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“I Lost My Head in Borneo”: Tourism and the Refashioning of the Headhunting Narrative in Sabah, Malaysia

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Abstract
Although headhunting is generally believed to be no longer practiced in Sabah, Malaysia, it is a phenomenon of the past that still exists in the collective consciousness of indigenous groups, living through the telling and retelling of stories, not just by individuals, but also by the tourism industry. The headhunting image and theme are ubiquitous in the tourist literature and campaigns. They are featured on postcards, brochures, and T-shirts (a particular favorite shows an orangutan head with the caption “I lost my head in Borneo”). One popular tourist destination, Monsopiad Cultural Village, has even named itself after a legendary headhunting warrior.

While Sabah’s headhunting past has taken on a commercial value, I argue that it has also taken on a cultural and political one that seems to resonate with contemporary needs and sensibilities, especially among the state’s indigenous communities. I propose that the tongue-in-cheek invocation of headhunting by the tourism industry represents one way in which Sabah’s indigenous people counter the outside world’s designation of them as the Other; that is, by parodying their headhunting past, they demonstrate their understanding of the joke and thus guard their indigenousness and their status as human beings. I also argue that their use of their headhunting heritage is a means of responding to the threats to their identities posed by the Malaysian state, which, in the process of globalization and nation building, has interpolated them into a Malaysian identity, an identity that they seem to resist in favor of their regional ones. This paper looks at what tourism’s refashioning of the headhunting narrative might suggest about how Sabah’s indigenous groups respond to their former colonization by the West and how they imagine and negotiate their identities within the constraints of membership within the state of Malaysia.²

I spent a large part of my growing-up years in Tamparuli, a small town near the west coast of Sabah, a Malaysian state in northern Borneo.² A river divides the town proper and the compound on which my family and I lived, so sojourns to the other side—to tamu (weekly market), to the shops, and to the library required the use of one of two bridges. The first was a suspension bridge for pedestrians, and the other, only a few minutes away, a concrete structure for automobiles also used by those on foot. Of the two, my friends and I considered the cement bridge to have the more fascinating history. We were told that during its construction, humans were hunted and their severed heads were placed within its foundations. The reason: the builders, we were told, apparently believed that the spirits of the heads would fortify the bridge and would help to guard it from calamities.
As a child, I delighted in hearing and telling stories about sagaii (headhunters) and took special pride in knowing that our very own Tamparuli Bridge was part of headhunting lore. But as I became older, stories about headhunters and my headhunting past became less fantastic. Despite the occasional semi-serious warning that a headhunter was on the loose, I, and most others around me, generally believed that headhunting, a phenomenon of the past shared by many of the state's thirty indigenous groups, was no longer in practice.

As I got older, I began to be aware of the economic and political struggles that indigenous people in my state face. Since becoming part of Malaysia in 1963, Sabah, a former British colony, had never had a chief minister who was both indigenous and non-Muslim. Consequently, when in 1984, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a Dusun lawyer, became the first non-Muslim native to assume this position, being indigenous suddenly meant something to me. It was also around the same time that I remember feeling a new attraction to the macabre and exotic elements of my culture—one of them being headhunting. Without quite knowing it, I was invoking those aspects of my culture that were potentially embarrassing as a way of responding to the threat I felt towards my own Dusun-ness. For me, headhunting ceased being just a part of history and became, in the most personal way, a part of my heritage—an expression of my indigenousness.

Of course I was not alone in my realization of the value of headhunting as a marker of indigenousness—I was in the company of the tourism industry. Images of headhunting in the tourist literature in Sabah are plentiful. They are on postcards, in brochures, and on T-shirts, and one tourist destination, Monsopiad Cultural Village, which is especially popular among overseas visitors, has named itself after a legendary Kadazan warrior and headhunter, and has made explicit use of the headhunting narrative as a way of organizing its offerings.

In my opinion, making headhunting such a visible icon of tourism in Sabah is an example of what Michael Herzfeld calls “cultural intimacy,” which he describes as “the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered as a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with the assurance of common sociality” (Herzfeld 1997, 3). Monsopiad Cultural Village is one site where I suggest cultural intimacy is performed. I believe that the Village's strategic association with headhunting (and the unfa-
vorable connotations that it might carry) is an instance of how native people in Sabah have recognized that by assuming agency over their culture, and especially by embracing their Otherness, they find a common ground—in the present case, a headhunting past—with which to respond to outside attacks on their indigenousness.\(^7\)

**Headhunting as a response to the social imagination of Borneo**

I have already suggested that “headhunting tourism” in Sabah might be seen as one way in which indigenous people counter the outside world’s imagining of themselves as the Other. In this section, I argue that early travel accounts of Borneo have, in part, created this “Otherness”; that is, these accounts have contributed to how the island and its native groups are perceived. Thus, I will now turn to a brief discussion of how early literature about the region, written mainly by European travelers, has played a role in the “invention” of Borneo; an invention that has lived on in tourist literature, and, in my opinion, to which the invocation of headhunting in the tourism industry in Sabah is responding. Of this notion, historian Graham Saunders makes the following observation:

> Travellers to Borneo today arrive with certain expectations. They carry with them an idea or image of Borneo, an image which tourist brochures have conveyed, authorities have cultivated. What an image is [is] the culmination of a process that began when the first European traveller to Borneo’s shore recorded his impressions of what he had seen (Saunders 1993, 271).

Saunders’ argument is clear: modern-day visitors to Borneo arrive with expectations that have been formed by early literature about the island and its people.

It was not until the late nineteenth century that the British gained control over Sabah, but the region as a whole had received European visitors before that time. They came in various capacities—as diplomats, business people, and explorers—and their contacts with, and reports about Borneo not only contributed to general knowledge about the island, but also helped to create an image of the place and its people in the European mind. Saunders suggests that, in fact, many of the images of headhunters, orangutans and long houses now associated with the island are products of these early accounts (Saunders 1993, 271).

The first Englishman to write about his travels in Borneo was Daniel Beeckman, who went on business to Banjarmasin, the present capital of South Kalimantan, in 1714. His accounts of life in Banjarmasin were often astute; nonetheless his characterization of the orangutan as being like a human—that, indeed, one originated from the other—has advanced the idea of a wild Borneo, to which current tourism campaigns still allude:

> The monkeys, apes, and baboons are of many different sorts and shapes; but the most remarkable are those they call Orang-ootans, which in their
language signifies men of the woods: these grow up to be six foot high, they walk upright; have longer arms than men, tolerable good faces (handsomer I am sure than some Hottentots that I have seen), large teeth, no tails nor hair, but on those parts where it grows on humane bodies; they are very nimble footed and mighty strong; they throw great stones, sticks, and billets at those who offend them. The natives do really believe that these were formerly men, but metamorphosed into beasts for their blasphemy (Beeckman 1718, 37).

The notion of a Borneo that was primitive, where men were apparently routinely transformed into apes, as Beeckman’s account above suggests, continued to be reinforced by works such as Elizabeth Mershon’s book, With the Wild Men of Borneo, which was published in 1922. In general, Mershon, the wife of a Seventh-day Adventist missionary posted in North Borneo, is fairly sympathetic in her portrayal of Sabah’s native people, but her designation of them as “the wild men of Borneo” is telling of the impact of a centuries-long depiction of the people of Borneo as—using her term—wild. The book begins as follows:

Borneo! What does the name suggest to your minds? The first thing probably is the “wild man from Borneo.” From my childhood days until I arrived in Borneo, all I knew about the country was that was where the wild men lived, and I always imagined that they spent most of their time running around the island cutting off people’s heads. Strange to say, even to this day, many people have the same idea. Before you finish reading what I am going to tell you about Borneo and its people, I hope you will have learned that the “wild man from Borneo” is not such a bad fellow after all (Mershon 1922, 13).

Thus, we see that while Mershon’s purpose for writing her book appears to be noble, her portrayal of the people of Borneo is nevertheless rather unflattering.

However, I do not think it is useful to analyze Mershon’s and Beeckman’s reports in terms of their language or even their veracity; rather, I believe they must be seen as those belonging to observers whose accounts were colored not just by their personal biases, but also by the intellectual climate within which they wrote. As Saunders states, “they interpreted what they saw and accommodated what they observed to their own prejudices, to their own cultural values, to their own intellectual world” (Saunders 1993, 285). In so doing, however, they created, developed, and reproduced an image of Borneo as a place that is undomesticated and mysterious; a place where wild men live as one with nature. Indeed, in a paper that anthropologist Victor King presented at the Borneo Research Council meetings in Kota Kinabalu in 1992, he argued that one reason why cultural tourism in Borneo is an important component in the marketing of the region as a tourist destination is the perception of its people as “exotic” and “unknown,” notions that he says have purposely been encouraged among Western audiences and which he calls “obvious tourist assets” (King 1992, 3).
The current emphasis in Sabah on eco-tourism and the rhetoric used to promote its natural offerings also contribute to the notion of a wild Borneo. The Sabah Tourism Board’s most visible campaign is in fact titled “Eco-Treasures from Mountain High to Ocean Deep” and strongly features two of the state’s most well-known “eco-treasures,” Mount Kinabalu, the tallest peak in Southeast Asia, and Sipadan Island, widely recognized as one of the world’s top diving spots and best places to witness marine life. The campaign also highlights, among others, such attractions as Kinabalu Park (the park on which Mt. Kinabalu stands), the Danum Valley Conservation Area, and the Sepilok Orang-utan Sanctuary.

The extent to which “eco-treasures” have been identified as important tourist assets by the state seems to indicate that the state subscribes to the same notion of Borneo expressed in early accounts about the island—that it is an uncultivated and timeless place. At the same time, however, as Kevin Markwell notes in his essay “‘Borneo, Nature’s Paradise’: Constructions and Representations of Nature within Nature-based Tourism,” the campaign employs a rhetoric that suggests a wildness that is domesticated—in essence, a negotiable wildness. He says, “The use of a selective number of animal species to represent nature in a specific way (e.g. the orang-utan) and the relative ease with which the wild can be conquered indicate that in tourism, nature is represented as a ‘wild/tame’ dualism which appeals to most tourists” (Markwell 2001, 258).

I believe the dualism Markwell observes in literature promoting nature tourism may also be applied to “headhunting tourism” in Sabah. Tour sites such as Monsopiad Cultural Village help to mediate between tourists and Sabah’s headhunting past. Presented alongside displays of traditional food, drink, medicines, dance, music, and structures, the forty-two skulls exhibited at the Village are further divorced from their initial association with murder and violence—in essence, they lose some of their “savage” quality, making an encounter with them perhaps more palatable.

But thinking about eco-tourism and “headhunting tourism” in terms of the wild/tame dualism that Markwell proposes allows us to come to what I believe to be a more important point: the self-conscious downplaying of an otherwise rather unsavory phenomenon of indigenous history demonstrates an understanding of the value of Otherness among those in the tourism industry and those in the indigenous population in general. In my opinion, what seems to be articulated in Sabah’s tourism industry is a response of its native groups to the social imagining of themselves as sub-human, with an existence overwhelmed by their geographies. It is through the headhunting narrative as it is told at Monsopiad Cultural Village and in tourism promotion that they understand their identities as they have been constructed through discourse. In response, they parody their headhunting histories, benefiting not just economically, but as the collective histories become a symbol of their prowess as an indigenous people, politically as well.
Thus their ostensible acquiescence to an “untamed” past should be seen as an act performed expressly to counter their designation as the Other, a designation that is, in large part, the result of colonial presence in the region.

In the following section, I look briefly at Sabah’s political history, in particular, the points of contention at play in its relationship with the Malaysian state. In addition, I will explore how local response to, and interpretations of, these points of contention are symbolically enacted in tourism.

A brief look at Sabah’s political history

In the preceding section, I have tried to demonstrate that the invocation of headhunting in tourism in Sabah can be seen as symbolic of an indigenous response to a hegemony that is more global in nature. In this portion of my paper, I argue that it is also representative of a rejection of powers closer to home—those belonging to the Malaysian state. The tendency for Sabahans, particularly indigenous ones, to align themselves culturally and politically with Sabah, rather than with Malaysia, is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, there has been a history of contention between Sabah and the federal government. Malaysia was, after all, created out of what Craig Lockard terms “a marriage of convenience” when the British suggested that Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei join the Malayan Federation; the federation that had obtained independence from the British in 1957 and had unified the territories on its peninsula as a way of terminating colonial rule over those regions (Lockard 1998, 224).10

Prior to 1963, Sabah was the British Crown Colony of North Borneo, having first come under the control of a British firm in 1877. It became a protectorate in 1881, and finally a Crown Colony in 1946. But it was the sultan of Sulu from whom the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company, the trading syndicate that first managed the region, had to obtain concessions—a fact that makes a necessary and relevant point: historically and culturally, native Sabahans perhaps have more in common with those groups in their immediate geographical area than with those in West Malaysia.11

Aside from being part of a national construction in which the dominant culture—Malay and Muslim—has relatively little in common with their own, indigenous Sabahans’ reluctance to align themselves with their West Malaysian counterparts may have had economic promptings. Many Sabahans hold the federal government responsible for the state’s backwardness: they blame it for usurping their wealth (Sabah is rich in natural resources) and using it to develop the federal territories and the states on the peninsula. In a political profile of Malaysia, Damien Kingsbury posits that the opposition of Sabah and Sarawak to the notion of the Federation of Malaysia, in 1963 and presently, was and is based on the allocation of income (more will be said about the formation of the Federation later in this paper). Kingsbury says that both Sabah and Sarawak contribute more to the federal income than they receive and states that the words “‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘equality’ were commonly used, often by the indigenous peoples, when talking
about their grievances against the federal government” (Kingsbury 2001, 276).

There is reason to believe that Sabahans see the Malaysian state as a threat not only to their fiscal well-being, but to their indigeneity—and the climate of recent and contemporary politics demonstrates their fear. In the early 1980s, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a Dusun lawyer, formed Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) or the Sabah United Party, an opposition party largely made up of, and supported by, indigenous Sabahans. He led his party to ultimately win the Sabah general elections of 1984; a victory that was seen as enormous and important because since becoming part of Malaysia in 1963, the state had never had a non-Muslim KadazanDusun leader.\(^\text{12}\)

Although indigenous people on the peninsula and on Borneo are designated not only as citizens of Malaysia but also as bumiputra, or children of the soil, indicating a special status that includes the Malays in both East and West Malaysia (though not other Malaysians who have come from non-Malayan lands such as China and India), many of the indigenous people in both Sabah and Sarawak view this designation with cynicism, feeling that the special rights and benefits that accompany this status apply specifically to the Semenanjung Malays (the Malays on the peninsula), rather than to themselves (Winzeler 1997, 8).\(^\text{13}\)

A ban in 2004 on KadazanDusun programming on television is another example of the sort of imposition that Sabah’s indigenous groups feel from the government. Bumiputera Sabahans’ reaction to this ban appears to be strong. Writing on Malaysiakini.com, an independent news agency, Tanak Wagu (a pen name meaning “young man” in KadazanDusun) remarks:

Information Minister Abdul Kadir Sheik Fadzi’s decision not to allow KadazanDusun programmes on television is certainly against national integration and cultural development. It is also an insult to the KadazanDusuns when he said—as reported by Sabah’s Daily Express on August 7 [2004]—that such programmes would only promote racial segregation. (www.malaysiakini.com).

Tanak Wagu clearly feels that it is the KadazanDusun as a people—and not just their language—that has been slighted by the Information Minister’s move. His closing statement comments on what he sees as the bigger problem, i.e. the federal government’s general disregard for the culture and religion of the indigenous groups living in the East Malaysian region.\(^\text{14}\) He says:

I also remember a recent debate on the appointment of the prime minister. One side said that a bumiputra should hold the prime minister’s post. Well, what they actually meant was that a Malay Muslim should hold the post. This is because KadazanDusuns and Dayaks [the biggest indigenous groups in Sarawak] are bumiputras, too, but we don’t seem much hope in someone from these two communities holding the post (Ibid).

Tanak Wagu’s distrust of the federal government as it relates to the protection of indigenous rights is, in my opinion, rep-
resentative of local views on the matter, and it is perhaps a distrust that has motivated the aptness of many bumiputera Sabahan to associate himself or herself with the state of Sabah, rather than the nation.

Local Sabahans’ distrust of the Malaysian government has existed since before the inception of the Malaysian nation. When Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the idea of an expanded Malaya that would include Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and British North Borneo in 1961, his proposition was initially rejected by local leaders in British North Borneo, some of whom were hoping for separate independence. When an influential local leader, Donald Stephens, who later became Sabah’s first chief minister, remarked that joining the Federation would inevitably lead to domination by peninsular Malays, he was, in fact, expressing a common view among indigenous Sabahans. However, because of the persuasive powers of the Malayan Prime Minister and Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Prime Minister, Sabah and Sarawak conceded, and when the Federation of Malaysia came into being in 1963, British North Borneo became a member state (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 282-287).

In his 1985 book *Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974*, the late KadazanDusun historian and politician James P. Ongkili writes that the reluctance of Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei to join the Malaysian Federation—and their wish for separate independence—had been foreshadowed by the failure of a colonial attempt in the 1950s at unifying them under a Bornean federation. Ongkili states, “The failure of the Bornean federation proposals of the 1950s was itself evidence that Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah were each inclined to hope and work for their own separate independence, even if the ideal of nationhood might take until the year 2000 or longer to achieve” (Ongkili 1985, 161). In other words, although people in Sabah and Sarawak eventually agreed to become part of Malaysia (Brunei opted to back out), their earlier feelings on the matter suggest a reluctance to relinquish identities that seemed more tied to their indigenousness, and the region in general. It is an attitude that seems to have reappeared not just in contemporary politics, but in other arenas as well, such as tourism.15

The economic, cultural, and religious differences that bumiputera in Sabah feel between themselves and their counterparts on the peninsula have necessarily informed both local and national politics, and what has been dubbed “Kadazan nationalism” has, in fact, been a movement of sorts existing since Sabahan bumiputera entered Malaysian politics in 1963. Stephens, who was a Eurasian of partly indigenous descent, was one of the first to become an advocate for the Kadazan. According to anthropologist Shamsul A. B., however, the federal government saw Stephens’ chief-ministership from 1963 to 1965 as “an attempt to seek an unacceptable level of autonomy,” and he was replaced by Datuk Mustafa, a Muslim Sulu chief and a leader of the Muslim Dusun (Shamsul A. B. 1998, 31).16 The mid-1980s, with the formation of the Kadazan-dominated PBS and the party’s subsequent ten-year
rule, saw Kadazan nationalism played out more emphatically (Shamsul A. B. 1998, 32).

To be sure, some of the impositions that the federal government has made and continues to make may be a necessary part of the process of defining a national culture—a dilemma that formerly colonized places like Malaysia face in nation building. Tourism, being an industry inevitably implicated in such a process, can be a particularly useful site for analysis. In Malaysia, the creation of a ministry that combines both tourism and culture is not a move that merely seeks to find a niche in the international tourist market—it also has a national purpose. The Ministry’s website states its objectives as follows:

To develop the Malaysian National Culture in accordance with the National Culture Policy towards strengthening national unity, to preserve and control the national identity as well as enrich the life of humanity and spirituality that is balanced with socio-economic development; and

To develop the tourism industry to become a main industry in the country’s economy by spurring its growth based on the elements of National Culture (www.mocat.gov.my/ministry).

But the “Malaysian National Culture” promoted in a country in which ethnic diversity is a reality (hence the official ideology, rukunegara, or harmony of the state) must necessarily be a composite culture, what King describes as “an ad

c hoc assemblage of beliefs and practices held by diverse populations” (King 1993, 109). However, within the context of tourism, a national culture can only exist in the abstract, for the most marketable forms of cultural distinctiveness, according to Robert Wood, are, ironically, “the lifestyles and artifacts of sub-national ethnic groups—which are often considered ‘backward’ by the dominant ethnic majority” (Wood 1997, 6).

But the alleged backwardness of Malaysia’s ethnic minorities is not simply a tourism marketing tool; rather, my study suggests that in Sabah, indigenous people consider their “backwardness” (as implied by the invocation of headhunting in tourism) as an important marker as well as an assertion of a bumiputera-ness distinct from, but equal to, the dominant culture. A similar sentiment can be observed in Anne Schiller’s account of her experience among the Ngaju Dayak of Central Kalimantan during a National Geographic Television filming of atiwh (death ritual) ceremony. She notes that religious activists hoped that the filming of a ritual that recalls violence and human sacrifice would attract international attention to the Ngaju Dayak culture, and as a result, further their quest for political autonomy (Schiller 2001, 33). What both the Kalimantan and Sabah cases suggest, then, is that the seeming willingness of indigenous groups to be exoticized in tourism and in media, both industries that are concerned with representation, is symbolic of their rejection of a national identity, signaling, in effect, a preference for a local, regional one.
Headhunting narratives

Although early historical accounts vary in their observations of the meanings associated with headhunting as it was practiced in Borneo, it seems clear that at least among some indigenous groups it held a significant place in their social, cultural, religious, and economic systems, perhaps explaining, in part, its continued manifestations in local, everyday discourse. Historian James Warren (1981), for instance, tells us that the slave trade in the Sulu Zone during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which involved the trade of persons from all over Southeast Asia, fulfilled the demand among certain interior groups in Borneo by providing captives—and heads—to be used in sacrifices. His study suggests that the taking of heads for religious reasons was an important practice among some Bornean groups; so important, it appears, that they procured humans through the slave trade. Such a demand, in essence, made head-taking not just a cultural phenomenon, but an economic one as well.

Early ethnographies by scholar-administrators during the British rule also give us another look at headhunting as it was practiced or conceived among the island’s native groups. One of these scholar-administrators was Ivor H. N. Evans whose 1922 book, Among the Primitive Peoples of Borneo, covers his brief stay in North Borneo as a cadet in 1910. While he observed that headhunting among the Dusun carried with it some “undercurrent of meaning,” that is, they believed human heads had the power to endow their daily lives with blessings, Evans also noted that heads were collected mainly as a sign of one’s prowess (Evans 1922, 160). Such a function of headhunting is reflected in Owen Rutter’s account of headhunting among the Murut in The Pagans of North Borneo (1929). According to Rutter, a district officer in North Borneo for five years, heads were at one time taken in order to appease the spirits so as to bring luck to or avert disaster from a community’s crops. That function had, however, given way to the sort that Evans observed—the taking of heads in the context of war or feuds. In other words, although headhunting had formerly been carried out in order to ensure a village’s spiritual and agricultural well-being, it was now observed as a way of attaining social power.

People in my family have also apparently had near encounters with sagaii (headhunters). Recently, my father told me about the time his mother and older brother came into close contact with one. In 1941 or 1942, in their village of Tungaa, my uncle and my grandmother, who was pregnant with my father at the time, were on their way to draw water from a well located in an area fairly removed from the village center. On the way there, they had to walk past a sulap, or a small bamboo hut without walls where rice farmers could guard their paddy crop. Harvest season had come and gone, however, and the sleeping man in dark clothes my grandmother and uncle saw in the sulap did not appear to be a paddy farmer. In fact, he did not even look like a local person. That he looked foreign, that he had a sword tied to his waist, and that it was, in my father’s words, “headhunting season,” led my grand-
mother to surmise that the man was a headhunter, and that, based on past accounts, he was most likely from nearby Sarawak and was there to collect heads to prove his bravery to his future wife and her family.

As my grandmother and uncle were about to leave the well, my grandmother noticed that the man they had seen in the hut was walking towards them. My father told me that this confirmed her suspicions that the man was, indeed, a headhunter, as headhunters were known to search out their victims near wells due to their usually isolated locations. Perceiving the danger they were in, my grandmother and uncle walked away as quickly as they could, cutting through the paddy fields. They reached their home without incident.

While headhunting is generally assumed to no longer be in practice today, rumors about headhunters still do circulate, for example, as I have discussed earlier, when the construction of a new bridge is underway. A few years ago, for instance, local people blamed the mysterious disappearance of several village boys in Sabah on a new bridge construction in neighboring Brunei—it was said that people involved in that project were in search of heads, which they believed would guard and strengthen the bridge's foundations.

From the accounts above, we see that there seems to be some degree of reluctance to be associated with headhunting: my grandmother, for instance, felt that the man she thought to be a headhunter was not local, that he was from neighboring Sarawak. And those discussing the missing boys in Sabah surmised that their alleged captors were from Brunei. But in my observation, the "embarrassment" presently associated with headhunting appears to be rather more abstract in nature. In other words, it seems that people in Sabah do not necessarily feel personally embarrassed by the idea that their forefathers hunted heads; rather, within tourism and other contexts, they capitalize on the notion that because a headhunting past might be viewed as a potential source of embarrassment, it can provide them with a provocative means of asserting their uniqueness as a people.

One tourist site in Sabah which has seemed to draw on Sabah's headhunting histories is Monsopiad Cultural Village. Although it is by no means the first to use the state's headhunting histories within the context of tourism, I believe the Village is the only tourist site that has developed an entire park around the headhunting theme. Located in the village of Kuai, which is just outside Sabah's capital city of Kota Kinabalu, the park was opened in 1996 and is owned and managed by direct descendants of Monsopiad, a warrior and headhunter who is said to have roamed the land on which the Village now stands over 250 years ago.

According to the Village's website, the story of Monsopiad is roughly as follows: as a young man, Monsopiad vowed he would protect his village of Kuai by finding every robber and beheading him. As the years passed, he continued with his self-imposed mission and in time, no robber dared to approach his village. But Monsopiad became obsessed and would incite fights with other men, which then
gave him an excuse to kill and behead them. The villagers became afraid of him and decided that he had to be eliminated, and he died at their hands. But grateful for all Monsopiad had done for their well-being, the villagers forgave him and erected a monument in his honor (www.monsopiad.org).

That the Village capitalizes on the provocativeness of headhunting is apparent, first and foremost, in its very use of the story of Monsopiad as a basis for the narrative it wants to tell about the KadazanDusun people. That it does so in a manner that is rather “self-exoticizing” is clear as well. “Learn everything you always wanted to know about headhunting!” its website promises (Ibid). And of the House of Skulls, a Village brochure (also posted on its official website) says the following: “Visit the legendary house that displays the forty-two skulls of Monsopiad’s victims and a thigh bone of the giant Gantang and gain an insight into the past pagan era of the Kadazan people” (Ibid). Indeed, the House of Skulls or the siou dimohoing is the highlight of a tour of the Village. Constructed out of bamboo in the traditional Kadazan style, it is the
dwelling place of forty-two human skulls, which are hung in a row on a long pole among the rafters. These skulls, visitors are told, were heads belonging to powerful warriors before they became Monsopiad’s conquests, hence the term that is assigned to them now, “Monsopiad’s headhunting trophies” (Ibid).  

Fig. 3.

But while the Village is ostensibly putting Monsopiad’s former notoriety to ample and strategic use, I think it is important to note the framework within which Monsopiad’s story is told, for although the narrative clearly centers on the warrior and his headhunting activities, the practice of headhunting itself is portrayed as an aspect of the “past pagan era of the Kadazan people” (www.monsopiad.org). In other words, as the story is told at the Village, Sabah’s headhunting past is something that the Kadazan people share, something that can potentially connect them as one of Sabah’s ethnic groups. At the Village, then, one sees the enactment of the notion of “cultural intimacy” proposed by Herzfeld (1997). For while Monsopiad Cultural Village, and the tourism industry in Sabah in general, make use of—and at times exaggerate—aspects of the state’s cultures that are deemed potentially embarrassing externally (e.g. 
headhunting), what they also seem interested in communicating is that it is these very aspects which provide a common ground for, and legitimacy to, Sabah’s indigenous groups. Observed in cadence with past and present political milieus, the “refashioning” of the headhunting narrative within tourism in Sabah hence seems to reflect a general consensus among certain of Sabah’s native groups: that Otherness, strategically invoked and appropriated, provides them with an instrument for addressing external threats to their identities.

Conclusion
In the introduction of Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia (1996), Janet Hoskins asserts that in order to expand the notion of headhunting as a symbolic medium, one should consider the distinction between the practice of headhunting and the trope of headhunting. Hoskins distinguishes each as follows: the practice of headhunting is a phenomenon of history, “a form of ritual violence once widespread”; and the trope of taking heads is a phenomenon of the present, a metaphor used “to imagine new historical conditions in which heads might be taken” (Hoskins 1996a, 37). In a chapter in the same volume, in which Hoskins writes more specifically about her own work on the eastern Indonesian island of Sumba, she expands on this point and proposes that conceived as a trope, headhunting enters the realm of heritage, a realm where the literal taking of heads might no longer exist, but where its original meanings remain somewhat intact (Hoskins 1996b, 218).

The model that Hoskins offers is a useful way of thinking about how aspects of a culture’s history gain currency within the context of tourism, and recalls a similar argument that Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett makes in her piece “Theorizing Heritage” (1995), in which she proposes that heritage is “a new mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995, 369). The functions that the headhunting narrative has appeared to assume in tourism in contemporary Sabah (i.e. as a response by indigenous people to outside imaginations of themselves, as well as an expression of their inclination towards a regional, rather than a national, identity) can thus be seen as a demonstration of Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s theory of heritage; that is, as tourism campaigns and tour destinations such as Monsopiad Cultural Village endow headhunting with a metaphorical quality through the process of exhibition, they transform it from a thing of the past into heritage.

But it is perhaps what “thing” of the past that is transformed into heritage that is of more salience in the case at hand. Why headhunting? Historical records suggest that while headhunting was indeed practiced in Sabah, it appears that it was only prevalent among certain groups, and even then, headhunting seemed to have been a relatively rare occurrence, not an everyday-everyman one. And it is hardly unique to Sabah’s indigenous groups. The volume Hoskins has edited, which looks at the practice in Brunei, the Philippines, and various parts of Indonesia, is only one of many that can testify to that. Yet,
headhunting— if one assumes that tourism is a quite accurate gauge of the political aspirations of a people— seems to provide, at least for some of Sabah’s indigenous members, a sort of distinctiveness, a measure of difference from others, or perhaps more accurately, from the Other (that is, the West) and other groups in the region whose histories and cultures they perceive to be incongruent with their own. However, to desire difference necessarily implies an alliance with a community with similar interests, and in my thinking, indigenous people in Sabah have used headhunting as a means of creating and maintaining a kind of imagined cohesiveness with others in the state and region as a whole for whom headhunting is significant, literally or metaphorically. In short, the trope of headhunting functions for some of Sabah’s native communities as at once a marker of unlikeness and likeness, a representation of how they view themselves in relation to those around them in complex ways.

What seems to be happening in Sabah brings to mind Richard Handler’s discussion of the nationalist movement in Quebec and his observation of an “invention of tradition” that is selective. In an article Handler co-wrote with Jocelyn Linnekin, “Tradition, Genuine or Spurious” (1984), they say the following about public folkloric presentations of Quebecois everyday life: “Only certain items (most often, those that can be associated with a ‘natural,’ pre-industrial village life) are chosen to represent traditional national culture, and other aspects of the past are ignored or forgotten” (1984, 280). The notion that cultural symbols are what they are by design, as demonstrated by the Quebec case, reminds one of the concept of “selective tradition,” which Raymond Williams addresses in Marxism and Literature (1977). People look to the past, Williams argues, to “ratify the present and to indicate directions for the future” (Williams 1977, 116). In other words, the transformation of history into heritage, of practice into trope, is informed by how a group perceives of its present realities.

The self-conscious selection of an element of a culture’s history to articulate a political stance recalls an assertion Pertti J. Anttonen makes about how people construct their identities through symbolic means. In Tradition through Modernity (2005), Anttonen states:

> Whenever people make public presentations of their identity and show allegiance through cultural representations, they foreground some particular aspects and background others, which makes the presentation of self always argumentative in nature. Having a cultural identity … means the production of images and representations through actions that have argumentative goals in the transformation of relations. As such argumentative production of relations, cultural identity is fundamentally political in nature, an issue of establishing, controlling and fighting over the meaning of symbols, exercising power, creating hierarchies and contesting them (Anttonen 2005, 108).

In short, according to Anttonen, to choose a symbol with which to identify one’s personal or group identity is to also acknowledge and defend one’s political
convictions and associations. Viewed as such, headhunting tourism in Sabah is thus argumentative because it articulates how certain of the state’s communities define their indigenousness. It is argumentative because it contests existing notions of their cultural and political identities. And it is argumentative because it is a response to the Malaysian state, to the project of nationhood—in essence, it is a response to modernity.

When I asked a friend of mine, herself an indigenous Sabahan, what she thought of the use of the headhunting imagery and narrative in tourism promotion in our home state, her reply was quick and to the point: “Embarrassing but cool.” In a subsequent email, she explicated her response, saying, “It’s beyond comprehension that I have ancestors that might have been headhunters. At the same time freakish ancestors totally distinguish you from the rest of the global population, so it’s secretly thrilling as well. I love seeing the slightly raised eyebrows reaction I get when I tell someone new I’m from Borneo.” My friend’s response to my question is, I think, characteristic of the ambivalence that many bumiputera Sabahans have about the matter; that is, while they appreciate the risk of assuming a “headhunting identity,” they also recognize its worth as a symbol of their “coolness.”

As a phenomenon of history, headhunting is still invoked and valued in complex ways among many indigenous Sabahans, as in the form of stories that I heard as a child and that children continue to hear today, or in the narrative that is the underlying unifying theme at Monsopiad Cultural Village. But it is the trope of headhunting that has, in my mind, appeared to be more useful both culturally and politically. Marginalized groups in Sabah, many of whom share a headhunting past, have re-written the headhunting narrative in their favor, becoming co-authors of a cause that seeks, in Hoskins’ words, “to seize an emblem of power, to terrify one’s opponents, and to transfer life from one group to another” (Hoskins 1996a, 38). Thus re-imagined, the headhunting narrative emerges as a tool useful in working towards change and equality.

Notes

All pictures by Wendell Gingging, used by permission.

1 While “headhunting tourism” is the focus of this paper, it is but one aspect of cultural tourism in Sabah, which also features, among many other things, home-stays, visits to tamu (weekly market), and attendance at various festivals. Additionally, it should be noted that eco-tourism in the state is as significant—if not, more significant—an industry.

2 Malaysia consists of two parts: West Malaysia on the Malay peninsula and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo, on which Brunei and Indonesia’s Kalimantan are also located. West Malaysia holds eleven of the nation’s thirteen states, as well as its capital, Kuala Lumpur, and its administrative centre, Putrajaya. East Malaysia, which is separated from peninsular Malaysia by about 400 miles of the South China Sea, includes the states of Sabah and Sarawak.

3 The multi-ethnicity that typifies Malaysia as a whole—its population is made up of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and indigenous peoples—is also true of the indigenous com-
munities in Sabah. They comprise more than thirty ethnic groups speaking over fifty languages and eighty dialects. The Kadazan-Dusun, the largest indigenous group, live primarily on the west coast and the interior portions of the state. Other groups include the Rungus, Murut, Bajau, Orang Sungei, and the Muslim Bisaya (Tongkul 2000, 6).

4 In this piece, I use the labels Kadazan, Dusun, and Kadazan-Dusun somewhat interchangeably. Although the Kadazan and Dusun are closely-related ethnic groups, many who belong to them tend to identify themselves as one or the other. Since becoming an officially-recognized designation in the 1990s, however, the term Kadazan-Dusun has come into general use.

5 Additional research on the other indigenous communities in Sabah, some of which are listed in note 3, will enrich and perhaps complicate the analysis offered here on the basis of my experience among the Kadazan/Dusun.

6 See note 4.

7 Additional research on the other indigenous communities in Sabah, some of which are listed in note 3, will enrich and perhaps complicate the analysis offered here on the basis of my experience among the Kadazan/Dusun.

8 The Sabah Tourism Board is a semi-private agency working under the aegis of the state's Ministry of Tourism, Culture, and Environment.

9 In his welcome address to visitors of his Ministry's official website, Sabah's former Minister of Tourism, Tan Sri Chong Kah Kiat, identifies eco-tourism in the state as playing an important role in rebuilding the nation's economy, especially in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of 1997. He states: "With the…economic crisis…tourism has become an important economic sector for Malaysia. The tourism industry was identified as a leading sector to assist in the national economic recovery. Sabah, with its many natural assets and tourism icons such as Mount Kinabalu, its beautiful beaches and islands, its unique flora and fauna, its pristine rainforest and renowned wildlife conservation centres, has all the ingredients to become a major tourism destination in this region" (www.sabah.gov.my/mocet/ministry-objective.htm).

10 Singapore joined the Federation but pulled out in 1965 due to political differences and became an independent nation. As for Brunei, the sultan felt he was being asked to concede too much power and declined the invitation to become part of the new Malaysia.

11 According to recent reports, the current Sultan of Sulu has renewed his territorial claim over Sabah and is asking that Malaysia hand over the state. The Sultan has also said that he will bring Manila to the International Court of Justice to settle the matter. In 1962, when preparation for the new Federation was underway, President Macapagal of the Philippines opposed it (the Federation) on the grounds that the inclusion of North Borneo (Sabah) could not be legally upheld. According to the Philippine claim, the 1878 transfer of the territory of North Borneo from the sultanate of Sulu (now part of the Philippines) to the British was in the form of a lease rather than a sale (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 86).

12 See note 4.

13 It is important to note also that the applicability of the bumiputera designation to the Orang Asli, an indigenous people living in the interiors of the Malayan peninsula, seems to be ambiguous because while the Malaysian government sometimes seeks to include them in this category, according to Winzeler, it does not offer them the special economic and educational benefits of the Malays as
well as the native groups in the East Malaysian states (Winzeler 1997, 8).

Unlike their counterparts on the peninsula, many bumiputera in both Sabah and Sarawak practice Christianity, not Islam. It should be noted, however, that the Bajau, one of the main ethnic groups in Sabah, are traditionally Muslim.

Another point of contention between the federal and Sabah governments has to do with the Twenty-Point Agreement, a list of guarantees to which Sabah and Sarawak were entitled when they joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963. Over the years, those advocating for Sabah's autonomy have cited the federal government's failure to honor Sabah's rights under the Agreement, for instance, in matters relating to immigration; the special position of indigenous groups; tariffs and finance; as well as the Borneonisation of public service positions (i.e. appointing East Malaysians to government jobs).

Donald Stephens served as Sabah's chief minister twice, from 1963 to 1965 and for a few months in 1976. His second tenure was cut short by his death in a plane crash. Donald Stephens was also known as Mohammed Fuad Stephens, a name he took after embracing Islam in 1971.

It might be worth noting at this point that in Malaysia, anyone who adheres to Islam, speaks the Malay language, and observes Malay culture is considered to be Malay, regardless of ethnicity.

The complete title reads: Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo: A Description of the Lives, Habits & Customs of the Piratical Headhunters of North Borneo, with an Account of Interesting Objects of Pre-historic Antiquity Discovered in the Island. After its publication in 1922, Evans continued to study and write about the Dusun, producing in 1953 an ethnography entitled The Religion of the Tempassuk Dusuns of North Borneo.

Besides the House of Skulls, Monsopiad's legacy is also displayed in one of its most visible attractions, the gintutun do mohoing or the stone monolith. Standing at four meters, this massive stone is an imposing presence in the middle of the compound. It is said to have been placed in its position by villagers with the help of bobohizan or Kadazan high priestesses and other unknown forces in the spirit world after being commanded by Monsopiad to build a monument in his own honor.

That the Village sees itself as just as much about skulls and headhunting as it is about Kadazan culture seems apparent from its other offerings and its stated goals. According to its website, the Village perceives its principal purpose as follows: "The mission and objective of the Cultural Village is to become a living museum, a showcase of KadazanDusun culture, and a unique attraction for travelers to Sabah, be they international [visitors] or Malaysians" (Ibid). To this end, visitors who go to the kotos di Monsopiad or Monsopiad Main House, for instance, can see exhibits featuring implements one would expect to find in a traditional home, such as jars of rice wine, rice sifters, as well as local fruits and medicines. Enacters are also on hand within the Main House (and at the other structures as well) to demonstrate the carrying on of daily work within a typical KadazanDusun household, such as the preparation of rice and other traditional foods, the making of lihing (the local rice wine), as well as handicrafts. Aside from live enactments of KadazanDusun daily life, a tour of the Village includes the chance to participate in the dancing, a taste of lihing, as well as a go at blow-pipe shooting and betel-nut chewing.

Charmaine Siagian, email message to author, March 20, 2005.
Works Cited


**Websites**


Embarrassing But Cool

As I write this, I’ve recently returned home from Oxford and the Pitt-Rivers Museum’s gala opening for its new modern wing. The featured speaker, Michael Palin (of Monty Python fame, now a television-explorer and major patron of the museum), praised the “wonderful eclectic displays” and the “spirit of discovery” they inspire. As I listened to Palin, I was standing two cases away from the museum’s most popular attraction, the exhibit of tsantsa, shrunken enemy heads made by the Shuar and other Jivaroan peoples of western Amazonia.

The shrunken heads are a magnet for visitors to the Pitt-Rivers; an encounter with them seems to occupy a charmed place in many a British memory of childhood’s spirit of discovery. So it was not surprising that controversy flared last spring when a (false) rumor spread that the Pitt-Rivers might take the heads off display. Critics derided what they labeled as arrogant political correctness interfering with an institution that is “a national treasure” (see French 2007 and blog comments).

Sensitivities about human remains in museums and research collections are old hat in the U.S., where NAGPRA (the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990) and other changes in curatorial policies have led to widespread de-accessioning and disappearance of indigenous body elements from public displays. The issue has surfaced with less urgency and under different circumstances in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. Flory Ann Mansor Gingging’s account of the Monsopiad Cultural Village in Sabah, Malaysia adds a fascinating case to the panoply of cross-cultural differences. Pair this with Steve Rubenstein’s (2004) insightful account of taking Shuar friends to see tsantsa on display at New York City’s American Museum of Natural History and you have material for a marvelous teaching moment.

These shifting cultural-historical relations to displays of indigenous heads recall the tropes of disappearing native bodies and assertions of native agency through headhunting that run through the film Bontoc Eulogy, Marlon Fuentes’ (1996) provocative exploration of Filipino-American identity, historical “truth” and representation (see Homiak 2000). Fuentes traces colonial power dynamics through a story of his Igorot warrior grandfather’s journey from a tribal village to perform at the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. The fictional journey ends with the film maker standing in front of a glass case at the Smithsonian that contains preserved Igorot brains.

The celebration of headhunter identity in Sabah is a striking contrast to other trends in indigenous cultural politics and post-colonial criticism. Body-mutilating and life-taking practices such as cannibalism, infanticide, and headhunting pose thorny challenges to ethnographers and indigenous intellectuals: how to acknowledge native practices of which outsiders disapprove without contributing to more negative “othering?”
The two common responses are to emphasize the flimsy factual basis for claims about unsavory non-western practices and/or to sanitize accounts of them. Cannibalism is a perennial favorite target for ethnicity-cleansing. Inspired by William Aren’s (1979) suggestion that people-eating may never have been a socially accepted practice but just racist propaganda, the extreme version of the impulse to erase the stigma of cannibalism from non-western cultures culminated in the academic proposal to erase cannibalism itself from the record of human behavior by claiming that no one ever really did it. (See Gardner 1999 for a dissection of the cannibalism-denial position.) As Arens (1998) notes, this claim was embraced more enthusiastically in 1980s-90s literary and cultural studies than in anthropology. In a review of recent cannibalism studies, Shirley Lindenbaum (2004:475) suggests that scholarship has matured to a point where we might finally be ready to shed the ethnocentric baggage that has burdened both colonial mentalities and the postcolonial critics who assume that cannibalism must be savage and therefore unreal.

Most ethnographers, myself included (Conklin 1995, 2001), who have written about anthropophagy as a social practice have tended toward the relativizing approach that Frank Lestringant (1997:12) calls “culturalist,” which tends “to idealize the violent act of eating, to shift the noise of teeth and lips towards the domain of language.” Like the explanatory labels that surround the Pitt-Rivers’ shrunken heads, ethnographic representations mute violence and trauma by emphasizing their ritual context and religious and symbolic meanings.

Gingging’s account suggests that some native activists see other alternatives. By embracing images of violent agency as a mark of their autonomy from the dominant culture, the KadazanDusun of Sabah assert their independence from state control and from the homogenizing bumiputera nationalist identity that includes Muslim Malays. As Gingging acknowledges, this works only from the safe distance that locates such practices in an ancestral past distant from contemporary Sabah self-identity. The idea that a pagan headhunting past may be common ground around which diverse non-Muslim groups can rally resonates with a point that Alcida Ramos (1998) and others have emphasized in pan-indigenous movements: that native activists’ self-representations are directed not only to non-indigenous publics, but also to establish solidarity with other indigenous people.

This is a fascinating variation on a global theme. As native people grapple with the need to make “room” for themselves in a crowded world (Turner 1992:14; Clifford 2000), they try to carve out spaces for innovative, indigenous ways of being modern by mobilizing discourses that are (at least partially) independent of state control, yet consistent with the need to enhance native access to economic resources and political support. To do so, they employ diverse discourses, ranging from the universalist claims of human rights and environmentalism, to assertions of localized ties to land, culture-specific spirituality, and
mystical knowledge beyond the ken of science as well as the state (Conklin 2002).

These are positive images. But Sabah use of the headhunting warrior as their logo (www.monsopiad.com) and origin narrative recalls other indigenous experiments with more aggressive stereotypes. In Brazil, belligerent warrior stances worked well at times for Xavante and Kayapo activists, especially under the military dictatorship when the indigenous causes were one of the only “safe” issues around which citizens could articulate criticism of the government (Ramos 1998). In more democratic contexts when support from image-sensitive NGOs became a major resource, aggressive imagery has tended to backfire, slipping too easily into old stereotypes of savagery, backwardness, or irrelevant buffoonery (Conklin and Graham 1995).

Gingging acknowledges that there are risks in the Monsopiad gambit, but one wishes for more ethnographic insight into what these risks might be. How do people negotiate the pressures to perform “tradition” in some contexts and “modernity” in others? Does the lone Sabah individual quoted in this article represent the views of all when she characterizes ancestral headhunting as “embarrassing but cool?” And what exactly does “cool” mean here?

Then there are the skulls themselves, forty-two enemy heads strung up for tourists to photograph. Are the people whose kin inhabited those skulls concerned with their present treatment or not? Gingging’s account suggests the tantalizing possibility that some years from now when the centers of empire (the Smithsonian, museums of natural history, perhaps even the venerable Pitt-Rivers) may have purged themselves of indigenous remains, indigenous museums like those of the Shuar and Sabah will find that in the competition for space in ethnic cultural politics, capitalizing on the display of such remains is still a time-honored way to get ahead.

Works Cited


Flory Ann Mansor Gingging


I know nothing about Borneo, except for what this essay by Flory Ann Mansor Gingging has taught me. "I Lost My Head in Borneo: Tourism and the Refashioning of the Headhunting Narrative in Sabah, Malaysia" argues that, in today's tourism industry in Malaysia, KadazanDusuns, the most prominent indigenous group in the state of Sabah in Borneo, put their headhunting past on display parodically to overturn their colonial relegation to a subhuman category and also to assert their distinctiveness—and possibly their right to independence—from a Malaysian national identity. The essay foregrounds the KadazanDusuns' agency in their "refashioning" of headhunting for the benefit not so much of tourists, but of the indigenous people themselves: the Monsopiad Cultural Village is a "tourist destination" but one where the tourist’s visit can "contribute directly to the conservation of one of Malaysia's rich cultural heritages and traditions" (www.monsopiad.com/Welcome.html).

I was so ignorant that even the headhunting association with Borneo had not readily been accessible to me. What does "learning" from this essay then mean? What kind of a position should or can I take in responding professionally—as a folklorist and cultural critic—to the essay? How to respond to it without putting into play a different kind of ignorance?

One section of Gingging's essay briefly discusses "how early literature about the region, written primarily by European travelers, has played a role in the 'invention' of Borneo; an invention that has lived on in tourist literature, and . . . an invention to which the invocation of headhunting in the tourism industry in Sabah is responding." Here Gingging addresses a type of colonial and colonizing cultural production that I am familiar with from my research about Hawai’i, where I live as a settler-teacher and scholar. In writing about the early 20th-century beginnings of Hawai’i's touristic representation as "tropical paradise," I identify "legendary Hawai’i" as an imaginary space "constructed for non-Hawaiians (and especially Americans) to experience, via Hawaiian legends, a Hawai’i that is exotic and primitive while beautiful and welcoming" (5). That this promotion of "legendary Hawai’i" was built on early Euro-American travelogues to the islands, and took place shortly after the forced annexation of Hawai’i to the United States in 1898, solidifies its legacy in the western social imaginary. Furthermore, it does so specifically at the expense of Native Hawaiians, who have, however, then and now, produced counter-narratives of Hawai’i as an indigenous, "storied place."

I gather that the "invention" of Borneo by European travelers produced a kind of primitivism that is different from the "soft primitivism" associated with Hawaiians (Desmond and Smith), but in both cases the narratives of "wild men" and "hospitable women" respectively, have been replicated by the tourist industry to produce in Westerners the desire to visit faraway islands. Nevertheless, even about Hawaiians who, as N-
tive scholar and activist Haunani-Kay Trask has noted, are consistently imagined as sexually inviting, feminized, and smiling "natives," literary tourists, such as Mark Twain, would pose the question of cannibalism. As with headhunting in Borneo or South-East Asia more broadly, "cannibalism" in Oceania brings excitement—the frisson of fear—to the tourist's encounter with the exotic, as long as that hostility is safely confined to an historical or imagined past.

In his book American Pacificism: Oceania in the U.S. Imagination, Paul Lyons convincingly draws a line of continuity between travel writing and tourism in ways that foreground their complicity as histouricism—where indigenous history is misrecognized for the sake of an exoticism that serves Euro-American economic and ideological interests. Particularly resonant in relation to Gingging's argument is Lyons's discussion of cannibalism in literary tourism (as still practiced by, for instance, Paul Theroux) and of "cannibal tours," whereby tourists are taken "to places where the Islanders are supposed to have until yesterday, by native admission (or practical joking), practiced a fantasmal 'cannibalism' (generally in the next village over)" (129-130). Lyons also insightfully analyzes literary "antitourism"—"an alternative mode of seeing, always concerned with the materialist conditions obscured by Pacifistic writing" (22)—in the works of Albert Wendt, Sia Figiel, Teresia Teaiwa, and many other Oceanian writers who document contemporary indigenous resistance to Euro-American takeover, a resistance that politically and culturally has a long history in the region and in Hawai'i (Silva).

But it is Lyons's careful reading of this colonial archive that I am thinking about the most in forming my response to Gingging's essay, partly because like Lyons, I am a settler whose position is necessarily different from Gingging's, who is writing as a member—be it a diasporic one—of the KadayanDusun people. Lyons shows the scope of histouricism, as it includes Charles Warren Stoddard, Jack London, Fred O'Brien, Margaret Mead, and Annie Dillard. The result is chilling: "Most of the canonical U.S. writers about Oceania were literally tourist boosters, and, especially in the twentieth century, were constituted as native informants to metropolitan readers in part by writing directly for the tourist industry" (Lyons 20). The authority of these widely circulated narratives sustains a "willed and stunning ignorance/ignoring of Oceanian priorities" (2) specifically in American cultural productions of Oceania, an active "ignoring of Oceanian epistemologies, political institutions and forms of cultural and intellectual tradition and performance" (8-9). It is this authority, as Charles Briggs has shown, that some anthropologists have unwittingly defended by denouncing indigenous "invention" of traditions.

National, tourist, and even academic interests have a deep investment in this kind of ignoring because, as we know, it is the grounds on which the expert subject builds her/his authority. My lack of knowledge about Borneo's history and diverse ethnic groups does not mean that I am not to some extent implicated in the Western "invention of
"I Lost My Head in Borneo"

...nor does it excuse me from at least attempting to refrain from reproducing this kind of ignorance in my scholarly but not "expert" response. It is one thing as an outsider and settler for me to write about "legendary Hawai'i" in an effort to re-orient myself, and others, towards recognizing our collective ignoring of the epistemologies and histories that I would not pretend to "know," but that I am actively trying to learn about and from. And it is another for me to respond to Gingging's assertion of an indigenous response that subverts the "invention" of Borneo's "wild men."

I did find Gingging's discussion of indigenous agency at work in the Monsopiad Cultural Village in Sabah to be informative and significant. I also found her discussion of the tension between Malaysian national identity and the KadazanDusun indigenous self-identification very interesting, especially as it is played out in relation to modernity. The Monsopiad Cultural Village is owned and run by Monsopiad's descendants and has no support from the national government. I learned a lot from the essay, and I know I will draw on it to question touristic representations of Borneo's headhunting narratives when I encounter them. That, in itself, is a meaningful step away from ignorance, not only of Borneo but of an indigenous perspective on Borneo.

I do have a lot more questions. Some of them stem from my experience with a different kind of colonial history, an experience in a different region and place. The kind of tourism I am more familiar with in Hawai'i is large-scale transnational corporate tourism, of the kind that Haunani-Kay Trask condemns for prostituting Hawaiian culture; Gaye Chan and Andrea Feesser blame for turning Waikiki, a previously self-sustaining community, into a haven of capitalist development and exploitation; and John Zuern de-romanticizes by focusing on workers' lives in the hotel industry. At the same time, I would not be alone in rejecting the proposition that there is no agency for Hawaiians putting their heritage on display, for instance, through hula: well-respected halau perform in a range of settings, and maintain control over what to share or not with different audiences; irony and parody have a long-term role in the history of hula performance (Diamond; Imada). Thinking about Monsopiad Cultural Village from Hawai'i, where the Polynesian Cultural Center is a foremost tourist attraction, I want to ask for more information about the Village in relation to what Gingging identifies as the more developed industry of (eco)tourism in Malaysia. How are the two economies connected? How many hotels sponsor the tour to the Monsopiad Cultural Village? What percentage and kind of tourist will go to the Village? Who has designed their website and packages?

The Monsopiad Cultural Village incorporates headhunting legend and material displays into what the website refers to as a "living museum," the purpose of which is to educate visitors and "to document, revive, and keep alive the culture and traditions" of the Kadazan people. In Global Villages: The Globalization of Ethnic Display, a documentary video produced by Tamar Gordon and Bruce Caron, several "ethnic theme
"parks" in China and Japan are viewed as contributing to a "global genre . . . run by governments and corporations politically intent on shaping public narratives of ethnic minorities and foreign nationals in the context of the nation-state." One of these parks is explicitly modeled on the Polynesian Cultural Center in Hawai'i. One aim of the documentary is to show how the performances and activities of ethnic minorities, such as the Wa, are mediated in Chinese ethnic parks by market considerations and tourists' expectations of "spectacle." Gordon states that these parks are "controlled fantasy environments" where "tourists and performers participate in the production of heritage" and of the "unity of the nation-state." When Gordon and Caron document the representation in the Yunan Park of the Mosuo, a matrilineal group, as spectators we see how verbal statements by the male spokesperson and the silent behavior of the women do not necessarily match: another form of mediation that seeks to mask gender tensions within the group itself. The other side to this observation is that Gordon, who has no connection with the ethnic groups displaying their heritage at the Yunan or the "Windows of the World" parks, conducts much of her research by relying on translators when interviewing performers. Whether that gets her to some "authenticity" or even to a response that is not staged is questionable—especially given the transparency of translation in the documentary—but a range of views, for instance among Wa performers in different parks, is represented.

I'd like to know more about tourists' engagement in the Monsopiad Cultural Village experience. I'd like to know if everyone in the Village—including the women—identifies with "headhunting" as a form of "cultural intimacy." I'd like to know how the decision was made to build this Village around the "House of Skulls," which the website tells us was "already a prominent tourist attraction since 1979." But part of the point of the KadazanDusun people "refashioning the headhunting narrative" is that it is up to them to establish what the parameters for "front" and "back" of their display are, for asking questions, rather than answering them. In addition to working with different media, Gordon's and Gingging's projects as well as their positions as researchers are different. Gingging's focus is on the re-visionist perspective and parodic practice of her own people, especially what it means to them. If I want to learn from her and them, I must also be aware of how my questions may not be of interest to, or even in the interest of, Gingging and her people. I've posed questions, but have I earned the right to have them answered?

In writing this response, I've considered more this kind of problem and others like it. When I ask to know more about the KadazanDusun people and the Monsopiad Cultural Village, however worthy my intentions may be, which "ignorance" is at work? How can this "will to know" not carry out a colonizing scholarly agenda if my "homework" is elsewhere? And can ignorance of and the ignoring of non-Western priorities operate in complete separation from one another? This is one of the mind-turning reflections with which I was left as part of the process of engaging with Gingging's indigenous troping of the "headhunting narrative."
**Notes**

Though their views do not necessarily match mine, I'd like to thank Dawn Morais, who is working on life writing and Malaysian national identity, and Nadia Inserra, who is writing about the cultural translation of Southern Italian folk dance in the US, for conversations that helped me shape this response.

**Works Cited**


Burgundian Regionalism and French Republican Commercial Culture at the 1937 Paris International Exposition

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Abstract
This article discusses how early twentieth-century France developed rustic modernization projects anchored in traditional regional practices. This entailed overcoming political and cultural fears associated with regional allegiances as well as developing regional cultural agendas susceptible to economic exploitation. The case study of how Burgundians marketed artisan workmanship, gastronomical traditions, vernacular architecture, and folkloric traditions at the 1937 Paris International Exposition illustrates how a commercial paradigm of French national identity was rooted in provincial productivity.

Introduction: The Problem with Rural France

One must visit its provinces to truly understand France. Only there... are the nation's particularities unveiled. -Stefan Zweig, Voyages [1931]

 Moralists, pundits and scholars have anchored their interpretations of French history in the putative virtues and alleged deficiencies of France's agrarian traditions and agricultural structures (Duby and Wallon 1976; Pitte 1983; Agulhon 1988; Antoine 1999; Le Roy Ladurie 1974; Le Roy Ladurie 2001; Moriceau 2002). Herman Lebovics characterizes conventional discourses about the nature or identity of "true France" as inherently reactionary insofar as they generally employ "political-theological nonsense" to maintain "that there can be only one way to participate in the culture of a country and only one natural political organization that fits society" (1992, xiv and xiii). Stéphane Gerson's argues that the concept of "local France" has "long evoked a story of neglect, coercion, nostalgia, and reaction" (2003, 539). Many still imagine rural France as the source of reactionary political and social agendas. The problem with such interpretations, anchored in depictions of the French Revolution's counter-revolutionary enemies to the Revolution Nationale's crypto-fascist supporters, is that they frequently either dismiss or undervalue the diversity and modernity of cultural formations originating in the French provinces.

This view has been challenged recently. Thiébaut Flory characterizes early twentieth-century French regionalism as
a "rich and multi-faceted ideology that seem[ed] to reconcile the most contradictory doctrines and still offered a certain unity of thought" (1992, 42). Patrick Young adds that "regionalism lent itself to a range of inflections, many informed by the desire to consciously avoid the charged polarities of French Politics" (2002, 171). Shanny Peer shows how folk representations of "rural France" were endorsed and exploited by France's leftist Popular Front government at the 1937 Paris International Exposition (1998). Supporting these interpretations, this article examines the Burgundian presence at the 1937 Paris International Exposition in order to better understand the nature and significance of regional contributions to the French modernization project during the Interwar years.

Consistent with interpretations that emphasize the importance of regional and rural agendas from France's Third Republic through Vichy's National Revolution and into the late twentieth century, my analysis of Burgundian regionalism examines how resuscitated or newly created "traditions" served to link regional interests to a French national political identity (Faure 1989). Although some scholars might argue that the resurgence of French regionalism "was only and gradually reintroduced under the condition that it became presentable in republican eyes" (den Boer, 47), I maintain that regionalism resulted from the regionalists' own ability to influence the terms and conditions under which regional cultural and economic practices were politically recognized, especially during the interwar years.

**French Modernization and Burgundian Regionalism**

The point is that politics is social, not textual, and if the text is made political, its politicization is effected at its point of entry into the social.... If the political potential of a text is to be mobilized, the text must reproduce among the discourses that comprise it a struggle equivalent to that experienced socially by its readers.


Eric Hobsbawm has described modern Europe as period of rapid change resulting in a search for "new social devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to structure social relationships" (1983; 1990). This analysis has a particular salience for Interwar Burgundy. Interwar Burgundians consciously exploited folk images and rural idioms to articulate an idealized, mystifying, and reassuring regional model of French modernity (Poirrier 1995; Bazin 1996 and 1997; Whalen 1999; Laferté 2002; Whalen 2007b). This strategy of ideological implication (White, 1987) used rustic referents of a "collective dream-world" (Buck-Morse 1989, 71) or imagined community (Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1991; Jameson 1992; Moentmann 2003) to animate residual social values, palliate cultural anxieties, mobilize political interests, and market regional products into what became a dominant model for French commercial regionalism. Burgundians staged elaborately choreographed gastronomical fairs, wine festivals, and the Burgundian Pavilion at the 1937 Paris International Exposition.
Exhibition to privilege localizing practices that presented regional folkways as culturally and economically valuable. These events presented authentic regional folkways and traditional artisan practices as models through which contemporaries could acquire self-understanding, frame collective identities, script their own heritage, and define a federal role for their own regions within French national culture.

The Burgundian project developed a highly successful form of French regionalism capable of sustaining local cultural interests by linking traditional social practices and modern marketing practices. The social and cultural spaces of an idealized Burgundian community (both real and imagined) were inhabited through carefully orchestrated spectacles that (re)classified notions of timeless traditions and rustic modernity into recognizable phenomena. By participating in these fairs and festivals, consumers performatively renegotiated political, cultural, and ideological preferences through market choices. Indeed, the benefits that French regions brought to the nation were central in the minds of the organizers of the 1937 Paris International Exposition:

[w]e understand that alongside the national interest exist particular interests that are not opposed to it…. It would not insult the most ardent regionalists to say that their agenda may be summarized as follows: to establish a structure supple enough to allow, instead of centralization to the extreme, for the legitimate efflorescence of local particularisms and respect for their origins ("Le Centre Rural," Livred’Or, 186).

As the result of these activities, marketing and consumption of regional products culturally invoked, symbolically reified, and socially inscribed Burgundian identity. Marketers harnessed popular, mass and folk practices to structure a French identity that lasted well beyond the Interwar period and into the twentieth century. This is how the cultural determinants of French identity became selectively available through the mechanisms of cultural commodification, product identification, and ritual consumption.

French Folklore Studies circa 1937

Thus, from pavilion to pavilion, cellar to cellar, garden to garden, restaurant to restaurant, the visitor may, in several hours time, conduct a happy and easy tour, which instructs and distracts alternatively.

–Raymon Lécuyer, "Le Centre régional," Illustration (1937, n. p.).

Discussions concerning the importance of regional practices were central to over 300 meetings, congresses, and conferences scheduled during the six months that coincided with the 1937 Paris Exposition International (Pernikoff, 162 and listed individually in Labbé 1938, vol. 11, 365-387). The First International Congress of Folklore, held at l’Ecole du Louvre in Paris during the last week of August 1937, culminated a quarter-century’s fruitful collaboration between French geographers, historians, sociologists, and folklorists.¹ Organizers coordinated the Congress to coincide with the International Exposition’s folklore festival on August 28. "A great folkloric festi-
val," to be held at the regional center to close the folklore congress, announced the Exposition's general commissioner, would "celebrate the provinces with singing, dancing, and fireworks" (Labbé 1938, vol. 11, 421). L'Humanité reported that the folklore festival was the "most magnificent" offered at the Exposition. "An immense crowd, in which it was difficult to move" witnessed all variety of folkloric expressions designed to "re-suscitate the past and [link] it to the present by giving folklore its true signification." The event also provided an educational display. Citing the example of a particularly impressive 100-year-old Normandy headdress, Le Jour noted that participating provincials gladly explained the origins and nature of their customs and traditions to inquiring visitors (digested in l'Action Régionaliste 37. 8 (1937), 10).

Catherine Vallantin notes that the ideological beliefs of folklore producers and consumers were neither monolithic nor fixed (Vallantin 1999). Participants of the 1937 folklore conference embraced a variety of militant nationalist, neo-Romantic, and empirical interests that were neither logically linked nor reducible to one another. These further informed different racialist, geographical, idealist, regionalist, etc., methodological approaches and commitments (482, 485 and passim). While informed French folklorists (readers of Rivièrè's Race et racisme journal, for example,) were certainly aware of the overtly racist Volkskunde literature and theories of a unified national volk, many remained committed to agendas more directly concerned with French issues understood through the lens of geographical traditions of cultural analysis. Vallantin cites the assertion of the secretary general of the Society of the Friends of Popular Arts, Guy le Foch, at the 1936 World Congress of Leisure and Recreation in Hamburg, Germany, that the participating French regional group's "desire to maintain regional differences" was not in opposition to "love for the nation" (485).

Another expression of contemporary interest in folklore studies and the synthetic and interdisciplinary collaboration that supported it was displayed through the creation of the Museum of Arts and Popular Traditions under Paul Rivet and Jacques Rivière's direction in 1937. Rivière described the new museum's charge to provide more than "a dusty succession of rooms, province by province" and, to offer, instead, a methodologically organized overview of folkways related to costumes, traditions, and crafts, etc. that could "transmit the souvenirs of the past to future generations." The museum was to have facilities, resources, and funds to support "vast research," conferences, the acquisition of collections, and a research library ("that would be enriched year by year") equivalent to those found in the Musée de l'homme (Daudier 9). Marc Bloch, Marcel Mauss, Georges Dumézil, and Henri Focillon were appointed directors of the Commission of Folklore in Education when the organization was created in 1939 (Vallantin, 488). Indeed, the co-directors of the innovative historical review Annales, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, maintained ties with various folklore societies before and after 1937. Both were associated with Jacques Rivière's projects.
through the winter of 1938 and participated in a series of radio shows calculated to inform the general public about the Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions' activities. Febvre used that opportunity to invoke humanist values that he associated with folklore studies as a bulwark against the specter of Nazi offensives (Vallantin 506).

The geographically-oriented rural historian Lucien Febvre presented a paper at the 1937 International Folklore Congress (read in his absence by Marcel Maget) on the availability of research materials pertinent to French culinary practices, in which he underscored the necessity of comparative studies and interdisciplinary collaboration (Vallantin 499-500). In a review of the Congress' Proceedings, published in the Annales de Géographie, Febvre underscored the promise that folkloric studies could be elevated in academic stature through the use of inductive methodological practices and association with other fields within the human sciences (Febvre 1936, 156-7). Even Marc Bloch, who was less sympathetic to the aims of folklore, recognized it could provide "a formidable instrument of social analysis," once shorn of its antiquarian or provincial sympathies (Müller, 180-81).

The geographers, folklorists, historians, ethnographers, and linguists who participated in these conferences invested in concepts such as genre-de-vie (folkways) and terroir, which denoted "the totality of the elements of the vineyard habitat" (Wilson 55-56, 113). Not since nineteenth-century neo-Romantics first identified patrimoine as a shared national resource have emotional responses to landscape been so adroitly harnessed to a project of identity formation. Exuding the confidence of nineteenth-century social positivists, interwar provincial notables and regional leaders made careers reducing Burgundy's existence (past, present, and future) to the seductive operations and necessary determinations of terroir. Different Burgundian wine-producing regions used the système d'appellation d'origine contrôlée to taxonimize a link between discernibly distinct folkways and the unique characteristics allegedly associated with distinct geographical terroirs (Whalen 1999, 171-181; Lafferté 2002, 66-95; Whalen 2001a, 6-10; Lafferté 2001; Whalen 2007b). The Burgundian scholar and vintner Gaston Roupnel described his wine as a "subtle emanation from the soil" replete with euphoric qualities responsible for the regional joie de vivre (1931, 27-28; also see Durand 2003, 3711). Kolleen Guy argues that terroir became one of the "fundamental references" for collective French identity by the early twentieth century (2003, 42-44). Building on her theorization of terroir as an ideological strategy (2003b), I argue that the concept permitted the Third Republic to map itself in terms of regional interests with the consequence that—far from being anathema to national unity as is often alleged—a federated regionalism became the currency of French republicanism during the first half of the twentieth century.

Another concept that heavily informed discussion of folklore among geographers, social morphologists, historians, ethnographers, and folklorists was genre-de-vie. Derived from Paul Vidal
de la Blache's geographical works (1911, 1921), this all-important descriptive and analytic category served to denote relatively stable patterns and structures of psychological, social, and material organization within rural villages. Multi-disciplinarian Lucien Febvre, for instance, retained the concept in his Geographical Introduction to History. "When we speak of the manner of life of a people," he wrote,

we speak just as much of the inevitable consequences of a particular habitat as of the necessary result of their manner of feeding themselves. Either the idea of genre-de-vie has no meaning, or it admits in the first place the consideration of habits of men, of those men who, from the most remote ages, influenced both by very strong traditionalism, which is itself only a result, and by their limited experience, always direct their efforts towards the same objects, and always employ the same means to overcome the same difficulties. To tell the truth, it is not the differences in their food that causes the differences between men; it is the diversity in habits and tastes that impels such human groups to seek one sort of food rather than another (1922, 246).

André Varagnac, a curator for the French National Museum for Antiquities, who defined folklore apolitically as "collective beliefs without doctrine and collective practices without theory" and maintained an intuitive belief in "mysterious internal forces" (1948, 21), unapologetically and unproblematically used genre-de-vie—despite its notorious association with disreputable Vichy ideology and policies—as an explanatory paradigm in his Civilisation traditionelle et genres de vie, as late as 1948 (Paxton 1997, 22).

1937 also marked a downturn in cross-disciplinary collaborations. A rise in intellectual divisions and disciplinary territoriality increasingly marginalized folklore studies. Emergent academic disciplines distinguished themselves from rivals within the human and social sciences by asserting their "scientific" foundations, epistemological assumptions, and methodological practices. A parallel rivalry between academic and applied practitioners in the United States saw Richard Dorson censure 1930s WPA applied folklorists for their "shameless promotion, populism, and activism" (Shuldiner 1998, 189) and Hermann Bausinger link the German Volkskunde movement's post-1933 ideological connection to National Socialism's racialist theories ([1966] 1986). Such disciplinary tensions created a deep rift between ethnology and folklore (Weber 2000; Bronner 1986, Bendix 1988, and most recently rehabilitated, in part, by Newell [1987] and recuperated by Payne 1998, 151). Arnold Van Gennep mounted a weak rearguard action when he argued that since folklore's objects of study were living beings, the discipline should be considered a biological science (Varagnac 1948, 40). Other ethnologists and folklorists interpreted these divergences more positively. Reflecting in l'Âction Régionaliste on the 1937 Exposition's rural center, international folklore week, and the 1937 annual folklore congress, Max Hymans contrasted an ethnology that "traced human origins through space" to "the most human of the sc-
ences," folklore, which "studied contemporary man within his terroir" (1937, 37: 8, 2). However much the object of either field remained selective and determined by a priori subjective factors or disciplinary conventions, ethnology, in particular, acquired an ambitious methodology heralded as objective, "descriptive," and historidizing, while folklore's investment in the maintenance and/or revival of traditional (read: timeless, pre-modern, pre-industrial, pre-democratic, pre-capitalist, while still egalitarian and based on social solidarity) folkways earned it the lesser status of an "applied" practice (Saintyves 1935, 29-58).

The historian and geographer, Marc Bloch, in particular, came to reject the visions of a timeless past associated with "applied folklore" illustrated in the works of Burgundian folklorists such as Arnold Van Gennep, Gaston Roupen, Perrin de Puycousin, and Marcel Maget (Payne 1998, 251-277). Despite censure from "scientific" quarters, folklore studies continued to thrive and find broad support precisely because it offered a pseudo-nostalgic and historico-fetishistic form of cultural therapy that could mobilize Interwar France's forces of economic regionalism. The importance of regional pursuits, then, attests to a vitality and creativity that do not, I would argue, conform to notions of folklore as a fixed, stable or stagnant set of ideas and signs.\(^3\) Such interests and debates informed France's Popular Front government's (1936-38) efforts to harmonize competing visions of France into a preferred image paradoxically founded on both modern agricultural traditional practices through "the large place given over to the principle subject of regionalism" at the 1937 Paris International Exposition (Pernikoff 1938, 155; Bleton-Ruget 1998, 156-58). Indeed, the Regional Center's Pavilions at the 1937 Paris Exhibition greatly surpassed the importance and centrality of the "Vielle France" (olden France) village located in the Attractions Park (Labbé 1938, vol. 3, 406-409).

National Unity through Regional Diversity

[A] French Exposition with a regionalist nature...[will] provide the provinces with a unique opportunity to compete, show their originality, and—far from attacking the unity of our country—to partake equally in giving France the greatest éclat.

–Livre d'Or Officiel (185)

Although the 1937 Paris International Exposition is most often remembered for the political tensions represented in the Soviet Union's and Nazi Germany's opposing pavilions, for Picasso's massive Guernica painting in support of Republican Spain, or simply as the last of the great Paris fairs, the French saw it, instead, as addressing important domestic concerns. Chief among these was the political and economic role that French regions played within the national economy and polity displayed using the mechanisms and strategies of applied folklore (Peer 1998).

The Exposition's general commissioner, Edmond Labbé, admitted he favored provincial interests. "I found the provincial arguments so justified," he wrote, that he "made every effort to carefully associate the provinces... [with
their respective cultures, arts, traditions, etc.] to the Exposition" (Labbé, 1938, vol. 8, xvi). The Exposition's Livre d'Or Officiel asserted that regionalism was "one of the key words in the Exposition organizers' program.... It is a term much in vogue right now; it generates much interest and sympathy as well as the most mistrust, hostility, and it must be admitted, hatred" (185). The director of regional life, Jean Charles-Brun, made regionalism one of the Exposition's main themes and organizing principles (Wright 2003, 28). Regionalist commentator, Jules Mihura, agreed that the Exposition produced "an incontestable occasion for the awakening of regional spirit" (1937, 2).

He was particularly pleased the event entailed the creation of an elaborate system of regional committees whose legal mandate during and beyond the Exposition was to "generally support, develop, and market regional resources and activities," including art, folklore, gastronomy, monuments, games and festivals, etc. Charles-Brun's theme of "Unity through Diversity" found "perfect" and "seductive" expression in the artisan practices and products displayed at the Exposition's Labor and Regional Centers. These highlighted the advantages regional economies offered the French national economy:

"Customs differ, even languages are dissimilar, but the spirit of the people is united. This will be seen by the fact that art, science, and crafts are all progressing in the same general line in different regions. That is to say, though widely separated by localities, manners, and languages, the people of France are one when it is a question of Progress." (Exposition Paris 1937: 4).


The administrative director of the Exposition's regional committee further declared, "with each regional pavilion, the Regional Center will be "like a Little France" ("comme une Petite France") produced directly by the regions and remaining under regional control." In the same vein, the Exposition's general commissioner, Edmond Labbé, asserted that "Each region has a soul that seeks expression through numerous chefs-d'œuvres and thereby introduces a suppleness, variety, and warmth into modern art that cannot be had through reason or good taste alone... (quoted in Livre d'Or Officiel, 185). Much like the 1900 Paris Exposition Universelle's famed banquet of 20,777 mayors, the
editors of Exposition Paris 1937 promised, "the reunion in Paris of all the Provinces will be a most interesting sight... bring[ing] together peasants from all different parts of the country—not only peasants but artists, craftsmen, [and] scientists into the Regional Center" (Chandler 1987, 39). "It will show the integral harmony of the Interior of France" (Exposition Paris 1937, 4). In a section devoted to "The Role of the French Provinces in the World's Fair," the editors also insisted that: "[t]he extraordinary medley of customs, peoples, scenery, and products which make up France will, insofar as possible, be brought to the Exposition. The Products of France are as varied as its people" (Exposition Paris 1937, 14).

The design of Exposition centers, as symbolic and material signs of French rural, folk, and regional cultures, celebrated the merits of both modernization and industrialization within a traditional French regional framework (Peer 1998; Faure 1989). Ossip Pernikoff, the Exposition's transportation and tourism attaché, noted that the 1937 Exposition was different from its predecessors in that it was not organized or built around one iconic architectural spike ("clous") such as the Eiffel Tower or the first Trocadero. Rather it revealed France through the "multiple visages" of its regions "as it really was in that year of grace." Edmond Labbé christened the entirety of the Regional Center as the Exposition's "spike" because it symbolized the union of all of France (Labbé, 1938, vol. 11, 421; vol. 8, 303; vol. 8, 307). "The Regional Center," he asserted, "was to be a microcosm of France's 27 provinces" (Labbé, 1938, vol. 8, xvi). Pernikoff further described how regional characteristics ("each following climate, race, customs... the treasures of their soul") associated with "diverse yet united terroirs" were represented by the Regional Center's 27 pavilions to achieve a "patriotic union of France" whose "individual regional traits [citing Georges Clemenceau] are so dear to the French" (Pernikoff 1938, 70, 150). L'Illustration's Raymond Lécuyer thought that the close proximity of the pavilions within the Center provided a "faithful" analog to the relation between the provinces within France (Lécuyer 1937).

![Fig. 3. The Eiffel Tower firmly implanted in and towering over the 1937 Paris Exposition's Regional Center From Edmond Labbé's Rapport général, vol. 2. Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.](image-url)
The General Committee emphasized that regionalist architecture should show "how much the benefits of experience and local art [were] not narrowly confined within the past" (Livre d'Or Officiel, 188). It wanted to give modern expression to regional potential by avoiding anything that appeared to be servile imitation and sought, instead, a free interpretation of regional character through original materials: "within and without, the architects strove to remain of their own time; to give reminiscences a fresh look, a contemporary accent" (Lécuyer). Such innovations—running the gamut from militant and unrepentant particularism to a complete convergence of national and regional interests in a generic "international style"—pointed France, it was alleged, in a new direction or third way toward "not an international style but the internationalization of [French] style" (Labbé 1938, vol. 1, 220).

If the Exposition's general architect, Jacques Greber, hoped to introduce "more color in our gray epoch," the Regional Center largely accomplished this goal (1937). Charles Bourgeois, the director of the Ecole des beaux-arts de Tourcoing touted regionalist aesthetics when he argued that "if there exists an area in which regional art achieves an incontestable value, it is clearly in architecture and its ancillary fields.... These create a style and provide the color of each regions vegetation, sky, and lighting" (Bourgeois 1938, 8). Like "freshness in a bouquet," Raymond Lécuyer found the Regional Center provided "one of the strongest attractions of the Paris Exposition." Georges-Henri Rivière also understood the Exposition's scope and grasped the Exhibition's greater pedagogical mission to provide:

1) An account of the most interesting efforts of the last 20 years;
2) An instrument of popular pedagogy, in order to place within the reach of each a documentation usually reserved to specialists, and capable of inspiring a greater desire for culture;
3) An experimental laboratory, the results of which should be capable of being adopted, so as to constitute a plan of work for the future;
4) For each country, an expression of its national characteristics (Expositions internationales, Paris 1937, New York 1939, 5).

Albert Bonnard commented on how each of the regions "stylized" its "indigenous" traditions and customs to offer crowds "an effortless and educational spectacle" (Livre d'Or Officiel, 191). To this end, the 1,600-square meter Burgundian Pavilion (Bourgogne-Franche-Comté et Pays de l'Ain Pavilion), located between the Avenue de Suffren and the Seine River, provided a "picturesque" composite of "traditional style and modern tendencies" in a conservative moderne vernacular (Dupays 1938: 255; Moentmann 2003, 311). "Nothing is archaic," noted L'Illustration's reporters,

[t]hat's the lesson one is to draw.... that it is possible, even desirable, to subordinate construction to the rhythms of modern life, while conserving its permanent and traditional characteristics.... Between servile pla-
Burgundian Regionalism

giarism of the past and the anonymous copies of our modern decorators, is there not a renaissance that is both regional and modern? (Clouzot and Ducharte 1937)

Figs. 4 and 5. Rural and Regional Centers. From L’Abbé's Rapport général, Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.

The organizers of the 1937 Paris International Exposition placed great importance in its Rural and Regional Centers (Peer 1998). Recalling the 1925 Paris Exposition's emphasis on decorative arts, the 1937 Exposition reflected the Popular Front government's investment in French technological progress and the prowess of artisan crafts. The General Committee stressed that the Regional Center would be "no bazaar– no fair– no carnival– but, instead, serve as an instructive example of France at work" (Exposition Paris 1937, 4). French national identity, it asserted, percolated through the labor and craftsmanship of artisans who "do not rest on their laurels. They go on. They achieve. Their past has given them this background. Upon that solid rock they have constructed new forms, never losing their individual ability nor their cohesion." The Exposition's General Commissioner, Edmond Labbé, wanted "to show how new methods are adapted to the respective character of each corner of the Nation" (Livre d'Or officiel 188) and promoted artisan crafts and techniques emblematic of qualities uniquely associated with provincial France. The Exposition's General Committee believed that a crafts center, "like a small commercial city quarter lined with shops bright and gay," where "craftsmen are to be shown working as they do at usual times," would have "a particularly important position in the Exposition" simulating an experience that would allow fairgoers to "enter into the internal lives of craftsmen and artists" (Exposition Paris 1937:1).

One of the Exposition's central objectives was to illustrate how traditional building practices and contemporary personal needs could produce attractive, welcoming, and comfortable dwellings (Pernikoff 1938, 154-55). These constructions were designed to appeal to regionalists, ruralists, and others outraged by the "crimes of modern architecture," whose equal portions of air, cement, ultra-violet rays, running water, and food allegedly produced "egalitarian and nudist" cubicles devoid of local color, charm, and character (Hubert-Fillay 1937, 2-3).
Similar concerns had previously been voiced about the architecture and interior design of the rural French Village built for the 1925 Paris Exposition. Writing for *l'Illustration*, Léandre Vaillot thought the designers had confused the "French village" as product of "a slow elaboration, with each generation carefully making its contribution to the previous generation's edifice" with a modern "garden city," a rapid work born out of new economic circumstances like the building of a factory" (1925, 131). Vaillot detected a "rational architectural tendency" denoted by modern lighting, extreme functionality, a clever yellow and violet color scheme, and chic balconies with "details too minute," resulting in an impressive style "more cubist than authentic," and "bad proportions" that spoiled the architectural treatment of the medical station, bakery, inn, sanitary station, express bar, pottery bazaar, artisan studios, and "luxurious stores," such as a pharmacy the author sardonically described as "making one feel like getting sick" (132).
Vaillot felt that too much place had been given over to current policy than the accurate reconstruction of regional realities. Examining the village church and cemetery designed by Jacques Droz, Vaillot detected "praiseworthy intentions" mired in an unfortunate tendency to reproduce the "artistic excesses of nineteenth-century art" (133). The furnishings of the French village's buildings, for instance, were more suitable for sedate bourgeois interiors rather than rural peasant dwellings. "One could say [...] this fantasy of rich Parisians who imagine themselves living [...] in an idealized rustic village... does not indicate which village nor in which region it may be found." (133) The contiguous emplacement of buildings marked as representing different regions also confounded visitors. Side by side, the Breton and Alsatian buildings, for example, captured the Exposition's desire to stage the unity of regional France at the expense of discernible authentic regional contributions. Similarly, the village town hall (la mairie), a place to "gather, amuse oneself, [and] learn," was designed to compete with both the village church and the local cabaret by appropriating their social functions (132). Architecturally "banal and without nuance," this building aimed to provide a "peasant club" that might compete with increasing contem-
porary union activism (132). In addition, this utopian civic agenda also masked any trace of rural boredom, unemployment, economic depression and underdevelopment. "More art deco than anything else," (134) the "French Village" was deemed by our critic as more fashionable than enduring.

Moved by his own confidence in the merits of rural modernization, Georges Rivière easily overlooked the contradictions inherent in the elaboration of a regional architectural style simultaneously authentic and national. Touting, without evident irony, the 1937 Exposition's Rural Farm's "fine tiled pavement, partly covered with thick and fragrant litter" and the "magnificent oxen from the Charolais and the Limousin," Rivière invited fairgoers to (1938, 54-55) "[c]ome see the home of the farm laborer," where "the cooking is done in the hearth," and observe how "progress has placed quite close an electric stove and kettle" (56). He believed in the end that the "innumerable city dwellers" who visited the Regional Center "found here again a rustic soul," while France's "innumerable peasants would have understood that it is not necessary to standardize the countryside in order to modernize it" (58). Less convinced was Raymond Badouin, the edi-
tor of the prestigious Revue of French Wine (La Revue du Vin de France) and secretary general of the Academy of French Wines. Calling the Rural Center "hokey and not very serviceable," he found it to be more suggestive than authentic. Ignoring that the material facilities of contemporary farms remained shockingly "rustic" (Segalen 1984, 186-91) and despite the addition of internal plumbing (running water), Badouin disapproved that the model farm lacked an indoor bathroom and furniture. Furthermore, the wine cellar was tragically located under the roof where damaging temperature changes would most likely occur. He preferred the Rural Inn (Auberge rurale) where "the public could taste a very fine selection of French wines" (Badouin 1937, 10-11). Indeed, Pascal Ory notes that many Exposition visitors preferred the Regional Center's familiar provincial markers and motifs to the Rural Center's technological implementations and generic moderne style (Ory 609-611).

More problematic were discussions among the regionalists within the pages of Jean Charles-Brun's Action régionaliste concerning whether the Exposition's Rural and Regional Centers could ever be more than "regional masquerades."* Against laments concerning the Exposition's shelved plans for more extensive folk festivals and "caravan" sorties into the provinces or allegations that the Exposition's regional restaurants only competed with their genuine counterparts in the provinces and the fears that folk singers and dancers visiting Paris might acquire "regrettable ideas of grandeur", Paul Hauet asserted– while agreeing that it was "always more desirable to visit a regional museum over the regional wing of a museum... to eat a bouillabaisse in Marseilles... [or] attend an Arlesian festival in Arles rather than at the Grand Palais– that the Exposition's new centers and museums would provide the basis for genuine interest and renewed research into regional issues and agendas (Hauet 4). A contributor to Dijon's Le Bien Public attempted to resolve this contradiction syllogistically when he observed that if "France is a country of diversity," and "unity is not uniformity," therefore "uniformity is nothing more than a gross forgery" (Belloni 6). Proud of their folk traditions, the quality of their artisanal wares, confident in their marketing prowess, and already invested in the organization and construction of the Burgundian Pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exposition, Burgundians contributed little to this discussion.

Fig. 9. Wine Cooperative with cellar "outrageously" located under the roof. From Expositions Internationales. Paris 1937- New York 1939, 53. Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.
Staging Burgundian Terroir in Paris

It is appropriate to remind visitors—or to reveal to them—that, by the riches of its soil and the glory of its wines, Burgundy is one of the classic fiefdoms of French cuisine.


There are two ways of traveling; that of Philéas Fogg and that of Xavier de Maistre. So, without leaving Paris, it is possible to visit the vineyards of France. Happy traveler—you need only visit the Exposition [1937].


Regional folk models remained popular for promoting economic interests through the 1930s. “Can anyone,” asked Ossip Pernikoff, “speak of this region without invoking the wines whose universal reputation has made Burgundy known across the four corners of the world?” (Pernikoff 1938, 79. Albert Noirot related how vintners from the Franche-Comté were organizing "to give Burgundy the place it justly deserve[d]" at the Paris Exposition. He added that the exposition would provide a fine opportunity to demonstrate the merits of Burgundian gastronomy and wines to "millions and millions" of visitors and that it was time to organize a local committee to ensure "the success of this colossal work" (Noirot 1936, 7). "Hasn't gastronomy," exclaimed Raymond Lécuyer, "become one of the richest fleurons in France's tourism crown?" (Lécuyer).

Burgundy's centrality to French viticulture was legendary and incontestable. Indeed, one of the French National Lottery's themes was the "Wines of France" (Tranche du Vin) series. Its September 1938 drawing was held and filmed in Beaune. It was followed by a banquet with the Knights of Wine Tasting at Beaune's Caveau Nuiton. Responding to increasing demand and limited space, the highly popular festivities of the original Caveau Nuiton were relocated to the Clos de Vougeot's celebrated Cistercian cellar:

[t]he success of our cellars grows daily. People like to come not only from France but from abroad as well! That is why, despite its size, the vast cellar cannot accommodate all the gastronomes who come ("Une conférence... des Chevaliers du Tastevin").

Whereas they had been 200 in 1936, some 500 knights gathered to consume 1,000 bottles of Burgundian vintages in one evening in 1938. In attendance, the poet Max Cappe recognized the event's ability to draw national and international attention to "the virtues and incessant labors of Burgundy" (Cappe 1938, 226). On the heels of such success, the Burgundian Order of the Knights of the Wine Cups, along with their accompanying choristers, the Cadets of Burgundy, were invited to participate in the 1937 Exposition's Burgundian Days (October 25 and 26). These ended with a "brilliant soirée" in the "Wine Pavilion" where, in addition to Exposition officials, celebrated gastronomes including...
Gaston Dérys and the self-styled Curnonsky, Prince of Gastronomes, and other leading citizens (all told, 350 from Paris and the regions) such as Edmond Chaix, president of the Touring Club de France, participated in what one journalist called a "magnificent instrument of Burgundian propaganda" (J. T. 1937: 1). Even Jacques Copeau returned to Paris from Burgundy to stage François Porché's three-part, epic poem, "Immortal France" at the 1937 Exposition.

As early as 1931, the Automobile Club of Burgundy anticipated the role Burgundian regional culture would play at the Paris Colonial Exposition: "[t]his Fair must reproduce... something of our folklore, of our ancient customs... Peasants and urbanites will come look, buy, and contemplate all that interests them" ("A l'Exposition Coloniale": 17). In fact, most of the prominent Burgundian civic leaders and cultural intermediaries—Gaston Gérard, Gabriel Jeanton, Gaston Roupnel, Louis Fyot, Perrin de Puycousin, Claude Chauveau, etc.—were members of 1937 International Exposition's regional committee number 13 which included the seven départements that constitute the Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and l'Ain regions (Labbé, Rapport officiel, vol. 8, annexes, 68-70). Exposition Organizers believed visitors who discovered Burgundian gastronomy in an appropriately rustic setting would take home a powerful image (souvenir) of Burgundy's artisan, aesthetic, and folkloric riches. Mindful of tourism interests, the Exposition's administrative director also expected that they would leave imbued with a strong desire to visit Burgundy to better appreciate its charms within its original scale and setting. The Regional Center, he asserted:

is a vast laboratory where the smaller nations (pays) illustrate how to reconcile necessary traditions and contemporary techniques within the larger Nation.... [L]ike a vast symphony of French provinces... the Regional Center is alive; it produces the image of... a dynamic France and proves that regional life remains a present reality. (Charier 1937, 1)

It should come as no surprise that the popular and commercial success of the Burgundian folkloric agenda was presented as a model of regional economic growth and cultural identity at the 1937 Paris International Exposition for Arts and Techniques. In early 1936, provincial civic, business, and economic leaders overcame intra-regional differences to coordinate their resources toward the construction of a Burgundian Pavilion that would promote the products, folklore, culture, artisanat, commerce, and industry of Burgundy, the Franche-Comté, and l'Ain through, most notably, "a Burgundian restaurant and cellar."

Georges-Henri Rivière's subsequent description of the folkloric festivities staged at the Exposition's Rural Center underscored the centrality of Burgundian elements and motifs there:

[o]n the last 23rd of August, on a beautiful evening, a gay procession was flowing down the village streets to welcome the minister of Agriculture. Under the shady trees, along the winding valleys, came the Bressan...
fiddlers, their instruments gay with ribbons, conducted by a fascinating old man in local costume of by-gone days. Their faces half hidden by the black lace falling from their hats, a group of beautiful laughing girls, arm in arm, marched and sang. Then came the mayor with the tri-color band across his breast, followed by peasants in their Sunday clothes. A great concourse of people was pressing forward to see the procession. The baker, leaving his oven, appeared on the doorstep. The clanking of the milk-cart in the cooperative ceased for a moment. The lads who were changing the animals' litter came to the stable door and waved their hands at the girls. And from the terraces of the inn many customers applauded loudly. When it got to the square bordered by the school, the post office, the town hall, two steps away from the covered market, bright with people, the procession broke up whilst on a rustic platform dancing began and the wooden Bressian sabots beat the boards to the rhythm of the "rigaudins" and "chibrelis." And yet how far this was from the lands of Burgundy: in Paris, Porte Maillot, at the rural center of the Exhibition of 1937. For it was under this new scheme that the committee of Agriculture, and working together with the chambers of Agriculture and Agricultural associations, had realized its program: "to put into evidence the technical and social improvements that can be brought in 'rural life' [and] to present in a manner to be appreciated, by actually tasting it, each agricultural product" (Rivière 1938, 53-54).

Edmond Labbé told the presidents of the Exposition's numerous regional committees, that "[t]he importance attributed to the Regional Center," stemmed from collective confidence in France as "the country of quality." He credited national "moral regeneration" and "material prosperity" whose benefit it was the Exposition purpose to showcase, to the "revitalization" of regional traditions (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, annexes, 369). Such values were invoked through exhibits that focused on the popular arts and traditions of various provinces. Museological displays of rustic Burgundian interiors for the most part copied displays found in
Beaune and Dijon two decades earlier when, for instance, on the occasion of the city's annual wine action, Pierre Richard and Camille Fondet (re)furnished 19th century "Burgundian interiors" and created a "retrospective" installation on the history of wine through an "artisan work space" accompanied by "instructional" graphic panels ("Echos d'Une Journée de Fêtes: À Beaune", 4). Similar to the Paris Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions' use of wax figures to stage "traditional" folkways in their appropriate ethnographic milieux the Exposition's Regional nality, and to resuscitate what tends to disappear" (Young 2002, 173). In a time of rural depopulation and the closing of urban artisan shops, these anaesthetized effigies served to aesthetically introduce

![Fig. 11. From Expositions Internationales. Paris 1937- New York 1939, p. 56. Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.](image-url)
rural labor into la France moderne. The exotic vitality of France's rural workforce could in this way be presented to the electoral nation as its faithful and reliable servant. The "vigilance, fidelity, and good taste" of artisans, Gaston Gérard asserted, made them "producers of quality" (1938, 265). By showcasing high quality regional craftsmanship and stylish design, the Popular Front government, exhibition directors, and Burgundian regionalists hoped to illustrate how artisan practices anchored in particular traditional contexts (terroirs) linked modern France to the regional values necessary for both supporting the national economy and anchoring an authentic French identity. 

Visitors saw workers producing finished products in a series of workshop displays designed to give a "large and brilliant place [...] to artisanry" (Lécuyer 1937). These displays reflected the influence of the ardent Burgundian regionalist and folklorist Maurice Perrin de Puycousin. He combined ethnographic ideas, museological principles, and folkloric interests by creating two museums of arts and popular traditions (Musée d'Arts et Traditions Populaires) in Tournus and Dijon. Thirty-two of his waxen images representing "a great variety of authentic costumes" from Burgundian regions had figured at the 1924 Gastronomical Fair in Dijon. Addressing a reception for the Committee for the Burgundian Pavilion, the president of the Exposition's committee directors, the 18th national economic district, and of Dijon's Chamber of Commerce, Paul Bur told his audience that he appreciated Puycousin's talent for making traditions relevant to the present (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 303). For the 1937 Exposition, Puycousin arranged a "Burgundian Interior" and a "Weaver's Workshop" for the Regional Center's exhibit (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 323). "Should not every village in France have such a museum?" asked Georges-Henri Rivière (Rivière 1938, 58).

The Exposition showcased the advantages regional economic strategies and local labor practices offered the national economy. Based on the successful example of Burgundian wine festivals and gastronomical fairs developed during the 1920s and 1930s, the promotion of regional interests through folkloricized marketing strategies pioneered in the provinces proved a successful formula at the 1937 Exposition. M. Clair-Daü, the mayor of the important wine community of Marsannay-la-Côte in Burgundy, supervised the building of a 600-square-meter "Burgundian Cellar" at the Exposition Rural Center. Upon penetrating the Pavilion's main portal, visitors seeking Bacchic pleasures squeezed past a
wine press "of impressive proportions" lit to create "an appropriate atmosphere" before descending "deep steps" into a capacious cellar 30 meters long and 15 meters wide. Its "powerful columns" supported an arched ceiling that covered—cathedral-like—"eight alveoli, four on either side of a central alley apportioned to reflect the importance of the different [wine] growing regions" (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 315). The "living spirit" of each region was fetishistically displayed in the form of "venerable bottles" arranged in separate niches like religious objects and surrounded—in reliquary fashion—by decorative panels that called attention, much like the stations of a potential tourist pilgrimage, to the region's archeological sites and geographic riches (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 315). It was there "one caressed and inhaled" a glass before "respectfully returning it to the table" (Labbé 1938, vol. 7, 331). Seated at the cellar's "rustic furniture" composed of "tables fashioned from barrels and wooden stools," visitors might imagine themselves vigneron (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 317).

With "the famous Caveau Nuits-Saint-Georges and its Knights," l'Illustration noted, "the wine regions are particularly well represented in the Burgundian Pavilion" (Lécuyer 1937). "Only this pavilion," the Exhibition's 12-volume Rapport général further observed, "accomplished a presentation of such importance and originality" (vol. 8, 316). To produce an "authentic cachet of terroir," the center's general architectural lines followed those of the vast cellars first created by Cistercian monks at Cluny and Clos de Vougeot (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 316). An appropriate "atmosphere of euphoria and healthy gaiety" was achieved by mimicking the stratagems of Camille Rodier's popular caveau (cellar) in Nuits-Saint-Georges, Burgundy, where the pseudo-folkloric Order of the Knights of the Wine Cups (Chevaliers de Tastevin) convened:

From the first days, a euphoric atmosphere of healthy gaiety was established.... Beneath the beams, obscurity, barrels, rustic stools, painted murals, and drinking songs created an authentic cachet of terroir [emphasis mine]... whose thousand aromas flowed as golden and purple wines... and was represented in magnificent decorative panels executed by the students of Dijon (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 316).

Much as in the experience of visitors to the Gastronomical Fair of Dijon's strategically located buvette-restaurant (Whalen 2007a), visitors to the Paris Exposition could taste and purchase (at "exceptional prices") any of the cellar's selected 300 different regional vintages once exposed to the appropriate "culture of wine." The
The Burgundian Pavilion designed by Roger Barade and Georges Gendrot provided a "picturesque" composite of "traditional styles and modern tendencies" in a new vernacular style (Dupays 255). Built on a slight elevation with an inner courtyard and surrounded by a garden approach, the pavilion showcased high-quality, regional craftsmanship and design beneath a sharply sloped roof of geometrically arranged, colored and glazed flat tiles that semiotically denoted the region. The continuous lines of different architectural features harmonized facades representing Burgundian, Bressian, and Franc-Comtois regional styles. Much like the Gastronomical Fair of Dijon, the complex's entrance was marked by a Monumental Gate "of majestic proportions" decorated with "the greatest regional riches: its vines and wine" (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 314-15). Charier hoped visitors would experience Burgundian gastronomy in the center's appropriately rustic setting, and would take home a powerful image (souvenir) of Burgundy's artisan, aesthetic and folkloric riches ("L’économie bourguignonne vue de l’Exposition" 1). Mindful of tourist interests, the administrative director also hoped visitors would leave imbued with a strong desire to discover Burgundian charms in their original scale and setting.
Before departing, visitors were invited to tour the Galerie du tourisme. This 28 square meter annex used the latest advertising techniques to promote tourist information. It boasted documentary films, enlarged photographs, ceiling paintings, electromagnetic wall maps, dioramas, commercial brochures, and even a library stocked "not only [with] guides and descriptive works but also imaginative works... that invoke their corner of France," and other "specialized monographs" for the "studious visitor" (Lécuyer).10 These instruments served to "glorify the well known cities, tourist attractions, thermal spas, historic sites, monuments, as well as seasonal sports" of Burgundy. Provincial arts and traditions found their greatest "consecration" in their "generously represented" cuisines. Even the Pavilions that could not set up an independent restaurant—"lest one imagine that gastronomical France can be reduced to a privileged few"—offered tasting stands filled with regional specialties (Clouzot, and Ducharte). Indeed, Raymond Lécuyer agreed that there was no better marketing strategy for the "products of the soil" than la dégustation: "[O]ne eats a lot at the Regional Center and nobody thinks to complain." Thus, in several hours, visitors could "conduct an easy and happy tour in which instruction and distraction alternate[d]" (Lécuyer).

The decoration and menus of the Regional Center's 16 restaurants further underscored the ascendancy of regional over Parisian restaurateurs (Labbé 1938, vol. 7, 206). Celebrated regional chefs served "robust" regional dishes and "fine delicacies" to as many as 200 persons per dining room at one time (Ory 1998, 123; Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 317). The guided tour of the Burgundian Pavilion inevitably culminated with a visit to its restaurant where "high priests of gastronomy officiated with dignity," and waiters and waitresses "furthered the illusion... [dressed] as they still appear in those provinces that have retained their traditions" (Lécuyer). It was in this rustic-moderne dining room, under high wood-beamed ceilings and giving onto a terrace "agreeably decorated with flowers" and looking upon the adjoining pavilions of Savoy and the Dauphiné, that Burgundy's own master-chef (M. Rousseau), serving over 30,000 meals "at comparatively advantageous prices" in three months, transformed casual dining into an act of ritual piety. He supervised a team of sous-chefs who served "succulent dishes" that included trout baked with Burgundian blue cheese, poached eggs served in a red wine sauce, creamed fish chowder (pike, monkfish, eel, and perch) with bouquet-garni, parsleyed vineyard snails, Bressian...
Philip Whalen

chicken in a white wine mushroom sauce, franc-comtois cheese en-croute, pike and shrimp stuffed quenelles, Corton coq-au-vin, and a cancaillotte fondue, "all punctuated by the best vintages of the terroir" (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 318).

Decorated like the halls of contemporary gastronomical fairs and wine festivals, the restaurant's décor signaled a convergence between historic preservation and the development of regional tourism. Three colorful canvases represented the province's sub-regions (see Fig. 17). These paintings exploited a "works and days" tradition of representation to locate regional laborers and artisans as the willing, happy, and natural tenants of imagined rustic landscapes (Whalen 2007b). They gastronomically and symbolically united Burgundy around a vast brick hearth emblazoned with the crests of the province's seven most important cities (Labbé 1938, vol. 8, 318). Iconically rendered vintners illustrate how representations of rural workers—ranging from costumed two-dimensional figures in glass cases to wax effigies animating rooms of period furniture—were strategically transformed, I argue, from exotic historical caricatures into model contemporary laborers who "graciously served" in the form of appropriately dressed and reassuringly "smiling waiters and waitresses" in the Pavilion's cellar and restaurant. They served to harmonize the "disjuncture between the rhetorical aspect of tradition represented in the claim of invariance, and the continually shifting, substantive aspect, which is institutionalized in practices and texts that are reorganized and

Fig. 17. Folkloric panels depicting the "works and days" of traditional crafts representing the Pavilion's three sub-regions decorate the Burgundian restaurant. Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.
reformulated over brief spans of time without apparent forfeiture of authority" (Vlastos 1998, 4). Sated visitors then departed through a "monumental staircase" lined with resting stations decorated with artwork juried by the general commission to instill lasting images of Burgundy's enduring attributes. Thus Burgundians offered an anxious nation solace and hope.

Conclusion: Republican Commercial Regionalism and French Modernization

World exhibitions are the sites of pilgrimages to the commodity fetish… They open up a phantasmagoria that people enter to be amused. The entertainment industry facilitates this by elevating people to the level of commodities. They submit to being manipulated…

-Walter Benjamin, Grandville, or World Exhibitions

While many have claimed that rural France remains the source of unchanging cultural formations and reactionary political values, my examination of the links between French folklore and economic regionalism during the Interwar period suggests that early twentieth-century French regionalism (re)defined the geography of place to associate the virtues of rural folkways with the quality of agricultural products to produce the dominant form of modern French economic regionalism. This strategy succeeded politically because it linked existing cultural interests to emerging business practices. Regional economic and cultural projects that generated civic commonality, stimulated regional economies, and promoted political unity were recognized as supporting rather than threatening a national paradigm based on universal principles, centralized politics, and modern industrial practices. The result is that French regions became the guarantors of authenticity. Indeed, republican commercial regionalism provided one of the most important and successful pathways to French modernization.

Notes

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1 Conference proceedings were published as Travaux du premier Congrès international de Folklore, Paris, 23-28 août 1937 (Tours: Arrault et Cie, 1938). Important contemporary French folklore studies journals included: Ethnologie française, Arts et traditions populaires, Folklore paysan, Le Folklore vivant, Le mois d'ethnologie française, Les annales de la société d'ethnologie française, Revue de folklore français et de folklore colonial.

2 Recently decommissioned as a National Museum, the Museum of Arts and Popular Traditions' historical role continues to generate considerable discussion questioning its political and financial engagements as a re-
search institution. This process culminated, in 2004, with cannibalization of the Museum of Arts and Popular Traditions in the name of administrative decentralization. See the proceedings of the "Du folklore à l'ethnologie en France et en Europe, 1936-1945" conference held at the Museum of Arts and Popular Traditions last conference on March 19-21, 2003.

3 It is interesting to note that the regionalist exploitation of folklore was pitched to mass audiences in contrast to its more highbrow applications in the realms of art, music, and historical fiction.

4 Not only was the construction of the Exposition delayed by labor strikes in 1936 and 1937, but numerous divisions between central committees and regional interests hampered the construction of the Norman and Lyonnais Pavilions (Moentmann, 322-27) and lukewarm economic support in the Franche-Comté forced it to pool its resources with the Burgundian and Pays de l'Ain Pavilions.

5 The Administrative Director of the Exposition's Regional Committee acknowledged that the Pavilion was a temporary structure and wished for a more permanent Center. See M. Charier, quoted in "L'économie bourguignonne vue de l'Exposition," Progrès de la Côte d'Or 13 November 1937, 1.

6 The Committee hosted the leaders and directors of such venerable gastronomical institutions as the Academy of Gastronomy, the International Office of Wine, the Club des Pur Cents, National Committee on Wine Marketing, the Club des Cents, and the editors of various trade magazines including La France à Table (Badouin 1937, 8-11). Badouin was happiest among his peers attending the Committee on Gastronomy's extravaganza dinner amongst other "gastronomes."


8 Letter from the Exposition's Regional Committee to the Mayor of Dijon, reprinted as "Exposition International de 1937: Edification du Pavillon de la 13ième region," Progrès de la Côte d'Or 17 March 1936, 6.

9 Dijon's Socialist, Popular Front mayor, Robert Jardillier, had the three buildings of Dijon's water supply pumping station in Poncey-les-Athée conform to this architectural agenda. See Bien Public 31 October 1937, 5.


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At a conference in Manchester, five years ago, a colleague delivering a paper on regionalism and cultural identity in the Third Republic was asked a question by an eminent visitor from America. The question, paraphrased, was along these lines: does your discussion of regionalist cultural practices in the Third Republic not make you think, with some concern and worry, about the onset of Vichy? After all, the things of which your paper spoke seem to point inexorably to the apotheosis of conservative regionalism which that regime represents.

Philip Whalen gave parts of this paper at the annual meeting of the Society for French Historical Studies in Stanford in 2005. A similar question was asked of him, by a colleague who works on aspects of the far left and far right in the inter-war period. The answer to both questions is 'yes, but...'—and the but must be underscored heavily. For Philip Whalen's argument revolves around the notion that regionalist cultural production in the interwar years, if it had something to do with Vichy, had in fact far more to do with the development of a modern commercial economy, with populist advertising, and thus with the whole gamut of commercial advertising and popular culture that form a quintessential part of modern French agriculture and viticulture. Moreover, his article suggests, this modern agriculture and viticulture has if anything more in common with the great plans of the trente glorieuses than it does with the rather fake window-dressing which passed for regionalism under Vichy. In a tantalizing aside, Whalen suggests that popular culture of the fifties, sixties and even later has much in common with the populist regional culture his chosen subjects were purveying in the twenties and thirties. To pursue that connection would be exciting and truly innovatory, but it is naturally beyond the scope of the path-breaking project presently before us, where Whalen establishes the credentials of Burgundian regionalism, in the context of Burgundy's contribution to an important and complex cultural 'moment'—the 1937 Exposition, held in Paris.

There is, in short, a problem of perception. Regionalism has for long been seen either as a feature of right-wing fascist discourse, full of danger for the unitarist, Jacobin values on which French republicanism is based (according to the dominant, but not necessarily correct, school of thought). Or regionalism can be seen as a less politically dangerous but nevertheless deleterious ideology, based on a loose and vague sentimentalism that, through its very looseness, undermines the more developed republican philosophical values in that same republican construct.

Philip Whalen goes some way to providing one particular angle on the attempt to deconstruct these misconceptions of regionalism. One important thrust of his argument is that the Repub-
lic—even the left-wing republic of the Popular Front—could not survive without regionalism, as regionalism had become a vital and energizing source of cultural symbolism that enabled French commerce to reach out to larger markets. Whalen also enables us to see how fruitful regionalism would become for the official political discourses of the later Third Republic, whether those discourses were right- or left-leaning. It is incontrovertible that the regionalism of the 1937 French pavilion was part of a complex attempt to promote French cultural identity; but the political aspect of this project is important as well, and the conservatism of some folklorists, well documented by Whalen, was balanced by a more pragmatic attempt to construct an authentic French product that would come to define commercial practices under the Third, Fourth and Fifth Republics. The very complexity of the different ethnological, folkloric and regionalist contributions to such important projects as the creation of the Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires should teach us that we should always beware of oversimple political associations when examining such disciplines in the context of the 1930s.

If the 1937 exhibition showed a connection between the grass-roots regionalist movement and some of the ideas espoused by high ranking actors in the Popular Front, how were those contacts initiated, and what were the networks between State functionaries and local regionalists that allowed the French pavilion to develop in the way it did? Whalen's steady uncovering of the design and organization of the Burgundy pavilion in 1937 gives us an opportunity to understand some of the connections between regionalist activists and the public agenda of Popular Front-era politicians and administrators. The domestic problem of a divided France was at the heart of French administrators' concerns as they developed the agenda for their own pavilion in 1937. Thus the pure nostalgia of sentimental regionalists was strongly overlaid by a modern vision promoted by the politicians of the Popular Front, the result of which was the contemporary feel of the regionalist pavilions; this subtle and important connection between modernity and tradition was thus an emblematic and vital sign of a hoped-for Renaissance in French society. In many simple, mundane ways—the ongoing importance of regional identification in the food market, for example—the 1937 Exposition, with all its regionalist connotations, represents the coming to maturity of a style and vision that is with us still.

Whalen is embarking on a path which cultural histories of regionalism have only recently understood as something worth pursuing: a conclusive account of regionalism's contribution to progressive ideas about the modern republic. While the famous historian Marc Bloch—whose moral stature has had a strong influence on post-war generations of French historians—may not have had that much sympathy with the regionalist flavor of 1930s folklore studies, we need not be so chary. The regionalist aspect of 1930s folklore did not necessarily lead to backward-looking ideals, but were rather signs of the slippery, pliable nature of folklore's contribution to the
discussions about French cultural identity; regionalism allowed these discussions to embrace nostalgia and modernity simultaneously.

We need, Whalen seems to suggest, to put the progressive regionalists at the centre of the stage. This entails a certain amount of putting aside of conservative regionalism, if that is possible. Historians need to look with greater clarity at the ideas and engagement of left-wing regionalists—but who are they, and how can we put their contributions more firmly at the centre of the stage? Part of this must surely involve a developing understanding of the political theories of republican regionalism. It seems logical that if we want to argue convincingly against the mis-association of regionalism with Vichy, a certain amount of political history must be necessary. Whalen points the way with his excellent contextualization of the debate at the beginning of his article. Pursuing this revision of regionalism enables a broader chronological frame of reference. As Whalen hints in his article, there were important connections between left-wing regionalism in the 1930s and left-wing regionalism in the 1960s or indeed the 1990s. It would be fascinating to be able to see Whalen’s subtle understanding of folklore as a discipline full of ‘vitality and creativity’ applied more generally, to the connection between republican politics and the regionalist movement; in other words, to see pre-war regionalism as brimming with ideas which did in fact come to fruition, not in the early 1940s, but little by little in subsequent, republican decades.

Beneath these further questions lies one great problem. It has been difficult to make the wider connections for which I have appealed, because there are certain basic assumptions about Third Republic politics that continue to prevail. The cultural history which has helped us to engage so intimately with projects such as those outlined by Whalen has not had as a primary concern the close investigation of mainstream political actors and their ideas. Thus we are now in a position to say far more about the ideas of (for example) the folklore movement of the 1930s than we are about many important politicians of the period. This situation is changing, partly due to a recent resurgence in political history in France, where a number of doctoral dissertations have been successfully published in recent years, on subjects such as the moderate and centre-right parties who often had close connections to regionalist ideology. The full possibilities of this work will only be savored, however, once connections are re-opened between such political history and cultural historians, whose analysis of the movements that designed and recreated an image of French national identity at a time of political tension and divergence has proceeded all too often in ignorance of the precise political machinations that were in fact taking place during this period. It is difficult for a historian who would want to find out about those politicians who most favored the cultural projects of the regionalists; we simply have not had enough primary research on middle-ranking figures, whose networks of influence would most closely have overlapped, for example, with the
designers of the 1937 Exposition. This situation is changing now, and the next step must be for a convergence between the political and cultural historians of 1930s France as we seek to understand this period better. This is particularly necessary for historians who are interested in regionalism; for, as well as promoting cultural identity, regionalism in France was also concerned with political questions, notably the redefinition of the republican State. There were regionalist-folklorists; but there were also regionalist-political theorists; and historians of regionalism need to know about both.

We are now talking about issues that have to do with the direction in which French history is moving. Can the political history of the Third Republic and the dominant school of cultural history work more closely together? It is greatly to the credit of Philip Whalen that this important article raises such vital and wide-ranging issues.

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That French wine production is today in crisis as a result of the growing competition from New World wines and the general worldwide trend towards higher quality wines at lower prices is beyond doubt. The French system of Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées (AOC) and its rooted notion of terroir, discussed in Whalen's article in the context of the 1930s has nevertheless protected part of the industry from its effects and from the impact of the dramatic decline in internal French consumption of vins ordinaires (ordinary wines) since the 1950s. It could therefore be argued that the AOC system and the attached notion of terroir and regionalism have been played as an effective trump card by French producers and political leaders.

In his stimulating case-study of twentieth-century Burgundy, Whalen rightly directs our attention to the complex process by which competing notions of 'True France'—incarnated by terroir, tradition and authenticity and represented through the work of regionalists, civic leaders and cultural intermediaries—have provided an important pathway to French modernization. Wine production in France has benefited from the combination of regionalism and economic modernization by a carefully orchestrated marketing strategy built on the iconic, museographic and folkloric figure of the vigneron as the paragon of quality and of terroir, accompanied by
hierarchization of French landscapes and regions illustrating the inherent qualities of a 'terroir béni des Dieux' (terroir blessed by God).

Following in the footsteps of a new generation of American scholars of France and of French scholars of regional folklore, Whalen offers a more balanced and complex interpretation arguing that regionalism had the ability to develop novel and enticing strategies calculated to preserve existing rural traditions and to re(invent) their ideological underpinnings. By examining Burgundy and its mise en scène at the 1937 Paris International Exhibition, Whalen questions the relationship established between folklore studies, the university and the economic framework developed to resist modernization. In the light of my own work on contemporary French national identity and wine consumption in the twenty-first century, some of the representations he has underlined from the earlier period have a continuing resonance, albeit with a different content and configuration. As a French anthropologist who has written on wine-growing culture in Burgundy, I have only a few reflections to make about this stimulating and pioneering article, suggesting a few areas for further investigation.

Foremost amongst these is the importance of an intellectual dialogue between various branches of the humanities and the social sciences and scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. Whalen himself works as an historian using family archives and ethnographic research combined with a great familiarity and passion for the region, which can be felt throughout his article. The dialogue between history, geography, literature and folklore in specific historical contexts offers a fruitful vantage point from which to question the changing nature of French cultural and national identity. In 1938, a regional museum dedicated to the wines of Burgundy was opened in Beaune by Roger Duchet, the mayor of the town who was later sympathetic to the Vichy government of Petain. The project was led by the Parisian Georges Henri Rivièrè. Its original display presented the pre-phylloxeric techniques and cultures of the 'vignerons', artisans and workers and was based on the fieldwork and the collection of objects directed by the folklorist and ethnographer André Lagrange, author of the novel 'Moi je suis vigneron'. The scenography was similar to that described by Whalen for the exposition internationale: 'These displays reflected the influence of the ardent Burgundian regionalist and folklorist Maurice Perrin de Puycousin. He combined ethnographic ideas, museological principles, and folkloric interests by creating two museums of arts and popular traditions (Musée d'Arts et Traditions Populaires) in Tournus and Dijon'. Neither the propriétaires-viticulteurs nor the négociants (wine merchants) were represented in this modern Burgundian rustic idyll. The rhetoric was indeed part of a regionalist construction orchestrated from Paris via the region and vice versa, but its purpose was above all to dissolve social tensions at a time of economic crisis and to give a more prominent voice to the world of vigneron (defined as workers of the land) at a time of major reorganisation of wine production and battles over the recognition of plots of
land through the AOC system. The heritagization of a disappearing world was a deliberate attempt to maintain social unity in a climate of class tensions and economic difficulty. This was also a period of major negotiations about the recognition of specific plots of land under the AOC system and, by the same token, a major redefinition at an economic level of the concept of terroir as a hierarchical device. As Elise Marie Moentmann has shown, at the Paris exhibition of 1937 some regions, notably Burgundy, presented themselves in a backward looking fashion, emphasising the folklore of artisans despite a background discourse of modernization, whereas others were already stressing the role of modernity. At both a national and a regional level, the analysis of this complex configuration raises questions about which social groups were involved and to what extent their access to this vision of themselves was culturally mediated by economic and social elites. Parallels could be drawn today with the political and museographic shift from 'rurals' to 'immigrants' presented as the new 'others'.

These representations have also to be questioned in the light of current research on the establishment of AOC, which suggests that negotiations and social spheres of influence played a major part in some regions (Demossier, Jacquet, Guy). My own research argues that AOC recognition and vigneron collective identification were connected to issues of social hierarchization, ties to the land, local political power and family history. The romantic image of the vigneron as a worker in the vines is still embedded in their contemporary identification as wine-growers, despite the fact they now employ manual workers and have left 'nature' behind. This also refers to the question of who produces and mediates those representations and how do they affect the consumers? If the cultural elites are presented as the main actors anchoring a national French identity to provincial traditions and regional economies, how are they then (re)appropriated by the concerned social groups?

Finally, when examining the concept of terroir and especially the promotion of an artisanal myth, it is important to remember that wine production was becoming increasingly mechanised and this was a period when both oenology and geology became sciences and means of instrumental rationality. The historiography of terroir offers an insight into the opposition between artisans and scientists. As the anthropologist Robert Ulrich (2002, p 700) has noted, while oenological knowledge is particular to cultivating and vinifying grapes, it proceeds, like science in general, with what Habermas (1971) calls a 'cognitive interest' in controlling or domesticating nature and thus by extension the work of wine growers is seen by themselves as a social and cultural process. Geology and its recognition as a branch of the science of the soil gave scientific credibility to the classification of the wine landscape in parallel with their historical and commercial recognition and, thus, the hierarchization of wines. In a similar vein, oenology which at the end of the nineteenth century was emerging as a new means of controlling the quality of wines and of fighting fraud.
played a major part in the construction and definition of terroir. Ulysse Gayon formed successive generations of oenologists in Bordeaux and under the influence of Emile Peynaud, and oenology progressively became the scientific basis of wine-tasting during the 1970s. The artisanal theme, however, is still presented today as a symbolic value despite the intense commodification of wine and the modernization of the wine industry. Thus concepts of terroir, authenticity and tradition reveal social cleavages and strategies adopted by various actors to combat the growing standardisation of wine as a product. It is now time to follow Whalen's critical approach by reassessing these cultural productions which provide contemporaries with space(s) useful for understanding and renegotiating the political tensions and cultural contradictions that arise at times of economic modernisation or crisis. Whalen's argument offers another opening into the debate on folklore in the 1930s and has many resonances with the role of ethnology in French society today.

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Orality, Inscription
and the Creation of a New Lore

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Abstract
This essay examines the process by which the discourse of folklore is used to entextualize and recontextualize the oral tradition in West Bengal through a discussion of two contemporary Bangla novels. Motifs from folk tales, myths, and popular epic poems are being re-appropriated by urban cultural forms—both popular as well as elite—to articulate new identities and subject positions. I selected these novels by considering the mode in which orality is inscribed and the time period. One of the novels attempts to re-constitute oral lore from a popular epic composed in the medieval period, and the other re-inscribes an origin myth that is part of folk ritual into a new genre via the mediation of folklore discourse that is responsible for the first step in entextualizing the myth. This essay concludes by suggesting that folklore's conception of tradition as being temporally disrupted has facilitated these new literary appropriations of oral lore. It is precisely because folklore's subject matter is supposed to be out of sync with the times that allows for conceptions of culture that are porous enough for innovation.

...[The] peculiar temporality of folklore as a disciplinary subject, whether coded in the terminology of survival, archaism, antiquity, and tradition, or in the definition of folkloristics as a historical science, has contributed to the discipline's inability to imagine a truly contemporary, as opposed to a contemporaneous, subject... Folklore is by many (though not all) definitions out of step with the time and the context in which it is found.

Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, "Folklore's Crisis" 1998, 283

In an essay that critically reviews folklore's disciplinary position vis-à-vis history and culture, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998) says that temporal dislocation between the site of origin and the present location of particular cultural forms signals the presence of folklore. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett thus conceptualizes culture as heterogeneous, layered and composed of multiple strands that are interconnected in rather haphazard and contingent ways. This sense of contingency comes about through the juxtaposition of different time scales such that the idea of locality or location becomes the conceptual frame within which the heterogeneous and circulating strands that we call culture come to cohere, if only for a moment. However, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out, even before location comes to be viewed as a spatial category it is a temporal one, and by constituting the present as a series of disjunctive moments, folklore creates a gap between the contemporaneous and the contemporary.
In a different, though related, fashion students of Indian society have made a distinction between "Great traditions" and "Little traditions" (Redfield 1955, Sinha 1957); or between desha (regional, provincial) and marga (sanskritic, global). Folk rituals, belief systems, and the cultural institutions of rural India are thought to reveal an interaction between the forces of globalization and parochialization, or marga and deshi aspects (Marriot 1955, Sinha 1957, Trautman 1997). For most scholars this interaction is a long-term and largely unconscious process. However, the historian Hitesh Ranjan Sanyal (2004) holds a somewhat different view. In his study of a small principality in one of the border regions of West Bengal, he shows how the semi-tribal Mulla court, in what is now the Bardhaman district, produced political institutions that self-consciously integrated aspects of what was then thought of as "high culture"—i.e. the culture of the Mughal court in North India—with indigenous elements taken from local tribal and peasant communities. Many such peripheral principalities were declared to be tributary states owing formal allegiance to the great, though distant, Mughal Empire. The geographical distance between the central authority and these border states gave the latter some degree of autonomy. Thus, they were able to selectively adopt elements of Mughal culture while retaining much of what was traditionally available. The Mughal presence was thought to be alien but distant enough to be non-threatening, and could therefore become a site for experimentation with novelty. Traces of this self-conscious adoption of high culture aspects is, according to Sanyal, still visible in the peasant societies of these border regions, for instance in the cultivation of particular genres of folk songs that can engage with forms of novelty. Sanyal says that many genres of folk song in Bengal have been cultivated into popular forms that require different kinds of performative contexts. He suggests that folk culture is constituted at three different levels: jana (local), desha (regional), and marga (global or pan-Indian). He says that the deshi or regional level acts as a site of mediation between the local and global levels.

Unfortunately Sanyal does not develop this theme further. However, as several scholars have tried to show, the conception of a cultural region is important in the study of folklore's engagement with forms of modernity (Morinis 1982, Blackburn 2003, Chatterji 2005). Self-conscious reflection on context, style, and the process of transmission actually occurs precisely at this level. Further, this is the level at which the local is conceived of as such and thus also is the level at which "metadiscursive practices for creating, representing and interpreting" folk discourses are developed (Briggs 1993). In this essay I examine some contemporary attempts at producing new kinds of folk discourses in a deliberate attempt to empower certain marginal groups in West Bengal. These attempts, as I will show, are part of a larger movement for the articulation of a distinctive regional identity in which folk culture plays a central role.

The idea of region is not necessarily restricted to a geographical unit, but refers rather to a social field formed by a...
network of governmental processes, cultural flows and forms of popular transmission shaped by oral, print and visual media" (Chatterji 2005,1). In this sense my field is carved out of a set of overlapping political regions—the states of West Bengal and Jharkhand as well as the erstwhile province of undivided Bengal of the colonial era; parts of which are now independent states in India, including the independent nation-state of Bangla Desh.

Folklore and the Literary Canon

Even though the folk have played an important part in articulating ideas about Bengali culture and tradition, there have been no significant grassroots reformist movements of the kind that have taken place in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. West Bengal, governed as it is by a combination of communist and socialist parties for three decades, is typically identified with a kind of middle class radicalism. Most reforms have been top down, including those that were initiated by an "enlightened" elite in the colonial period (Basu 1992). Instead the folk are perceived as an abstract category—an aid to the process of "traditionalization"—a term coined by Shuman and Briggs (1993) to identify "aspects of the past as significant to the present" (ibid. 1993, 109). Folklore comes to represent the authentic voice of the folk, a living museum from which Bengal's history may be excavated.

In a previous paper I have shown how the discourse of folklore, reinforced by state policy, comes to constitute parts of Bengal as a folklore region (Chatterji 2005). Once constituted, this region then becomes the location for creative experimentation with the oral literature found there. Traditional folk themes begin to circulate among new publics in popular urban spaces. I will examine two Bangla novels that reinterpret folk myths as part the ongoing project of the Bengali intelligentsia to find contemporary significance in traditional lore.

In an important paper on the Grimms' anthology of fairy tales, Charles Briggs (1993) says that folklore discourses use entextualizing strategies to produce authentic folk voices. These texts are created with a political agenda in mind and the task of the folklorist is to deconstruct these texts for the powerful effects that they produce. Unlike the texts that folklorists usually analyze, the texts that I present here are explicit in laying out their political agenda. Both novels draw upon the mother goddess complex to frame their stories. The fact that mother goddess worship (shaktism) is an important religious tradition in Bengal may have influenced the choice of subject to some extent, but more importantly, the significance of the mother goddess as a mediator between the "Great traditions" and "Little traditions" of Hinduism, or between local religion and textual, or shastric, religion gives this theme its symbolic charge (Beane 2001, Humes 1998). Coburn (1988) says that even though the origin of the mother goddess complex lies in India's non-Aryan pre-history, continuous interplay between various religious streams—local/tribal, Buddhist, and Hindu—has produced the mother goddess complex as we know it today. A point of significance for my argument is that the mediating position occupied
by the mother goddess tradition allowed Bengali nationalists to claim a distinctive place for Bengal's culture within the civilizational mainstream (Chatterji 2003).

Mahashweta Devi's Vyad Kaand (The Book of the Hunter) and Nilakanth Ghoshyal's Bhumi Kanya (Earth Maiden), both fall within the Bengali nationalist tradition of historiography, which assumes Bengal's folk traditions had a seminal role in shaping her culture (Dutt 1990, Sen 1985). In keeping with a modern political perspective, they use folk tradition as a site for articulating contemporary concerns. However, in the forms in which they have become available for literary interpretation, these folk traditions have already been mediated through inscription. The role of folklorists in bringing oral traditions to print in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been extensively studied in India (Blackburn 2003, Sen 1960), but the relationship between writing and oral literature has a much older history. Mangala kavyas, long narrative poems about specific gods and goddesses, written from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in Bangla, circulated in oral forms long before they were written down. According to Clark (1955) these poems have two distinct levels—the popular and the learned—and he believes that there is a chronological relationship between the two levels. The oral lore was re-inscribed in an orthodox Brahminic literary canon, but the fact that the medium was Bangla rather than Sanskrit allowed for its mass circulation, a fact that holds true today as much as it did in the medieval period.²

Bhumi Kanya by Neelkanth Ghoshyal was serialized in a Bangla literary magazine called Desh in 2004-2005. It is a creative re-telling of some of the myths associated with Bhadu, a local goddess cult still prevalent in the border regions of West Bengal. The influence of recent folkloric interpretations of the Bhadu story and their role in the process of contextualizing the rituals and songs associated with her worship is evident in the novel. My selection of these two works has been determined by the fact that the subjects that they deal with represent two important moments of literary inscription—one set in the sixteenth century and the other in the present.

Chandi Mangala of Mukundaram and Mahashweta Devi

In the preface to her novel, Mahashweta Devi says that the Chandi Mangala Kavya of Kavikankan³ Mukundaram is the inspiration for this work. The epic poem is composed of several different stories that bear little connection with each other: an autobiographical account of the composer's journey to a new settlement in a different part of Bengal that reveals, according to critics, a detailed knowledge of the current socio-political state of the society (Bhattacharyya 1976, Devi 2002); the Vyad Kaand, the story of the hunter Kalketu and his wife Phullara; and the adventures of the merchant Dhanapati, his two wives Khulana and Lalona, and his son. According to scholars such as T.W. Clark (1955) and Ashutosh Bhattacharyya (1976) these stories show evidence of the evolution of the cult of Goddess Chandi from that of a benign protector of forest life to a more malevolent deity who deliberately
brings misfortune to coerce humans into giving her worship. (Bhattacharyya says that the poetic text was written at a time when distinctions between different groups of goddess worshippers were becoming blurred. However, he bases his hypothesis on the text itself and not on other historical sources).

According to the preface of The Book of the Hunter, Mahashweta Devi was inspired by the Vyad Kaand of Kavikankan Mukundaram's epic poem, where he describes the lives of nomadic, forest dwelling tribes such as the Shabars. She describes the clash between contrasting forms of life through the experiences of two couples, the migrant Brahmin priest Mukundaram and his wife, and Kalya and Phuli, a young Shabar couple. She explores the culture of the Shabars and how they cope with the erosion of their way of life as new settlements encroach on forestland. In the novel, the Brahmin Mukundaram is seen using his experiences with the forest dwelling couple to depict the characters of Kalketu and Phullara, both re-incarnations of demi-gods who were cursed to suffer mortal birth. He invokes the Goddess of the Great Forest (Abhaya or Reassurance) through the voice of the hunter Kalketu (Devi 2002, vii).

Mahashweta Devi says that Mukundaram's personal experience with hunter-gatherers in medieval Bengal inspired her to write a novel that would help in the re-historicization of the Shabar tribe. A part from being a renowned novelist, Mahashweta Devi is also a well-known activist who has worked among former "criminal tribes" like the Lodhar and Kheria Shabars of Central India. She thinks of this novel as an attempt to re-create the lost oral lore of the Shabars and thereby restore their self-respect. The novel is based on her experiences with the Shabars and with the stories that they have published about themselves and their lore in her journal, Bartika.

The novel is interesting not only in that it seeks to re-inscribe a medieval literary text in the form of an experimental Bangla work using contemporary stylistic devices, but also because of the way that the author seeks validation both from the Shabar community as well as from the Mukundaram's life experiences. She says that she was inspired by Mukundaram's own endeavour, which combined direct experience and acquired knowledge of the socio-political events of sixteenth-century Bengal. She weaves fragments of the mangala kavya story of Kalketu and Phullara into her own narrative in a way that both subverts it and gives it authenticity. Thus, whilst in the mangala kavya, the goddess gives Kalketu a boon that makes him the founder and chieftain of the city of Gujarat; it is not because of his devotion to her or to forest creatures but rather, to put a break on his wanton destruction of forest dwelling animals. Instead, Kalketu becomes the first priest of a new goddess cult and, according to Devi, an ancestor of one of the priestly clans of the Shabar. In the novel, an old rogue elephant representing the forest goddess kills Kalya as he inadvertently ventures into the sacred grove where hunting is forbidden. This act of transgression and his untimely death lead to his transfiguration into a clan ancestor and demi-god.
The character of Mukundaram (who is responsible for this transfiguration) is opposed to the deceitful Brahmin priest in a Shabar origin myth who betrays the hospitality of his tribal hosts by trying to steal an iconic symbol of the forest goddess. The Brahmin is killed by the goddess, and the Shabar people condemned to destitution. Their lot will change only when a Shabar hunter is able to find and trap the golden iguana, the vahana (vehicle) of the goddess, as Kalketu once did.

Devi draws on the authority of the myths published by Shabar activists in her journal, Bartika, to validate her version of the Kalketu story rather than on stories that are orally narrated. In fact, she stresses that the stigma of the label "criminal tribe" imposed on the Shabar in colonial times gave them a form of cultural amnesia so that they forgot their oral lore. In this context, the attempt to re-historicize the Shabar is interesting, though somewhat paradoxical. The Shabar voice must first be entextualized before it can be re-inscribed in Devi’s novel. Similarly, when she refers to Kabikankan Mukundaram’s first-hand knowledge of the Shabar and the forest, it is at the moment when the forest and the Shabar’s distinctive way of life is about to be destroyed. Thus she refers to the names of trees mentioned in the Chandi Mangala that are felled when Kalketu clears the forest to make his settlement.

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998) quotes Ong as saying that writing did not reduce orality when it was first introduced but rather enhanced it. She also says that inscription creates a gap between words and speakers, a space that allows for creative innovation (ibid. 1998, 309). In the example discussed above we see how an act of inscription by a Brahmin in the sixteenth century—the compilation of oral narratives about the goddess Chandi into a written text—led to a proliferation of similar texts. Thus, not only are there several other versions of the Chandi Mangala compiled by other authors in the medieval period, but there are also more recent oral and painted narratives in Bengal’s folk tradition based on the Chandi Mangala Kavya. Similarly, Mahashweta Devi’s novel has inspired popular plays on the same theme and has even became the theme of a Durga pujapandal in Calcutta last year (Ghosh 2000).

Mahashweta Devi’s novel allows us to read popular culture as a postmodernist text that makes self-conscious use of citation as a device to politicize its location both within tradition and the modern. Peter Shand (2002), in a paper on the cultural appropriation of Maori art, discusses Julia Kristeva’s view of language as being constitutive of texts that form “mosaics of citations; every text is an absorption and transformation of other texts” such that it is able to straddle disjunctive registers. He says that the fusion of high and low art creates opportunities for cultural critique made possible through dislocation from their conventional contexts (ibid. 2002, 54). In the examples discussed here we see that this concept holds true for medieval times as much as it does today. Kavikankan Mukundaram’s text draws upon earlier versions of the epic found both in the oral and the written
Orality, Inscription, and the Creation of a New Lore

traditions. Similarly, other composers in the sixteenth and seventeenth, centuries as well as folk painters and story tellers, modern day novelists and playwrights, and contemporary producers of popular culture all become part of a culture of citation and circulation.

In the next example, folklore writing gives the impetus for the process of entextualization. As I will show in the next section, the production of certain folkloric themes has given rise to new literary subjects that are in circulation in the Bangla public sphere.

**Bhumi Kanya: The Transformation of a Goddess Myth**

Let me begin with a summary of the novel by Neelkantha Ghoshyal: Folklorist Papiya is researching Bhadupuja in Purulia when she comes across Herambh Bauri (a low caste man) who tells her the secret story of Bhadu's life. Bhadu was an orphan found by the chief (mukhya) of Lada village. Raja Nilmoni Singh of Kashipur in whose kingdom Ladha is located has just introduced a new strain of rice—Bhaduyi—for cultivation in Kashipur. He tours the kingdom, disguised as an alien traveler, to see if his subjects are in favor of the new crop. His minister, Dhruvachand, accompanies him. In the course of his travels he hears that the chief of Lada village has a daughter who is the living embodiment of Lakshmi, the goddess of prosperity. He decides to see her in person and visits Lada disguised as a Sanskrit pundit (scholar). He is wonderstruck by her beauty and grace and decides to adopt her as his daughter. However, since her father, the village chief, will not let her go away, the king decides to let Bhadu stay in the village but to be educated in a manner befitting a royal princess. Dhruvachand stays behind to oversee her education. Bhadu's new identity, as a royal princess, is kept secret. Bhadu is very popular among the village people because she works actively for their betterment. In this way she meets Anjan, the son of the doctor (kaviraj) of a neighbouring village. They fall in love, much to the dismay of Dhruvachand. In the meantime the British imprison the king because of his active involvement in the popular uprising of 1857. He is, however, later released. When he hears about Bhadu's involvement with Anjan, he orders the latter's capture and secret imprisonment. Bhadu is heartbroken and, together with two of her companions, travels across the kingdom singing songs at the gates of various forts in which Anjan may be imprisoned, hoping that he will recognize her voice and respond. The king relents and Anjan is released, but by then Bhadu has disappeared. Her companions report that one morning she seemed to fade away, merging with the sky. Village women continue to sing the songs that Bhadu first sang in the fruitless search for her lover.

The positioning of Papiya, the researcher, as the main interlocutor signals the novel’s self-conscious location within the larger discourse of folklore. The folk goddess Bhadu has been at the center of folklore research for the last four decades. More recently, her story has been dramatized and is now on the way to becoming a popular theme in urban performative and literary genres. Thus,
accounts of the Bhadu puja produced by folklorists have been used as source material for the transformation of a ritual complex into a literary subject. This is demonstrated in the way in which certain motifs from the folklore discourse are woven into the literary text. Before I discuss the motifs in detail, a brief account of the Bhadu complex is in order. My account is based on versions of her origin myth that circulate in the border districts of West Bengal, Orissa, and Jharkhand (Chakravarti 2001) and on songs sung during her festival.

Bhadu, a local goddess who was born human and the daughter of the royal house of Kashipur (a former principality in Purulia,) gained the status of a goddess after her early death. The enigma of her virginity and untimely death has led to many stories that purport to explain it. One set of stories views Bhadu as an incarnation of the goddess Durga, who was born to the Maharaja of Kashipur in answer to his prayers. Being a goddess she could stay with him only for a short period of time. She died a virgin because no human man dared to marry her. After her death the king instituted this puja in her memory. It is performed in the rainy season between August and September at the time when the rice seeds are transplanted. The worshippers are exclusively women. The songs that are sung about the goddess are an important feature of the ritual.

Most of the songs depict Bhadu as a young married woman who is visiting her parents' home for the festival season. These Bhadu songs follow the pattern of the agomoni songs sung to welcome the goddess Durga at the time of the Durga puja in October and November. However, some Bhadu songs refer to historical details in the goddess's biography, such as the name of her father, Raja Nilmoni Singh Deo. Raja Nilmoni Singh Deo is an important historical figure in Purulia. He participated in the uprising in 1857 and was imprisoned by the British for instigating his Santal subjects to raid the royal treasury. However, Nilmoni Singh Deo had no daughters and this fact is one of the folklore conundrums that have generated much speculation.

Interestingly many Bengali folklorists attempt to re-construct Bhadu's history, and the songs and origin myth are used as archeological objects that may help to reveal Bengal's pre-history. Ashutosh Bhattacharyya (1965), one of the first folklorists to write on Bhadu, views this puja as a tribal agricultural ritual that has been transformed by "Hindu iconicity" (Hindu poutolikta) and by the colonizing influence of the Maharajas of Kashipur. Later folklorists do not necessarily follow Bhattacharyya in making a strict separation between tribal and Hindu aspects of the ritual. However, they do follow his methodology in that they separate the songs from the ritual and foreground the former as the primary object of analysis. The discussion that follows is based largely on one text by Shubrata Chakravarti (2001) since this is one of the most comprehensive, and the most recent, of the studies on Bhadu and summarizes all preceding interpretations of the Bhadu complex.

As I have said, most folklorists have tried to re-construct Bhadu's life story from the songs sung during her festival.
Two significant events of her life stand out—these are her birth as Raja Nilmoni Singh Deo’s daughter and her untimely death as a virgin. Given that it can be demonstrated that she was not his daughter, some folklorists assume that this festival was started by the king to deflect the force of a rebellion among his poor subjects led, perhaps, by a woman. He was able, according to another account, to appropriate Bhadu’s voice by giving her a royal lineage. Her untimely death has generated another set of explanations. Thus, Bhadu was indeed a member of the royal family even if not the direct descendent of the king. She eloped with a low caste man and was killed by her kinsmen in an attempt to avert dishonor to the family name. The royal house of Kashipur then instituted a festival in her name to deflect popular anger, as the king’s low caste subjects loved Bhadu.

A point worth noting in these accounts is that the songs and myths are treated as potential documents. There is no attempt to analyze them as semiotic texts. No folklorist, as far as I know, has examined the genealogy of the royal family to discover whether a princess called Bhadu actually existed. I spoke to one of the senior members of the royal family in her home in Purulia town in 1983, and she told me that Bhadreshwari (Bhadu) was the daughter of Maharaja Bikhambar Narayan Singh Deo. She was to be married but her bridegroom died on the eve of the wedding. (Clearly, the relationship between Nilmoni Singh Deo and Bhadu is a metonymic one, established in the oral tradition. Nilmoni Singh Deo is the subject of folk narrative, as is Bhadu, and that, since both figures are associated with Kashipur, they are often linked. Unlike the folklorists discussed above, my respondent was quite comfortable with a semiotic explanation for the Bhadu puja. She told me that the women of the royal family once performed a goddess puja at the time of great misfortune. Kashipur was being attacked and Bhadu, on hearing of an impending defeat, chose to kill herself rather than face dishonor. However, the rumors of defeat were false and the goddess puja was institutionalized in Bhadu’s memory).

In Chakravarti’s text, the Bhadu myth is an ideological construct, a successful piece of propaganda to discipline and pacify a potentially rebellious population. The establishment of her worship can be interpreted as an attempt to incorporate the source of rebellion into the structure of power. However, Bhadu does retain her exemplary status in this text, if not as a goddess than as a figure that represents all womankind, and by extension, all subalterns. The emphasis on the songs, especially on the lyrics, have helped to crystallize a particular disciplinary perspective which assumes that folklore is necessarily concerned with the search for the authentic voice of the people and that the feminine voice is the privileged site of this authenticity.

Scholars like Chatterjee (1993) and Sarkar (2001) have said that the nineteenth-century nationalist historiography of Bengal posited a domestic space that was insulated from the modernizing influences of the colonial state. The internal space came to be represented as the site for national resurgence. The as-
sociation between domestic space and the women’s activities that become the symbolic markers of this space is folklore’s contribution to this historiography. This point will be elaborated in the next section. We must first, however, examine folklore’s contribution to the new social imaginary that is being formed in contemporary Bengal.

To conceptualize folklore’s role in cultural production, Gerald Warshaver (1991) proposes a triadic schema in which folklore of the first level is the lore produced by the folk. When this lore becomes the object of knowledge of a discipline, it becomes second level folklore. Third level or postmodern folklore consists of “abstract reconceptualization and denotative reconstitution of second level constructs of first level folklore so that it appears bearing traits which... can be identified as postmodern...” (ibid. 1991, 220). One could think of the two novels discussed here as exercises in postmodern folklore. The “representational practices” of folklorists constitute the raw material that the novelists work with (Warshaver 1991, 224). Thus Bhumi Kanya uses motifs from folkloric representations of the Bhadu story rather than from the oral tradition.

In an earlier work I have argued that Bengali folklorists have focused on songs to the exclusion of ritual to conceptualize Bhadu puja as a secular festival (Chatterji 2005b). Bhadu songs, now available in print form, are supposed to represent the authentic voice of rural women expressing their daily concerns. Secularism is associated with the folk voice in many parts of the world (Asad 2002). In Bengal today, left-wing oriented intellectuals use it to counter the cultural nationalism propagated by right-wing political parties. In this context women become suitable representatives of the folk, used to represent the category of the subaltern, cutting across such conflicting divisions such as class, caste, religion, and locality.  

History, Realism and Folklore

Bengali folkloristics has traditionally engaged with the ideology of secularism and the political form that it takes in the discourse of art criticism, i.e., realism. Since the first quarter of the twentieth century, Bengali intellectuals have tried to harness folk forms to the expression of popular political and social concerns. 

In 1943, the left-oriented Indian peoples' Theatre Association (IPTA) formed to try to introduce the register of "socialist realism" into folklore and folk art so that the latter would reflect the real life concerns of the common people. Folk art had to be transformed into a people's art that would help in the growth of people's power (Oberoi 1998). However, as Sudhi Pradhan (1979) says, IPTA's theatre activities in Bengal were largely confined to urban areas. Their impact on rural areas was limited. Also, they were less interested in folk culture per se, creating instead, hybrid forms of music and dance out of the three broad traditions that were thought to make up modern Bengal’s popular musical tradition – i.e., folk, classical, and western (Oberoi 1998).

The Left Front government that has been in power in West Bengal for three decades has been more successful in this regard. The first attempt at establish-
ing government institutions for the preservation and study of folk culture began in the late nineteen-seventies. An advisory committee called the Loksanskriti Parishad (Folk Cultural Committee) was set up to explore possibilities of district level interaction. Members of this committee organized workshops in the different districts of West Bengal to facilitate interaction between folk artists, local scholars, and government agencies. The government also set up a series of awards for folk artists and has instituted scholarships and pension schemes for folk performers. The Folk and Tribal Cultural Centre was set up in the early nineteen-eighties for the promotion and publication of research on the folk culture of West Bengal. Lokshruti, the bi-annual journal published by the Centre, has become an important forum for intellectual debate and discussion on the folk culture of West Bengal.

The significance of such forms of government intervention lies in the fact that it creates sites on which a new form of local self-knowledge can emerge. Most of the scholars who contribute to Lokshruti have a moral and political stake in the constitution of folk culture. For them, folk culture embodies the symbolic imaginary through which they can critique certain trends in bhadralok (cultured) society. Folklore then represents the site which is both of Bengali society and yet not fully in it. The folk become a virtual community used to delineate the spiritual qualities, not just of the region, but also (through the mediation of state agencies) of the nation itself (Dutt 1954).

Government intervention in folk culture has allowed the latter to be transposed into a different register such that it can be co-opted by new forms of institutionalization. The print media is one such form. Since Anderson’s (1983) seminal work, its role in the articulation of new political entities has been extensively studied. In India, forms of folk culture have been re-articulated by print media in the service of new political formations (Ashley 1993). In the process they also acquire a new kind of aesthetic autonomy such that they can absorb new contexts of performance.

In India, oral and literary traditions have co-existed for a very long time. Some scholars see this in a positive light as two intellectual streams that mutually enhance each other (Sen 1986, Bhattacharyya 1976). Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, nationalistic intellectuals like Rabindranath Tagore, who set up Vishva-Bharati University at Shantiniketan, actively supported institutions for the propagation of folk culture. This meant that only the images selected for circulation in the literary media were considered archetypal folk forms, such as Baul songs made popular by poets like Tagore and Nazrul Islam, and Santali dances represented in paintings of the Shantiniketan artist Nandalal Bose. Some activists like Pashupati Mahato (2000) consider this to be a process of internal colonization that has led to a form of “cultural memocide” and to a loss of voice among the tribal people of Central India. In this Mahato is responding to the writings of an earlier generation of folklorists like Ashutosh Bhattacharyya who felt that there was a mutual exchange of cultures between Bengali Hindus and tribal...
groups and not a form of forced imposition (Bhattacharyya 1965). To illustrate this point he shows how particular forms of devotional song evolve from tribal (i.e. Santali) songs. Other scholars have pointed out factual anomalies in Bhattacharyya's data (Chakravarti 2001). Bhattacharyya seems to have used the Santals as a reference point because they are important in the literary imagination of modern Bengal. In a similar vein, in recent theatre productions on the Bhadu theme Bhadu is called a Santal goddess, in spite of the fact that folkloric treatises on Bhadu and on the songs associated with her worship are commonly available and widely read all over Bengal. All folkloric treatises on Bhadu refer to her as an agricultural goddess worshipped by low-caste Hindus in the border regions of Bengal. Some scholars like Bhattacharyya admit that her worship may have roots in some archaic tribal ritual, but much the same can be said for any form of goddess worship in India. The Santals have come to represent the voice of subalternity in Bengal today and there are departments for the study of Santali language and literature in universities such as Vishva-Bharati University in Shantiniketan (Azad 2004). The attempt to incorporate the Bhadu cult into Santali cosmology is somewhat paradoxical, given the fact that the low caste groups who worship Bhadu were absorbed into the caste system only in the medieval period at the time of the composition of the mangala kavyas, when popular folk cults became Hinduized. Bhadu has no mangala kavya, so perhaps the absorption of her cult into Brahmanical Hinduism never did take place. These groups can lay claim to autochthonous status as much as the more autonomous indigenous groups that have been called tribes since the colonial period (Sarkar 2005). Mahashweta Devi refers precisely to a text that was used to proselytize—to bring groups into the Hindu fold—to re-constitute the lore of the Shabar tribe. Thus, tradition that is being re-constituted here is thought to be hybrid, disrupted by historical events, and not unbroken or continuous. This view of tradition allows selective re-appropriation to create a regional culture that can find its place within pan-Indian civilization.

In this essay I have juxtaposed two moments in Bengal's history when the written and the oral inflect each other (The Chandi Mangala Kavya belongs to the written tradition that is also part of secondary orality. Bhadu belongs to the oral tradition and has only recently begun to be appropriated by the written tradition). If we read the contemporary history of the vernacular public sphere in light of events of the medieval period, not only are recent attempts at entextualization and recontextualization given historical depth, but the past is made contemporary. Much of contemporary Bengal's oral lore has been re-contextualized from popular medieval texts like the mangala kavyas which are still enacted in villages. New forms of oral composition are modeled on the poetic language that was formed through these texts (Chatterji 1985). Folklorists need to turn their gaze to the past, not to re-configure survivals but to make the discipline truly contemporary.
Notes

1 The Dalit (former "untouchable" castes) movement in Maharashtra and the Anti-Brahman movement in Tamil Nadu have reshaped local societies in both the states (Basu 1992).

2 The Bangla of Kavikankan Mukundaram's epic has numerous Arabic-Persian words in it. After the Turkish conquest of Bengal in the thirteenth century, Persian became the court language and Arabic was also studied. The composers of the mangala kavyas all pay homage to their patrons who were largely Muslims (http://www.banglapedia.org/HT/P_0336.HTM, downloaded on 18 April 2006).

3 A title that he was given after he wrote this much acclaimed epic.

4 Apart from the version composed by Kavikankan Mukundaram, there are several other Chandi Mangalas as well, some of which precede Mukundaram's version. Manik Datta composed the first one. Another composer, Dvija Madhava was probably Mukundaram's contemporary. Dvija Ramdev, from the border region of Chittagong, now in Bangla Desh, composed the Abhayamangala and Bharatchandra, the Anandamangala, all variants of the goddess narrative. (http://banglapedia.org/HTM_0123.HTM, downloaded on 18 April 2006).

5 The "Criminal Tribes Act" was passed in 1871 by the British Indian government. It was believed that certain groups within the caste system were criminals by hereditary occupation. Meena Radhakrishna (2001) says that this act was based on assumptions about vagrancy and impoverishment that was associated with forms of life that were considered nomadic. Such groups were forced to adopt a sedentary ways of life. After independence such groups were re-designated as "de-notified tribes."

I use the word "tribe" rather than "indigenous peoples" or its Indian equivalent "adivasi" as it is still commonly used in India, even by activists like Mahashweta Devi.

6 Mahashweta Devi considers Kavikankan Mukundaram to be a forerunner to a more modern literary sensibility as he includes his own experience of migration in the epic text. The modern Bangla novel that deals with the subjective aspects of its characters is supposed to have been inspired by the English novel in the nineteenth century (Chatterjee 1993).

7 This is a form of negative devotion that is well known in medieval Bengal. As important Sanskrit texts are translated and re-inscribed in folk culture, a transformation of the major characters also occurs. Demons come to acquire spiritual grace through the power of their hatred for the gods. Single-minded hatred is sometimes even more effective than single-minded devotion in achieving a sighting of God. The mystical movement called Bhakti (devotion) that spread throughout India in the medieval period shaped popular religion, lore, and literature. The reverberations of this movement are still being felt today (Sen 1987).

8 She makes a distinction between groups like the Shabar who have forgotten their oral lore and those like the Santal, Munda, and Oraon; neighbouring tribal groups who have rich oral traditions.

9 Bengal and Bihar have popular story telling traditions that involve depictions of sacred stories in the form of scroll paintings. Excerpts from the mangala kavyas or even variants of the stories told in them are sung, while the pata (painter of the scroll) displays the scroll register by register before an audience. Thepata tradition is probably very old, but the first collections of such scrolls and writings on them date to the end of the eighteenth century (Singh 1995).
Puja here refers to an annual public celebration and worship. However the word may also be used to denote worship organized within the household. A pandal is the temporary structure constructed to house the icon (murti). Unlike permanent icons made of metal or stone, the icon worshipped in Bengal, Durga puja, is made from straw and clay. The icon is immersed in a river or pond at the end of the five-day puja. Even though pandals are temporary structures, they are often very elaborate and designed around particular themes that reflect contemporary political and social issues.

The Calcutta edition of the Telegraph posts a list (with description of the themes) of Durga puja pandals of Calcutta and its suburbs every year. Last year's list includes a reference to the "Nalin Sarkar Street Sarbojanin Durgostab" on Aurobindo Sarani, which had pata paintings of Phullara and Kalketu on the walls of the pandal. The goddess Durga was depicted as a village woman with the god Ganesa in her lap (http://www.telegraphindia.com/1031002/asp/others/print.html, downloaded on 18 April 2006).

Even though the selection of the theme was inspired by the popularity of Mahashweta Devi's novel among the urban elite of Bengal, the portrayal of the characters from the Chandi Mangala were inspired by the pata painting tradition of Bengal as was the juxtaposition of figures from different stories in the text. The scroll paintings that depict the Chandi Mangala always concentrate on the second story, i.e. the story about the merchant Dhanapati and his vision of a beautiful maiden, Mangala Chandi, who kept swallowing and regurgitating an elephant. In the scroll paintings there is only a fleeting reference to the story of the hunter Kalketu. He is depicted as carrying seven pots of gold, given to him by the goddess Abhaya or Chandi. He is seen accidentally by Khulana, a character from the next story. The rest of the scroll makes no reference to the first story. In the epic the two stories are kept completely separate. Interestingly, in the pandal depiction of the epic we find a confluence of two traditions: a contemporary activist one that gives prominence to the tribal presence in Bengali culture via the works of Devi, and the older popular tradition of pata narratives. Thus, the goddess is not depicted as "Abhaya" for which there is no iconic model, but rather as the maiden Mangala Chandi with her elephant headed son in her lap. Recent pata paintings show the goddess seated on a lotus flower with Ganesa on her lap instead of showing her swallowing an elephant, and the song says that Dhanapati misread the vision of the goddess kissing her elephant headed son, Ganesa, and thought she was swallowing him instead (Singh 1995).

According to Anjan Ghosh (2000) public festivities associated with Durga puja emerged in the eighteenth century with the emergent comprador elite in Calcutta. The British colonial elite also patronized these festivities.

The Calcutta-based theatre group performed Phullaketur Pala, based on the Chandi Mangala, but clearly inspired by Mahashweta Devi's novel in that it emphasizes the story of Kalketu and Phullara. In the play, as in the novel, Kalketu is depicted as a tribal leader who leads the journey of his tribe from a nomadic way of life to settled agriculture. The handbill of the play reprinted in the Telegraph says that it depicts the conditions of that time and tries to historicize the modern psyche (http://www.telegraphindia.com/1031030/asp/others/print.html, downloaded on 18 April 2006).

13 Various known as the “Indian Mutiny” and “The First war of Independence” depending on the perspective of the writer.


15 It will be obvious that I am referring to wet rice cultivation. In border districts like Purulia, paddy is sown in May and June and the crop is harvested in November and December. Dry rice cultivation is rare and until recently many areas in the border of Bengal cultivated only one crop a year (Chatterji 1985).

16 The Santal are the largest tribal group in Bengal. The timing of uprising of 1857 dovetails with several other localized uprisings that were taking place in different parts of India at that time. One of these was the Santal rebellion of 1855-1857. Many nationalist historians interpret this rebellion as a first stirring for a nationalist cause by tribal groups in India, and view Nilmoni Singh as a nationalist.

17 There is an implied reference to alien conquerors (i.e. Muslims) in this story. The story seems to have been influenced by Rajasthani tales of valour and virtue, in which Rajput women prefer to commit ritual suicide rather than face dishonour at the hands of the enemy. The Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan by James Todd, a colonial administrator and folklorist, was widely read all over India and influenced many creative writers in Bengal as well, one of the most famous being Rabindranath Tagore (Mukherjee 2004).

18 Bhadu songs that address the goddess as an ordinary village woman are privileged in folkloric discourse rather than those that describe her as a goddess. Thus:

Don't cry, don't cry Bhadu
Your father, o Blighted one
Where will he get more kajal (colloriuom)
Chatterji 2005, 199

Contrast this song with the following:
The drums beating in the bamboo grove
My treasure Bhadu is coming
Look, look Vraja maiden, how far is Vrindavan
You are a friend of Vrindavan, you live there
Who are your parents, whom do you look to for support
Whose house did you go to, who took care of you
Mother’s hands are stained with red sandalwood paste, she wears a garland of red hibiscus flowers around her neck
I went to Kashipur and saw a tiger sitting on a golden plate
The tiger doesn't eat people, he has come to show himself
Bhattacharyya 1965, 77

References to the Great Goddess, as Durga, as Kali, and even as Radha occur repeatedly in this song. Bhattacharyya professes to be puzzled by the imagery, probably because he views the Bhadu complex from the perspective of a so-called aboriginal, agricultural ritual.

19 The Swadeshi (self-rule) movement, 1905-1907 was the first attempt to use folklore for political mobilization. This nationalist upsurge was sparked off by the plan to partition the province of Bengal. The rationale for partition was purportedly administrative. However there were also political reasons such as the threat of a burgeoning Bengali nationalism in the nineteenth century.

20 The Bengal famine of 1943, the worst famine in living memory according to the oral
tradition in Bengal, coincided with the establishment of the IPTA. This famine was artificially induced in the sense that it was the result of the diversion of grain for the war effort by the colonial government rather than because of crop failure. Several of the IPTA’s most famous theatre productions, as well as films by some of Bengal’s most illustrious film directors, are on the theme of the Bengal famine. Folk songs on this theme are still sung all over Bengal (Chatterji 1985).

21 "The Left Front" refers to a coalition of political parties in Bengal with communist and socialist orientations.

22 Much of this information was given to me by Professor Mihir Bhattacharya of Jadavpur University, Calcutta. I interviewed Professor Bhattacharya in October 2004.

23 The Santals are a numerical dominant tribal group in West Bengal. They are a significant presence in Bolpur, the place where Tagore established his famous institution, Shantiniketan.

24 As Chakravarti points out the forms of song attributed to the Santals by Bhattacharyya are more popular among other, though less famous, tribal groups.

25 I quote: "Bhadreshwarir Galpo is the tale of a popular and benign princess's transformation into a cult figure. A popular folk icon, Bhadreshwari or Bhadu is worshiped by the Santals of the Bankura-Purulia-Birbhum-Burdwan districts of Bengal and a large part of Jharkhand state." (Telegraph, Calcutta, June, 17, 2003).

26 While doing fieldwork in Purulia, a district in West Bengal, I realized that much of the oral lore, especially that which concerned traditional agricultural practices, was not based exclusively on local tradition but was imperfectly remembered from medieval texts like the Sivayan and Khanar Bachan, that circulated orally.

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The evening before I had the chance to read this rich and stimulating article by Roma Chatterji, I had found myself riveted by a short book that a friend had passed on: Lady Gregory’s Toothbrush, by Colm Toibin. I had so far known Toibin’s marvelous novels, not his nonfiction; this lively biographical essay recreates the life, writings, and historical context of Lady Augusta Gregory (1852-1932). An amateur folklorist who crafted literary texts from Irish oral traditions, Lady Gregory was also a playwright, a founder and director of the influential Abbey Theater, a close associate of W.B. Yeats and a key figure in Irish cultural nationalism. Reading Roma Chatterji’s essay set in contemporary Bengal, reminded me of the recurring association, across regions and historical eras, between writing down folklore, producing literary works inspired by folklore, and drawing on the language and themes pervading these forms of inscription to articulate a cultural identity with strong political ramifications.

Bringing the perspective of a folklore scholar to two contemporary Bengali novels, Roma Chatterji beautifully illustrates the complex and ongoing cycles of interchange between oral and written cultural materials in India. Her final footnote adds context from her own work: "While doing fieldwork in Purulia, a district in West Bengal, I realized that much of the oral lore, especially that which concerned traditional agricultural practices, was not based exclusively on local tradition but was imperfectly remembered from medieval texts...that circulated orally" (22). Just as the oral lore she encountered had sometimes already been written in other texts, so the folklore on which the novelists draw, Chatterji finds, has also already been entextualized elsewhere. Regarding these novels, Chatterji points to the centrality of other medieval Bengali literary writings, inscribing oral traditions in the 16th century, and also other forms of inscription and reformulation by activists and intellectuals, sometimes with government support. So Mahashweta Devi’s V yad Kaand (The Book of the Hunter) recreates the adventures of the author of a sixteenth century epic poem encountering hunter-gatherers in the forest, adding myths written by authors from contemporary tribal groups and published in her own journal. Neelkantha Ghoshyal’s Bhumi Kanya (Earth Maiden), serialized in a Bengali magazine, draws extensively on rituals and songs published by folklorists. Tracking oral traditions through multiple media, Chatterji reminds us of how "composers...as well as folk painters and story tellers, modern day novelists and playwrights, and contemporary producers of popular culture all become part of a culture of citation and circulation."

I would like to have had further information from the authors of these novels about their creative process as Chatterji’s conclusions prompt me to wonder whether, in addition to these chunks of entextualized folklore materials, the ongoing flows and permutations of oral tradition might not also be rippling through the novels. If the two authors have spent time in these regions,
one might assume that conversations with actual people would play an important role, with direct observation and listening joining practices of reading.

Both novels appear to be written from the perspective of a semi-outsider looking in, discovering and contextualizing a different world. This pattern makes me consider the different positions that authors take in regard to oral traditions represented in fiction. When are the traditions presented as one’s own, recast from within, and when are they presented as the traditions of a closely related Other carrying key insights for a personal, regional, or national Self? How does a literary stance inflect a political message?

These particular examples also suggest a disjuncture between inscribers of oral traditions and literary creators. Yet, as Lady Augusta Gregory vividly demonstrated, the two roles may also exist in the same person. While Lady Gregory mostly wrote plays, other folklorists have written in a diversity of creative genres (cf. De Caro, forthcoming). Chatterji points to the gap between past and present as key to literary innovations in folklore; as someone who writes fiction and memoir drawing on oral traditions I’ve also contemplated as a folklorist (Narayan 1994, 2007), I perceive the relations between everyday life and oral tradition’s richly imagined parallel realms—which might be located in the past, but are not necessarily so—as also inspiring creativity.

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Identity-as-Form: 
The Mosque in the West

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Abstract
This article is a reconsideration of the ethical conceptual framework developed by Edward Said in his book Orientalism within an art historical context. It focuses primarily on the relationship between form and cultural identity in the architecture of contemporary mosques in Europe and North America to discuss key theoretical issues and current methodological tendencies in cross-cultural art history. The aim is to explore the highly charged topic of contemporary mosque architecture and minority cultural identity through the prism of what I call the Saidian turn. The article concludes by suggesting that one of the virtues of the Saidian turn is to contextualize 'otherness' not as a cultural dead-end burdened by an over-determining sense of identity but as an opportunity to participate in a material and open-ended becoming.

Something in me mistrusts "identity."
Orhan Pamuk, 1998, 489

"So, are you designing minarets?" In the early nineties while practicing architecture in London I often heard people ask me this question after telling them that I was Turkish. At first I did not know how to take this joke, though I assumed it was a joke since it was followed by a smile. The frequency of the question was enough to reveal an underlying discursive structure whose principle has been described by Edward Said as an ideological construction of culture as a source of identity geared to "differentiate 'us' from 'them,' almost always with some degree of xenophobia." (Said 1994, xiii). This ideological construct rests on a syllogistic intellectual and moral deduction based on an essentialist chain of signifiers, whereby minarets are seen as a common denominator of Turkish culture as well as of Islam; and, in turn, a Turkish architect is seen as the correlative bearer of that form wherever she or he may be in the world. Apart from the baffling degree of arrogance and blindness to other histories that this narrative reveals, what is explicitly suggested (and reproduced) under a smile in this ahistorical, discriminating, and deterministic portrayal of an individual (architect), a culture (Turkish), as well as a civilization (Islam), is a postmodern Orientalism under the guise of cosmopolitanism. As Said has shown, Orientalism led the West to see Islam, or the East, as static both in time and place, as "eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself" (Said 1995, 15). In addition, by this artificial telos, working against today's liberalism, all agency and creativity are also disturbed according to pre-set categories. The contradiction be-
tween current tendencies towards architectural open-endedness, abstraction, or internationalism, and the cultural authenticity or ethnic religious identity, subconsciously or consciously implied by the above question deserves a closer scrutiny.

Challenges to alterity, assimilation, or multiculturalism through the "uses" of culture and tradition are not only a symptom of latent Orientalism, they have also become a general phenomenon of identity politics in the face of fragmentation and alienation, nurturing varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism worldwide. Critical post-colonial theory has in this respect pointed out many similarities between colonial and post-colonial discourses of identity claims; both are based on a system of ambiguities, contradictions, and separations, aiming at a homogeneous order by marginalizing or alienating one another. Identity, or a sense of existential belonging or subjective determination, is not a coherent path through unproblematic instances, but a contingent and precarious sense of constructions produced by sets of mediations and discourses, "opposed essences," and a "whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things" (Said 1995, 352; Said 1994, 60). In this article my aim is to both historicize and contextualize Said's claim that Orientalism is the blind spot of identity politics through a reading and interpretation of metropolitan architectural culture, and in particular, of the purpose-built mosques in Europe and North America since the late nineteenth century.

Since the emergence of post-colonial states, mosques funded mostly by petrodollars present us with a visual discourse of an unprecedented kind that strives towards a formulaic objectivity or sameness, particularly, but not exclusively, in the West. This discourse, as I will show, invents along the way traditions and even an architectural ontology of sorts in which minarets have a particularly enduring appeal. My study focuses on this uneasy gesture of negotiating Muslim identity within a poor repertoire of forms. It contends that identity politics is a predicament that leads to not less, but more strict methods of self-definations based on even lesser signs and categories of distinctions. As I shall argue, more than a mere signifier, the minaret, together with the dome, has become a structural metonym of Muslim identity that can no longer be read in any other context than the one it predetermines, even though there exist in the Muslim countries both old and new mosques without minarets and domes. Hence the relevance of the question posed by my British acquaintances on this topic, since it is a product of a tendency to deny distinctions and foreclose alterity, or even hybridity, by reducing cultures (Turkish or/and Islamic) to the homogeneous stance of a visible sign such as a minaret. Such a regime of referential singularity not only sustains the category of identity as a logical boundary between 'us' and 'them' but also reconfigures the colonial trope, image-as-identity, into one of post-colonial, identity-as-image.

Highlighting Islam (symbolized by the minaret instead of the mosque itself)
both as a cultural and national marker points towards the enduring force of religion, rather religious distinction, in the awkward articulation of national identities both in the East and the West. As the relationship between religion and nationalist politics is being evoked following political reconfigurations and the resurgence of Islamism in the Muslim world, we indeed find ourselves in the midst of intense debates that continue to draw ontological and essentialist distinctions between the West and the East, notably around the questions of secularism as exemplified by recent polemics surrounding the Muslim veil both in France and in Turkey or the worldwide violence caused by the offensive Danish caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed.

We may ask if Western European identity is being redefined against Islam and not just without it (Huntington 1997). The realm of the purpose-built mosques in Europe and North America since the 1950s, following decolonization, is one among other realms where the religious polemic is taken to its extreme by both sides in forging political identities based on poorly defined notions of Islamic civilization.

The idea that globalism produced vibrant identities in the form of the hybrid is an attractive one (Bhabha 1994). Yet, there is surprisingly little evidence in the architecture of mosques that resists the reproduction of idealized forms and their distribution. Nowhere has this predicament manifested itself more clearly than as in the mosques founded by the Muslim minorities in Europe and North America. In describing a new multinational world order, Gayatri Spivak identifies this tendency as "neo-colonialism," that is to say, "a displaced repetition of many of the old lines laid down by colonialism" (Spivak 1989, 269). She continues, "It is in this newer context that the post-colonial diasporic can have the role of an ideologue" unable to negotiate their identity outside the context of a colonial discourse (Spivak 1989, 269-292). An investigation into the genesis of purpose-built mosques in the West provides us with a case study of such displaced notions and uncanny repetitions of colonial styles.

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Outside of the imperial context, Western Europe is very new to the experience of multi-religious and multi-cultural existence. The Middle East, on the other hand, as the cradle of all three monotheistic religions, would be unthinkable without the co-existence of synagogues, churches, and mosques however contentious that co-existence might still be. This difference, as we shall see, also effects the appropriation of foreign architectural forms into an indigenous context. Until very recently, according to sociologists, Muslims in Europe were usually perceived as transient immigrants, refugees, or negligible ethnic minorities, rather than as part of communities deserving their own places of worship or cultural institutions. In this sense the Orientalist colonial discourse was a function or by-product of the distance between the dominant center and the dominated periphery. Thus the early appropriations of cultural forms from the East were based on synoptic views of the history of Islamic architecture. From the second half
of the eighteenth century onwards, the mosque, with its dome and minaret, was singled out as the stylistic/formal metonym of the Muslim 'other.' It became a leitmotif in what is known as 'exoticism' or turquerie in architecture. Mosque-like buildings, mostly based on the Turkish model—since the 'Turk' itself was a synonym for the Muslim 'other'—transfigured into garden ornaments all over Europe (Figs. 1 and 2).

Examples of this transfiguration include the Turkish Mosque at Kew Gardens in London built in 1762, the Mosque at the Schloss Garten in Schwetzingen constructed in 1776, and the Mosque at the Armainvilliers, near Paris, designed in 1785. Needless to say none of these buildings were functional. Although Frederick the Great of Prussia went so far as to think about establishing a working mosque as part of his enlightenment project of religious tolerance, the foundation of such a mosque in Western Europe has its much more humble origins in the late nineteenth century.

With the dawn of industrialism in the early nineteenth century, however, these ornamental buildings were replaced with functional ones clad in freely mixed architectural idioms of the East for playful aesthetic reasons. Although continuing to resemble mosques with their domes and minarets, they functioned as bathhouses (such as those at Leeds or at Tsarskoye Selo in St. Petersburg c.1852), or as steam-driven pump stations (like the one built at Potsdam near Berlin c.1842), and even as a cigarette factory (Figs. 3, 4 and 5). This last example, constructed in Dresden, Germany in 1909 by the architect Martin Hammelzschisseveral stories high and features a mixture of Middle-Eastern styles (Wefing 1997, 18-20). Since 1998 there has been an attempt by the Muslims living in this community to reclaim the building as a mosque because it is said to carry key religious motifs such as the dome and minaret, even though no call to prayer could be allowed from the so-called minaret, which actually functions as a chimney.
What this brief genealogy shows is that this formal representation of the Muslim East has had the effect of severing forms from any live context— which would be dynamic, changing, and innovative—for more than two centuries. The multifunctional possibilities of that form also resulted in it being the locus of an unambiguous collapse of culture and religion into each other: the temporal and the spiritual, the here and the there, the now and the always, thus performing the Orientalist trope identified by Said, according to which "Islam was the essential Orient" (Said 1995, 116). This overloaded process promoted Islam or Muslimhood in the West as if it were a nationality, with one culture, one language, one identity, one form, and so on. In this abstract and uncritical semiotic operation both the signifier—form—and
the signified—identity—are essentially either reduced to empty shells, or on the contrary hardened into ideological 'mythemes', as the example of the Dresden factory demonstrates.

If eighteenth-century exoticism was integral to the gradual opening up of Europe to other cultures, Orientalism—that is to say carefully studied objectification, description, and representation of the other became a principle feature of nineteenth-century imperial control against the possibilities of hybridization or heterogeneity at home (although hybridization did sometimes occur, as in the case of the establishment of the Turkish bath more often than not they were subjected to hostile and racist attacks). Thus, increasingly, standardized and idealized purpose-built metropolitan mosques of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while perhaps putting an end to the form/function discrepancy of the earlier period, crystallized the image into an identity once and for all. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed history of each and every mosque built in Europe. Instead, I will briefly point out the underlying mechanisms that sustained colonial subjection during the construction process of some of these mosques, such as the Shah Jahan Mosque in Woking near London (Fig. 6), the Great Mosque of Paris (Fig. 7) and the Hamburg Mosque (Fig. 8). We will see that in each case the chosen style of architecture was usually determined by the colonial presence in that region; that there was always a drawn out process of decision-making and construction during which endless financial, political, and structural limitations were imposed; and most tellingly, that almost in all cases, while the funding was foreign, the architect was always local.

Fig. 6 Shah Jahan Mosque in Woking, Woking, UK, William Chambers, 1889

Fig. 7 The Great Mosque of Paris, Paris, France, 1926

Fig. 8 Imam Ali Mosque, Hamburg, Germany, 1973. Photograph by Greg Gulik.
The first mosque dedicated to Muslim worship in Europe was built in Woking, 25 miles southwest of London in 1889, without any governmental contributions. It was a modest project promoted by the Orientalist Gottlieb Wilhelm Leitner, who had been the principal of the Punjab College in Lahore (originally a Hungarian Jew, brought up in Istanbul), and financed by Shah Jehan, Begum of Bhopal, whom the British restored to power in India and after whom the mosque is named. A minor architect, William Isaac Chambers, ostensibly designed this tiny structure, measuring only 16 by 16 feet, with 'recognizable' Indian features. Its façade supposedly alluded to the famous Badshaahi Mosque in Lahore and the Taj Mahal in Agra, but it was more than anything else an imperialist showcase, as Mark Crinson asserts, for "a studied synopsis or distillate of knowledge about some object imagined as utterly other" (Crinson 2002, 82). Crinson argues in favor of visibility granted to a functioning mosque, based on Homi Bhabha's notion of the third space, or the interstices, to show that meaning becomes more ambiguous in a metropolitan context: "its appearance of respect or sympathy for this cultural otherness is part of the management of consent essential to the dynamics of hegemonic power" (Crinson 2002, 82). Without undermining the complex but slow transformation taking place within power dynamics, it is equally important to interrogate the aesthetic validation of the mosque's appearance and the context from which it emerged. Declarative, 'self-evident' architecture of the other was the metropolitan conditionality; therefore what is seemingly the granting of religious rights with functioning mosques turns into the peremptory enforcement of display not visibility.

The specific entanglement of such architecture with British imperialism, defying productive or creative hybridity, is clearly discernible if we compare the Woking Mosque with the Crimean Memorial Church in Istanbul constructed twenty years earlier. The church was built not only for the Christians living in Istanbul but specifically for the use of British minorities. What is more, unlike Woking, the Memorial Church was designed in the most fashionable style of architecture of the time by a native British architect, but financed by the Ottoman government. Interestingly, although the English toyed with the idea of granting a similar kind of aesthetic autonomy to Muslim minorities (Egyptians in this case) living in London during the conception phase of the London Central Mosque in early twentieth-century, the same imperialist logic, as we shall see, prevented its implementation (Tibawis 1983:1-4).

A formal structural comparison between the Woking Mosque and the Taj Mahal or Badshaahi Mosque has often been neglected (Crinson 2002, 82). Considering the monumental differences in their sizes, how and in what way they are similar is a legitimate question. Additionally, the Taj Mahal is not even a mosque. In fact, formally speaking, there is an astonishing visual proximity between the Woking Mosque and, not with the above mentioned Indian buildings, but the ornamental Turkish Mosque at Kew Garden built more than one hundred years earlier in 1762, by Sir William
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Chambers (see Fig. 1). Perhaps it was not a sheer coincidence that even the architects shared the same name. We find in both cases not only a use of simple architectural rhetoric based on recognizable signposts in the shape of domes and minaret-like structures, but also the exact same central buildings covered with a dome and flanked by lower pavilions and decorated with ogee arches, urns, and crescents. This shows that, in fact, when it comes to adapting alien forms into a dominant culture, it is not the knowledge of the ‘original’ that holds the authority but the precedent that sets the standard for what is and is not aesthetically acceptable. Naturally, such an admission would unsettle the Orientalists’ claims that they are the “agents of authority” (Said 1994, 19) about the East; as, for example, Leitner saw himself to be, as evidenced by his numerous scholarly publications (Leitner 1889, 1868). Not acknowledging this fact is one of the pitfalls of Orientalism. This comparison clearly demonstrates that a century of presumably increasing knowledge had no impact on the way in which the Eastern models were observed and implemented.

Like the Woking Mosque, the Great Mosque of Paris also stands out as recognizably different from its surroundings. They are also very different from each other, carrying the signs of their respective colonies in the East. The Paris complex, designed by a group of French architects who took their aesthetic inspirations from architectural idioms across Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and the famous Alhambra in Spain, was completed in 1926 with the help of North African craftsmen. Although the site, in this case, was given by the French government following intense negotiations which began as early as 1895, most of the funding that enabled the mosque’s realization came from overseas. The Magazine L’Architecture identified the Paris mosque not only as the hallmark of the whole of the ‘Orient’ but also as the triumphal representation of the French in North Africa, lest the man on the streets of Paris have any doubt: “What is all this …may ask the twentieth-century Parisian man of the street, who by chance passes through these environs. This ensemble [the mosque], on the other hand, brings back to those who have visited our North Africa, or those who have traversed the far and prestigious Orient, familiar impressions” (Bayoumi 2000, 272). Thus the tautological representation of the ‘other’ by its ‘otherness’ is the essence of an alienation process that achieves a certain kind of imperialist subjection. The Hamburg Mosque in Germany, finished in 1973, designed by the Schramm & Elingius Architects, with financial contributions from the local Iranian community and religious institutions in Iran, was similarly replete with Orientalist assumptions with its dome and two minarets (Holod and Khan, 213-232). Although the mosque is tiled with turquoise revetments and has a modern flare its overall appearance has an uncanny resemblance to that of the Kew mosque. In addition, its process of construction, fraught with conflict and controversy, took more than 13 years to come to fruition.

Such genealogy has important implications for our understanding of postcolonial purpose-built mosques because what emerges is not a rejection, but a con-
tinuation of such formally authorised, yet equally disfranchising, modes of diasporic self-representation. Architecture is often seen as fundamental in assuming the role of a moral and physical signifier in and for cultures. Thus mosques in the West have become the 'official' repository of identity claims from all sides (Muslims, immigrants, and host nations), articulated as they are around a pseudo-transparency of form to meaning. George Bataille's critique of architecture as having "the authority to command and prohibit" is justified in a discussion of colonial and post-colonial conditionality of identity-as-image (Bataille 1997, 21). Bataille reminds us that "when architecture is discussed it is never simply a question of architecture.... [the discourse] finds itself caught from the beginning in a process of semantic expansion that forces what is called architecture to be only the general locus or framework of representation, its ground.... Architecture, before any other qualifications is identical to the space of representation" (Hollier 1989, 31). Indeed as Said has argued, the construction of colonial discourses about the 'other' has often been a way to claim a tight control of that space of representation; and as Homi Bhabha has shown this colonial sense made the representation of the other spin "around the pivot of the stereotype" (Bhabha 1994, 76). This also holds true of the architecture of the modern mosques. Despite the buildings' reliance on technology, materials, and skills, certain essentialism about these mosques continues to hold the space of Islam (or for that matter Muslim cultures) as fixed and presents it as either unchangingly distinct from the 'West' or identical everywhere in the 'East.' Even the most recently built mosques have failed to produce an alternative representation.

Like a spinning top, since the eighteenth century the 'Oriental' stereotype thus became defined by its outline, as the essence of a radical difference that could be realized less ambiguously. This is indeed pushed to the extreme in twentieth century modernist mosque architecture and has, in effect, produced what Spivak has called a "collective hallucination" (Spivak 1989, 280). This should not come as a surprise, as recent literature has pointed out that modernist architects assimilated the colonial ideology of difference wholeheartedly into their movement by endowing pure abstract forms with the notions of authority and authenticity (Celik 1992, 58-77). Thus, instead of discouraging any attempt at reducing an aesthetic artifact (such as a mosque) to one of its features (such as a minaret) which pushes the association chain all the way to the collective identity (Muslim) that such an artifact is supposed to hypostatize, they have instead endorsed it.

The Central London Mosque at Regent's Park, which took nearly half a century to realize, is a case in point. The project was political and the Muslims living in London became directly participating members. Encouraged by the Parisian example, it was promoted as early as the 1920s by the Egyptian ambassador, Hassan Nashat Pasha, and Lord Lloyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, but the diplomatic antagonism over the Suez Canal and budget deficits halted the work until the 1940s. Also around this time the Egyptian government granted land and total liberty for the construction of the Anglican Cathedral in Cairo, a project to be designed by Adrian Gilbert Scott. Hoping for reciprocal attitudes, the Mosque Committee made a demand for a plot from the British government while at the same time commissioning the Egyptian architect General Ramzy Omar. Although the land was granted, Omar's traditional plan was finally thrown out, yielding to a metropolitan cultural anxiety. The British opted for a competition hosted in 1969 to find an 'appropriate' design. Out of fifty entries mostly from Muslim countries, Sir Frederick Gibberd's modernist design won and the work began in 1974 (Fig. 9). Gibberd's design placed a greater emphasis on the purity of forms and undifferentiated specificity of dome and minaret, although the project brief included a statement that no prayer call would be allowed from the tower. Opting for a highly modernist design instead of the truly heterogeneous Muslim projects, clearly suggests that the use and circulation of cultural codes was a Western prerogative. The complex was finally consecrated four years later in 1978. Entirely funded by petro-dollars, additional Muslim contributions were assigned to the interiors; minbars were sent from Egypt, tiles from Turkey, and carpets from Iran (Tibawis 1983, 1-4). The Functionalists protested against the design as being an empty shell, though not on the basis that it still looked traditional, but that it lacked the movement's integrity: "Of course you cannot put the decor to one side. It is not the fact that it is decorated that upsets us, or even that it is recognizably traditional in appearance, but the fact that there is no internal logic, which ties the decor to the structure behind it. This makes it (at least for architects) a frivolous building" (Crinson 2002, 88). Even though the comment is disguised as a modernist lamentation, it is not really concerned with the problem that function doesn't follow the form, since the existence of the minaret is left unchallenged. The modernist believes that Islamic cultures and traditions can be represented in simple recognizable shapes, in effect facilitated by a decisive link between archetypes and identity politics. Gibberd's design was later embraced as the prototype for the Grand Mosque of Kuwait City in 1984 (Fig. 10). The favorable approach would be to read this mosque as an instance of hybridity or as a metaphor for border crossing, but Mohammed Arkoun identifies it instead as a 'symbolic statement of power' of a rising new dynasty in Kuwait rather than as a spiritual place of worship (Frishman and Khan 1994, 271). Such a sharing of visual language with the former colonial power is indicative of a global sharing of the language of power through the
desire for immediate access to an originary identity or tradition through representation.

The predicament here is not that modernism has caused forms to collapse into signifiers of whole cultures, and in particular Eastern cultures (for example, an all-subsuming Islamic 'shape' in the form of a minaret or a dome), but that these ideas have somehow converged with some of the Muslim views particularly endorsed by those living outside Muslim countries, as an effect of socio-economic violence, displacement, exile, and in general, imperialism. In Spivak's words, "s/he is more at home in producing and simulating the effect of an older world constituted by the legitimizing narratives of cultural and ethnic specificities and continuities, all feeding an almost seamless national identity—a species of 'retrospective hallucination'" (Spivak 1989, 282). Indeed more and more purpose-built mosques in Europe and North America, mostly funded by the Wahabi sect (Sunní fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia), do seem to strive towards a "seamless national [Muslim] identity" inspired and guided by the colonial sense that the dome and minaret were the undisputed signs, not only of Islamic cultures, but Islam itself.

Indeed when Ziaulhoq Zia, the chairman of the Islamic Centre of Ocean County in the United States, was asked to describe the project for a new mosque the first thing he declared was: "We will have a minaret" and "We will have a dome" (Everline 2004). Seen from this perspective, the question "are you designing minarets?" can be decoded on the one hand as a colonial fantasy and on the other as a post-colonial diasporic desire. The missing element in all of these is that, in actual fact, neither the Koran nor Traditions—the sayings of the Prophet—dictates a shape for a mosque or its accompanying structures. Few Muslims would even disagree with the idea that there is no need for a mosque to pray. Scholars have also argued that the minaret was essentially an invention of formal archaism (simply a tower imitating a lighthouse) and that its use in a religious context was almost accidental (adhan, the Muslim prayer, by chance took place up in the tower). The Islamic art historian Jonathan Bloom's in-depth study of the minaret is unequivocal: "the minaret was invented, not early in the first century of Islam, but at the end of its second century, … and that in the beginning it had little if anything to do with the call to prayer" (Bloom 1989, 7). As Bloom has shown, only in the thirteenth century did the minaret become a common element of a mosque and even then it was entangled in aesthetic and political signs of representation; its style, which was extremely varied, advertised
distinction not unity (Fig. 11). Indeed the dogmatic shape of mosques, with not one but several minarets, belongs to the legacy of the Sunni Hanafi School championed by the Ottomans, the longest lived Muslim imperial power.

Such formal reductionism, transcending all questions of style, design, technology, culture, history, or modernity, has now become the orthodox principle of a singular Muslim identity. In the same way that Charles Jencks has identified the self-conscious classical architecture, with its principal columns and entablature, with European fascism (Jencks 1987, 46), so do the dome and minaret become the universal properties of Islamic fundamentalism. Even the intensely debated design of the Manhattan Mosque built in 1991 gave in to this convention of the dome and minaret (Fig. 12). Omar Khalidi, a historian of North American contemporary mosques, writes that "[a]fter a long and thoughtful debate the two groups [Muslim financiers and non-Muslim academic advisors] agreed on a 'modernist' building, but with the Muslim Committee forcing the inclusion of both a minaret and a dome, neither of them favoured by the architects and scholars" (Khalidi 1998, 324). Since the minaret and the dome were claimed as divine properties of a mosque, any rejection of them was seen in opposition to Islam. Indeed for most practicing Muslims, and
particularly those living in the West, even the sheer idea of a mosque lacking a minaret and/or a dome has now come to present a challenge of an existential kind. Jencks's view is pertinent: "the politics of the self-conscious tradition [of architecture], as one could guess, are conservative, elitist, centralist and pragmatic with an occasional element of mystical fundamentalism thrown in to catalyse, or brutalise the masses" (Jencks 1987, 46).

After it was decided that there would be a minaret at the Manhattan mosque, it was separately designed by the Turkish-American architect Altan Gürsel. The rationale for this decision could be that the pencil-shaped Ottoman/Turkish minaret easily translates into a modern shape, but in political terms, as more and more contemporary mosques around the world draw on this model, it provides the most congenial sign of the Muslim Umma (the universal community of Muslims) as well an identification with power (the Ottoman Empire being the last vestige of that memory).

This insistence on minarets has now produced surprising new results—a minaret without a mosque. In Turkey, in a small village called Ayvalik, near Izmir (Symirna) I encountered a ruined, thus unused, mosque with a brand new minaret attached to it, the foundation plaque reading 2005 (Fig. 13). When I inquired about the mosque itself and whether it was scheduled for a repair I was told that it is in the process of reparation but that they chose to build the minaret first. Even when the mosque is finally restored, what is lost in this upside down process is an enduring sentiment of spirituality. When the spectator looks at this minaret without a mosque, he or she invests it not with less but greater politics, perhaps the politics of the current Turkish Islamicist regime.5

There is no one methodology for understanding the long catalogue of minarets from Manhattan to Ayvalik but it is clear that most contemporary mosques no longer involve the makings of "a place of worship and collective social activities," but rather, as Oleg Grabar asserts, they are in the service of "a monument" symbolizing power as culture (Frishman and Khan 1994, 245). The existence of a minaret in this case is a neutral, easily manageable, generic trope, neatly tiding so many different cultures, habits, climates, and traditions. Within such a context it becomes apparent that legiti-
mizing narratives for building minarets are not simply based on religion or historicity, but on sheer appearances, taken at face value, constructing a social and political reality based purely on themselves.

The problem with political Islam is that it attaches so much value to that form that even the outright Orientalist buildings are recoded into consecrated ones and reclaimed by Muslim minorities as their own. As Jencks states, "[t]he self-conscious tradition of architecture often shows an attention to its own actions which is so self-reflective as to be paralysing" (Jencks 1987, 46). The Dresden Turkish Tobacco Factory is a case in point (see Fig. 5). The attempt to claim it as part of a Muslim cultural identity, because of its dome and minaret-like chimneys, is indicative of this paradox. This is not to deny that such a recoding could not be read as an appropriation of power on the part of the marginalized, but to suggest that it only serves an ideological end that traps these communities in a perpetual state of minority and forecloses their creative abilities. Within the metaphorical and symbolic field this frozen identity-as-image produces not culture, but melancholy or fundamentalism. It cannot articulate difference; it only creates a fictitious totality against the equally fictitious homogeneity of a host nation.

Formal militancy, in a way, encourages a regime of resistance for the sake of resistance. Indeed, in Europe and North America more and more mosques are under greater scrutiny and new mosque projects are received with suspicion. Marco Pastors, a city councillor in Rotterdam, declared his protest against a new mosque which was recently completed in a quasi-fascist manner: "We want a European version of Islam, and that Islam must adapt to Europe, not Europe adapt to Islam. ... [Y]ou have to earn the right to make very distinctive buildings when you are new in a country" (Knox 2004). What is in fact utterly perverse about this statement is that if there is a version of Islam it is already the European version. Based on these kinds of statements identity becomes a fallacy, a jail whose keys are in the pockets of the inmates, or as Adorno describes it, "the whole dispute resembles shadowboxing" (Adorno 1978, 303).

There is an intrinsic difficulty to cope with open-endedness about cultures (in the Foucauldian sense of the term, culture's lack of a 'pure' origin or meaning or enclosed authority). As Said states: "... no one finds it easy to live uncomplainingly and fearlessly, with the thesis that human reality is constantly being made and unmade, and that anything like a stable essence is constantly under threat" (Said 1994, 333). And he adds that "we all need some foundation on which to stand; the question is how extreme and unchangeable is our formulation of what this foundation is" (Said 1994, 333). This question is important in order to prevent a vicious circle of complicity in the handling of predetermined, uncritical claims to identity. Equally to objectify discursive elements is to disentangle analytically the ideological pre-requisites (ontological, political, and aesthetic) implicit in cultural products, and to consider them as guiding themes in
shaping one's critical stance towards them.

Edward Said's Orientalism has indeed forcefully thrown open Pandora's box for all of us. Scholars following the Saidian concept contested the dominant norms (narrative) of history writing, interpretation, and cross-cultural interactions within the socio-political context of colonialism and post-colonialism (Celik 2002, 21). But so far, contesting dominant forms (modalities) of representation remains unexplored. Challenges to dominant narratives have indeed expanded the academic canon and even altered its historical interpretation. However, reading the proliferation of standardized mosque architecture in the West as a post-colonial success story runs the risk of being partial to the 'other.' Considering these mosques as autonomous statements of a single Muslim identity in the West would also undermine the theoretical issues that have identified representation with power. In order to avoid ideological pitfalls we must then pose the pertinent question of form, which has been side-tracked by most scholars. In Adorno's words, "a work of art that is committed strips the magic from the work of art that is content to be a fetish, an idle pastime for those who would like to sleep through the deluge that threatens them, in an apoliticism that is in fact deeply political" (Adorno 1978, 301). From this perspective it becomes clear that a mosque without a dome or a minaret is not a threat to the processes of becoming or identification. Only a discussion of creativity instead of identity can make these mosques politically visible, and only then potentially existentially fulfilling.

This is not just a theoretical wishfulness; alternative solutions, aesthetically creative and non-conformist mosques employing modernizing elements, with or indeed without domes or minarets, do exist. Amongst them are the Sherefudin Mosque in Visoko, Bosnia, by Zlatko Ugljen (1980); the Plainfield Islamic Centre in Indiana, USA, by Gulzar Haider (1981); the National Assembly Mosque of Behruz and Can Cinci, in Ankara, Turkey (1989) (Fig. 14); Poulad Shahr in Isfahan, Iran, by Mohammad Ali Badrizadeh (1991); Ilyas Cavusoglu Camii in Rize, Turkey, by Erhan Isözen (1993); the Nour Mosque in Gouda, Netherlands, by Gerard Rijnsdorp (1993); the Kazan Mosque in Russia, by Rafik Bilyalov (1998); or the Tuzla Mosque in Bosnia, by Amir Vuk (2000) (Fig. 15) to list just a few. Their forms are contemporary and modern; here I am using this adjective not as a European prerogative but as a shorthand for a set of tendencies betraying an autonomy that, both thematically and formally, presents an outward-looking cultural productivity. These mosques have none of the identity politics trappings; they are not conceived as religious signposts. The mosque of the National Assembly in Ankara with its 'international' style, for instance, takes its function as a mosque for granted and aligns itself with a cultural discourse of secularism in a country with a Muslim population. These mosques foster a sense of cultural context and artistic concentration, and can be seen as not only contesting the modes but also the dominant forms of representation. This is akin to what Said says about the works of writers he admires,
such as Césaire and Walcott: "whose daring new formal achievements are in effect a re-appropriation of the historical experience of colonialism, revitalised and transformed into a new aesthetic of sharing and often transcendent re-formulation" (Said 1994, 353). One of the virtues of the Saidian turn is to contextualize 'otherness' not as a cultural dead-end, burdened by an over-determining sense of identity, but as an opportunity to participate in an open-ended becoming.

More recently, artists are focusing on expressions of the Muslim way of life in the West precisely in those terms. Bosnian-born artist Azra Aksamija, now living in the United States and Austria, resists the post-colonial identity-pastiche by promoting what she calls "nomadic mosques" (Aksamija 2005, 17-21) by which the Muslim practice of prayer can be performed anywhere (Figs. 16 and 17).

Fig. 14 Ilyas Cevusoglu Mosque, Rize, Turkey, Erhan Isözen, 1993. Photograph by the architect.

Fig. 15 Mosque of the Behrambeg Madrasa, Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zlatko Ugljen and Husejn Dropic, 1999. Photograph by Azra Aksamija.

Fig. 16 Dirndlmoschee [Dirndl Dress Mosque], Azra Aksamija, 2005. Courtesy of the artist.

Fig. 17 Nomadic Mosque, Azra Aksamija, 2005. Courtesy of the artist.
According to Akšamija "...the design of wearable mosques—clothing that can be transformed into prayer-environment...examines the notion of mosque space and investigates its formal limits" (Akšamija 2005, 17-21). This radical work also explores the themes of cultural dynamism and adaptability inherent to Islam as seen by the young Muslim artist: "[t]he religion of Islam" Akšamija writes "is not understood as a static concept, which it often claims to be, but rather as a dynamic process that adapts to specific geographical and cultural conditions" (Akšamija 2005, 17-21). Here, the experience of the civilian massacres in Bosnia and of post-9/11 politics in the United States places an awareness of Islam as a crucial space of today's global politics (i.e. the need to flee or hide to save one's life, the status of the displaced, misplaced, or refugee). But rather than remaining frozen on a passive, victimized spot, Akšamija's work emphasizes the creative dynamics of cultural de-territorialization under the figure of the nomad with her portable/wearable mosque. A mosque on the road as it were for an undetermined becoming is able to decode and recode and de-code itself with the changing landscape, politics, and life in general. The signified of the line of flight leads not to de-politicize Muslim populations but to invigorate self-determination. In the words of Akšamija, the "success [of the project] is contingent upon the actual wearing of the mosque, which can only take place if the Muslims themselves recognize and accept the basic ideological elasticity of Islam" (Akšamija 2005, 17-21).

**Notes**

1. This is a revised and extended version of a paper delivered at the Conference Hommage à Edward W. Said held at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris in September, 2004. Research for this paper was carried out during my Fellowship at the Columbia University Institute for Scholars at Reid Hall in Paris in 2005. More recent version of the paper was delivered at the symposium on The Mosque in the West organized by the Aga Khan Programme at MIT in April 2006.

2. The notion of secularism has now itself become an essentializing and chastising decoy, hiding the much more concrete issues of the universalist, global neo-imperialism, presented either as democratic or as natural human condition.

3. The reception of Turkish Baths in London in the 1860s is a case in point. One critic identified the Turkish habit of washing as a barbaric and enervating act. This is how he describes it: "Turkish Bath vies with Mons. le Gorilla (referring to Charles Darwin's book On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, 1859) in attracting public attention at the present time. This is not at all to be wondered at, seeing that the latter desires to claim us as first cousins, while the former is going to assist in bringing us down to the level of the latter" (Avcioglu 1998, 66).

4. The scholars have included none other then the doyens of Islamic art and architecture Oleg Grabar and Renata Holod (Khalidi 1998, 324).

5. One is immediately reminded of the poem read by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 1997: "The minarets are bayonets/ the domes helmets/ the mosques our barracks/ the believers our soldiers." As the first line suggests the minarets have now become the proverbial political instruments rather than elements in an architectural scheme.
Works Cited


This article aspires to move the discourse on contemporary mosques in the West, both as architectural objects and as framers of communal identities, from its usual frames of reference—taxonomic, typological, and stylistic on one hand, and political, ideological, and polemical on the other—into the expanses of critical theory. To achieve that end, in a review of important mosque projects in Europe and North America, the author discusses and tests current themes in cultural criticism, such as the signs and boundaries of cultural territories and cultural claims; the polarity of center and periphery, both original and derivative; and majority and minority. These themes were originally formulated for the investigation of cultural and social politics and issues of identity in modern and post-colonial contexts, but have successfully migrated in recent years to permeate the study of creative processes, such as architecture.

The author's examination of the design and building of mosques in the West offers a prime opportunity to question the validity of geographic, historical, religious, and national boundaries as disciplinary dividing lines. Styles of building design in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constructed as frivolous exercises in stylistic exoticism resulted in various buildings in Europe masquerading as pseudo-mosques. In the various Western cities where new Islamic communities grew beginning in the 1950s, these pseudo-mosques became formal "precedents" for the design of modern mosques seeking roots. Burdened by Eurocentric administrative limitations and ideological passions forced upon them for a variety of reasons, these communities sought conformity, historicity, and authenticity in the architectural vocabulary of their places of worship away from their Islamic home.

These developments in the West, however, are not independent from what happened in the Islamic World in the last 30-40 years, where architecture underwent a series of complex transformations. Indeed, the romantic conception of an exotic, colorful, and religiously driven Islamic architecture, which was originally propounded by Western Orientalists in the nineteenth century, was challenged by new visions with the gradual collapse of the colonial rule by the middle of the twentieth century. The independence movements which became ruling political parties in the colonized Islamic countries, brought with them the more vocal and aggressive concepts of modernity and nationalism to represent the architecture of their newly constituted states. This period, however, was short lived, succeeded and somewhat supplanted by the no less passionate discourse on religion as identity marker that sprang forth in the 1980s, primarily as a backlash to the failure of the nationalist rhetoric to encompass the cultural aspirations of the vast majority of the common people in many countries of the Islamic world.

This process (badly understood by most), evolved intermittently during the 1980s and 1990s in the vast majority of the Islamic countries and gave rise to an
ideology that saw Islam as identity. The shift has been promoted by at least two economically and politically dissimilar, though ultimately mutually reinforcing, social groups.

First was the reemergence of a fundamentalist political movement in many Islamic countries after an apparent dormancy of some thirty years. Spurred by the triumph of Khomeini's Iranian Revolution of 1979, and vaguely conceived as a response to the perceived failures of the national states to face up to foreign interference, economic corruption, and moral decadence, the fundamentalist movement sought a return to more authentic political and social foundations to govern the Muslim Nation. Despite its relentless and violent attacks on what it sees as the depravity of all Western cultural constructs, especially those aimed at the Islamic world, the fundamentalist movement showed surprisingly little interest in the conceptual contours of various aspects of Islamic cultures, including Islamic architecture.

The second group to emerge in the 1980s was made up of the elite of many recently formed nation-states of the Gulf region, which experienced an unprecedented prosperity and a concomitant socioeconomic empowerment in the aftermath of the oil boom of the 1970s. Their new wealth, deeply religious and conservative outlook, and fervent quest for cultural identity combined to create a demand for a contemporary yet identifiable Islamic architecture. Sincerely at times and opportunistically at others, many architects responded by engaging in the design of various historicist styles, all modern and all dubbed "Islamic," sponsored by these elite groups across the Islamic world or wherever new Islamic communities happened to congregate, mostly in the West.

These three phases of architecture in the modern Islamic world—the Orientalist/colonial, nationalist, and neo-Islamist—share the same historicist discourse on "Islamic Architecture." They differ only in the historical segment they select as their main reference. The Orientalists see the dawn of Islam as the beginning of Islamic architecture and the beginning of the colonial age as its end, and consider all preceding or contemporary traditions external to it. They construct a continuous narrative that runs parallel to the Western architectural tradition but almost never intersects with it until it dissolves with the onset of modernity.

Both nationalists and neo-Islamists accept the paradigm of cultural autonomy but emphasize different historical trajectories. The nationalists stress the point in time when their putative nations—i.e. Turkish, Iranian, Arab—rose to prominence under Islam or broke away from its hegemonic grip, and construct their history selectively from that moment to the present, which they invariably see as resurgent. They sometimes search for anchoring roots in the distant, pre-Islamic past and postulate some latent continuity between that past and the awakening of their nation to its true identity in the modern age.

The neo-Islamists, too, construct a preferred historical trajectory, which is a medley of Golden Ages stretching from the high Caliphate in the 8th century to the Gunpowder Empire in the 16th cen-
tury. They hold that age as the fountainhead from which their architecture derives, yet still, in the present moment, attempt to rebuild that romantically remembered architectural utopia using purely postmodern compositional and formal techniques and leaving out all that they consider aberrant, or, to use their favorite term, jahili, (ignorant, a term that usually refers to the pre-Islamic period in Arabia). As a result, both nationalists and neo-Islamists conceive "their" architecture from exclusionary perspectives, which they unwittingly inherited from their Orientalist predecessors and which resulted in the traditional, rigid, and almost caricature-like architecture of their places of worship both in the Islamic World and the West.

The publication in 1978 of Edward Said's seminal book *Orientalism* marked a turning point in the conception of Islamic studies in the West, but its influence on design in the contemporary world was mostly indirect and hard to gauge. Progressive architects working in the Islamic world did begin, around that time, to break the artificial boundaries of their heritage and explore new design ideas, but their experiments were limited and lacked popular appeal. They chafed under bureaucratic restrictions and the influence of populist movements. Perhaps their most formidable opponent was the dominant paradigm of the entire discipline of architecture, which legitimizes a theoretically reflective and historically evolving Western architecture while casting the architecture of other cultures as outdated and unable to beget modern living expressions. Changing these conditions, in my opinion, depends to a large extent on the satisfaction of two interrelated requirements. First, these progressive architects building new mosques must resolve the tensions inherent in the discourse of contemporary architecture and diffused over such binary oppositions as "regional vs. international", "transcendental vs. historical", "traditional vs. modern", "vernacular vs. designed", or "static vs. dynamic." The second requires Western architects and town planners and administrators, in their capacity as prime arbiters of the discipline, to reflect the thoughts and work of their newly assertive interlocutors from the Islamic world.

In Mayan People Within and Beyond Boundaries anthropologist Peter Hervik presents a challenge to both popular and academic understandings of Yucatec Mayan identity, which he claims have been largely constructed externally to the communities in question. He bases his book on fieldwork begun in 1989 in the town of Oskutzcab in southern Yucatán. Hervik's primary argument is that the social categories used by outsiders (academics, the popular media, and the tourism industry) to represent Mayan peoples are predicated on flawed assumptions about cultural continuity with the pre-Hispanic past. All-encompassing categories such as "the Maya" do not reflect the historically complex and internally differentiated subjectivities that today comprise ethnic communities in Yucatán. The author maintains that residents of Oskutzcab and other southern Yucatec communities, in fact, are more likely to self-identify as mestizo than Maya.

Hervik takes a deconstructionist approach to ethnic categorization firmly grounded in postmodern critiques of cultural representation. At the same time, he is clearly apprehensive about the literary turn in anthropology, which he believes has permitted discourse analysis to become the sole "object and means of post-modern ethno-graphy" (163). He is particularly critical of works that privilege the self-reflexivity of the author over the lived experiences of informants. As a corrective, he offers an analysis of Yucatec social categories based on what he terms "shared social experience" (xxviii). This approach, according to Hervik, considers the social positions and relationships of all the individual actors in the field: informants, the ethnographer, as well as other researchers. A holistic understanding of the fieldwork encounter ideally leads to an analysis that considers the dialectic nature of ethnic identity formation; this includes lived social experiences that lie beyond the confines of language.

Hervik begins his work with a description of the Maya themselves. In Chapter One he introduces the reader to Oskutzcab and the surrounding region by way of historical overview. He quickly moves through the pre-Hispanic, colonial, post-independence, and post-revolutionary eras, finally reaching the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the bulk of his research was carried out. He lays out a socioeconomic profile of the community, based on indicators such as population growth, native language use, and changing patterns of land use. In the second chapter, Hervik describes the historical conditions out of which various Yucatec social categories (e.g. mestizo, catrín, gente de vestido) emerged. Importantly, he discusses how the term mestizo came to be the primary self-identifier for "those people whom we normally speak of as the Maya" (26). Hervik reminds his reader that, elsewhere in Mexico, mestizo typically referred to persons of mixed Spanish and indigenous ancestry. However, during the Yucatán
Caste War of the nineteenth century, mestizo was specifically used to denote pacified Yucatec Mayas, as opposed to the Maya rebels who continued to resist political and economic subordination.

After briefly describing the Mayan history and culture, Hervik turns, in Chapter Three, to focus on external representations of "the Maya." Hervik devotes considerable space to deconstructing visual and textual representations from National Geographic, as well as providing somewhat less detailed analyses of sixteenth-century Spanish accounts of Yucatán and newspaper articles, from 1990, about the threat posed to traditional Mayan culture by expanding Protestant sects. In Chapter Four, he moves back to a discussion of social categories and the construction of ethnic identity, arguing that there is little continuity between pre-Hispanic and present-day Mayan society. Finally, in subsequent chapters of the book, Hervik attempts to bolster this claim with ethnographic materials drawn from interactions with a local theater troupe, community festival organizers, and other cultural brokers involved in Mayan revitalization projects. He also includes a brief account of his own experience negotiating the presence of another outsider who arrived to conduct fieldwork in Oixutzcab. The concluding section of the book theorizes about the "shared social experience" model of ethnographic research. He argues for its usefulness not only in capturing the lived experiences of social actors, but also in producing a critically engaged, self-reflexive ethnography.

Although Hervik's basic premise is provocative, his methodological approach and analysis are less convincing. One of the most notable inconsistencies is found in his insistence on using "shared social experience" as an analytic frame. On one hand he is critical of external representations of the "voiceless" Maya (85). Yet, with the exception of a few select indigenous cultural brokers featured in the final chapters, the people of Oixutzcab are woefully under-represented in his text. The relatively thin ethnographic data offered in Chapters Five and Six do not adequately demonstrate the complex matrix of social relations in which external representations of Mayan communities circulate and are contested or transformed by a broad spectrum of social actors. Moreover, the reader is left uncertain as to how Hervik's shared "social experience" approach is different from the best reflexive ethnography, which necessarily takes into account the ethnographer, informants, and other researchers in the field.

Hervik's treatment of the social categories operating in Oixutzcab ultimately serves to reinscribe monolithic notions of identity. Although perhaps not self-identifying as Maya, he maintains that "the people who live in Oixutzcab share a single cultural identity, regardless of the fact that they identify themselves by different terms and that different social groups exist" (26). Once again, Hervik does not provide convincing ethnographic evidence as to how he came to this conclusion. His claims appear to be based on a handful of cases in which self-appointed cultural brokers, themselves occupying a certain class position, assert a particular vision of local identity. Furthermore, despite
Hervik’s preoccupation with self-reflexivity, he does not consider his own racial/class position as a male European researcher in the community and the limitations it may pose. More critically, he does not acknowledge how he himself is producing yet another singular representation of "the Maya," the term that he uses throughout the text.

It is also bears mentioning that this book, first published in 1999 and again in 2003, relies heavily on statistical data and ethnographic materials from one, and even two decades earlier. Surely Oxkutzcab, like many other ethnic and rural communities throughout Mexico, has witnessed a number of demographic shifts in the past fifteen years. This book needs to be updated to include a discussion of current socioeconomic trends, as well as the considerable body of recent literature devoted to this topic. Hervik is well justified in his critique of earlier Mayanists' representations of the region. Nevertheless, the post-1980s scholarship on Yucatec communities, and identity politics generally, has often rejected the reified social categories of which he is critical in favor of locally meaningful terms of identification and cultural production. For a book in its second edition with a well-respected publisher, it also contains a surprising number of typographical and grammatical errors. Not only does this, at times, distract the reader from the author’s discussion, but it also lends an unprofessional feel to the text as a whole.

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Relying heavily on his own position as an ethnographer and musician, Timothy J. Cooley’s latest book Making Music in the Polish Tatras: Tourists, Ethnographers, and Mountain Musicians carefully employs an oft-used ethnomusicological model wherein the subjects of music and cultural dynamism guide the ethnomusicologist who offers us a historically and ethnographically dynamic look into the music of a particular region; in Cooley’s case, the music of Southern Poland’s mountains. Positioned between the geography of its locale and the social community of its musicians, Cooley’s stance view focuses on at the process of playing mountain music in the Tatra region of Poland as part of a dialogue between himself and his subjects mapped out in part by previous ethnographers and tourists. The Górale people, the music they play, and the ethnographer are all actors in the challenge of interpreting song definition, cultural questions, and the relationship between music and region (250). While attempting to foreground interpretation, Cooley frames all his questions of place, modernity, history, and globalism as part of a regional and cultural specificity, embodying Górale ethos and the musical culture of the Tatra region.
From the outset, Cooley outlines the important relationship between the ethnographer and the mountain musician as typified in the historical characters of Dr. Tytus Chalubinski and guide Jan Kreptowski-Sabal (introduction). Cooley credits Chalubinski with promoting the Tatra region as a tourist destination and what Cooley refers to as "brokering" Górale cultural practices; by this the author means the ethnographic work on the promotion of music that was often done in tandem in Chalubinski's work (104). Jan Kreptowski-Sabal represents an indigenous and authentic construction of Górale ethnicity, as reified by tourism and cultural promotion, whose local knowledge and relationship to the urban inteligencja (Polish "intellectuals") expanded the scope of Górale cultural ethos; he reaped the benefits of Chalubinski's desire to promote Górale culture by providing the musical material that seemed to embody as transient, but tangible, sense of Górale culture. Cooley attempts to form the same relationship with his informants. Like Chalubinski and Kreptowski-Sabal, his position follows the same route already traced by ethnographers and their subjects in search of musical representations of Górale culture.

While this relationship frames the discussion of the book, Cooley proceeds conservatively into his ethnography by describing representative examples of Muzyka Podhala (Music of Podhale, also called muzyka górala). In his first chapter, entitled "Podhale," he provides detailed transcriptions of vocal and instrumental genres, music for dancing, and the song texts themselves, ultimately attempting to present contextually the way in which these songs types occur in the everyday musical culture of the Górale people. Here Cooley is mainly concerned with showing how the production of muzyka górala, whether on the festival stage, or at the restaurant, funeral, or after after-hours gathering, "situationally" invokes contradictory and problematic representations of identity not easily described by a unilateral definition of Górale identity (61). The ethnomusicologist's concern for a music's ability to represent a community's cultural practices, no matter its context, also takes its cue from modernist scholastics as exercised by the urban Polish academics who came in and out of the mountains for both pleasure and research purposes. Cooley's most engaging chapter on the history of ethnography in Podhale, entitled "Making Mountain Music," sheds further light on the issue of modern constructions of Muzyka Podhala. The strength of the story he tells lies in the way he historically aims at linking tourism and travel with the cultural brokering and ethnography that accompanied latenineteenth century urban discoveries of the Tatras (85).

Such a historical examination provides a much-needed look at some of the questions of European comparative musicology, particularly in its reevaluation of Central and Eastern European models of folklore and song collecting. As Cooley implies, the essentialisms generated by city-dwelling ethnographers in their definitions of Górale music prove to be productive for indigenous musical practice itself in that the academic interest in the music legitimizes the peculiar-
ity of Podhale’s music. In the chapters following Cooley’s history of ethnography in Podhale, the study expands panoramically as musical globalism and Jamaican Rastafarianism become tourists in the Górale’s mountains. While the cultural brokering of ethnographers succeeded in essentializing Górale identity and musical practice, Cooley’s transposition of that very essentialized identity into the complex space of globalization and world music presents new challenges and contradictions. The highly defined and geographically bound category of Muzyka Podhala exists in tandem with world music in that on the festival stage Muzyka Podhala is neither the same as other “world music” nor is it different; such globalist aesthetics succeed in making the far-off familiar. The reason for this, according to Cooley, lies in the constructed sense of self Górale musicians make whether they play for a multicultural crowd on the festival stage, with Rastafarian reggae artists, for tourists in restaurants, or for their own community at funerals.

While the author heavily leans on culturally centered Górale motivations for identity construction, he only tentatively lays out the contradictory, but productive relationship inherent in the collision of rigid identities and suddenly expansive global interactions. The parallels between early modernism’s ethnographic and tourist venture in Podhale remain to be studied extensively, though the productiveness of this relationship is very clear in Cooley’s explanation. That is to say, the modernist and nationalist interest in researching Muzyka Podhala in Górale helped to create a musical ideal beyond that of a reified subject beyond something simply constructed Cooley alludes. There is an economic process linked with the research via tourism in that researchers and tourists are both paying money to see and hear supposedly “constructed” musical and cultural practice. A question that remains is if remuneration for musicians through tourism helped in creating the salient examples of Muzyka Podhala in both the eyes of the researcher and the Górale community.

For example, in his chapter “Village for Hire,” Cooley describes a restaurant with different floors for each type of music found in the Podhale region replete with matching decor for each musical genre (205). This restaurant, with Roma music on one floor, the Górale music on another rustically decorated floor, and a disco on the top floor, is not unlike the archive or the song catalogue of previous ethnographers venturing to the mountains as tourists themselves. The need to compartmentalize song types for either scholastic or tourist purposes seems strikingly similar especially as Cooley has already demonstrated that a sense of a specific Górale culture and music emerged out of the economics of both research and tourism.

Perhaps these markets as well as rigid definitions of a geographic self and music emerge from the way both tourism and folklorics thus magnify the peculiarities of place while at the same time submerging them. It is a contradiction much like the globalist stage of world music and Cooley wisely addresses the musical relationship between reggae musicians the Twinkle Brothers and a Górale
family-band called Tutki as brokered by radio producer Włodzimierz Kleszez. At this point the CD included with the book becomes more exciting to the listener because while one can hear related song types in Cooley’s track selection, the Górale-Rastafarian fusion project with its reggae dub and Tatra music patches appears stark and awkward in its contradictions. Cooley emphasizes that while identity was a motivating factor for the fusion project vis-à-vis the parallels in cultural values, the audience for this music was made up of tourists and not the local Górale who normally attend events featuring Muzyka Podhala (185).

While the contradictions of such musical fusion projects, in their attempts to be specific while simultaneously universal, appear under the banner of globalism, Cooley gives us more examples of how this music simply perpetuates more placeless and contradictory music. The broadest example is that propagating a niche and aesthetic (even if it is mixed-up) means Górale musicians will create spin-offs that are increasingly more contradictory. These take the form of tributes to Bob Marley by Górale musicians and technomusic remixes whose only aim is to propagate a message by employing only the general sound of Muzyka Podhala. There is nothing particularly Górale in a dub mix by the Twinkle Brothers or a techno reworking of Górale music, but it is labeled as such and seems to grow out of a market fed by tourists and then analyzed by academics. Similarly, the producer Włodzimierz Kleszez’s translation and cover of a Bob Marley tune sounds nothing like reggae. This song seems to embody this contradiction. As Cooley states, “They use a de-reggaed reggae song to sing about their own music” (195).

After looking at Górale music from several angles, taking it through global stages with World Musicians, restaurants beneath discos, and the wax cylinders of the region’s early ethnographers, at its end Cooley’s book returns to the Górale village. The last chapter “Back to the Village” returns to the town of Zakopane with an ethnography of funeral performances of Muzyka Podhala. He then follows up with an anxious and self-reflexive epilogue entitled “Village Exhumed” in which he presents an edgy interpretation of another Górale, fusion techno mix. The juxtaposition is productive and highlights Cooley’s facility for posing difficult questions about the ethnographer’s process. Ethnomusicology’s direction has long been charted by ethnographers asking questions about musical and cultural change and Cooley stays squarely within this paradigm as he researches Muzyka Podhala. Though the book is written according to this conservative, context-centered approach, Cooley adroitly expands its scope a little by hinting at wider interpretations of Górale musical practice that perhaps lay farther afield. By examining the inheritance of tourism and research in the Tatra region’s musical practices, Cooley does something new in ethnomusicology by eschewing his field’s tendency to write only unproblematized histories of the present. Instead, more of the contradictory discourses in Muzyka Podhala over time come to the surface via Cooley’s astute observations and historical analysis.
Researching the historicity of discourses on musical practice, as Cooley does, benefits ethnomusicology and signals an interesting and important direction for future ethnomusicology research and writing.

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In Baseball and Country Music, Cusic offers the reader a historical account of country music and baseball as both forms of entertainment and evolving industries, beginning with their inception in the United States and continuing up to the present. Cusic is a professor of Music Business at the Mike Curb College of Entertainment and Music Business at Belmont University as well as an author, songwriter, and music industry insider in Nashville, Tennessee. He has an extensive publishing history, having written or edited fourteen books on various aspects of country music, including biographies of Eddy Arnold and Riders in the Sky.

Cusic's professional background in the music business puts him in a unique position to comment upon the economic and institutional contexts within which country music took shape, many of which, as the author shows, were equally relevant to the development of baseball. He explores these contexts as they took shape in response to significant changes and social forces in American culture, including the impact of World War II, the changing landscape of popular music and the music industry, the advent of suburbs and increased attendance at colleges and universities, and the growth and development of radio and television. Cusic attempts to employ multiple lenses
in his history, including some attention to changes in baseball and country music with regard to class, race, ethnicity, and gender.

Cusic's vision of the core connection between baseball and country music, however, goes beyond their historicity. At the heart of Cusic's book are his attempts to connect both baseball and country music to an essence that is timelessly and quintessentially American. Cusic claims that both baseball and country music are somehow microcosms of an American "character" and professional pathways to an "American dream," a dream achievable by the stars and players and experienced vicariously by the masses. As microcosm, Cusic writes, "The story of baseball tells us a lot about America, and so does the story of country music. Each is supremely American, and each presents a unique history of America, particularly during the twentieth century" (3). Although this point is never overtly explored, it serves as a constant subtext for the book, occasionally emerging explicitly in Cusic's prose. For instance, Cusic writes:

Both baseball and country music have taken people who were born without social status, money, and connections but with great talent and allowed them to rise to the top and become heroes. Coming from a working-class background and ending up on top of the world is the American dream. Baseball and country music both deliver that dream, and you can't get more American than that." (146)

For Cusic, the idea of individual triumph over socially constraining circumstances is at the heart of the connection between baseball and country music and is what marks them as American in character, and the celebrities of both are representatives that embody this achievement for fans and enthusiasts. As Cusic elaborates:

...what baseball and country music have most in common is the ability to provide entertainment for their fans. They touch the lives of the many who sing only in the shower or watch baseball only from an armchair but nonetheless find in country music artists and baseball players something that transcends the ordinary and takes those born without wealth, privilege, or social status and turns them into heroes by virtue of their natural talents, dedication, and hard work. In other words, both baseball and country music are tickets to the American Dream. (9)

Cusic's efforts to connect baseball and country music do, however, stray beyond such bold generalizing statements, and are at their most effective and interesting in the details. His accounts of the shift in both baseball and country music from a lower-class to a middle-class pastime, for example, are particularly illuminating. As Cusic summarizes in his introduction:

The story of class and wealth in American society is a touchy one, because Americans generally refuse to admit to living in a class-based society. But the simple fact remains that baseball and country music both have
their roots in the white working class and early on were looked down upon by the upper classes and considered entertainment for roughs and rowdies, the great unwashed masses. Both have fought against this stereotype and become the sport and music of the middle class. In Nashville the city fathers intensely disliked the image of country music taking over "the Athens of the South" image they had carefully and assiduously cultivated. Upper-crust Nashville saw itself as a bastion of high culture, and country music shattered that image. Still, the city's elite managed to keep those in country music on the outside of "respected" society—that is, until money changed everything. Country music and musicians made too much money for the elite to ignore them. (6, 7).

Cusic's detailed description of the tensions between the live attendance of baseball games and country music events and the radio and television broadcasting of these events is also interesting. As Cusic explains, in the early days of baseball and country music, radio provided important revenue streams as well as a means for amassing larger audiences. While the advent of television provided the same benefits, it also hurt both industries by undermining their appeal to live audiences. "For baseball this meant fewer fans paid to see games; for country music it meant being saddled with an image of yokels and rubes that the industry would work hard for years to overcome" (107). The early years of television saw baseball and country music appearing on television primarily through local shows in major cities such as Chicago, with occasional network exposure. The country shows that originated from Chicago and New York were "yokel-type shows that featured rube comedy" (104). As a result, while television helped baseball become "...a sport loved by the middle class, country music was generally shunned by the middle class, which viewed the genre as backward, uncouth, and low class" (107).

Other efforts at forging the connection between baseball and country music, however, are frequently sprinkled throughout the text as generalizing statements that are not further explored or supported. Take, for example, this passage:

Through the first half of the twentieth century, New York and Chicago each had major league teams—the Yankees, Dodgers, and Giants in New York and the Cubs and White Sox in Chicago. And since many country artists were baseball fans, and since many baseball players came from the South, it is logical to conclude that there was some connection between the worlds of baseball and country music in New York and Chicago. However, that connection was most evident in Los Angeles and Nashville, where top minor league teams played and where a number of country artists lived. (35)

In this example, Cusic wants us to believe that the connection between the worlds of baseball and country music is logically deducible; country artists were baseball fans and came from the South, many baseball players also came from the South, so, logically, when they both
ended up in New York and Chicago, there was a correlation. Perhaps, but Cusic leaves the passage quoted above with no further explanation or supporting information, making statements such as this look tenuous at best.

As a further example, take Cusic’s description of the effects of Boots Poffenberger’s violent reaction to an umpire’s decision that resulted in the end of his career in the Southern Association:

He never played in the Southern Association again. Fans from that time remember him as “looney” even on his best days. Such antics were not unknown to early country music performers either, and it was usually booze that caused the trouble. (61)

Here we are left wondering: which performers? Is Cusic suggesting that there was some shared aspect of the professional lifestyle of both baseball players and country musicians that contributed to their violent behavior and alcoholism? As in the example above, statements of this kind ask the reader to accept its claims without articulating the questions that emerge or offering any evidence to support them. In a book whose title suggests a detailed exploration of the relationship between baseball and country music, all too frequently, when connections between the two are highlighted, they beg for more explication.

While the vagueness of some of his arguments is, at times, problematic, Cusic does sometimes successfully illuminate his intended connections, most often when providing specific examples of how baseball and country music crossed paths in the lives of individual people. His detailed description of Bill Monroe’s passion for both baseball and “country music” (bluegrass in particular) is one such instance:

Monroe went on to create bluegrass music, named after his group, and formed a baseball team made up of his band mates who, before the concerts, played exhibition games against a number of minor league teams in the South. Monroe pitched and played first base. Because he was so infatuated with baseball, Monroe often made his decisions about hiring musicians for his band with additional consideration based on how well they played ball. Banjo player Stringbean was a good pitcher, which added to his value as a musician. (56)

Furthermore, Monroe’s Bluegrass All-Stars played baseball on the road for exercise, and even used baseball games to promote their performances. Cusic quotes an advertisement in Billboard magazine from April 30, 1949: “Bill Monroe will carry a baseball team with him again this summer in conjunction with his personal tour. Monroe intends to line up fifteen players, some of whom will double in his show set for the evening” (56).

Baseball and Country Music is more a historical survey of two parallel cultural domains painted in broad strokes than a focused, critical analysis of specific aspects of American culture. As a survey, the researcher will find many potential connections between baseball and country music glossed here that could be explored in greater detail in future work. Cusic’s bibliographic notes, which elaborate on the sources in his bibliography...
that he found most helpful, are particularly useful for the researcher. Additionally, fans of country music and/or baseball will enjoy Cusic's investigation into the institutional history and connections between these two interests, and the author's extensive knowledge and experience as both an artist and business executive in country music do provide fresh insights into relatively unexplored topical territory.

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Ad-Hoc Arabism holds as its central premise that advertising is able to convince consumers to buy products by "identify[ing] the reader's desires, hopes, tastes, and yearnings" and then convincing the readers that a product will fulfill them (9). Therefore, a close analysis of advertisements can reveal the culturally specific yearnings of consumers. Drawing on ads in the weekly family magazine Sayyddati, Roni Zirinski sets out to do this for contemporary Saudi Arabia. He argues that the primary framework for Saudi Arabian advertisements is "Arabism in the essential sense of the word" (3). Although Saudi culture contains conflicting ideologies, such as Saudism, Wahhabism, and Westernism, Arabism works as a larger reference to bind them into a fantasy that will resonate with all consumers.

The main body of the book is divided into six chapters, which provide an in-depth examination of the visual and linguistic techniques advertisers utilize to market often non-Saudi products to Saudi consumers. Zirinski categorizes the chapters by product: automobiles; food ads; cosmetics and personal care products; electronics, leisure, and recreation; and pens, writing and grammar. Within these chapters, he uses specific ads to demonstrate how the advertisements appeal to, and reinforce the Saudi conception of self. Zirinski shows how
non-Arabic brand names are transformed so that they will sound prettier on the Arab tongue, shifting vowel sounds and often condensing two word names into one word. As further evidence of this process, in his chapter on food he shows how Kellogg's uses advertisements to redefine its products from being considered to be a breakfast food into being seen as fit for a pre-dawn meal during Ramadan.

Foremost among the book's strengths is Zirinski's demonstration of how Western products become Saudi ones. He provides an interesting, well-defended interpretation of advertising as essentially a conservative force. For him, the global economy is not one in which the West uses goods to impose its values upon helpless non-Western societies. Instead, advertising reflects and draws upon culture to make consumers think of global products as local ones. Another strength is his ability to explain complex theories clearly enough so that readers from multiple disciplines will be able to follow his arguments. Additionally, he structures his chapters around products rather than themes. This allows him to describe each ad in precise detail, which is helpful as many of the ads are not reproduced and those that are have been squeezed four to a page.

The drawback to this organizational structure is the lack of discussion of larger themes. For example, in the first chapter, Zirinski discusses how a series of ads for the Swiss watch brand Concord portrays Saudi women to construct a Saudi Arabian fantasy. He emphasizes the importance of the women's veiled dress, particularly the way their face veils' slits place focus on their eyes. However, in ads in other chapters, not only are the women's entire faces often uncovered, but at times their hair and clothing as well. A thematic approach would allow him to discuss this discrepancy, but the topical approach buries it. As a result, the chapters have the feel of independent articles arguing the same main point rather than component pieces that combine to build an argument.

A more serious drawback comes from Zirinski's following of Derrida's belief that "there is nothing outside the text" (13). Although it is clear from his acknowledgements and his mastery of Arabic that Zirinski has spent extensive time in Saudi Arabia, he does not refer to interviews (either formal or informal), surveys, or focus group results when he presents interpretations. When his arguments focus on the ads' formal features, this is not a problem. When he makes assertions about how readers interpret the ads (for example, that Saudi women interpret images of independent Western women as "no more than a dream; or perhaps even an antigenic vaccine against the possibility of cultural revolution … meant to release pressure" (133), he is on much shakier ground.

The lack of reference to readers' actual responses also makes his decision to present only one possible interpretation for the ads questionable; at times, the ads suggest alternatives. For example, in his analysis of an ad for Häagen-Dazs ice cream, he explores only how the tropes of forbidden pleasure would appeal to men. His reasoning is that the text is addressed to men. However, the visuals of the ad suggest

Zirinski's overall argument that advertising in Saudi Arabia appeals to culturally distinctive fantasies is convincing; however, his arguments about what constitutes those fantasies are not. Therefore, this book will be most useful to readers interested in the general idea of how advertising functions in a global world or to scholars of Saudi Arabia who will benefit from the descriptive detail but who have the background to critically examine the interpretations. Due to the lack of ethnographic support for his claims, it will be less useful to readers interested in contemporary culture in the Middle East.

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Shields begins his analysis of virtuality with sixteenth-century debates over the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. "[T]he conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ [was] actually real, material body and blood, insisted the Church. 'Virtually real,' argued Reformation theologians" (5). The virtual is defined in part by its proximity as well as its opposition to the actual; the sacrament is essentially Christ's flesh and blood according to Protestants, but is not actually so. This disjunction between the virtual but real 'in essence' and the actual frames Shields' discussion. He relates the virtual to dreams, memories, and absent presences. Although lacking concreteness, the virtual is no less real or consequential for its intangibility. Virtuality is further linked to the virtuous; to spirituality, liturgy, and ritual as an ideal, a perfected and/or imagined but 'impossible' reality. Examples of virtuality as experienced reality include embodiments of the divine or supernatural, liminal zones, altered states, and periods of (social) transformation. The virtual contains within it the ideals of a society, whether manifested as embodying divinity through the sacrament or discarding cumbersome and needy physical bodies in virtual reality environments. "'Virtual' is a space," Shields argues, "it is places, relationships, and implies values" (20).

These relationships and values are of primary importance for Shields. He notes that cyberspace as imagined by science fiction writer William Gibson "describes the type(s) of social world that VR [virtual reality] might afford" (52). Cyberspace offered itself as "a haven for those who are otherwise labeled deviant or feel the restriction of social and moral discipline too strongly" (60). Cyberspace thus provides a liminoid space (akin to Victor Turner's liminal space, but evacuated of the transformative power associated with rites of passage) where experimentations with or expressions of otherwise socially unacceptable identities can occur. As Lisa Nakamura and others have pointed out, however, this may be more problematic than it seems at first glance. The Internet also fosters what might be termed 'identity tourism' where users can be a virtual 'other' (through avatars, etc.) without experiencing material repercussions for the identities assumed in virtual environments. Users thus misunderstand what it is to be 'other' as a result of their ability to play 'other.'

While Shields does give attention to philosophers of the virtual, such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, they remain of cursory importance to this project. In this regard, readers do not need to be familiar with the philosophical texts underlying Shields' work to benefit from this book. Indeed, Shields' real success is not his adaptation of Deleuze and other theorists of the virtual as an abstract concept, but his discussion of the virtual in everyday life, particularly in its redefinition of contemporary labor patterns. Shields criticizes the dehumanization of communication through the circulation of data that has replaced social networks as mechanisms of informational exchange (133-134). He argues that workers are further alienated from their labor in virtualized workplaces because they no longer deal directly with mate-
rial objects. Embodied knowledge required to produce goods or perform intricate surgical procedures is replaced with mechanical processes. Now workers manipulate signs, images, and code as machines output standardized products (130-132).

Shields also criticizes the tyranny of work under the current regime of ubiquitous computing and endless data-management. There is no escape from the digital virtual technologies impinging upon the private sphere: telemarketers place carefully-timed calls based on database profiles of virtual consumers; employees work from home or on the road and are encouraged to stay 'in the loop' with cellular phones, e-mail, and other forms of instant communication. "The job never ends" for workers who have "acquiesce[d] in becoming cyberserfs--virtual slaves to technology and to organizations because of their surrender of control over their own attention (96-97, original emphasis)."

While consumers may be reduced to their database counterparts and workers overtaxed by the surveilling presence of employers, the virtual contains yet another dimension. Consumers' relationships with companies or products are based on intangible, virtual qualities. Brand names inspire trust, and their promises of consistency act as a guarantee against risk (177-178). Virtuality is likewise fundamental to assessing safety and security, vulnerability, and danger (184). The virtual is also a mechanism of war, yet is perhaps simultaneously the antithesis of war as we have known it; a negation of war that Jean Baudrillard suggested in his essays on the Gulf War—a virtual war, a video game without blood or bodies. Shields rightly argues, however, that even wars fought on screens and monitors have actual, material consequences (211).

It is at the point of war that the path Shields traces through the virtual surprisingly comes full circle: the virtual as digital or technological collapses into the virtual as virtuous or ideal. In war, and more specifically in terrorism, technologies are put to use in the service of ideals as a "violent form of communication" (210). Shields explains, "In the hearts of those who sacrifice themselves for their ideals, the virtual reigns over the material." The promise of the hereafter, of justice (itself an impossible ideal), and of recompense takes precedence over and even justifies material consequences (i.e., deaths and injuries). For Shields, terrorism attempts to actualize the virtual, to bring to pass or make concrete an (in this case religious) ideality. Both terrorism and the 'War on Terror' thus represent "war[s] over virtualities, over 'real ideals'" (211). Reversing the argument, Shields states, "Virtual war is terrorism" (211). Virtuous wars, or wars of virtues and competing ideals, are terrorist. One must ask, when are wars fought for reasons other than competing ideals and opposing worldviews? Is all war therefore terrorist? Yes and no; wars fought as an attempt to actualize a religious or political virtue/ideal, presumably thereby imposing that ideal on other bodies, are terrorist in nature. This assessment is, of course, relevant to ongoing debates around the current war in Iraq, which many critics of George W. Bush have long called terrorist. In its theoreti-
cal and historical accounting of the virtual, Shields' argument lends credibility to such a characterization of the Iraq war, which might otherwise seem reactionary.

In the end, we must revisit Shields' statement that "'virtual' is a space; it is places, relationships, and implies values" (20). Just what are the values of the virtual, and where will they lead? Shields' open-ended critique is directed not at the virtual per se, but at abstraction—the denial of physical, material realities and their replacement by disembodied and immaterial ideals. Disjoining the ideal from the actual can translate, as we have seen, into violence. As long as the ideal remains an impossibility, something to work toward but which cannot (should not) in actuality be attained, this violence is kept at bay. Thus Marcel Proust's definition of the virtual as "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (25) also serves as a caution. The virtual may continue to provide a space for creation and innovation—"virtue," Shields reminds us, "[is] the power to produce results, to have an effect" (3)—but where the virtual lapses into abstraction and dehumanization, that same power and efficacy is deployed toward destructive ends.

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