achievement requiring the mastery of a difficult milieu and practice. (ibid., 156–7)

Why, then, is the critical intellectual more likely, instead, to devalue the bureaucrat as a one-sided and incomplete embodiment of the function of reason? In answering this question, Hunter draws on Weber's general sociological principles, treating the post-Kantian construction of the critical intellectual as a person committed to a higher and universal sense of moral duty as itself a particular ethos requiring analysis in terms of its relations to particular kinds of social prestige and power. When considered sociologically, "the persona of the self-reflective scholar acting on the basis of inner conviction is no more ethically fundamental than that of the official, whose ethos involves subordinating his inner convictions to the duties of office" (ibid., 163). Both represent specific moral dispositions cultivated through the exercise of particular spiritual disciplines and routines. Critique, however, arranges these differences hierarchically by "treating its own status-persona—the self-reflective scholar, the 'complete' person . . .—as 'ultimate' for all comportments of the person, the bureaucrat and citizen included" (ibid., 163). Hunter is clear in seeing this absolutizing tendency of critique as part of a tactics of intellectual life through which a particular stratum of intellectuals, while disconnected from the actual administrative forms through which social life is organized, aspires to a distinctive kind of social influence. This is to be achieved by cultivating the status of moral notables who, speaking to the world at large, claim the mantle of a "secular holiness" which, as part of a practice of "world flight," allows them to "criticise the dominant organization of social life by practising an exemplary withdrawal from it" (ibid., 167).

Said's Representations of the Intellectual provides a convenient example of this practice of "secular holiness" and of the forms of critical intolerance and ethical bullying it entails. For Said's strategy in elaborating his view of the intellectual as an exile and marginal, as an amateur whose true vocation is "to speak the truth to power" (Said 1994, xiv), depends on trapping professionals, experts, and consultants—those false intellectuals who have traded their critical independence for wealth, power, and influence—in the contaminating mire of their associations with worldly powers and the limitations, of perspective or of
moral capacity, that these entail. Said's "world flight" into universality is thus sustained by the role in which the bureaucratic or managerialist intellectual is cast as the low Other against whom the stellar trajectory of the true intellectual—the amateur whose activity "is fuelled by care and affection rather than by profit, and selfish, narrow specialisation" (ibid., 61)—can be mapped:

In other words, the intellectual properly speaking is not a functionary or an employee completely given up to the policy goals of a government or a large corporation, or even a guild of like-minded professionals. In such situations the temptations to turn off one's moral sense, or to think entirely from within the speciality, or to curtail scepticism in favour of conformity, are far too great to be trusted. (ibid., 64)

But how clear-sighted is the universal intellectual when he has cut a moral trench between himself and other intellectual workers? In truth: not very. Said, in what he has to say about the relationships between intellectuals and government, surveys the world through the tinted lenses of a metropolitan parochialism whose belief in its universal validity is based on nothing so much as a constitutive blindness to its own forms of limiting particularity. For when Said—speaking to and for all the world—places true intellectuals outside of government and charges them to speak the truth to power, it is clear that he imagines government always and only in the form of some branch of the US science-military-industry complex.10 The possibility that, in other parts of the world, intellectuals might see themselves as speaking the truth to and for more local forms of power with a view to muting or qualifying the effects of other forms of power is simply not thinkable from within Said's elementary bi-polar construction of the relations of truth and power. I have in mind here the role that intellectuals—whether as academics, government employees, or as public intellectuals—have played in the development of progressive nationalist cultural policies in contexts (France, Australia, Scotland, Wales, Canada) where this is seen as involving both setting limits and nourishing alternatives to the invasive influence of other dominant national cultures (American, English). The same is true of intellectuals who work within government as cultural workers of various kinds—curators, community arts workers, arts administrators—in cultural diversity, community, or art and working life programs.

This is not to suggest that any of these contexts for intellectual work are without their ambiguities and contradictions. My point is rather that the simplified and polarized construction Said places on the politics of intellectual life does not allow an adequate recognition, let alone resolution, of those ambiguities and contradictions. More important, it eviscerates the work of the critical intellectual in sanctioning a refusal to engage with those ambiguities and
contradictions. For Said, the intellectual must choose "the risks and uncertain results of the public sphere—a lecture or a book or article in wide and unrestricted circulation—over the insider space controlled by experts and professionals" (ibid., 64). Yet this either-orism is misleading owing to its inability to distinguish the radically different forms in which—depending on the issue and the context—the relationships between specific regions of government and specific realms of public debate might be related to one another. For there are intellectuals who manage to speak into, and to influence opinion on, matters of general public concern in ways that have long-term consequences for the ways in which bureaucratic forms of social and cultural administration are exercised, while also taking account of the distinctive technical and ethical exigencies which characterize the practice of those who work in such bureaus. This is not remotely possible, however, if the realms of the critical and the technical are hermetically separated from one another at the outset in ways which require that the latter should be subordinated to the former (even though, in fact, it clearly is not).

There is a need, then, for those who aspire to be critical intellectuals to look more closely at their own practice and the conditions which sustain it. This, in its turn, will require a clearer differentiation of critique, as a highly specific practice—a moral technology, in effect—dependent on the discursive coordinates of post-Kantian philosophy, from the more general categories of criticism or critical thought. This is necessary if we are to recognize that intellectuals can both contribute critically to public debate about particular forms of social and cultural policy, assessing these in terms of their shortcomings when viewed from particular ethical and political standpoints, while at the same time contributing their expertise to particular areas of policy formation and learning from the other intellectuals, working within the policy process, with whom such work brings them into contact. To engage in critical thought in this way, however, does not require—and is not assisted by—any rigid separation of means-end from normative rationality of the kind proposed by critique. Nor does it require any elevation of the latter over the former. Critical thought, no matter who its agent might be, is most productive when conducted in a manner which recognizes the need to take account of the contributions of different forms of expertise without any a priori prejudicial ranking of the relations between them and, equally, when it takes account of the forces—social, economic, political, and moral—which circumscribe the field of the practicable.

To put the matter in this way is also to allow the possibility that intellectual work conducted within the bureaus of social and cultural administration may possess a built-in mechanism of critical self-reflexiveness. This is especially so if the issue is posed at the level of institutional practices rather than that
of the mental procedures of individuals. Jeffrey Minson's work has been suggestive here in identifying the respects in which bureaucratic forms of management are structurally restless owing to the incorporation within them of principles of reflexive self-monitoring which make for what is often a remorseless capacity for unending change (see Minson 1993). There are, of course, countervailing tendencies in which bureaucratic processes function to manage political tensions by "massaging" policy processes so as to favor specific outcomes. Nor can there be any ducking the fact such processes can be applied in the pursuit of ends that are socially and politically debilitating: the literature on the functioning of bureaucratic mechanisms in the context of eugenic or fascist programs is ample proof of this. To recognize the potential critical effects of bureaucratic procedures is not to minimize the equally crucial questions concerning the social and political ends toward which those procedures are directed, and the need for these to be arrived at through open and democratic procedures.

However, this does not gainsay the point that bureaucratic procedures are a form in which the requirements of a critical self-reflexiveness are institutionalized since it is in the very nature of those procedures to interrogate their own effectiveness in accomplishing particular ends. In these ways, bureaucratic mechanisms have built into them means of connecting with the realms of social life they are responsible for administering as well as for being corrected and revised in the light of those connections. It is here that the opposition McGuigan poses in counterposing the "culture of dissatisfaction" as the source of a restless demand for change to the closure and stasis of the bureaucratic apparatuses of government is so questionable. While the mechanisms of connection that characterize bureaucratic procedures are, no doubt, imperfect, they are a significant advance on those of critique which often accomplishes little more than to repeat endlessly the same moves, as it establishes sets of polarities whose mediation or reconciliation it then projects as a goal to be accomplished via its own dialectical conjuring tricks—and all of this without ever having to give an account of how this is to be done in terms of the connections it will establish with the actual forms of social and cultural administration through which social and cultural life are managed.

Yet this is the central point at issue, and one that will be greatly assisted if, rather than seeing questions of mediation as ones concerning how to overcome the apparently irreconcilable divisions which split the realm of reason into its critical and instrumental forms, poses them as questions concerning the need for new forms of institutional and organizational connection capable of interrelating the work that intellectual workers of different kinds do in different contexts. For there is no cognitive or, indeed, ethical gulf separating intellectuals working in government and industry centers of cultural management from those working in universi-
ties. There are, to be sure, different pressures, exigencies, and priorities bearing on these different contexts. However, these are best represented not in the form of an essential split between different mental operations but as a division between those contexts in which intellectual work is disconnected from immediate practical consequences (academic contexts) and those in which it is, and has to be, connected to such consequences (government and industry contexts). This is a significant difference, and one in which the benefits afforded by academic contexts—the latitude to canvass a broader range of issues, to bring a historical perspective to bear, to have long-term considerations in view, to take the points of view of constituencies who might otherwise be marginalized—should be valued as enabling distinctive contributions to be made to the actual, and no doubt compromised and contested, processes through which cultural life is organized and managed. However, intellectuals working in such contexts will constantly marginalize themselves and what they have to offer if they broach this task as involving haughtily hailing across a moral and cognitive divide, rather than as a matter of devising institutionalized mechanisms of exchange that will allow academic knowledges to connect productively with the intellectual procedures of policy bureaus. For these inescapably comprise an interface which academic intellectuals have to recognize as a necessary and valid, but not exclusive, point of reference for their work. Equally, of course, there is need for reform on the "other side" of this exchange: more open policy processes, less "control freakery" and, so far as the culture and media industries are concerned, better ways of mediating the relations between commercial advantage and public interest that are involved in their own research activities. But these are not questions that require the epistemological mediation of different intellectual faculties.

To approach them productively, however, will require that we review our sense both of where public spheres are and the nature of our relations to them. This requires a cautious assessment of the value of Habermas’s work on this subject. This is not to gainsay the role it has played in providing the primary point of reference for the now extensive literature in which the concept of a public and democratic space for, and function of, intellectual life has been both elaborated and sustained within European and Anglo-American debates. Its influence—although not without qualification—on debates in the Asia-Pacific region has also been strong and increasing over the past decade. I want to suggest, however, that the support it has lent the view that the public sphere or spheres comprise an institutional and discursive realm which might provide a critical exterior in relation to the power effects of both state and economy is historically misleading and politically unhelpful.
Relocating the Public Sphere

The general contours of Habermas’s account of the rise and fall of the classical bourgeois public sphere are well known. The classical bourgeois public sphere is understood in terms of its role in forming a public which, through reasoned debate, aspired to articulate a public will as a set of demands arrived at independently of the state or public authority and advanced in the expectation that they would need to be taken into account in the exercise of state power. The radical implications of this commitment to a critical rationality are then subsequently lost as a consequence of the increasing commercialization and bureaucratization of public communications from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. While I cannot engage here with the detail of this account, I want to propose a different way of reading the historical unfolding of the relations between government and culture. Rather than seeing the founding ideals of the public sphere as being subsequently overturned through bureaucratic forms of statism and new forms of commercial cultural production and distribution, this would trace the steps through which the institutions and practices of the public sphere have been translated into modern forms of cultural governance in which cultural resources are applied to varied tasks of social management. This is not, though, a matter of offering a history that is entirely at odds with Habermas’s account. Rather, the view I wish to develop can be arrived at by means of, first, highlighting an aspect of his discussion of the classical bourgeois public sphere that has not always received the attention it merits, and, second, commenting on an equally little-remarked absence in the account he offers of the subsequent structural transformation of the public sphere.

The first point is most easily introduced via a commentary on Habermas’s diagrammatic representation of the bourgeois public sphere at the moment of its emergence in the eighteenth century. His depiction is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Realm</th>
<th>Sphere of Public Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society (realm of commodity exchange and social labor)</td>
<td>Public sphere in the political realm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjugal family’s internal space (bourgeois intellectuals)</td>
<td>Public sphere in the world of letters (clubs, press)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(markets of culture products) &quot;Town&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Habermas 1989, 30)
The division that most concerns Habermas is that between the sphere of public authority and the private realm: hence the double line separating the two. He accordingly approaches the manner in which the different components of the private realm interact with one another from the point of view of their common differentiation from the sphere of public authority. From this perspective, what matters most about the public sphere in the world of letters, or, as Habermas also calls it, the literary public sphere, is its role as a set of sites for forming opinions that are to be taken heed of in the exercise of state power. Similarly, the market for cultural products plays a historical role in desanctifying them with the consequence that they are able to play a role in these secular processes of opinion formation. In detaching such products from their aura, the market allows works of culture to become objects of critical discussion with the consequence, first, that they become embroiled in the critique of both the state and courtly society and, second, that they become vehicles for the enunciation of new generalized rights of public accessibility: the public for culture becomes, for the first time, theoretically universal.

It is noteworthy that Habermas sees the historical emergence of culture’s autonomy as a necessary precondition for the process through which culture is then enlisted as a political instrument in the formation of a public opinion critical of, and opposed to, the realm of public authority. This instrumental view of culture—the notion, that is, that cultural forms and institutions are shaped into new instruments to serve new purposes—emerges from the language of “functional conversion” which Habermas uses to account for the detachment of the literary public sphere from its earlier tutelage to the publicity apparatus of the prince’s court and its refashioning into a properly bourgeois public sphere. This bourgeois status, however, is clearly an historically-acquired rather than an autochthonous attribute. The procedures and the composition of the institutions comprising the public sphere, and the role these play in allowing cultural resources to be harnessed in the cause of rational and public critique, are the results of a historical process through which earlier institutions and practices are functionally converted to new uses:

The process in which the state-governed public sphere was appropriated by the public of private people making use of their reason and was established as a sphere of criticism of public authority was one of functionally converting the public sphere in the world of letters already equipped with institutions of the public and with forums for discussion. (ibid., 51)

The institutions of the literary public sphere, then, comprised a site in which culture, via the new forms of critical commentary and debate through which its reception was mediated, was forged into a means of acting against
the sphere of public authority. It did so in a manner that was conditioned by the role those institutions played in forging a critical and public rationality out of the differentiated interests comprising the private realm. But this does not exhaust what Habermas has to say about this new realm of public culture, or about the directions in which it faced and the surfaces on which it acted. To the contrary, he is clear that, through the literary public sphere, cultural goods became involved in new spheres of action in the relationships they entered into in connection with what Habermas variously characterizes as civil society or the sphere of the social: that is, with the institutions comprising the left-hand column in the diagram above. For if the public sphere mediated between the sphere of public authority and the social, it faced both ways in doing so with the result that the use of cultural resources within the public sphere also had a dual aspect to it. It was, at one and the same time, a means for forming a public opinion in a rational critique of state power, and a means of acting on the social to regulate it. This is made clear in the terms Habermas uses to differentiate the functioning of the modern public sphere from that of the ancient public sphere:

With the rise of a sphere of the social, over whose regulation public opinion battled with public power, the theme of the modern (in contrast to the ancient) public sphere shifted from the properly political tasks of a citizenry acting in common (i.e., administration of law as regards internal affairs and military survival as regards external affairs) to the more properly civic tasks of a society engaged in critical public debate (i.e., the protection of a commercial economy). The political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the regulation of civil society (in contradistinction to the res publica). (ibid., 52)

This dual orientation of the public sphere is reflected in the contrasting positions that the personnel of culture were obliged to adopt according to whether their activities were directed toward the sphere of public authority or that of the social. In the early stages of the public sphere's formation, the new cultural role of art critic was thus, according to Habermas, "a peculiarly dialectical" one in view of the requirement that he serve "at the same time as the public's mandatary and as its educator" (ibid., 41), both taking a lead from the public and directing and organising it. The point, however, is a general one: all of the new forms of criticism (art, theatrical, musical, moral weeklies) and institutions (theatres, museums, concerts, coffee houses) Habermas is concerned with had, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this dual orientation. Nor, at this time, was this perceived as a contradiction: it was by acting on the social that the institutions of the public sphere formed a public opinion which was then able to act on the sphere of public authority.

Habermas associates these aspects of the public sphere with what he
characterizes as "the tension-charged field between state and society" (ibid., 141). His account of the subsequent social-structural transformation of the public sphere rests mainly on his argument concerning the tendencies which, in closing down the gap between state and society, led to what he calls a "refeudalization of society." This resulted from two intersecting processes in which public functions were transferred to private corporate bodies (the modern firm) while, at the same time, the sway of public authority was extended over the private realm. "Only this dialectic of a progressive 'societalisation' of the state," as Habermas puts it, "simultaneously with an increasing 'statification' of society gradually destroyed the basis of the bourgeois public sphere—the separation of state and society" (ibid., 142). Caught in the pincer movement comprised by these two tendencies, the public sphere, in its liberal form, ceased to exist. The contradictory space in which it had operated was no longer there: the autonomy of the social as an independent realm was no longer sustainable as a result of the new forms of private and public administration which directly repoliticized society in subjecting it to increasingly direct and extensive forms of control. At the same time, the development of new forms of mass consumption deprived culture of that hard-won historical autonomy that had earlier allowed it to function as an instrument of criticism through its connection to the public sphere. The forms in which the new mass culture was distributed—book clubs, for example—disconnected it from any public context of debate and criticism except for administered forms (Habermas's examples are the adult education class and the radio panel discussion). The commercialization of culture which had once provided for culture's autonomy now takes it away:

To be sure, at one time the commercialization of cultural goods had been the precondition for rational-critical debate; but it was itself in principle excluded from the exchange relationships of the market and remained the centre of exactly that sphere in which property-owning private people would meet as "human beings" and only as such. Put bluntly: you had to pay for books, theatre, concert, and museum, but not for the conversation about what you had read, heard, and seen and what you might completely absorb only through this conversation. (ibid., 164)

The shortcomings of Habermas's account of this social-structural transformation of the public sphere have been thoroughly rehearsed in the literature. These usually focus on the liability of his account to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School's mass culture critique and the considerable historical foreshortening which characterizes his tendency to treat the period from the 1870s through to the 1950s more or less indiscriminately. The issues I want to focus on here, however, concern two aspects of Habermas's account which, taken separately, might occasion no particular concern but which, when looked at together, suggest a different
light in which the tendencies he is concerned with might be described and accounted for. The first concerns his characterization of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the period in which the public sphere is structurally transformed, as marking the end of the liberal era. The second concerns the marked narrowing in the focus of his attention which results from his limiting his account of the transformation of the public sphere to the press and the book industry. The broader range of institutions which form a part of his account of the historical formation of the classical bourgeois public sphere—museums, concerts, art galleries—do not enter into his account of this later period any more than does the new institution which arguably ought to have been at the centre of an account organized primarily in relation to the literary public sphere: the public library.

Habermas’s perspectives on the first of these matters are drawn from what were, at the time he was writing, the standard Marxist accounts of the shift from liberal to monopoly capitalism. For Habermas, this transformation in the structure of the economy entailed a related move away from liberal forms of government and a consequent closure of the relations between state and society which he summarizes as a tendency toward the "refeudalization" of society. This is extremely questionable. It is, of course, true, to take the British case that he dwells on so much, that the last quarter of the nineteenth century did see the introduction of a new form of liberalism which, in comparison with the "Manchester liberalism" of the earlier period, supported a stronger role for state intervention, particularly in the moral sphere. But it is equally true that the programs of liberal government that developed over this period, especially in so far as they involved using cultural resources to regulate the moral sphere, depended on—and worked to maintain—a separation between state and society. This was evident in their construction of the social as a realm which the state might intervene in only indirectly, through the mechanisms of moral reform, primarily with a view to making the members of society voluntarily self-regulating and self-directing without the need for more direct forms of state intervention. It is clear, moreover, that the programs of late nineteenth-century liberal cultural reformers and administrators were explicitly motivated by a commitment to retain the separation of state and society in opposition to the closure of the gap between the two that was involved in the panoptic and directly interventionist forms of state action implied by eugenic conceptions of the role of government.14

However, I shall not pursue this line of analysis further except to suggest that, to the degree that the separation of state and society was undermined in this period, this had little to do with any "refeudalization" of state-society relations. Rather, it was an effect of the increasing racialization of relations of government as new conceptions of biopower gave rise to increasingly
direct forms of state administration orientated toward the purification of the population (see Stoler 1995). My interest here, to come to my second point, concerns the role that was accorded the institutions Habermas neglects—museums, art galleries, and libraries—in the liberal programs of cultural management characterizing this period. For, although enabling legislation for the establishment of public museums, libraries, and art galleries had existed since the mid-century period, it is not until the last quarter of the century that European governments—at both the national and local levels—begin to invest significantly in the provision of such institutions which, alongside public schooling, constituted the backbone of the public cultural infrastructure until the advent of public broadcasting. While this might accurately be described as a process which resulted in the incorporation of components of the earlier liberal or bourgeois public sphere into the state, this did not result in a closure of the gap between state and society. To the contrary, the purpose of redeploying these institutions of public culture as instruments of government was, precisely, to obviate the need for the state to exercise direct forms of social control by developing a capacity for moral self-regulation in the population at large. The realm of public culture, however much it was now integrated into and directed by the state, continued to function—as in Habermas’s account of its earlier phase of development—as a means for acting on the social as a realm that was still conceived as separate from government. What had changed was not the action of culture as a set of resources deemed capable of shaping the conduct and attributes of individuals through their voluntary self-activity but the social relations within which that action was put to work. The field of “the social” to which the action of culture was to be applied now comprised not the civil society of Habermas’s private realm but a set of problematic behaviors—defined mainly in class terms—that were to be managed while, just as important, this action was to be put to work in the context of institutions that were located within the sphere of government rather than in a realm outside of and opposed to it.

Indeed, from a global perspective, this location of the public sphere within the realm of government has more typically characterized its origins as well as its point of contemporary arrival. To read these institutional complexes in terms of their colonial histories proves instructive in this regard. For the late nineteenth century was also the period in which the public cultural institutions developed in western Europe first began to go global. They did so, however, as parts of histories which fall quite outside the terms of the story Habermas proposes for their European origins, early development, and subsequent transformation. Martin Prosler has written usefully on this subject, remarking that, in the case of museums, their initial spread up to and
including the mid-nineteenth century was limited to white settler colonies in the Americas, India, Australia, and South Africa, and to British colonial territories in Asia (Madras, Lucknow, Lahore, Bangalore, Mathura, and Colombo) (Prosler 1996).

It is clear, however, that the functioning of these institutions in these colonial contexts was sharply different from their European origins. In Australia, for example, museums were parts of a public sphere that was nurtured into existence by government rather than having an earlier history in a pre-existing and separate realm (see Finney 1993). Their formation was, in this sense, as parts of a process through which a civil society was fashioned into being. Similar tendencies characterized their major period of growth in the late nineteenth century (see Kohlstedt 1983) which, like that of the other institutions of public culture such as libraries, art galleries, and art schools (see Candy and Laurent 1994), relied more extensively on direct forms of government support than had been true of early stages in the development of their European counterparts. There was, to put the point bluntly, no time at which these institutions had ever been developed in opposition to, or in critique of, the state in a way that would make it intelligible to view their integration into government as a structural transformation of an earlier condition. In Australia, public culture was thoroughly governmentalized from the outset. Equally important, the surface of the social on which such institutions were to act was conceived in racial as well as class terms in ways that had no parallels in Europe. Unlike their European counterparts, the civil society that was pertinent to the definitions of citizenship characterizing these transplanted institutions was defined in racial terms owing to the manner in which they were distinguished from the indigenous populations which they excluded: in Australia, Aborigines were admitted into museums only as dead specimens (see Lampert 1986, and Turnbull 1991). In India, similarly, museums operated to bond colonial and indigenous elites rather than relating to the population as a whole (see Prakash 1992).

We shall similarly find, in other contexts, that, in being globalized, these institutions were shaped by different histories. Prosler notes that, outside of India and the Dutch East Indies, Asian museums were not developed until the 1870s with museums being opened in Japan (1871), Bangkok (1874), China (1905), and Korea (1908) (Prosler 1996, 25). It is clear, however, that this was mainly a response to the spread of the museum form via the international exhibitions (see Harris 1975; Yoshimi 1993). As such, it had more to do with nationalist and modernizing imperatives than with any acceptance of, or subscription to, European conceptions of citizenship or the democratic values of a public sphere. The same was true of the development of museums in Africa in this period, and especially Egypt where the role that was envisaged for imported western-style public cultural institutions was driven entirely by a
modernizing imperative (see Mitchell 1988). However, I shall not labor the point any further. Although apparently similar in form to their European counterparts, the institutions of public culture that have been translated into other settings in the context of colonial histories have always formed parts of the distinctive socio-cultural relationships in which they have been inserted and which, in turn, they have helped to shape.

The Personnel of Culture
My purpose, then, is to suggest that, with a little "tweaking," Habermas's account of the "societalisation" of the state and the "statification" of society can usefully be seen as addressing the same historical processes Foucault is concerned with—albeit from a different theoretical perspective; Foucault is explicit in his critique of the concept of "the étatisation of society" (Foucault 1991, 103)—in his account of the "governmentalization of the state." I do so not because Foucault's approach to governmentality or the role that it plays in his account of the emergence of liberal forms of government is without problems. There are, however, some advantages in superimposing a Foucauldian optic on the historical processes with which Habermas is concerned. The first is that it becomes possible to offer a more open-ended account of how the institutions that comprised the classical bourgeois public sphere assumed new functions as a result of their subsequent incorporation into relations of government. This opens up to investigation their changing uses in the context of historically mutable relations between government and the social rather than attributing to them a generalized function of social control arising from a general historical closure of state/society relations. The advantages of this for a historical approach to cultural policy are evident. It makes thinkable a much greater variability in the relations between government, culture, and the social as a consequence of the ways in which cultural resources are organized to act on the social in different ways in accordance with shifting governmental conceptions and priorities.

A second advantage is that an account couched in these terms can help prevent a polarization of the relations between critical and practical intellectuals of the kind that Habermasian constructions tend to propose. I have suggested, in my discussion of Habermas's approach to the early formation of the public sphere, that the action of culture within this had a dual orientation in both acting on the social to regulate it while also functioning as means for forming an opinion in which state power was subjected to rational forms of critique. If my emphasis so far has fallen on showing how the transformation of this first orientation might be viewed from a Foucauldian perspective, there is also much to be gained from considering how the institutions of public culture have continued to perform aspects of the second function in spite of their having become branches of government. Indeed, it is, in some cases, precisely
because they are branches of government that these institutions have assumed a function of criticism that is, now, more or less institutionalized. The translation of anti-sexist and cultural diversity policies into the exhibition practices of collecting institutions, for example, has resulted in a considerable amount of cultural effort being dedicated to depicting both past and, where they persist, present culturally discriminatory practices as unacceptable with a view to the role this might play in fashioning new norms of civic conduct. In such cases, where the institutions of public culture have comprised the cultural and intellectual spaces that have played leading roles in both developing and disseminating specific forms of social and cultural criticism, governing and criticism go hand in hand. Where this is so, it is appropriate to refer to such institutions as places in which, just as much as universities and sometimes more so, government employees—whether as administrative or creative staff or, increasingly, as staff performing hybrid functions—have operated as critical intellectuals. They have done so, moreover, precisely in and through their performance of technical functions.

This brings me back to my earlier discussion of the ways in which Habermas's distinction between techné and praxis limits our ability to theorize the varied roles and functions of the personnel of culture in envisaging the technical solely in the form of a purely means-end administrative rationality that is, by definition, critical reason's opposite. For there is then a tendency to impose this grid of oppositions on to the concept of the technical wherever it is used even though this may be contextually inappropriate. An example is McGuigan's interpretation of a suggestion I had made, in an earlier essay, that cultural studies should think of itself as having a role to play in training cultural technicians whom I defined as "intellectual workers less committed to cultural critique as an instrument for changing consciousness than to modifying the functioning of culture by means of technical adjustments to its governmental deployment" (Bennett 1992, 406). McGuigan, in placing a Habermasian tint on this passage, views it as a suggestion that there can be "no normative principles other than administrative usefulness" (1996) that can be drawn on to either specify the aims to which the work of such cultural technicians should be directed or to provide a perspective from which the outcomes of their endeavors might be assessed. This is only so, however, if Habermas is granted a monopoly over the use of the concepts of the technical and the critical so that the oppositional structure he posits between these is then seen as necessarily invoked whenever the two terms are used. There are, however, no good reasons for doing so, and there are plenty of reasons for not doing so if it prevents us from equating the concept of critique with the more general notion of being critical and allows the field of the technical to be thought of in a
manner which does not see being technical and being critical as automatically incompatible.

For the example I gave of the ways cultural resources might be technically adjusted as a part and parcel of their becoming involved in new governmental projects was one to which these oppositions are simply not relevant. It had to do with the role that nineteenth-century romantic aesthetics played in allowing art to be reconceptualized in a manner that made it intelligible to suppose that the activity of government might usefully be directed to the task of bringing art and the workingman closer together in view of the benefits it was expected would follow from exposing the latter to the soothing, elevating, and refining influence of art: less drunkenness, a lower birth rate, lower rates of domestic violence. It was clear to contemporaries, however, that if art were indeed to serve this purpose, then a host of technical changes—and these were endlessly debated at the time—would need to be made to the ways in which works of art were exhibited: how they should be hung, how labeled, how the visitor's route should be organized, what should be said of the art exhibited, what value should be placed on originals versus copies.15 This is not, then, a concept of the technical that can simply be equated with the purely disinterested means-end rationality of the bureau but rather concerns that level of procedures through which particular forms of knowledge and expertise organize the materials with which they work and prepare the social surfaces to which those materials are to be applied in ways which make them amenable to particular kinds of governmental action.16

The history of the relations between culture and government is littered with technical considerations of this kind. These include, in the visual arts, the roles of different theories of the aesthetic, of different conceptions of art's public, of different ideologies of the visible and their role in relation to specific techniques of vision (see Crary 1996), and of different conceptions of visual education. All of these play a crucial role, in any actual context, in influencing the ways in which art is exhibited, to whom it is exhibited, and why, and all of which—as Habermas's account of the refunctioning of culture associated with the formation of the classical bourgeois public sphere acknowledges—involves specific forms of technical expertise which do not fall in the same category as bureaucratic rationality. It is, moreover, through the role which these forms of technical expertise play that cultural resources are adapted to new purposes and, in the process, made infinitely pliable as they are bent to first one governmental project and then another—and all of this through the activities of intellectuals working in the cultural sphere who are neither critics, as McGuigan defines them, nor bureaucrats.
Notes

1 This paper is a modified version of an earlier essay published under the same title as no 2 in the series of Papers in Social and Cultural Research published by the Pavis Centre for Social and Cultural Research at the Open University in 2000. A reduced version of this was subsequently published as “Intellectuals, culture, policy: the practical and the critical” (in Miller 2001, 357–74).

2 This is not to imply that these are the only two theoretical traditions that have contributed to debates in this area. There have been notable feminist contributions to our understanding of the role of gender in organising distinctively feminised intellectual personas and assigning these distinctive functions within the cultural sphere: see, for example, Garrison (1976) and McCarthy (1991). Bourdieu's nuanced accounts of the role of different groups of intellectuals, cultural specialists, and intermediaries have also made a significant contribution (see Bourdieu 1988, 1993, and 1996). However, a somewhat different assessment is called for of his account of intellectuals as the bearers of the "historical universal." I have discussed this elsewhere (Bennett 2005).

3 I should add, to avoid possible confusion, that my attention is limited to Habermas's initial account of the public sphere. While acknowledging that Habermas has subsequently revised this in the light of the critical debates it has generated see especially the chapter "Civil society and the public sphere" in Habermas (1996, 328–87) no account is taken of these revisions here. Although Habermas's revisions are significant ones, especially in re-locating his original account of the public sphere as a historically specific form of what have proved to be more mutable public sphere/civil society relations, these revisions do not bear significantly on the accounts of intellectuals that I am concerned with here as these have drawn mainly on the earlier work.

4 See, however, for a thoughtful assessment of the limitations of this legacy, Collins and Murroni (1996).

5 McGuigan has since generously acknowledged some of the problems his formulations on this subject gave rise to and has clarified his position in ways that indicate both the limits of the place occupied by academic intellectuals and the need for them to be open to learn from other intellectuals in the cultural sector. See the postscript to McGuigan (2003).

6 There are, however, other traditions of analysis that might be drawn on for the same purpose. Bruno Latour, for example, concludes his Science in Action with an equally spirited defence of bureaucracy from the scorn and loathing of science; see Latour (1987, 254–257).

7 See, for an account which locates the emergence of the "good bureaucrat" in a longer historical perspective, Saunders (1997). Saunders's interest is with the development of the common law as a specific mode of practical reason and with the cultivation of an ethical obligation on the part of lawyers to uphold the procedures of the law rather than act out
of their own religious or political convictions.

9 A more expanded version of the line of an argument proposed by Hunter has also become available since the first version of this paper was published; see Du Gay (2000), especially the chapter on Bauman.

10 This is not to suggest that Said’s criticisms of that complex are unsound. This question, together with Said’s criticisms of the USA’s Israel-Palestine policies and his broader criticisms of ongoing colonialisms, are not under discussion here.

11 The literature here is vast. The best representative sample of the varied range of work to which Habermas’s concept of the public sphere has given rise is the collection edited by Craig Calhoun (1992).

12 While it is true that Habermas’s work has been drawn on in discussions of the role that the press and other media played, in a variety of Asian contexts, in the development of political movements directed against both indigenous and colonial forms of autocratic rule (see, for example, Milner 1996), such usage has rarely implied an acceptance of the more specific historical and theoretical aspects of Habermas’s writings on this subject. The historical limitations of applying Habermas’s concept of the public sphere to Japan, where the emperor system imposed a different structure on the space of public meanings, have thus been fully argued by Tatsuro Hanada (see Hanada 1995). In Allen Chun’s perspective, the post-war public cultures of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have been shaped mainly by the hegemonic imperatives of nation-state formation; only since the 1980s have democratic conceptions of the public sphere played a major role in questioning the closures of these officially administered, proto-national public cultures (see Chun 1996). For Ping-hui Liao, the proto-nationalistic aspects of these territorial public cultures is now being eroded, or at least complicated, by the emergence of a “hyphenated and transcultural” Chinese public sphere constitute a shared field of political action and social habitus formed by the new forms of cultural connectivity and exchange created by satellite communications networks (see Liao 1995). Similar qualifications have attended the application of the concept of the public sphere to Australian debates. For indigenous Australians, for example, the acquisition of equal entitlements in the field of public culture which accompanied the acquisition of citizenship has been associated with an ongoing history of the defence of kinship rights whose legitimacy is organized in terms which stand outside of, and in critique of, the universalist rhetorics of “public” and “citizenship” (see Rowse 1993).

13 It is symptomatic of lapsarian discourse that what is for one theorist a degeneration of a previous norm is, for another, the normative ideal from which other lapses are to be assessed. The adult education class that is, for Habermas, a purely administered form of culture represents, for Raymond Williams, a democratic norm of face-to-face mutuality and curriculum democracy which later mass-mediated distance teaching systems surrender to the demands of a technological rationality. See Williams (1989).

14 I have argued this point at greater length in relation to the role played by liberal appropriations of Darwin’s thought in organising a morally interventionist role for government that would either complement or override the laws of nature; see Bennett (1997). For more direct statements of the extent to which the liberal thought of this period explicitly
pitted against itself the closure of the gap between state and society, see Huxley (1890 and 1894).

15 I have since dealt with these matters in greater detail. See Bennett (1995).

16 See Rose and Miller (1992) for a fully elaborated account of the role which different forms of technical expertise play in translating specific forms of knowledge into programmes of government.

**Works Cited**


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We are in a crisis of belonging, a population crisis, of who, what, when, and where. More and more people feel as though they do not belong; more and more people are applying to belong; and more and more people are not counted as belonging. Economic welfare is increasingly disowned as a responsibility of the sovereign-state and pushed onto individuals and communities, onto civil society. Traditional means of direct state control have been added to by doctrines of self-management, through a project of neoliberal government that seeks to manage subjectivity, and often does so through culture—ironically, the very thing supposedly imperiled by threats to belonging. Models of national unity have been displaced or supplemented by sectarian allegiances below and across the level of the sovereign-state, while managerialist and neoclassical discourses of scarcity have deregulated the social, recasting the population as consumers and believers in a way that differentiates between social groups via a fine, culturally precise grain. This crisis began in the 1960s and has continued since, because of:

- changes in the global division of labor, as manufacturing left the First World and subsistence agriculture was eroded in the Third.
- demographic growth, through unprecedented public-health initiatives.
- increasing numbers of refugees, following numerous conflicts amongst satellite states of the US and the USSR.
- transformations of these struggles into intra- and trans-national violence, after one half of the imperial couplet unraveled.
- the decline of state socialism and the triumph of finance capital.
- augmented levels of human trafficking.
- the elevation of consumption as a site of social action and public policy.
- renegotiation of the 1940s–70s compact across the West between capital, labor, and government, reversing that period’s redistribution of wealth downwards.
- deregulation of key sectors of the economy, especially the media; and
- the development of civil-rights and social-movement discourses and institutions that changed the division between public and private life, extending ideas of cultural difference from tolerating the aberrant to querying the normal, and commodifying the result.
Of the approximately 200 sovereign-states in the world, over 160 are culturally heterogeneous, and they are comprised of 5000 ethnic groups. Between 10 and 20% of the world’s population currently belongs to a racial/linguistic minority in their country of residence. Nine hundred million people affiliate with groups that suffer systematic discrimination. Perhaps three-quarters of the world system sees politically active minorities, and there are more than 200 movements for self-determination, spread across nearly 100 states (Thio 2002; Abu-Laban 2000, 510; Brown and Ganguly 2003, 1, n. 1; Falk 2004, 11). Even the “British-Irish archipelago,” once famed “as the veritable forge of the nation state, a template of modernity,” has been subdivided by cultural difference, as a consequence of both peaceful and violent action, and a revisionist historiography that notes the millennial migration of Celts from the steppes; Roman colonization; invading Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Frisians, and Normans; attacking Scandinavians; trading Indians, Chinese, Irish, Lombards, and Hansa; refugee Europeans and Africans; and the 25,000 black folks in London in the 18th century (Nairn 2003, 8; Alibhai-Brown 2005).

There are now five key zones of immigration—North America, Europe, the Western Pacific, the Southern Cone, and the Persian Gulf—and five key types of migration: international refugees, internally displaced people, voluntary migrants, the enslaved, and the smuggled. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers at the beginning of the 21st century was 21.5 million—three times the figure twenty years earlier (United Nations Development Programme 2004, 6 and 2; Massey 2003, 146; Cohen 1997). The International Organization for Migration estimates that global migration increased from 75 million to 150 million people between 1965 and 2000, and the UN says 2% of all people spent 2001 outside their country of birth, more than at any other moment in history. Migration has doubled since the 1970s, and the European Union has seen arrivals from beyond its borders grow by 75% in the last quarter century. Many such people come and go serially—one and a half billion airline tickets were sold in 2000 (Castles and Miller 2003, 4; Annan 2003; United Nations Development Programme 2004, 30).

This mobility, whether voluntary or imposed, temporary or permanent, is accelerating. Along with new forms of communication, it enables unprecedented levels of cultural displacement, renewal, and creation between and across origins and destinations. Most of these exchanges are structured in dominance: the majority of international investment and trade takes place within the First World, while the majority of immigration is from the Third World to the First (Pollard 2003, 70; Sutcliffe 2003, 42, 44). In response to new migration, there are simultaneous tendencies towards open and closed borders. None of the major recipients of migrants raced to ratify the UN’s 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Annan 2003), even as they benefit economically and culturally from these arrivals.

Opinion polling suggests sizeable
majorities across the globe believe their national ways of life are threatened by global flows of people and things, and so they oppose immigration. In other words, their cultures are under threat. At the same time, they also feel unable to control their individual destinies. In other words, their subjectivities are under threat (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2003, 2004). This has led to outbursts of regressive nationalism, whether via the belligerence of the United States, the anti-immigrant stance of Western Europe, or the crackdown on minorities in Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Arab world (Halliday 2004). The populist outcome is often violent—race riots in 30 British cities in the 1980s; pogroms against Roma and migrant workers in Germany in the 1990s and Spain in 2000; the intifadas; migrant-worker struggles in France in 1990—on it goes. Virtually any arrival can be racialized, though particular feeling is often reserved for expatriates from former colonies (Downing and Husband 2005, xi, 7).

In addition to this international lumping and splitting, the specifically heterogeneous hybridity of urban experience is on the increase. Across the globe, cities have undergone “macrocephalic” growth (Scott 1998, 49), to the point where they burst at the seams—not so much with opportunity and differentiation, but desperation and sameness. UN HABITAT estimates that a billion people reside in slum conditions, a figure expected to double in the next three decades. In 1950, only London and New York were big enough cities to qualify as megalopolises. By 1970, there were 11 such places, with 33 projected for 2015. The fifteen biggest cities in 1950 accounted for 82.5 million people; in 1970 the aggregate was 140.2 million; and in 1990, 189.6 million. Four hundred cities today have more than a million occupants, and 37 have between 8 and 26 million (García Canclini 1999, 74; Scott 1998, 49; Dogan 2004, 347). Almost 50% of the world’s population lived in cities in 2000, up from 30% in 1960. In fact more people are urban dwellers today than were alive in 1960, and for the first time in world history, more people now live in cities than rural areas. Most of the remainder are desperately poor peasants...
(Davis 2004, 5; Observatoire de la Finance and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research 2003, 19; Amin 2003). Across Latin America, for instance, 70% of people moved from the country to the city in the four decades from the mid-20th century, with Mexico City growing from 1.6 million residents in 1940 to 19–29 million today, depending on which figures you consult (Martín-Barbero 2003, 40; García Canclini 2001, 13). The emergence of capitalism in China is another key instance. It had 293 cities in 1978. Today it has 640. These changes are reactions to economic, military, and social polices, such as neoliberal economics’ insistence on agricultural trade over subsistence, military planning, and corporate domination over local concerns. In India, as many as 55 million people may have been displaced from agricultural life because of dams constructed in the name of development: the Green Revolution dispatched surplus workers away from rural disappointment and towards urban hope (Castles and Miller 2003, 3; Roy 2004; Davis 2004, 10, 7).

In the post-1989 epoch, crises of cognitive mapping—where am I and how do I get to where I want to be?—have been added to by crises of ideological mapping—who are we and what do we stand for? (UN HABITAT 2003; Martín-Barbero 2000, 336). No wonder Mexico City’s people live with the heavily ironic motto “La Ciudad de Esperanza”—the city of hope. They go there for a better material existence. In doing so, they lose the familiarity and security of the everyday in a world that sometimes appears to be “rushing backwards to the age of Dickens” (Davis 2004, 11).

At this time of crisis, art and custom have become resources for markets and nations—reactions to the crisis of belonging and to economic necessity. As a consequence, culture is more than textual signs or everyday practices. It also provides the legitimizing ground on which particular groups (e.g., African Americans, gays and lesbians, the hearing-impaired, or evangelical Protestants) claim resources and seek inclusion in national narratives (Yúdice 2002, 40 and 1990; Martín-Barbero 2003, 40).

This intermingling has implications for both aesthetic and social hierarchies. Culture comes to “regulate and structure . . . individual and collective lives” (Parekh 2000, 143) in competitive ways that harness art and collective meaning for governmental and commercial purposes. So the Spanish Minister for Culture can address Sao Paolo’s 2004 World Cultural Forum with a message of cultural maintenance that is both about economic development and the preservation of aesthetic and customary identity. Culture is understood as a means to growth via “cultural citizenship,” through a paradox—that universal (and marketable) value is placed on the specificity of different cultural backgrounds. Similarly, Taiwan’s Premier can broker an administrative reorganization of government as a mix of economic efficiency and “cultural citizenship” (qtd. in Foro Cultural 2004 and Yu 2004). This simultaneously instrumental and moral tendency is especially important in the US, albeit in a rather different way. For the United States is virtually alone amongst wealthy countries, both in the widespread view of its citizens that their cul-
ture is superior to others, and the successful sale of that culture around the world (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2003). The US has blended preeminence in two cultural registers, exporting both popular prescriptions for entertainment and economic prescriptions for labor. These have become signs and sources of the global crisis of belonging, even as their sender displays a willful ignorance of why the rest of the world may not always and everywhere wish to follow its example, despite buying its popular culture (Carreño 2001, 22).

My working assumption is that cultures are constitutively blended. Reactionary and progressive ideas about cultural essences are equally flawed, given the multiplicity of other affinities that even those who share a particular culture may have (Benhabib 2002, 4). Rather than operating from the idea of culture as superordinate, I assume that it is subject to the shifts and shocks of material politics that characterize other social norms, and must be understood via a blend of political economy, textual analysis, and ethnography. I argue that the right has been as important in the creation of cultural politics as the left, through forms of neoliberal governance that turn identities into market and religious niches that are linked to self-formation and social control through consumption. If this is correct, then for a progressive politics to thrive, new forms of social obligation must be levied in return for the fetishization of deregulated, commodified, and superstitious difference. This can be done by appealing to collective responsibility as a quid pro quo for commercial and faith-based targeting—a way of connecting what in the Hispanic Americas is called la cultura politica with la politica cultural—linking civic culture to cultural policy.

The global crisis I have briefly described, and its associated cultural ramifications, are, it seems to me, the backdrop to the papers collected here. Barbro Klein asks, “[i]n what way is the ascendancy of cultural heritage as term and phenomenon linked to the ascendancy of intense multicultural co-existence? How is the heritage of various ethnic Others to be understood in relationship to that which is regarded Our Own?” In addressing these questions, Klein refers to the Swedish case. Its fetishization of the peasantry in the 19th century resonates for me with the Mexican situation, where art forms akin to socialist-realist indigenous heroization of the worker can be found outside Marxism, but inside every zocalo (town-square), as part of utilizing inclusive heritage as a means of mobilizing the popular classes. Some of Klein’s analysis details moments when Sweden was an export culture, via its great migration to the upper mid-west of the United States, and I wondered about how that exodus factored into domestic debates about the nation, and contemporary policies of refugee migration and Swedish culture abroad. Cris Shore asks: “is the European Union (or, to use its earlier incarnation, the European Community), one people or many? And what is, or should be, the relationship between peoplehood and culture in the EU’s emerging system of supranational governance?” Shore ponders why culture emerged as a key precept in the Union
It seems to me that this distinction relies on very large generalizations about bureaucracy—that assume it does what it says, and that economic self-interest, specifically class interest, is separate from how policy is formed. Even if bureaucrats resemble the figures outlined here, they are often the pleasure-things of politicians and corporations, as any account of neoliberalism clarifies. None of the authors cited from the post-governmentality tradition has undertaken ethnographic or political-economic evaluations of contemporary cultural administration across the world (or displayed great awareness of that large literature), so what is the basis for their claims about equivalent self-reflexivity among direct servants of the state and capital to that of critical intellectuals? It is true that the claim for the general intellectual as an independent scion of truth who cuts through special interests is problematic—anyone actually watching public intellectuals at work, as per media mavens or other universal experts, can see that. But it is also true that distance from the specific interests that drive policy, along with the protections of liberal education and other arms-length private and public infrastructures, propels a certain autonomy in contrast with culturecrats.

These are stimulating, provocative papers. Each one touches on issues I have long pondered, and each one taught me many new things about them. I think they could have benefited from a political-economic analysis that foregrounded the sorts of issues with which I began this comentario. The questions of who gains,
who labors, who flees, and who interprets are at the core of culture and its policies. In theoretical terms, the situation seems to call for a blend of ethnography and political economy to comprehend the labor of cultural policy.

Notes

1 Four million people travel as slaves each year, generating revenues of up to US$7 billion annually through forced labor, especially in the sex industries (Maryniak 2003).

Works Cited


In Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism, sociologist and black feminist critic Patricia Hill Collins challenges African-Americans to “start from scratch” and create a progressive black sexual politics in the age of a “new racism.” Drawing upon diverse fields of critical social theory (feminism, sociology, critical race theory, queer theory, cultural studies), Collins presents a work that is intent on being accessible across disciplines and beyond the academy. She engages with a rich variety of examples from black popular culture and mass media, and these, along with her glossary and extensive notes, give her study greater value and should also appeal to undergraduates, in particular African-American students, who, according to Collins, rely heavily on radio, film and other media sources for information on gender and sexuality. For her, mass media is the primary technology through which dubious claims that “racism does not exist” are constructed, manipulated, and distributed for international public consumption (54–55). From Tupac Shakur and Lil’ Kim to Booty Call and Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner, Collins’s deft analysis of diverse media also provides key and compelling evidence for her theoretical arguments concerning the contours of culture, domination, and black cultural resistance.

Capitalism and the disparate distribution of resources structure this “new racism,” which is “new,” Collins argues, because it is global: racializing wealth and poverty on a global scale, while situating people of African descent at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. For her, the new racism is also transnational, hence, racial inequality transverses borders in ways that circumvent local and national governments’ absolute power over shaping racial policies. Throughout the black diaspora this idea continues to prevail as black populations experience social and economic powerlessness. A key function of the new racism, she asserts, is to undermine social protest against anti-black racism within nation-states.

Black diaspora scholars such as Paul Gilroy (There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: the cultural politics of race and nation. London: Routledge, 1987), Edmund T. Gordon (Disparate Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African-Nicaraguan Community. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), and Asale Angel-Ajani (“Italy’s Racial Cauldron: Immigration, Criminalization, and the Cultural Politics of Race,” Cultural Dynamics 12:331–352, 2000) have also theorized the new lexicon of race and racism (class, nation, culture) that has emerged in recent decades. What distinguishes Collins’s work is the basic theoretical tenet that frames her ideas: any progressive black racial ideology cannot be based on gender subordination. Black Sexual Politics builds on Collins’s former books, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990) and Fighting Words: Black
Women and the Search for Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) in which she developed the idea that black women’s intellectual traditions are the foundation for a distinctive black feminist standpoint. As with her previous works, Black Sexual Politics pushes for a broader critique of racial, gender, class, and sexual oppression and shows Collins’s ongoing commitment to the global struggle for social justice. Whereas in previous works Collins privileged black women’s experiences, Black Sexual Politics focuses on women as well as men’s experiences as deeply racialized in gender-specific ways. Collins affirms that “talking about gender does not mean focusing solely on women’s issues,” (6) as gender ideology must encompass ideas about both black masculinity and femininity.

Black Sexual Politics is divided into three parts that include nine chapters. Part I, “African Americans and the New Racism,” introduces the conceptual framework for analyzing black sexual politics in the United States, recognizing the crucial link between black political economy and gender relations. For example, in chapter three, Collins suggests that the metaphor of the “prison” and the “closet” might illustrate how oppressions of race and sexuality are interwoven. The prison may be likened to racism and the closet to sexual oppression. Both systems use state-sanctioned mechanisms of social control such as segregation to maintain racial and sexual hierarchies and to subjugate black people. “Coming out” of the closet or attaining freedom from the prison reflect resistance to racism and heterosexism.

The three chapters in Part II, “Rethinking Black Gender Ideology,” examine how the mass media globalizes class-specific images of black women. These demonizing images of “bitches” and “bad mothers” influence local public policies such as welfare programs in the U.S. One particularly striking image Collins describes is the “new” image of the middle-class “Educated Black Bitch,” which, she suggests, illustrates how black women’s financial success is devalued, pathologized, and perceived as a problem for black social and economic progress (184). As Collins writes, these images of black women “help to justify and shape the new racism of a desegregated, color-blind America” (147).

Part III, “Toward a Progressive Black Sexual Politics,” broadens the definition of state-sanctioned violence as a form of political and social control of black men and black women’s bodies. The new racism reveals the “past-in-present” aspect of racial formation whereby traditional and colonial ideas of racial domination persist today with real material effects such as the widespread violence of unemployment, incarceration, and environmental pollution. One of the most striking statements in this section is Collins’s bold acknowledgement that “Black people may be bombarded with gender-specific images that deem black bodies as less desirable if not downright ugly” (283). Collins calls for a new body politics that promotes the “honest body,” or rather an “ethic of honesty and personal accountability within all relationships that involve sexual contact” (282). This approach to gender and sexuality within the African American community breaks
the silence surrounding intra-community sexual violence as well as the spread of HIV/AIDS. The very real possibility of disease, physical suffering, and death underlies the urgency of non-oppressive forms of sexual practices.

As Collins repeats throughout the text, neither the subjugation of women nor men is acceptable in a just society. This book is a much needed text that pushes for the broader conceptualization of oppositional theories and social action. It is exactly this linking of collective identity formation, community building, empowerment and politics that makes the future of anti-racism resistance movements hopeful. The construction of black men’s and women’s collective experiences with racial and gender subjugation operates in conjunction with necessary acts of resistance against racism, sexism, and homophobia. No matter how restrictive the structures of racial oppression, black people find ways to resist by organizing uprisings in cities or by just surviving homophobic persecution. Black sexual politics must be grounded in actual social conditions and not in mere abstraction for it to be considered oppositional. Specifically, Collins recognizes that anti-racist and anti-sexist critiques must also address the socioeconomic needs of black people to include their access to adequate health care, habitable housing, personal safety, and other vital resources.

In spite of these significant contributions, Black Sexual Politics still has its shortcomings. As Collins herself admits, Black Sexual Politics is a “diagnostic project” that is “heavy on problems and short on solutions” (9). The text is more deconstructive than constructive and offers little by way of concrete solutions on how to proceed with the global struggle for human rights. Moreover, while Collins characterizes the new racism and social justice as inherently transnational and diasporic, she does not succeed in breaking away from the US-centric perspective that she purports to avoid. Her discussion of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, a reality that resembles the epidemic within black communities in the United States, is the only attempt to illustrate the global implications of sexual politics. Another limitation is Black Sexual Politics’ lack of a critical perspective on the structural constraints of gender difference and sexism in same-sex relationships. As Collins acknowledges, LGBT relationships do not escape racism, but they also do not escape rigid definitions of normative gender behaviors. What then would the new black sexual politics mean for healthy non-sexist relationships between LGBT and heterosexual blacks and for the production of a new body politics that challenges deeply entrenched notions of masculinity and femininity in both communities? An exploration of this question would greatly benefit this work. Despite this, Black Sexual Politics continues the ongoing process of global black liberation for men and women by advancing a sense of community that affirms the inherent self-worth of all black people and encourages political activism aimed at challenging the multiple manifestations of the (not so) new racism.

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When I was a graduate student in the late Alan Dundes' folklore seminar, he had each one of us select a theoretical topic, get the reading list from him, and then make a presentation for the class. Although I didn't select postmodernism, I was disappointed with the materials available at that time. Later, when I began to write my dissertation research proposal, I included a section on folklore and postmodernism relying in good part on the works of Pertti J. Anttonen. I had acquired my many-xeroxed copy of his research, which had been published in Nordic Frontiers: Recent Issues in Modern Traditional Culture in Nordic Countries (Edited by Pertti J. Anttonen and Reimund Kvideland. NIF Publications 27, 17–33. Turku: Nordic Institute of Folklore, 1993) and passed along for a few years from colleague to colleague before finally landing on my desk. The next year, I noticed a frantic looking graduate student. When I asked her what was wrong, she told me that she was to present on postmodernism in the seminar, and Dundes had given her a reference to the article I had used. Unfortunately, it didn't exist on campus, giving rise to her acutely-felt predicament. Future students were destined to follow in her path.

Happily, this unfortunate situation should now be largely rectified with the publication of this important new book by Pertti Anttonen. Not only will this ease the frantic, late-night library searches of graduate students, but it will also bring many scholars to the theoretical scholarship that Anttonen has forcefully tracked and pioneered, by bringing many of his works—both published and unpublished—together in this slim but dense volume.

His focus is on tradition, post/ modernity, and the nation-state. “My starting point is that the concept of tradition is inseparable from the idea and experience of modernity...”, and that “…since the concepts of tradition and modern are fundamentally modern, what they aim to and are able to describe, report, and denote is epistemologically modern” (12). Tradition in his view is a creation of modernity, giving the self-imagined nation a claim to the state status. This view turns on its head the more usual outlook in which tradition and modernity are opposed, and also entwines both concepts in a postmodern framework and within the political context of the modern nation-state.

One might easily see how modernity views and promotes tradition, but Anttonen goes further, saying instead that tradition does not exist, at least for his purposes, outside of modernity. While Anttonen does state at one point that “This does not mean that the phenomena regarded as folklore do not ontologically exist” (57), he nonetheless talks not about their ontology but only their discursive elements, leaving the curious impression that traditions do not exist outside of modernity’s gaze. Of course, this is a hallmark of a
deconstructionist, postmodernist approach. Can we talk about reality, or can we only talk about talking about it? Is there a reality outside of jargon, outside of viewpoints? Common sense would tend to say yes, but postmodernist outlooks like this tend to say no, or at least de-emphasize this aspect until it effectively disappears from the argument. This is a work which talks about talking about things.

But for a folklorist, talking about things can easily be seen as a thing in itself, and here Anttonen lays bare a master narrative of how states (especially in Europe, and especially Finland) came to think of themselves as epic-sharing kinfolk. In this Anttonen excels, recounting the involvement of modernity and tradition (including language) in the rise of the new political configurations. The book speaks with great authority on the development of folklore theory from its inception, but with a focus on the changes wrought in the 1960s and on through the 1980s and '90s, providing an incisive and useful overview of many of the core concepts and writings around which the field of folklore currently revolves.

Among the newer works mentioned is the somewhat related Locating Irish Folklore: Tradition, Modernity, Identity in which Diarmuid Ó Giolláin traces the entwinings of tradition and nationalism in Ireland (Cork: Cork University Press, 2000). The two countries have their similarities in many ways, and both have produced some of the most important works on folkloristics. Nonetheless, whereas Ó Giolláin states that “[t]he modern age is inherently destructive of traditions” (2000, 12), Anttonen replies that although often used as semantic opposites (“such as old and new, right and left, warm and cold, north and south, east and west, raw and cooked, etc.” [37]), tradition and modernity “must not be seen as oppositional, since modernity contains traditionality” (37). In a similar vein, Anttonen asserts that the folkloristic gaze “does not only find historicity and collectivity in human communication and social life; it makes it folklore, that is, folklorizes it” (57).

In addition to the sweeping main thrust of the book (post/modernism, nationalism, and folklore) are also smaller forays bristling with possibilities into such areas as political identity, media, and globalization. These hold implications for all students of culture and politics.

The last 56 pages are dedicated to discussing the particular case of Finland. Often viewed as a good example of a “homogenous” nation-state, Anttonen shows how this homogeneity was constructed, and the effects on the ground in different parts of the region flowing from this conceptualization: how the Saami were excluded, the Karelians exalted, and the Swedes forgotten. Also interesting is the mixed reception that the scientific category of a Finno-Ugric language family has received, with some seeing links to a greater Finno-Ugric ethnic group, but with many people wary of establishing links to people in a territory belonging to the Soviet bloc. As throughout the rest of the book, Anttonen presents convincing, well thought-out logical arguments, with implications far beyond Finland’s borders.
Given all that this volume has to offer, it is somewhat disappointing that the book is not a smoother read. Anttonen states in his introduction that “[d]espite the fact that most of the chapters are based on previously published articles, this book is not an anthology. The chapters are meant to form a monographic entity . . .” While that may have been his intention, it does not read like a monographic entity—we are told numerous times the role that the Fennomans played in the development of state of Finland, for example. This sort of thing could have been rectified by a thorough, comprehensive editing. And while most of the book is international in scope, we suddenly on page 124 find ourselves talking about Finland exclusively, without much context or explanation. All in all, it reads about halfway between an anthology and a monograph, which is an uncomfortable mix.

Also, while Anttonen’s mastery of English as a foreign language is complete, his sentence-building can at times be overly abstract and dense, producing such cumbersome humdingers as:

“So, when folklorists such as Glassie and Dorst in the late 1980s disassociated themselves from antimodernist postmodernism, they associated themselves with antimodernist modernism, which, paradoxically, is quite promodern in its antimodernism.” (75)

While this can be frustrating even for the native English speaker, it can provide a serious obstacle for those with English as a foreign language.

Still, these quibbles are over presentation, not substance. During her presentation at the American Folklore Society conference in Atlanta in 2005, Outi Lehtipuro commented at one point that good books are those which provide a pleasurable reading experience and smooth read (in the sense of “curling up with a good book”), while great books are books which significantly advance our conceptual understanding. There are many good books that are not great, and there are some great books that are not good. For example, Lévi-Strauss’ Elementary Structures of Kinship is a turgid and interminable read, yet is undoubtedly a great book, shattering the previous notions of kinship as a strictly social arrangement based on descent, and giving rise to the understanding of the cultural aspects of kinship, including its links to myths, rituals, and gender. Likewise, Tradition through Modernity does not provide the smoothest read. It does not flow along a pleasant story, nor entice one with sugared prose. But, and I do not say this lightly, I do think it may be a great book, one which will become a hallmark of theoretical folkloristic research while also touching upon many other areas as well, perhaps most especially postmodernism itself.

For anyone wanting to improve their understanding of the relationship between post/ modernity, nationalism, tradition, and folklore scholarship, this will be an authoritative text. It accomplishes this on the one hand by a thorough understanding and explication of post/ modern theoretical developments, and on the other by proposing exciting, if at times extreme, theoretical arguments
and viewpoints. In this book the reader will find many quotable passages where the author condenses complex ideas into powerfully terse prose. I highly recommend this work to anyone with an interest in folklore theory.

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As any scholar even vaguely familiar with the critical dialogue on Ernest Hemingway’s life and work knows, “Papa’s” relationship with and literary treatment of women has, for decades now, been fraught with controversy. His biography reveals a man who, despite four marriages and numerous affairs, found neither stability nor lasting satisfaction in his relationships with women. His short stories and novels likewise reveal an ambivalence toward and distrust of women—sentiments so intensely expressed in some of his works that they have long been considered proof of the author’s sexism. Indeed, from Brett Ashley to Catherine Bourne, the “Hemingway Bitch” has become a literary icon, read by some feminist critics as both an embodiment of Papa’s misogyny and a reinforcement of the negative female stereotypes that have been perpetuated for centuries. Given Hemingway’s seeming inability to portray women as independent, strong, and sympathetic, as well as his iconic status as the quintessential “man’s man,” why should women continue to read, teach, and write about his work? Why, if at all, should we pay attention to Papa and his patriarchal ways?

The answers to these questions can be found in Hemingway and Women: Female Critics and the Female Voice, edited
by Lawrence A. Broer and Gloria Holland. Broer and Holland have assembled an impressive array of seventeen critical essays—all authored, as the title suggests, by female critics—that intervene in “forty years of often superficial or misguided interpretations of Hemingway’s treatment of women and gender” (ix). Rather than dismissing both Hemingway and his work as sexist, interpreting his female characters as one-dimensional and unsympathetic, or deeming the author undeserving of a female readership and critical base, the scholars included in this volume recognize, address, and grapple with the complexity of Hemingway’s relationship with women, both real and fictional. Indeed, by “argu[ing] cogently for the central role of women in the Hemingway canon,” the essays in this collection “expand and deepen our appreciation of gender issues in Hemingway’s novels and stories, and in his life as a whole” (xiii). It is worth noting, however, that the authors’ “appreciation” of Hemingway only rarely borders on adoration; this collection is not an unequivocal, uncritical celebration of Papa. As Broer and Holland note in their introduction, “these scholars do not speak in a single voice with equal sympathy for Hemingway’s treatment of women nor do they respond with like readings of Hemingway’s life and work” (xiii). What the scholars included in this collection do share is a common aim: to reveal how the conflicts in Hemingway’s short stories, novels, and personal relationships—familial, romantic, and professional—“revolve around questions of gender . . . and that understanding these compli-
cated gender dynamics offers vital new ways of interpreting Hemingway’s fiction as a whole” (xiv).

Broer and Holland have divided the book into two sections, the first of which, “Heroines and Heroes, the Female Presence,” features essays that fall into three groupings. The first grouping explores the role, characterization, and significance of Hemingway’s fictional women. By examining major characters such as Brett Ashley in *The Sun Also Rises*, Catherine Barkley in *A Farewell to Arms*, and Maria and Pilar in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, as well as minor characters such as Nick Adams’ sister, Littless, in “The Last Good Country” and the wife in “Cat in the Rain,” these scholars provide us with new ways of seeing how, as Gail D. Sinclair insists in her essay “Revisiting the Code: Female Foundations and ‘The Undiscovered Country’ in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*,” “Hemingway’s iceberg principle applies to [these female characters] as profoundly as it does to any other character or novel in the canon” (94).

Sinclair further demonstrates how Maria and Pilar, characters who have been largely overlooked in critical commentary on Hemingway’s women, are “not easily reducible, nor should they be, to the traditional polemic extremes critically assigned to Hemingway’s fiction” (108). She argues, in fact, that these two women collectively embody the Hemingway code—“living simply within the confines of one’s circumstances, but acting courageously under those constraints” (97)—a code heretofore understood as almost exclusively male. Similarly, Kathy G. Willingham, in “The Sun Hasn’t Set Yet: Brett Ashley and
the Code Hero Debate," asserts that Hemingway’s most famous female character “provides a model no less significant, important, or romantic than any of the male code heroes who have inspired or influenced countless readers” (34). Several other essays in this section likewise re-read Hemingway’s fictional women, demonstrating how the heroism, depth, and complexity so often attributed to Hemingway’s male protagonists and so often interpreted as the exclusive province of men, are traits shared by many of his female characters. In short, these critics reveal not only how Hemingway deals with the matter of women, but also how the women matter in Hemingway’s œuvre.

Part 1 also features essays that interrogate both Hemingway’s relationship to the feminine and the female reader’s relationship to Hemingway’s work. In the most convincing and impressively researched essay in the volume, “Santiago and the Eternal Feminine: Gendering La Mar in The Old Man and the Sea,” Susan F. Beegel offers a stunning interdisciplinary essay in which she establishes the centrality of the “Eternal Feminine” in Hemingway’s novella. Drawing from a remarkable array of sources—mythology, religion, folklore, marine history, and literature—Beegel argues that the sea itself, “gender[ed] as feminine throughout the text” (132), is “a protagonist on an equal footing with Santiago” (131). In “On Defiling Eden: The Search for Eve in the Garden of Sorrow,” Ann Putnam similarly explores the presence of the feminine in the most unlikely of places: stories such as “Big Two-Hearted River” and Green Hills of Africa, which feature “a solitary hero journeying across . . . paradisal landscapes” (111). Putnam’s desire to elicit the feminine in Hemingway’s œuvre stems from a crucial question that has long haunted female Hemingway scholars: “how do female readers who have always been moved by Hemingway’s works . . . negotiate theories that insist upon the exclusionary quality of the Hemingway world?” (110). This critical tension that Putnam identifies—a tension which underlies many of the essays in this volume—is most eloquently and compellingly addressed in Linda Patterson Miller’s “In Love with Papa.” Combining personal reflection on Hemingway’s work with critical analysis of his female characters, Miller acknowledges that “any lover of Hemingway’s art who surveys his biography feels a bit betrayed by the man” (40), but ultimately explains that her love of Hemingway stems from “the emotional complexity of his art and of his heroines . . . His women embody the 7/8 of the iceberg that is down under and carry much of the work’s emotional weight accordingly” (6).

Finally, several essays in “Heroines and Heroes, the Female Presence” examine the politics of gender, sexuality, and desire that characterize Papa’s work, drawing attention to how his narratives often blur rather than reinscribe boundaries between male and female, masculine and feminine, straight and gay. Nancy R. Comley and Rose Marie Burwell specifically address how these blurrings have been suppressed in Hemingway’s posthumous publications. In “The Light from Hemingway’s Gar-
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Regendering Papa,” Comley discusses how The Garden of Eden challenges the longstanding image of Hemingway as the representative of machismo, yet argues that the edited, published version of the book—particularly its characterization of Catherine—belies the complexity of the novel and the author alike. Burwell, in “West of Everything: The High Cost of Making Men in Islands in the Stream,” voices a similar concern regarding the editing of Islands in the Stream, noting how those involved in the publication process “ignore[d] the complex musings on the problems of gender and creativity that are embodied in the deleted episodes” of the novel (172). Debra A. Moddelmog and Linda Wagner-Martin draw attention to how Hemingway’s published narratives—even those posthumously published—often reveal his abiding interest in configurations of gender and sexuality that fall outside the “norm” of society. In “Queer Families in Hemingway’s Fiction,” Moddelmog maintains that “Hemingway’s works are rife with alternative families” (174)—or what she calls “queer” families—which “reconfigure the bonds of belonging . . . [and] target various norms of [the traditional] family—especially norms of sexuality and power” (175). Finally, Martin’s “The Romance of Desire in Hemingway’s Fiction” examines how Papa’s works reflect the sexual ethos of their historical and cultural contexts—“times . . . marked with a nearly obsessive interest in sexuality and erotica” (54). Martin provocatively argues that “Hemingway’s real subject was eroticism. And the form he needed to tell that story, to entice the general reader, was the romance” (55).

Thirteen of the seventeen essays in Hemingway and Women appear in Part 1; by comparison, Part 2, “Mothers, Wives, Sisters,” is somewhat sparse. The four essays in this second section focus on historical and biographical contexts of Hemingway’s work and connect these contexts to his representations of women. Of particular note are the last two essays in this section—Sandra Whipple Spanier’s “Rivalry, Romance, and War Reporters: Martha Gellhorn’s Love Goes to Press and the Collier’s Files” and Rena Sanderson’s “Hemingway’s Literary Sisters: The Author through the Eyes of Women Writers”—which offer fascinating accounts of Hemingway’s relationship with women who were his professional equals: his third wife, reporter Martha Gellhorn, and his literary peers, Dorothy Parker and Lillian Hellman. Spanier and Sanderson adeptly illustrate Hemingway’s complicated relationship with these women—as well as his indebtedness to them. As Sanderson succinctly concludes: “Whether they were adoring (Parker), critical (Hellman), or begrudging (like Gellhorn), they helped to identify and advertise Hemingway’s message, style, method, and persona” (294).

Clearly, the range of essays in Hemingway and Women is impressive; Broer and Holland have done an admirable job of selecting works that examine Hemingway’s work and life from a myriad of critical angles. Like any other collection of essays, however, some of the selections are decidedly stronger than others. In particular, the essays by Beegel, Miller, Moddelmog, Spanier, and Sanderson—whether by virtue of their writing style, their interdisciplinary rigor,
or their extensive knowledge of Hemingway’s life, work, and historical and cultural contexts—were much more compelling and original than the others. Despite the relative unevenness of the selections, Hemingway and Women is an engaging and important book. By enlisting female critics who are invested in the man, the myth, and the literature—and whose insightful analyses broaden the scope of the field of Hemingway studies—this book offers an invaluable service to Hemingway scholars and feminist literary critics alike.

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First published in 1982, this classic work by anthropologist Jerome R. Mintz has been reprinted with a new foreword discussing its significance to both its specific subject matter and the field of anthropology in general. It is an enduring example of in-depth ethnographic research, as well as a historical study of complex political and social relations. Mintz examines the small but significant anarchist uprising that took place in the Spanish town of Casas Viejas in 1933, just a few years prior to the Spanish Civil War. He investigates events leading up to the revolt and its aftermath, through official accounts, press releases, and interviews with those who were present. Through these multi-faceted perspectives, Mintz presents a clear picture of the uprising and its place in the larger political history of Spain, and in the process refutes some previously published accounts of events and makes a valuable contribution to historical understanding.

In order to gather his detailed knowledge, Mintz spent years conducting fieldwork in Spain in the 1960s and 70s, gaining the trust of those involved in the uprising, their descendants, friends, and neighbors. Since his research involved an event that took place decades earlier, he had to track down sources who had moved, a task made all the more difficult because Spain was still
under Franco’s rule at the time of his research, and anarchism was not a safe topic of investigation. After years of oppression, his informants were often wary of talking to anyone, and the government often questioned those who did. Despite these difficulties, Mintz was able to speak to a great many of the surviving participants of the uprising. These interviews, combined with painstaking descriptions of Spanish society and the political climate that engendered the anarchist movement, paint a detailed picture of not only that famous day’s events, but also of the social inequality and unrest that led up to them and of the repression that followed.

The anarchist uprising in Casas Viejas took place on January 11, 1933. It claimed the lives of two civil guards, while the brutal government reaction the next day killed 20 villagers, including both anarchists and unarmed townspeople. Although this battle was small in comparison with many armed conflicts, the events at Casas Viejas had a lasting effect on Spanish government and society. It was already a tumultuous time, since the Spanish government had just transitioned from a monarchy to a still unstable republic. Social unrest was rampant among the poor, including a sizable anarchist following. The old monarchical system had allowed the growth of vast social inequality, and a few noblemen or others of the wealthy upper class owned the majority of land. Many of these landowners spent the majority of their time in urban centers, leaving their land to be rented out or worked by day laborers. Especially in southern Andalusia, most of the people were extremely poor landless agricultural workers, while the land and wealth were controlled by a very few. These landowners often left land fallow in order to increase the prices of crops, or charged exorbitant rent if they did allow others to plant on it. Laborers’ wages were very low for long days of backbreaking labor, and their families still went hungry.

This extreme inequality sparked great social unrest and, influenced by global movements, ideas of socialism and anarchism became popular among workers. Due to Spain’s rural population, the need for communal labor to work the land, and isolation from major governing centers, the philosophy of Russian anarchist Michael Bakunin, emphasizing cooperation and local control, won greater popular support than the state communism advocated by Marx. Anarchism developed into a major movement in Spain, and even small towns, such as Casas Viejas, often had their own anarchist sindicato, where members met to educate themselves and discuss political ideas and revolutionary plans. These sindicatos were nationally linked by newspapers and representative meetings, and they cooperated to declare general strikes that displayed their solidarity and maximized their impact on land and business owners by adding leverage to the workers’ demands. One such strike was planned to involve railroad workers, and the more militant members of the anarchist movement decided to take advantage of the lack of access to transportation by government troops in order to begin the revolution in earnest.

All sindicatos were set to revolt on the signal from leaders in Barcelona, but due
to government infiltration their plans were discovered, the planned rail workers’ strike was called off, and the anarchists were quickly defeated. However, word of this defeat did not reach smaller towns quickly enough, and Casas Viejas, believing itself to be part of a national movement, declared their town under anarchist control and laid siege to the civil guard barracks, in the process of which two guards were killed. Government retribution for this was swift and brutal. More guards were sent in, and although most of the anarchists had already fled the town, those who remained, along with their friends and family, were attacked. They were under fire throughout the night, and those who still lived were burned to death when guards set fire to their hut in the morning. Not satisfied with this, the guards went through town and chose twelve other men and executed them in front of the hut. The government then combed the countryside for those who fled, and they were sent to prison. A public outcry was raised over the brutality, especially when it eventually became known that many of those killed had been unarmed and not involved in the uprising. The Republican government was widely criticized, which further destabilized the country, ironically leading to a right-wing rebellion, a bloody civil war, and the fascist regime of Francisco Franco. What reforms the Republic had managed to enact were undone, and the anarchists faced decades of further persecution, to the point that some who were interviewed for this book did not want to be named even years later.

The rebellion caught the attention not only of the people and government in Spain, but also of the international community. It was written about by anarchists and scholars, and used to further various causes, but never, until Mintz, was it directly investigated. Although others, including various political inquiry committees and scholars such as Primitive Rebels author Eric Hobsbawm, went to the town, none of them recorded the views of the townspeople, preferring instead to form events to fit their preconceived theories. Because of this, factual errors were made, and then repeated through scholarly research based on these misinformed sources. As an example, Hobsbawm reported Seisdedos, a 70-year old man uninvolved in the anarchist movement, to be the “charismatic leader” required to fit his theory of social movements (274). Seisdedos was in fact killed in the fighting, but only because his anarchist sons were hidden in his hut, and not because of any actions of his own. While villagers did blame him for much of the rebellion, this was only because he was dead and therefore a safe target at which to direct the wrath of authorities. Through his in-depth research, Mintz was able to discover truths such as these behind the often-confused accounts of events. He refutes many previous examinations of events, thus providing a valuable contribution to Spanish political history and an excellent example for the merits of ethnographic study.

The book is detailed to a fault, occasionally losing its direction due to extensive notes on background events, but this is a minor concern and only serves to highlight the well-grounded research of the
author. This important work is a classic anthropological study, used to teach subjects ranging from political history to public memory, and definitely deserves to be reprinted. Although left-wing politics are no longer taboo in Spain since the demise of Franco's government, the basic inequality Mintz deals with remains an important topic worldwide.

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In a quote that the author borrows from Todd Mouton (“Checking the Rear View”, Offbeat, July 1999, 37–41), Zachary Richard articulates the paradoxical sense the term les bon temps, which literally translates as “the good times,” has for Cajun and Creole musicians:

The basic contradiction of Cajun music . . . is that you have songs which are about nothing but heartache, loneliness, loss—loss of love, loss of property, loss of stature in the society, all of these things—on this music that is absolutely joyful. So it’s this incredible contradiction that is part of the Cajun soul, I think. You know, that even in pain you celebrate. (2)

The author of Disenchating Les Bon Temps, Charles J. Stivale, borrows the term “disenchating” from Sylvia Winter (“On Disenchating Discourse: ‘Minority’ Literary Criticism and Beyond,” Cultural Critique 7:207–44, 1987) to characterize the way in which he seeks to demystify and deconstruct the various facets of cultural representations that sustain the spiritual and mythic force of this term as they simultaneously celebrate it. As Stivale points out, “the constructions of identity and authenticity in the Cajun dance and music arena mani-
Disenchanting seeks to explore the intersection of local and global social-cultural activity by demonstrating some of the ways in which the practices of various local cultural agents affect wider global representations of Cajun music and musicians.

Stivale draws on his extensive personal experience with the community he studies in his effort to pinpoint issues of identity and authenticity as constructions situated in social spaces, inextricably tied to loci of their cultural production. He attenuates this first-hand experience through a combined theoretical lens of cultural studies literature and the scholarly output of theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (cf. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983[1977]). Consequently, the work's purview includes a wide variety of cultural contexts in which identities are constructed and authenticity is debated, including personal accounts about the dance floors of various venues, song lyrics, perspectives of various Cajun and Zydeco artists on the trajectory of their performance and recording careers in relation to these issues, and their negotiation and representation in both the motion picture industry and in Cajun dance instructional videos.

In Chapter 1, Stivale discusses the process of his “becoming Cajun” (an identity process many native and non-native Louisianans refer to as “Cajun-by-choice”). In doing so, he reflects on the relationship in this work between the personal, the scholarly, and the disciplinary dimensions, highlighting points of contention as well as complementarity. Stivale also describes in detail two terms essential to the original conceptual framework for his research: “spaces of affects” (arguing that “affective renewal occurs through the dynamic and creative exchange between musicians and fans in multiple dance sites in and outside southern Louisiana”) and, using syntax borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari, “becoming-Cajun.” Stivale explains the latter term as the creation of a collective enunciation of Cajun music and language in a way that contains its own political force and “both a temporal passage through successive experiential phases and an experimental and spatial process of engagement with diverse cultural practices” (21).

In Chapter 2, Stivale considers the concept of dislocation, which he calls (dé)paysement (translated literally as “[un]countrying”) in the Cajun music repertoire. The term is used to describe the instability of fixed settlements evoked in song and inscribed through lyrical references. As Stivale writes, “This instability is manifested lyrically as the displacement to, from, and between different parts of the pays—that is the local region understood as a distinct land or territory” (42). Stivale then extends this thematic reflection to the recent poetry and music of Zachary Richard in an effort to understand the ways in which one Cajun artist relates to issues of location and identity.

In Chapter 3, Stivale turns to three visual forms of representation as case
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studies of the ways in which film has been used to construct Cajun identities. In these films, Cajun cultural agents have communicated various forms of authenticity through self-representation in a variety of capacities. Specifically, Stivale examines two examples of the familiar dominant/dominated dialogue within commercial cinema of the 1980s, Southern Comfort and The Big Easy. In Walter Hill's 1981 action drama, Southern Comfort, for example, National Guardsmen are at war with the residents of rural Louisiana's swamp who are depicted as dark and foreign in an attempt to illustrate the film's larger allegory about U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. Cajun music, musicians, and dance play a significant role in this film's cathartic climax. Stivale also explores the construction of Cajun cultural identity in the documentary genre, focusing specifically on director Les Blank's three films French Dance Tonight, J'ai Été au Bal: The Cajun and Zydeco Music of Louisiana, and Marc and Ann. Stivale concludes the chapter by examining the representation of Cajun identity in three different dance instructional tapes produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including Betty Cecil's I Love to Cajun Dance (1988), the New Orleans restaurant Michael's Cajun Dance Instruction (ca. 1992), and J. Randolph (Rand) Speyrer's Allons Danser (1987) and its 1993 two cassette follow-up with Cynthia Speyrer, Introduction to Cajun Dancing and Advanced Cajun Dancing.

In the remaining chapters, Stivale first draws upon his own experiences in Cajun dance and music venues to discuss how vibrant exchanges between musicians and dancers transform mere physical locales to "spaces of affects." He then considers a number of sociopolitical issues and tensions underlying les bon temps cultural practices that constitute their active construction and expression. Stivale concludes the book with an exploration of ongoing cultural initiatives authored by folklorists, musicians, dancers, and fans that demonstrate the possibilities for maintaining the vitality of Cajun music and dance.

This book is a uniquely theoretical and scholarly-grounded addition to the canon of writing on Cajun music and dance. Though Stivale's adaptation of theoretical frameworks from Deleuze and Guattari will be challenging for readers not familiar with this particular mode of analysis, the rest of the book provides enough rich detail in the form of case studies of specific works, artists, and the author's own experiences to balance and explain these theories, and show how they play out in particular contexts. Stivale provides extensive notes and works cited, though it would have been useful to have a separate discography and videography. Readers searching for a complete ethnography of New Orleans and Cajun culture will be disappointed, but that is not this book's intent, and Stivale provides a clear and cogent discussion of his own positioning in the context of this music and the people that engage in it. Readers should also be aware of the book's tendency to over-emphasize the uniqueness of some of the processes described here involving the negotiation of identity and authenticity on the part of cultural/ethnic minorities.

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