Aiko Yamashiro
*Ethics in Song: Becoming Kama‘āina in Hapa-Haole Music*
Response by **Donald Brenneis**

**Mu Li**
*Criticising Local Politics, Rejecting Western Cultural Intrusion: A Study of Sanlu Dairy Online Jokes*
Responses by **Larisa Fialkova; Gunnella Thorgeirsdottir**

**Ahmed Al-Rawi**
*The Mythical Ghoul in Arabic Culture*
Responses by **Aref Abu-Rabia; Amira El-Zein**

**Donna Varga**
*Gifting the Bear and a Nostalgic Desire for Childhood Innocence*
Responses by **Daniel Thomas Cook; Jacqueline Fulmer**

Reviews by **Alisha Eastep, Elaine Yau, Sean O’Neil, Jeffrey S. Debies-Carl, and Eric O’Connell**

© 2009, The University of California
Articles and Responses

Aiko Yamashiro
Ethics in Song: Becoming Kama’āina in Hapa-Haole Music ....................................................... 1
Response: Donald Brenneis

Mu Li
Criticising Local Politics, Rejecting Western Cultural Intrusion:
A Study of Sanlu Dairy Online Jokes. ............................................................................................... 25
Response: Larisa Fialkova
Response: Gunnella Thorgeirsdotir

Ahmed Al-Rawi
The Mythical Ghoul in Arabic Culture. ........................................................................................... 45
Response: Aref Abu-Rabia
Response: Amira El-Zein

Donna Varga
Gifting the Bear and a Nostalgic Desire for Childhood Innocence...................................... 71
Response: Daniel Thomas Cook
Response: Jacqueline Fulmer

Book Reviews
Alisha Eastep, Wonder Women: Feminisms and Superheroes. (Robinson).............................. R1
Sean O’Neil, Swinging in Place: Porch Life in Southern Culture. (Donlon)................................. R5
Jeffrey S. Debies-Carl, The Idea of North. (Davidson)................................................................. R8
Eric O’Connell, Solovyovo: The Story of Memory in a Russian Village. (Paxson)..................... R10
Editorial Board
Fekade Azeze, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
Pertti J. Anttonen, University of Helsinki, Finland
Hande Birkalan, Yeditepe University, Istanbul, Turkey
Regina Bendix, Universität Göttingen, Germany
Charles Briggs, University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.
Véronique Campion-Vincent, Maison Des Sciences De L’Homme, France
Linda Dégh, Indiana University, U.S.A.
Valdimar Tr. Hafstein, University of Iceland, Reykjavik
Jawaharlal Handoo, Central Institute of Indian Languages, India
Galit Hasan-Rokem, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Jason Baird Jackson, Indiana University, U.S.A.
Kimberly Lau, University of California, Santa Cruz, U.S.A.
John Lindow, University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.
Sabina Magliocco, California State University, Northridge, U.S.A.
Jay Mechling, University of California, Davis, U.S.A.
Fabio Mugnaini, University of Siena, Italy
Sadhana Naithani, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India
Peter Shand, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Francisco Vaz da Silva, University of Lisbon, Portugal
Maiken Umbach, University of Manchester, England,
     Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain
Ülo Valk, University of Tartu, Estonia
Fionnuala Carson Williams, Linen Hall Library, Belfast, Northern Ireland
Ulrika Wolf-Knuts, Åbo Academy, Finland

Staff
Editors: Anthony Bak Buccitelli, Karen Miller, Tok Thompson, Ted Biggs
Review Editor: Kiesha Oliver
Copy Editors: Bianca Hagan, Maggi Michel, Michelle Robinson
Website Developer: Brooke Dykman
Ethics in Song: Becoming Kama‘āina in Hapa-Haole Music

Aiko Yamashiro
University of Hawai‘i-Mānoa
USA

Just five hours away by plane from California, Hawai‘i is a thousand light years away in fantasy. Mostly a state of mind, Hawai‘i is the image of escape from the rawness and violence of daily American life. Hawai‘i—the word, the vision, the sound in the mind—is the fragrance and feel of soft kindness. Above all, Hawai‘i is “she,” the Western image of the Native “female” in her magical allure. And if luck prevails, some of “her” will rub off on you, the visitor. (Trask 1999, 136-7)

In “Lovely Hula Hands’: Corporate Tourism and the Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture,” Native Hawaiian activist, poet, and scholar Haunani-Kay Trask critiques mass, corporate tourism as “cultural prostitution,” an exploitation that depends on figuring Hawai‘i as a complicit, inviting, exotic female. Trask underscores the power of popular culture to perpetuate these debilitating stereotypes and argues that these representations lead to real and devastating effects. In her cutting words, the “attraction of Hawai‘i is stimulated by slick Hollywood movies, saccharine Andy Williams music . . . . Tourists flock to my Native land for escape, but they are escaping into a state of mind while participating in the destruction of a host people in a Native place (1999, 137). Her essay hammers out hard statistics of material conditions that support her condemnation of tourism as “the major cause of environmental degradation, low wages, land dispossession, and the highest cost of living in the United States” (1999, 144).

It is no accident that Trask borrows her essay’s title, “Lovely Hula Hands,” from the name of the hit song written by R. Alex Anderson in 1940 about a beautiful, graceful hula dancer. For Trask, this song signifies not only the feminized and sexualized stereotypes of Hawai‘i that were promulgated and are perpetuated by U.S. popular culture, but also these stereotypes’ power in the American imagination. As documented in work by Elizabeth Tatar, Adria Imada, and Charles Hiroshi Garrett, among others, Hawaiian music, via sheet music, the new technologies of records and radio, and live travelling performances, was a driving force for the “Hawaii Craze,” that besotted the U.S. during the first half of the 20th century. A new musical genre also grew out of this period—“hapa-haole” music (“half-foreign”—a hybrid genre that mixed American jazz and dance rhythms (swing and foxtrot), Hawaiian instrumentation (such as the steel guitar and ‘ukulele), and lyrics in both English and Hawaiian languages. Through national (U.S.) song-hits like “Lovely Hula Hands,” “My Little Grass Shack,” “Hawaiian War Chant,” and “Sweet Leilani,” hapa-haole music solidified and perpetuated U.S. mainland caricatures of Hawai‘i as a place of grass shacks, white sandy beaches, lovely hula maidens, and happy dancing natives.
I argue that these sweet and tantalizing songs also played a significant role as reassuring and enabling texts in the larger project of settler colonialism, through their appropriation and breezy translation of the Hawaiian concept “kamaʻāina.” Kamaʻāina is often translated literally as “child of the land” and can also mean local, native, “old-timer,” or host. Its linguistic counterpart is “malihini,” a foreigner or newcomer, a guest, or a “tenderfoot.” Today, kamaʻāina is a Hawaiian term valued by businesses as an easy way to advertise local-ness, familiarity, and belonging. For example, many businesses employ kamaʻāina in their names to show a connection to the community (Kamaʻāina Pest Control, Kamaʻāina Kids Day Dare, Kamaʻāina Pizza Hut, etc.). The term is also commonly used to label a type of monetary discount (e.g., the admission price to a theme park may have a “kamaʻāina discount” for people who can prove, through a Hawaiian driver’s license for example, that they live here.) Historically, this value placed on belonging—of being kamaʻāina—has also been a cornerstone of settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi. Settler colonialism has drastically refigured the concept of kamaʻāina in various popular cultural texts, hapa-haole music being one of many examples, putting focus on the idea of becoming kamaʻāina as an easily attainable possibility. This paper will trace some of the history of how the term kamaʻāina has been transformed in the service of settler colonialism. I will also explore some musical examples that argue that outsiders can become kamaʻāina, and consider the unique ethical problems of posing this argument through music: the embodied experience of musical structure and the disruptive potential of a performer’s ethos. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that in the case of music, settler texts are entirely captivating yet not static; and that through performance they can be directed and re-directed for overlapping and conflicting purposes. The use of music can raise some unsettling questions about what we may call “settler texts.”

**Kamaʻāina and the ethics of settler colonialism theory**

Settler colonialism theory often depends on a hard-and-fast distinction between Native/indigenous and non-Native/settler. This distinction is designed to do the ethical work of undermining settler claims and recognizing and restoring indigenous peoples’ unique rights to land. Kamaʻāina and malihini have often been defined along this binary by supportive Hawai‘i scholars. For example, in his 1999 book *Displacing Natives: The Rhetorical Production of Hawai‘i*, Houston Wood argues that kamaʻāina in the Hawaiian language originally meant “Native-born” or indigenous Hawaiian and that this meaning changed over the early 1900s into “island-born” or “well-acquainted” with Hawai‘i. He uses Mary Louise-Pratt’s idea of “anti-conquest rhetoric” to explain that a kamaʻāina identity was taken up by white missionaries’ children (who were born in Hawai‘i, as opposed to their parents who came to Hawai‘i from New England) to do the “dual work of asserting innocence while securing hegemony” (1999, 40). Tracing the transformation of the word, Wood surveys the popular tourist and white settler publication *Paradise of the Pacific* from 1909 to 1910, concluding that quite liter-
ally, kamaʻāina had gradually come to replace the words “white” and “foreigner” (1999, 41): “By the 1930s, at least for the mostly Euroamerican writers in the pages of Paradise of the Pacific, kamaʻāina referred to Caucasians who had lived long in the islands, or who claimed to know much about ‘island ways’” (1999, 41). Linking the processes of colonialism and tourism, Wood’s argument identifies the white settler’s/visitor’s very real desire to become kamaʻāina as a colonial desire and appropriation of indigenous identity. His reassertion of kamaʻāina as Native (indigenous) thus attempts to undo colonial claims and lead to an ethical formulation based on recognizing impossibility: If you are not Native, you cannot become Native, and can therefore never have the same claims to land. An ethics based on this polar understanding between kamaʻāina and malihini relies on responsibly recognizing impossibility.

Yet this irrevocable distinction between Native and non-Native contradicts what is found in cultural material in other Hawaiian-language folklore sources, namely ʻōlelo noʻeau (wise/诗意ical sayings or proverbs) and Hawaiian-language songs that use the words kamaʻāina and malihini. Although malihini was used to refer to white foreigners and newcomers to Hawaiʻi, the word was not exclusively reserved for non-Natives. In the standard Pukui and Elbert Hawaiian-English Dictionary, malihini is more broadly defined as a “stranger, foreigner, newcomer,” “one unfamiliar with a place or custom” (Pukui and Elbert 1957, 233). One ʻōlelo noʻeau reads “Māmua ke kamaʻāina, mahope ka malihini, first the native-born, then the stranger” and explained as something “often said before legendary battles in deciding who was to strike the first blow” (Pukui 1983, 124). It is unlikely that the malihini in the context of “legendary battles” referred to non-Native foreigners, and very likely that it referred to a person from another island or another part of the same island. In addition, Hawaiian-language songs like “Wai Punalau” (1897) and “Akaka Falls” (1934) use the word malihini in a non-ethnic, non-nationalistic way to simply describe unfamiliarity with a particular place in Hawaiʻi (the waters of Punalau and Akaka Falls, respectively). These kinds of sources assume that a person is kamaʻāina or malihini by their knowledge and relationship to place. A kamaʻāina has specific knowledge about a specific place that a malihini does not.

Along with this knowledge requirement, the possibility of becoming kamaʻāina is already culturally inherent to the concept. The saying “E hoʻokamaʻāina! Make yourself at home (said to strangers)” (Pukui 1983, 124) suggests that, even if meant figuratively, kamaʻāina can become a verb and an imperative in the context of hospitality. Strangers are welcomed into this identity, but the welcome is bound by responsibility. For example, the ʻōlelo noʻeau “Hoʻokāhi no [sic] lā o ka malihini” is translated as “A stranger only for a day” and explained, “After the first day as a guest, one must help with the work” (Pukui 1983, 115). Based on this Hawaiian cultural knowledge, a more difficult ethic emerges in which it is not only possible to become kamaʻāina; further, one ought to. In contrast to the limiting settler colonial model of ethics discussed earlier (bound by impossibility), this ethical model defines its limits in terms of responsibility and care between
the land, host, and guest. I say “more difficult ethic” because the translation of this model out of the Hawaiian language and cultural context and into a tourism discourse can and has offered a dangerous opening to making colonial claims to a kama‘āina identity. To qualify Wood’s argument, we can understand the colonial appropriation of kama‘āina as something the term had been vulnerable to all along.

We can look at Jack London’s desire to be kama‘āina as a brief example of the way kama‘āina was used as a tourist and settler strategy to soothe possible unease about identity and imperialism. In a chapter titled “Becoming Hawaiian: Jack London, Cultural Tourism, and the Myth of Hawaiian Exceptionalism,” John Eperjesi identifies London’s desire to be kama‘āina as a desire to move from “same to other, from us to them from ma-lihini to kamaaiana [sic]” (2005, 127). The transformation is effected through the Londons’ participation in Hawaiian cultural activities like surfing and attending lū‘au. These kinds of “adventures” (2005, 113) helped distance the Londons from the “run-of-the-mill tourists” (2005, 114) and their white American identities, ultimately “[giving] the Londons the confidence to extract themselves from complicity with the project of imperialism” (2005, 127). In other words, the “fantasy of becoming kamaaiana [sic] . . . enabled [the Londons] to believe that they had distanced themselves from their Americanness. According to Lili‘uokalani, this fantasy, which was becoming quite popular amongst white settlers around the turn of the century, was one of the most insidious weapons for annexation” (2005, 106-7). London is happy to be distancing himself from the “run-of-the-mill tourist” but, as Dean MacCannell elaborates in The Tourist, this very renunciation of the tourist category is essential to tourism. As MacCannell put it, tourists are motivated by a desire “to go beyond the other ‘mere’ tourists to a more profound appreciation of society and culture” (1976, 10). In other words, the ability and possibility of becoming kama‘āina is a necessary dimension of mass tourism. London’s story demonstrates the intimate link between tourist pleasures and settler colonial desire.

At the same time, we must not forget about the resonance kama‘āina still holds in Native Hawaiian epistemology. How can the invitation to become kama‘āina simultaneously sustain settler colonialism, tourism, and Native Hawaiian culture? These kinds of paradoxes are unavoidable in a colonized place like Hawai‘i, layered with a conflicted history, and call into question the possibility of decolonizing such fraught concepts. For example, Keiko Ohnuma’s work on “aloha spirit” traces how the Hawaiian cultural concept of aloha has been taken up and altered by Christianity, tourism, and the multicultural Democratic State of Hawai‘i. Ohnuma concludes that aloha’s complicated genealogy renders it difficult to reclaim by Hawaiian nationalist groups, for “the term’s history already contains within it competing markers of nationhood” (2008, 380). Instead of dismissing the concept of kama‘āina, I would like to keep its contested meanings at the forefront of this paper. The concept’s conflicted malleability is both restricted and augmented by hapa-haole music, a genre that wields a unique transformative power. The rest of this paper will fo-
focus on the multiple processes and strategies by which settler colonial claims for a more local identity can be issued and made persuasive, looking in particular at the rhetorical force of music.

“I’m Just A Kamaaina Now”: musical stories and transformations

Because the English language is stress-timed rather than syllable-timed, words’ meanings often depend on the particular stress and rhythm of spoken delivery. When words are set to music, certain stresses are made mandatory by the melody itself, which in turn create dominant understandings of the words’ meanings. As musical rhetorician Simon Frith explains, the spoken phrase “she loves you” “shifts its narrative meaning (if not its semantic sense) according to whether the emphasis is placed on the ‘she’ (rather than someone else), ‘loves’ (rather than hates), or ‘you’ (rather than me or him). In setting the words to music, the Beatles had to choose one stress, one dominant implication. The song becomes the preferred reading of the words.” (1996, 181). My close analysis of the music in this section will focus on the interaction between melodic stress and meaning while also questioning the dominance of these created meanings.

Several theorists have pointed to the ways in which music’s it’s use of rhythm and ability to invoke strong feeling, poses a unique ethical situation. For example, in “Reality and Its Shadow,” Emmanuel Lévinas explores the danger of rhythm (in music specifically but also in poetry and visual art) as “the unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, assumption, initiative or liberty, because the subject is seized by rhythm and carried away” (2004, 79). The subject (the listener or viewer) falls away from grappling with reality and falls into passive sensation and imagination (2004, 80-81). This formulation suggests that the experience of music itself can effect a subjective transformation. A musical structure can make a certain argument work by carrying listeners along with it. Whether or not they want to, they must experience the highs and lows of a song, the changes in rhythm and stress, and all these techniques have (at least subconscious) effects.

In thinking about settler colonialism, Theodor Adorno’s argument about the power of music as “social cement” (2002 “Popular,” 460) takes on new relevance. In his elaboration of mass listening habits in “On Popular Music,” Adorno stresses the importance of recognition (2002 “Popular,” 452). The average listener gains pleasure out of listening to popular music because of its familiarity (it sounds like all the other songs) which in turn is created through mind-numbing repetition (of themes, notes, melodies, etc.). Music—and in this case he specifically mentions Tin Pan Alley as an example of standardized, mass-produced music—needs to be easy and predictable. This standardization creates a parallel effect in the listener: “popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and promotes conditioned reflexes.” It is “predigested” (2002 “Popular,” 442-3). Popular music, as mass entertainment and part of the culture industry, thus works to subdue individuality into an obedient collective of workers. To keep people contentedly working at industrialized drudgery, leisure time must provide relief through “effortless sensation” (2002 “Popular,”
fun that requires no work at all. From Adorno’s analysis, we see that music has the potential to provide, without any effort of thought by the individual, a sense of community and engender a feeling of recognition. How might it host a transformation into kamaʻaina (joining a local community) and allay outsider anxieties about being strangers in a strange land?

Both Lévinas and Adorno were severely mistrustful of music as an obstacle to accountability, control, and thought. They were also both writing nearly contemporaneously with the worldwide popularity of hapa-haole music, which makes their thoughts on this particular genre especially relevant, as long as we keep in mind certain qualifications. To counter Adorno’s cultural and class-based elitist dismissal of popular culture and its revolutionary potential, I would like to also work with Gayatri Spivak’s discussion of the ethical in fiction (which I am here applying to narrative and story more generally) as an “interruption” (2002, 17). Spivak argues that literature can give “rhetorical signals to the reader, which can lead to activating the readerly imagination.” For example, characters that are denied focalization in a story can provoke a reader to “counterfocalize” (2002, 22). The act of imagining something difficult and unverifiable is itself an ethical act; it is the practice of “imagin[ing] the other who does not resemble the self” (2002, 23). Can settler texts also stage responsible understandings across cultural difference? In this section, I will explore the ethical ramifications of the interplay between narrative interruption and musical coercion in two songs explicitly about becoming kamaʻaina: “I’m Not A Malihini Anymore” and “Kamaaina,” both copyrighted in 1935 by Johnny Noble and published in a collection titled Johnny Noble’s Book of Famous Hawaiian Melodies; Including Hulas and Popular Standards that was distributed out of the large Miller Music Company in New York. Though neither of these songs appear to have been popular successes at the time they were written, their step-by-step explanations of the transformation from malihini to kamaʻaina are blatantly pertinent to questions of settler colonial strategies, and well worth thinking about theoretically.

The first song, “I’m Not a Malihini Anymore,” tells the story of a wandering malihini who arrives in Hawai’i and decides to settle there. Narrated in first person and addressed to Hawai’i generally or someone representative of Hawai’i, the malihini describes his transformation through pleasant Hawaiian cultural, now turned tourist activities such as learning how to “eat fish and poi,” “swim like a real beach boy,” how to do the “hula hula dance,” and “the meaning of Aloha too.”

Musically, we can feel and experience the tragedy of the wandering malihini character in the long and deliberate notes of the introduction, the story of the voyage. After a pensive minor-chord rising proclamation under “no more will I roam,” the answer appears...
The song ends confidently with the assertion “I’m not a malihini any more I’m telling you/I’m just a Kamaāina now.” Musically, the song’s ending pounds out this emphatic claim, the chords changing quickly with each word of “more I’m telling you,” and the melody driving excitedly upward into one of the highest notes of the song. Only in the final word, “now,” does the song finally resolve into an ending major chord. This resulting stress on the word “now” emphasizes the immediate presence of the new state of being as kama‘āina and suggests that the transformation described also transpired within the song itself. Melodic convention forces us to this reading, leaving no other option.

Yet there is an anxiety about this malihini’s story, a characteristic, according to Stephen Turner, that marks it as a settler narrative. This unease speaks to Turner’s description of the internal, inescapable “self-contradiction of the settler” he

with the otherby way of their similarity. The triumph of kama‘āina feels inevitable, as its final two syllables are given long, weighty notes that deliver us into the ending, as opposed to the notes of the final syllables of malihini, which quickly dance away.
terms “colonial being—a mode of being in a place which is discontinuous with its past (the past of place)” (2002, 40). Settler narratives—whether “historical and/or fictional and/or personal”—try to cover this up, they “provide an illusory continuity, a more or less seamless sense of place and history” (2002, 59), but the narratives themselves are unsettled and cannot suppress the sometimes brief appearances of anxiety or indignation. In his essay on settler colonial texts in a New Zealand/Aotearoa context, “Being Colonial/Colonial Being,” Turner identifies the main purpose of settler narratives as having to “settle the settler” (2002, 55). Some telling trademarks include bursts of indignation, proclamations of decency, grand expressions of genuine feeling, and general anxiety, discomfort, and contradiction. These are all signs of how “the anxiety of colonial being, and the indignation associated with it, infects stories of place” (2002, 50). In the song “I’m Not a Malihini Anymore,” it is significant that the malihini is all alone in his story of becoming kama‘aina. Gaping absences are left by the malihini’s obsessive repetition of I, I, I in this uneasy autobiography. Both the land and other kama‘aina characters seem to be pointedly left out. Perhaps the extremely confident and self-assertive ending acts as an overblown overcompensation in the face of this outsider’s unspoken concerns. A settler penchant for self-determination, via claiming a kama‘aina identity, also surfaces in other kinds of Hawai‘i popular culture texts. For example, a Paradise of the Pacific article from 1917 describes a Honolulu candidate for mayor as follows: “Joel C. Cohen, widely and heartily known as just ‘Joe,’ is in every sense of the Hawaiian word a kamaaina, which means not only an old timer, but an old timer who belongs because he wants to belong” (“Everybody Knows” 15). In Hawai‘i settler rhetoric, being kama‘aina has often been justified through mere re-assertion and self-reassurance.

Another characteristic of settler narrative, according to Turner, is a rationale of affection and emotion in which the settler’s “real feeling for the place and indigenous peoples entitles him to claim that he is indigenous” (2002, 50).16 This rhetoric sets up our second song, “Kamaaina.” Again narrated in the first person, this time by a self-proclaimed “malihini haole boy,” the song begins with swooning declarations of love for “Dear Honolulu,” a “wond’rous paradise.” He wants “to do like the natives do,” and prove that “I can be a KAMAAINA too.” This song is even more conscious of the power of music than “I’m Not a Malihini Anymore”—the Natives seem largely preoccupied with song and dance—they chant, croon, and hula. After learning these music-based skills, the malihini proudly concludes, “So Honolulu, I can always say/I’m a KAMAINA to you now.” Much like the first song, this ending statement is showily adorned with rapid chord changes over every syllable of “a KAMAINA to you now,” and the “now” is also aligned with the necessary concluding major chord.

Because this song is in cut time, also notated as 2/2 and indicating double speed, the main stress falls on the first and third beats of each measure (if we read each measure as having four beats, as each would in 4/4 time). This rhythm underscores a subtle shift in the stress between the phrase “I can be a KAMA-
AINA too” in the middle of the song and “I’m a KAMAAINA to you now” at the end of the song. In the first phrase, the first and third beats fall under the “I” (referring to the malihini) and the “ka” of kama’āina, thus linking the two terms and foreshadowing the I’s adoption of this identity. By the end, however, the I is pushed back to the fourth beat, shifting the emphasis to the “ka” (and therefore kama’āina) and “now” (the first beat of the next measure). Again, the relation between the rhythm and the melody of the song argues for the transformative potential of music itself in the story of becoming kama’āina.

This second song, “Kamaaina,” differs from the first in one important way—the addition of Native characters as both a colluding and countering voice in the text. The malihini names the existence of “natives” and “tropical hula maidens” who are “happy all day long” and then quotes them: “‘Aloha mai’ they all say to me ‘E komo mai’/They’re inviting me.” These quotations are set off melodically from the rest of the song, given a unique rhythm not repeated anywhere else. Although the descriptions of these other characters as warm and welcoming definitely creates a settling effect for the malihini, I think there is also something compelling and mysterious about their presence that the narrative cannot quite explain. For example, when the tropical hula maidens are first introduced, they “seem to dance and croon to a native tune” [emphasis mine]. There is something unknowable about them, something again gestured at in the description of hula as “move and sway in that funny way” [emphasis mine].

This Native presence comes closest to the surface in a highly ambiguous moment that happens over the longest Hawaiian-language phrase in the song: “He inu i ka okolehao, malama pono oe aahana ehehene.” Roughly translated, this sentence would be “drink the okolehao [a drink akin to moonshine], take care la la la.” There are many possible explanations as to why the words break down into sounds at this point. For true malihini unfamiliar with Hawaiian, this section could serve as the obligatory nonsense syllables that made Hawaiian music enjoyable and playful for outsiders. For Hawaiian speakers (and we can assume a fair amount of Native Hawaiians did still understand the language at this point, although this population of speakers was steadily decreasing), this part of the text could speak directly and specifically to them, a small inside joke that not just anyone could access. Both these interpretations are supported by the fun surprise of the melodic jump from middle F to high F between “ahahana” and “ehehene.” It is no coincidence that these two words approach typical English laughter sounds, and hard to say if everyone is laughing together or the malihini is being laughed at. In either case, this moment of incoherence invites speculation and imaginative action on the part of the listener/reader, and harking back to Spivak’s work, a potential opening for an ethics of interruption.

In the larger context of its performance, hapa-haole music as popular dance music had particular force in both settling the malihini as well as making (more) kinesthetic the possibility of transformation into kama’āina. During the early 1900s, hapa-haole music was often
played as dance music performed by a live band at hotels and country clubs.¹⁹ This was the way musicians made money and achieved popularity. These dance scenes were also where tourists and natives/locals came into regular contact with each other and formed relationships. Frith explains that “dance matters not just as a way of expressing music but as a way of listening to it, a way into the music in its unfolding—which is why dancing to music is both a way of losing oneself in it, physically, and a way of thinking about it, hearing it with a degree of concentration that is clearly not ‘brainless’” (1996, 142). It is through dance “that we most easily participate in a piece of music” (1996, 142). This kind of bodily connection with dancing music has the potential to amplify the transformative experience of music discussed earlier. American tourists, already familiar with the popular entertainment of dance halls back home, could easily understand, interpret, and interact with the hybrid, danceable hapa-haole music.

For an example of dance music’s power to derail settler insecurity, I want to quote a passage at length from the biography of Johnny Noble (1948) titled *Hula Blues*. This largely celebratory biography was authorized by Noble’s estate, written by Gurre Ploner Noble—herself a self-proclaimed (haole) kama’aina—and printed by a small, private press in 1945. Based largely on Johnny Noble’s own notes for a book about Hawai‘i’s music, *Hula Blues* seeks to teach malihini audiences, as suggested by its appendix’s explanatory notes on “ancient Hawaiian instruments” and Hawaiian poetry and language. The following passage describes a musical performance at the Moana Pier by the Waikīkī Beach Boys on a “typical” Sunday night in the 1920s:

Nothing is heard but the waves moaning against submerged coral reefs. The boys begin to play and to sing, softly, with a gentle breath which seems to do little more than add its obbligato to the silver voice of the surf. With deep emo-
tion their voices rise and fall in unison, and a melody of indescribable beauty emerges, compelling and sweet, touching the hearts of every listener. On and on it reaches, into the pulsing darkness of the tropic night. Like a sigh it fades and dies—the song has ended.

And then, before a word can be spoken, comes a gay hapa-haole tune. The ukuleles and guitars thump out a wild, carefree air, young voices are raised in joyous unrestraint. People smile and nod and murmur, tapping their feet to the intoxicating tempo. Some slip into each other’s arms and dance lightly among the other listeners. With a burst of laughing harmony—another song has ended. (Noble 1948, 61)

In this scene, the Hawaiian-language music described in the first paragraph harmonizes with its natural surroundings—the surf and the night. It belongs to the place. The words “moaning” and “pulsing” emphasize the music’s primal quality, a quality that affects its listeners emotionally (through the heart), not cognitively, thereby sketching a typical colonial representation of the primitive, irrational Native.

Then begins an uncomfortable silence.

The listeners are incapable of verbalizing a reaction or comprehending the strange music that came before. Before the audience can try to make sense of that first experience, hapa-haole music bounds exuberantly into the silence with “joyous unrestraint” and now people know how to react. They are “intoxicated” with its magic spell, quickly forgetting the solemn moment that had preceded it. The way each song ends is particularly telling. While the Hawaiian song “dies”—registering a serious, irrevocable loss—the hapa-haole tune is just another song that merely ends, “[w]ith a burst of laughing harmony.” Turner discusses these kinds of uncomfortable gaps or contradictions in the narrative as something settler texts attempt to cover over. The gaiety of hapa-haole music as a genre has erased the seriousness, sadness, and strangeness that came before it, enabled listeners to become dancing participants in this happiness, and helped them forget the silence that had left them dumbfounded earlier. Though it only tells the story from a malihini perspective, this example suggests sobering limits to the revolutionary force of interruption, especially considering music’s rhetorical force to engage the body and senses and carry them away.

A final point, or problem rather: as discussed earlier, both songs posit malihini characters that appear at one level to be passive and innocent. They are by no means imposing themselves on unwilling natives. They are simply responding (“decently,” as Turner might say) to the invitation. However, the natives in each story don’t have any real agency either. In each story, the malihini speaker is the one narrating the story, and at the end of each song, it is the malihini who ultimately gets to decide and proclaim that he is now a kama’āina. Analyzing the invitations in these hapa-haole songs in terms of power and authority suggest that becoming kama’āina within the realm of tourism is based on what Paul Lyons has described as a colonial situation, in which the power relation between host and guest is reversed, a situation that can lead to the guest figuratively and literally taking the host hostage (2006, 12). To
further complicate matters, though each song’s first-person narration ostensibly speaks from a malihini perspective, the copyrights to these songs were registered by a kamaʻaina who was also part-Hawaiian, Johnny Noble. Why would a kamaʻaina take on a malihini persona in order to tell a story of triumphant settlement? Perhaps the deployment of authentic native bodies (as writers, singers, dancers) helped to create even more convincing lullabies for the uneasy settler.

The details of this issue are outside the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that Turner’s critique of settler narratives, though quite helpful in probing motivations and signs of settler colonialism in a story, cannot explain the twists and turns of authorship and (likely) performance for these two songs. The scope of Turner’s “Being Colonial/Colonial Being” is restricted to settler narratives by settlers.

Alongside this recognition of hapa-haole music as a coercive embodied experience that can try (and fail) to interrupt itself, we should also recognize that settler stories themselves are able to circulate within both settler and non-settler communities, opening unexpected possibilities as performer and audience change. As folklorist Amy Shuman reminds us, “[s]tories do not exist in isolation, and it is impossible to prevent a story from being appropriated, reinterpreted, and re-categorized” (19). Can these same (colonial) arguments and strategies of becoming sometimes lead to more positive and anticolonial outcomes? Performance, in particular, can open up drastic retellings of settler narratives, as we will explore in the next section.

Retelling settler stories
The hapa-haole song “Haole Hula” (1928) is an excellent example of how tourism depends on music to be understood. The lyrics consist of a list of reasons to love Hawai‘i, and the organization of the song privileges music as the first and foremost reason. The song begins with the unnamed narrator recalling different Hawaiian-language songs, both by name and also musically by melodically capturing that “large intervallic leap” (which starts on one note and ascends or descends to a different note quite distant on the scale, also characteristic of yodeling) that George Kanahele identifies as a characteristic of Hawaiian songs (1979, 107) This verse encapsulates the force of Hawaiian music in the tourist’s experience: through radio, records, sheet music, traveling musicians, or the arrival of the steamships to sounds of the Royal Hawaiian Band at the dock, music was truly the first story many tourists heard of Hawai‘i.

The land itself is given a musical voice—the rain swishes “as it sweeps down the valley,” the wind has a “song” and the ocean waves “crash” and “hiss.” Emotion becomes something audible that is expressed and communicated specifically through music. The narrator is moved to “dance and sing of the charms of Hawai‘i/And from a joyful heart sing Aloha to you/In ev’ry note I’ll tell of the spell of my Islands/For then I know that you’ll be in love with them too.” Again, here is clearly the expectation that the performance or experience of the song itself can enact a transformation, this falling in love.
The narrator’s own relationship to Hawaii’i is not divulged. All we can deduce is that the singer is familiar with Hawaiian songs, expresses great love for the land, and refers to this place as “my Islands.” It is unclear whether the “Haole” of the title refers to the singer or the “you” addressed. The singer’s message is decidedly welcoming. The simple, repetitive structure of each verse builds up anticipation and expectations that get released in the climactic high note of the last line under the word “you’ll.” Through this coalescence of word and melody, the main force of this song is directed outwards, likely towards a malihini or newcomer—one who is haunted by Hawaii’i, but not yet familiar. Though the words kama’aina and malihini do not come up in this song, I find the relationship described between the land and one familiar, and one unfamiliar sufficient to be relevant.

We can easily critique this song as a settler text by way of its author’s biography. This song was written by R. Alex Anderson (1894-1995), one of the most successful and well-known composers of hapa-haole music. His hits include “Lovely Hula Hands,” “Soft Green Seas,” and “Mele Kalikimaka.” He was also a third-generation settler whose family directly profited from Hawaii’i’s colonial and tourism projects. His grandfather, Alexander Young, was an important figure in the sugar plantations, built and opened the Alexander Young Hotel, bought the Royal Hawaiian and Moana hotels, was a member of the House of Nobles under the Hawaiian Kingdom, and after the illegal overthrow was the Minister of the Interior for the Republic (Stone 2003, 16-18). With this knowledge about Anderson’s family, we might well be right to read this song as fulfilling a settler impulse to lay claim to land and belonging. In this case, music’s own rhetoric of emotion aligns itself with the rhetoric of emotion that, as Turner points out, settler narratives can also rely on.

We can also critique this song’s English lyrics as an impoverished translation of Hawaiian cultural understanding and knowledge of land. A defining characteristic of Hawaiian songs and poems is a rich and detailed knowledge of place—every kind of wind and rain and valley has a name and a story, and knowledge of these specificities is a mark of being kama’aina to a place. We can see an example of this in the Ho’oulumāhiehie mo’olelo of Hi‘iakaikapōliopele (originally published in a Hawaiian-language newspaper in installments from 1905-1906) in which Pele proves she is kama’aina to Kauai by reciting the names of over 300 different winds found on the island (2007, 13-25). The vague and general English words “wind” and “rain” and “cloud” seem feeble in comparison.

All these ethically charged criticisms seem to make sense, but we run into a problem when confronted with the ethos of one later performer of “Haole Hula,” George Helm (1950-1977). George Helm was a Hawaiian musician and activist who was one of the leaders of an organization in the 1970s called the Protect Kaho’olawe Ohana. This group fought against the U.S. military’s use of the island of Kaho’olawe as a site to test bombs and as target practice for live ammunition, a practice that began during WWII and ended in 1990. As Hawaiian scholar, musician, and activist Jon Osorio explains, George Helm’s cultural under-
standing of the ethics of relationship to land dramatically changed the stakes of this atrocity: “George Helm’s leadership helped to broaden the scope of the [PKO] movement from the more political issue of native lands versus military occupation to a cultural expression of recognizing the land as a living and feeling entity. . . With this cultural understanding, Hawaiians did not perceive the bombing of Kaho‘olawe as simply wasteful, but rather as institutionalized torture and murder” (1992, 431). As a crucial figure of the Hawaiian Renaissance of the 1970s, Helm helped reconnect Hawaiians of that time (often referred to as the “lost generation,”) with their culture and identity after decades in which indigenous history and language were forgotten or difficult to access. Together with the PKO, Helm spread the use and understanding of the term “aloha ʻāina,” a concept that can be translated literally as “love for land,” but also carries the Hawaiian ethical imperative to care for the land as a family member, and the understanding that the land will reciprocate by caring for you. The phrase also connects with an often underplayed history of Hawaiian national political resistance in the time of the overthrow (Morales 1984, 19-20). George Helm and fellow PKO-member Kimo Mitchell were lost at sea in 1977, after attempting to rescue some fellow activists who were occupying Kaho‘olawe. To this day, their disappearances continue to haunt the Hawaiian and Hawaiian nationalist communities.

Trained by Kahauanu Lake, George Helm was also a musical legend and a young master of Hawaiian-language music and the Hawaiian falsetto-style of singing. Lake also taught him integrity as a musician and performer, instilling the value of carefully researching the meanings and histories of the songs he chose to play. This discipline and commitment to history informed Helm’s political work too; he often exhorted others to “do your homework” (Morales 1984, 13-14). With this knowledge of Helm, we can assume he was very aware of where “Haole Hula” came from and who wrote it, yet chose to perform the song anyway, recording it on a live album in 1976 that featured many Hawaiian-language songs (including traditional favorites and lesser-known older songs) interspersed with a handful of English-language songs more explicitly about tourism—“Waikiki” by Andy Kealoha Cummings, “Royal Hawaiian Hotel” by Mary Robins, and “Haole Hula.” The original liner notes to this album (released after his disappearance) speak of Helm’s deep relationship to his chosen music:

[According to his close friend ‘Ilima Pi‘ianai‘a . . . . “[Helm’s] appreciation centered on songs which had been written during the first half of this century [early 1900s] and embodied what George called ‘Hawaiian Soul’ . . . . [these ellipses in original] The Isaac’s [sic] family (including Alvin Kaleolani Isaacs, Sr., who wrote one of George’s favorite songs, “Emau,” telling of the need to preserve Hawaiian traditions), Andy Cummings, David Naope, Alfred Alohikea, and Lena Machado were among his favorites, and through their Hawaiian Soul he came to understand the political activism, the crying hurt and the unspoken dignity of the Hawaiians of the 1920’s, 1930’s and 1940’s. (Masuda 1996)
Helm’s skill and power as a musical performer also proved a powerful force in his activism, often helping him connect with people who would normally be put off by the label “activist.” Besides performing at purely entertainment venues, Helm also played and sang at political rallies, and many stories relate that Helm’s music would draw people to his political and cultural messages infinitely more effectively than speeches. As Pō’i’anai’a writes, “through his music older Hawaiians were touched in the depths of their na’au, their guts, and understood what George was about” (1984, 47). Walter Ritte, Jr., another leading member of PKO, explains how music in particular connected Helm with his own cultural beliefs and identity and allowed Helm to share that connection with others: “It was his music which created a neutral space for all to come close to the man, George Helm. It was his music which allowed him to caress his culture. It was his music which allowed us to observe a true Hawaiian” [emphasis in original] (1984, 73). As these examples demonstrate, music and politics and identity were not separate for Helm, but necessarily dependant on each other.

To discuss Helm’s performance of “Haole Hula,” I would like to briefly bring up folklorist Amy Shuman’s work on empathy. Narratives that ask listeners to identify with an unknown teller are grounded in what Shuman identifies as the “promise of storytelling”—empathy. Although Shuman’s work deals specifically with the everyday telling of personal stories, not settler stories, her critique of empathy can help us further understand how settler stories and their “wish to understand across a divide” (2005, 162) hold a double (edged) promise of justifying and enacting colonial violence and also being mobilized for radical change. She maps out how and what empathy unsettles as follows:

Empathy is the act of understanding others across time, space, or any difference in experience. Although empathy holds out a great, perhaps the greatest, promise of storytelling, it is at the same time a destabilizing element in storytelling. Empathy relies on, but also destabilizes, the association among persons and their experiences. It destabilizes entitlement by creating the possibility that people can legitimately retell each other’s stories. It destabilizes meaning from the personal to the allegorical. (2005, 4)

Shuman’s breakdown of empathy explains that stories that ask listeners to enter into a different/strange/new subjectivity are vulnerable to appropriation on multiple fronts. When taken in conjunction with a critique of settler colonialism, we can see that splitting people from their experiences can be understood as a colonial tactic—an un-knowing or purposeful forgetting of Native stories and claims on land. In a similar vein, Shuman also points out that empathy “rarely changes the circumstances of those who suffer. If it provides inspiration, it is more often for those in the privileged position of empathizer rather than empathized” (2005, 5). The previous narrative of hapa-haole music as dance music painfully underscores, in Shuman’s terms, the “luxury of storytelling” and the relative safety of the listener (2005, 8). On the other hand, this same destabilizing energy inherent to stories that evoke empathy can also be channeled into reworking settler narra-
tive songs, as we can see in the example of George Helm.

Conscious and careful with his song choices and quite familiar with the experience of performing music in a tourist setting, George Helm’s choice to perform “Haole Hula” suggests this song’s complicity in a settler colonial project is only one possibility. His particular ethos works to recontextualize the song in the service of aloha ‘āina. With this knowledge of Helm’s commitment to reconnecting other Hawaiians with the idea of aloha ‘āina, the welcoming lyrics to “Haole Hula” take on new and radical meanings. The lyric’s argument to fall in love with Hawai‘i becomes recast as a political and cultural argument to recognize the land as not an object or surface, but as being and family. For Helm to perform this song, the “I” and “you” built into the song’s lyrics are destabilized, shifting from “Anderson” and “tourist/newcomer” to “George Helm” and “other Native Hawaiians.” In Helm’s recording of “Haole Hula,” we can hear that he performs the last line of the song differently from the way it was originally written in Anderson’s sheet music. As discussed earlier, the highest, most climactic note originally fell under the word “you’ll,” marking the utmost importance and dominance of the malihini in the kama‘aina-malihini interaction under the usual tourism-colonial conditions. In Helm’s rendition, however, the endphrase melody slowly (ritardando, in the musical lexicon) builds the entire phrase “you’ll be in love,” shifting the highest note to “love.” This change in musical rhetoric shifts the emphasis away from “you’ll” in order to emphasize Helm’s key goal—spreading the message of “aloha ‘āina.” Becoming kama‘aina, or entering into this knowledge and relationship with the land, becomes an ethical imperative refigured in the service of Hawaiian culture and nationalism.

Coda

Far better as a remembrance of Hawai‘i, than such souvenirs as a pressed flower, a piece of lace-like coral, a grass skirt, or a paper lei, is a record of Hawaiian music, played and sung by Hawaiians. The langorous (sic) Polynesian melodies with their sweet, sober cadences, transport the listener to idyllic scenes of tropic loveliness, for somewhere deep in the heart of everyone is hidden the dream of Paradise—a life spent on a South Sea Island. (Noble 1948, 101)

On the particular force of popular music in history, Frith writes, “Pop music has been an important way in which we have learned to understand ourselves as historical, ethnic, class-bound, gendered, national subjects... Music certainly puts us in our place, but it can also suggest that our social circumstances are not immutable” (1996, 276-7). In a similar vein, this essay has examined a particular music’s force in representing Hawai‘i to the U.S., codifying damaging touristic stereotypes, and staging opportunities and invitations to change one’s social circumstance—to become kama‘aina. Music can get inside of people, can carry them in and out of emotions, and can affect them bodily. Simultaneously, music relies on performance, and bodies can transform and redirect music for new and conflicting purposes. Gaining particular power in this complex medium, the seemingly
settler colonial promise of becoming kama’āina and the desire to understand and claim a place through telling stories can speak to both settler and Native Hawaiian audiences. The very instabilities of a settler colonial text can open possibilities of revolutionary potential.

Hapa-haole music, or “Waikīkī tourist music,” as I sometimes refer to it when talking colloquially to other people about this project, has often been dismissed as embarrassing kitsch, “bereft of substance, as inauthentic as a coconut-shell bra” (Drury 2003). As Hawaiian scholar Lisa Kahaleole Hall points out, the (over)marketing of Hawai‘i as kitsch—and she identifies Tin Pan Alley hapa-haole music as part of this conception—can have much more severe consequences: “A culture without dignity cannot be conceived of as having sovereign rights, and the repeated marketing of kitsch Hawaiian-ness leads to non-Hawaiians’ misunderstanding and degradation of Hawaiian culture and history” (2005, 409). The translation of “becoming kama’āina” into the medium of hapa-haole music has enacted a violence of simplification on this understanding of local identity. Through the lyrics and melodies of the songs discussed in this paper, kama’āina becomes an identity open for the taking. Anyone can become kama’āina if they want to, if they love it here. When “becoming kama’āina” loses its connotations of mutual responsibility and emphasis on interdependent relationships, it in turn becomes an empty shell, too easy to pick up and string onto a 99-cent lei.

There exist small pockets of resistance in the Hawaiian community that advocate the re-cognition of hapa-haole music as a Hawaiian cultural aspect to own and take pride in.28 This idea is championed most publicly by kumu hula and Hawaiian rights political activist Vicky Takamine and her annual Hapa Haole Hula, Music, and Film Festival. According to Takamine, “[t]he hapa haole period served a real purpose . . . . It kept the Hawaiian culture alive” (qtd in Drury 2003). As explored in this essay, I understand hapa-haole music as an unwieldy transmitter, a genre that has preserved cultural values such as the invitation to become kama’āina, but only by cycling them through multiple translations.

Popular music is often seen as “harmless” and “light,” thereby eluding criticism and closer thought. In Adorno’s words, it “inclines to smile at itself in order to pass by without being challenged” (2002 “Social,” 427). He calls for a more rigorous examination of this inocuity as well as efforts to historicize popular music in political and economic terms (2002 “Social,” 425-7.) In the economic and political context of colonialism, what are the roles emotional, creative, and performative popular cultural texts such as music play? It is possible to break down this larger question into many more specific ones. For example, we could interrogate how the requisite humor of hapa-haole music has been used by local and/or Hawaiian musicians to satirize darker and more serious political and socioeconomic conditions in song and dance. We can also think harder about how this music addresses non-white Hawai‘i settlers.

As I hope this essay suggests, this deceptively simple genre is ripe for much more work that can reach beneath the common criticisms of inauthenticity to investigate moments of ethical interruption, instability, and more subtle forms of struggle.
Notes

1. I am very grateful to Paul Lyons, Jeff Carroll, John Zuern, Cristina Bacchilega, John Rieder, Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, and my anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful feedback on this paper at various points in the writing process. Any errors that remain are entirely my own.


3. Two very successful musical performances are often cited as beginning this fascination with Hawaii—the 1912 debut of the Hawaiian musical The Bird of Paradise in New York and the performance of the song “On the Beach at Waikiki” at the 1915 Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco. For more on both of these events, see Charles Hiroshi Garrett’s chapter “Sounds of Paradise” in Struggling to Define a Nation: American Music and the Twentieth Century.

4. Following popular convention in Hawai‘i, I use “Hawaiian,” “Native,” or “Native Hawaiian” to signify an indigenous Hawaiian identity and “Hawai‘i” as an adjective to signify a local, but non-Native identity.

5. Wood also talks at length about the developing usage of a “kama‘aina style” of home décor that fetishizes “Native lifeways into a collection of discrete Native crafts” that can be collected and owned, divorced from use and history. Though outside the scope of this particular paper, this particular understanding of kama‘aina is alive and well today, as evidenced by a 2002 Honolulu magazine article titled “Kama‘aina Style” that asserts the possibility “for a home to have kama‘aina style without necessarily being in the islands.”

6. Wood’s argument about the appropriation of kama‘aina continues to be relevant for contemporary Hawai‘i scholars. For example, see ku‘ualoha ho‘omanawanui’s essay “This Land is Your Land, This Land Was My Land: Kanaka Maoli versus Settler Representations of ‘Āina in Contemporary Literature of Hawai‘i” from the 2008 collection entitled Asian Settler Colonialism. This paper does not contest the usefulness of his work in documenting examples of colonialism, but does suggest that the question of the cultural permeability of kama‘aina bears more scrutiny.

7. The ‘ōlelo no‘eau are from the book published by Mary Kawena Pukui in 1983. She collected them as a personal project over decades of being an important and prolific translator, editor, composer of mele, writer, and archivist for the Bishop museum. 2942 were published in the book, but she knew many more (Luomala 1999).

8. And linguistically, the prefix “ho‘o” can mean to behave like x. For example, ho‘okane would mean to behave like a man (kane).

9. The ‘āina itself is often identified as an existing settler colonial project, dominated largely by Asian settlers, “locals,” who trace their lineage to Hawai‘i’s immigrant plantation workers. See Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i, edited by Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura.

10. The well-worthwhile project of writing a detailed genealogy of kama‘aina is outside the scope of this paper.

11. Though Lévinas’s argument focuses on high art and on critiquing the argument of “art for art’s sake” rather than popular music, his comments on rhythm are made more generally.

12. Tin Pan Alley songwriters capitalized on the “Hawaii Craze,” making Waikīkī and hula girls the focus of scores of songs. See Charles Hiroshi Garrett’s chapter “Sounds of Paradise” in Struggling to Define a Nation: American Music and the Twentieth Century for a detailed look at this.
13. A stipulation—Spivak also discusses the necessity of education and training in forming an active (ethical) reader, and the very real difficulties of this kind of education for poor and illiterate communities.

14. Both these songs are connected in some way to filmmakers Norman Foster and Frank Borzage. The question of whether or not these songs were being marketed for film bears further study, and points to larger questions of the relationships between musical and filmic representation of Hawai‘i.

15. I could find no recordings of these songs or mention of them outside of their own sheet music.


17. My thanks to Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada for his assistance on this translation and for his generous help on other Hawaiian-language issues in this paper.

18. See Charles Hiroshi Garrett for a discussion on Tin Pan Alley’s fascination and disregard for the Hawaiian language, as well as examples of parodic anti-Hawai‘i songs from Tin Pan Alley.

19. Another excellent project for further research could examine the specifics of how hapa-haole music functioned as dance music.

20. No relation to Johnny Noble.

21. What kind of music did the hapa-haole dance music replace? In an article by Johnny Noble published in *Paradise of the Pacific* in 1944, he describes the beach boy music at Moana Pier as including both songs like “Aloha Means I Love You” and (likely Hawaiian-language) songs by Hawaiian royalty Queen Lili‘uokalani, King Kalakaua and Prince Leleiohoku. It is likely that this scene written earlier by Johnny Noble was reworked by Gurre Ploner Noble for the book.

22. Johnny Noble is also credited with composing both songs, although he shares the “words and music” credit in “Kamaaina” with Sol Bright. Both these individuals’ lives, as Hawaiians and significant musical figures in Hawai‘i’s tourist industry, present mightily complex examples of how one must have had to negotiate conflicting identity politics to be successful.

23. See Jane Desmond’s discussion of bodies and tourism in *Staging Tourism: Bodies on Display from Waikiki to Sea World*.

24. My aim here is not to disparage Anderson or his family, but to make the point that well-meaning critiques of settler colonialism can easily oversimplify situations.

25. See *Nā Mele o Hawai‘i Nei* by Samuel Elbert and Noelani Mahoe for a discussion of the aesthetic of Hawaiian poetry.

26. The Hawaiian Renaissance was a cultural and political reclaiming of Hawaiian knowledge and rights. Some of the most oft-cited events include the successful rebuilding and voyaging of Hawaiian canoe Hokule‘a, the work towards establishing Hawaiian-language immersion schools, and the PKO itself.


28. According to the *Honolulu Weekly* article by Drury, hapa-haole music really lost popularity in the 1970s, as the Hawaiian cultural renaissance of that time pushed the focus onto Hawaiian-language materials and earlier histories. In talking with other Hawaiian scholars, they tell me that little work is currently being done on the Territorial period, with much more emphasis being placed on the Kingdom era, annexation and overthrow, and statehood.
Works Cited


Everybody knows this live wire. 1917. Paradise of the Pacific. May, 15-16.


Response

Emplacement, Entrainment, Empathy, and Ethics

Don Brenneis
University of California, Santa Cruz
USA

Aiko Yamashiro’s thought-provoking “Ethics in Song” takes Hapa-Haole music into serious and imaginative account - and to very good ends. She considers this apparently light popular music as a key site for claims-making and contestation, one in which we can hear the resonances of such consequential themes as identity, indigeneity, personhood, and moral value. She further argues and elegantly demonstrates that the meanings, uses, and lingering effects of such music are not static but rather reverberate in multiple and dynamic ways in today’s Hawai‘i and beyond. In this brief response I want to highlight three dimensions of her subtle exploration of hapa-haole music.

First, the texts of hapa-haole music focus on making oneself at home in a specific place, a theme shared by mainland country music and by its highly varied offspring worldwide. Such lyrical place-making, accomplished through naming, describing, and narrating, is integrally linked with making ethical claims to local identity, whether for indigenous communities or for settlers and their descendants. The work of such scholars as Aaron Fox, David Samuels, and Alexander Dent on various world country musics resonates with Yamashiro’s argument here.

A second key dimension is the way that hapa-haole music becomes, to use Yamashiro’s (2) own phrase, “entirely captivating.” In other words, how do its rhythmic and other acoustic characteristics compel listeners’ engagement? Key here is the notion of “entrainment,” of being pulled into participation through “the embodied experience of musical structure.” (2) Are the pleasurable sensor-}

Perhaps the most complex terrain Yamashiro explores here is that of ethics, a term that takes on multiple meanings over the course of her essay. One cluster of meanings centers around the ethics of whether and how one can claim indigeneity: Does Native status come only through birth, or can one legitimately “become Native?” Yamashiro’s consideration of hapa-haole music suggests an ethical ideology in which “it is not only possible to become kama‘aina, one ought to,” (3) a position clearly contrary to the view of many indigenous activists.

A second way in which ethics figures in this popular music has to do with its reception and effects. Here Lévinas’ troubled assumption that “subjects [can be] seized by rhythm and carried away” (quoted by Yamashiro, 5) is central. For him and Adorno (for whom the entraining dangers of such music lie more in its predictability and standardization) ethics
depends upon consciousness, agency, and reasoned consent, characteristics imperiled by the formal features of popular song. In Yamashiro’s account, Gayatri Spivak argues for the generative and resistant possibilities of interruption, that is, of “refocalizing” (6) a text. But, Spivak’s argument draws directly upon the themes and content of narratives rather than their style; can the shape of hapa-haole sound also afford the potential for such interruptions?

For me the most suggestive constellation of questions has to do with the ethics of empathy and entitlement that figure centrally in Yamashiro’s astute use of Amy Shuman’s recent work. We often regard “empathy” as an admirable and ethical capacity, one allowing understanding across difference. At the same time, however, Shuman notes that it “relies on, but also destabilizes, the associations among persons and their experiences.” (quoted by Yamashiro, 15) Are the narratives of subjective transformation central to hapa-haole songs an ethical violation of the entitlements, narrative or otherwise, of Native Hawaiians? Thinking through the complexities of empathy suggests a more complex and nuanced way of thinking about such processes as cultural appropriation. It also speaks directly to broader aspects not only of settler societies specifically but of colonialism as well. As Amit S. Rai (2002) convincingly demonstrates in his Rule of Sympathy: Sentiment, Race, and Power, 1750-1850, the sentiment of sympathy can claim simultaneously to bridge human difference and to provide a powerful engine of social differentiation as well as, at least implicitly, a mandate for control.

While empathy and sympathy differ in significant ways, a similar dynamic may be at play here. What bridges have been built by hapa-haole music? How do they find purchase at either end? And what kinds of traffic – aesthetic, personal, political – move across them?

**Work Cited**

Criticising Local Politics,
Rejecting Western
Cultural Intrusion:
A Study of Sanlu Dairy Online Jokes

Mu Li
Memorial University of Newfoundland,
Canada

Abstract
In this article I analyze online jokes that developed in response to the tainted milk powder scandal in China. Sanlu Dairy milk jokes were widespread on the Internet, especially on Chinese websites, from mid-September to early November 2008. I explore why the jokes became popular during the tragedy. Within the context of Chinese culture, I examine the reasons for their emergence and the internal mechanism of their humor.

Prestigious Past and Tarnished Present

In addition to the Beijing Olympic Games, another event shook China in the summer of 2008—tainted milk. This event, which became known as “the 2008 Chinese milk scandal,” originated in early May, although it did not initially attract much attention. On July 16, 2008, sixteen infants in Gansu Province who had been diagnosed with kidney stones were all found to have been fed milk powder produced by the Shijiazhuang-based Sanlu Group. Although the Chinese central government’s Administration of Food Safety became involved, in order to maintain China’s reputation during the Olympics, no investigation was initiated and sales were never stopped. The news broke on August 2, when the Sanlu Group’s New Zealand partner Fonterra became aware of Sanlu milk’s contamination. By Sept 5, 2008, Fonterra had notified the New Zealand government of its discovery and, three days later, on September 8, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark alerted Beijing officials directly. The World Health Organization was informed about the contaminated milk powder on September 11. With the contamination exposed, the Sanlu Group admitted that its milk powder was tainted by melamine, and recalled all its products which had been used before August 8. Meanwhile, both the Chinese central government and the local government in Shijiazhuang, initiated an investigation into the matter. By September 13 they had arrested 19 persons. According to the Chinese Ministry of Health, from September until December 10, 2008, 22 million children were examined for kidney problems.

Soon afterwards more Chinese food products were found to contain melamine and many countries temporarily stopped all imports of mainland Chinese dairy and other food products. In late October 2008, food safety officials established that the problem had spread to eggs and possibly other food categories as melamine is commonly added to animal feed, despite a ban imposed in the wake of a 2007 scandal over melamine-contaminated pet food exported from China to the United States. Given China’s wide range of exported food products, the scandal soon affected countries on every continent. It left Sanlu labeled as a tarnished brand and significantly degraded the reputation of “Made in China” products.
While the timeline of events may be straightforward, the Sanlu scandal is a complex event. To understand it we must consider the reputation of the formerly “prestigious” Sanlu brand. According to official reports, Sanlu Infant Formula milk had been the top-selling infant formula in mainland China for the last nine years. In one Sanlu advertisement potential formula consumers were told that sales over the past 15 years were large enough to cover the whole of the Sahara Desert! Moreover, just as the scandal was revealed, a government-authorized program on product quality, Weekly Quality Report, boasted on September 2, 2008 that there are more than a thousand rigid scientific procedures involved in Sanlu milk production. In comparing Sanlu milk’s prestigious past with its tarnished present, the Chinese people realized that the problem was not just the deteriorating quality of Sanlu milk but that fraudulent businessmen, in collusion with a corrupt government, had fabricated the company’s stellar reputation. Ultimately, the scandal raised both issues of food safety and political corruption in mainland China.

This summary of the Sanlu scandal provides a background for the subsequent online jokes. While the origin of these jokes is still unknown, they spread quickly on the Internet from mid-September to early November, making the Sanlu scandal a hot topic throughout China and in parts of the rest of the world. But what triggered these jokes? What prompted people to transmit them?

**Different Types of the Sanlu Joke Cycle**

Before interpreting Sanlu jokes the first step is to identify their form and content in order to classify them into different subsets. Actually, definitions of “form” and “content” are often confused in the history of folklore research since, in many cases, it is hard to clearly separate one from the other. To clarify these two terms Christopher Wilson’s definitions seem helpful. He states that

content refers to the specific perceptions and meanings evoked by joke stimuli. In the case of a verbal joke, for example, the content consists of its sounds and of the meanings that these evoke [while] form refers to the inter-relation or pattern of these stimuli. (Wilson 1979, 2)

Thus, according to Wilson, the core of a joke is the joke stimulus, which is the trigger in the joke that alerts one. It may be a word, a phrase, or something else prompted by the joke itself, and it determines both content and form. In this essay, I classify Sanlu jokes according to their internal joke stimuli.

By scrutinizing the Sanlu joke cycle, it is possible to divide the jokes into five main categories: A. nation-identity jokes, B. sexual jokes, C. political jokes, D. familial jokes and E. anti-media jokes.

A. The nation-identity joke contains a comparison between China and foreign countries (often Western, developed countries). In these jokes China, which seeks to catch up with developed countries by drinking milk to make the bodies of “her” citizens strong, is depicted as fossilizing their kidneys with poisoned milk, for example:

A1

鹿2008年流行广告词:
每天一斤奶，强壮中国肾。
[“Sanlu 2008 advertisement: ‘Half a kilo of Sanlu milk daily will give you a Strong Chinese kidney’.”]

A2
外国人喝牛奶结实了，中国人喝牛奶结石了。
[“Milk makes foreigners strong and Chinese people stones.”]

A3
日本人口号：一天一杯牛奶振兴一个民族；中国人口号：一天一杯牛奶震惊一个民族。
[“The Japanese slogan is ‘A cup of milk daily makes a nation strong’ while the Chinese is ‘A cup of milk daily shakes a nation strongly’. ”]

B. The sexual joke usually contains sexual images, words popularly termed “dirty,” or an explicit indication of sexual relations, for example:

B1
蚊子进城！饿极·见一小姐双乳高挺·遂一头扎入猛咬·发现嘴里全是硅胶·于是仰天长叹：唉！食品安全太成问题了·上哪能吃到放心奶啊.....
[“A mosquito, looking for fun, went downtown. When it felt hungry, it noticed a woman with large breasts. When it bit into them, it sucked silicone. The mosquito was so disappointed it sighed: ‘My god! Food safety really is a problem if I can’t even get safe milk from a woman’s breast!’”]

B2
男：‘老婆，跟你商量个事!’
女：‘什么事?”
男：‘老婆，你看三鹿奶粉事件查出来这么多三聚氰胺·看来娃儿吃什么奶粉都不放心·你看这样行不·咱家养个二奶吧，这样奶粉就有了保障，亏了我无所谓，别亏了孩子啊.’

[Male: “Darling! Can we have a talk?”
Female: “Yes?”
Male: ‘Darling, melamine was found in many dairy products, they are no longer safe. We have to consider our child’s health. I have an idea. Why don’t we look for an ernai.2 Then we’ll be guaranteed safe and fresh milk! Don’t worry about my cost, consider the kid first!”]

B3 “Dirty” words:
三鹿说：奶农干的！
奶农说：奶牛干的！
奶牛说：草干的！
草说：我妈干的！
草他妈抬头看看天：日!
[Sanlu said: “The dairy farmer did the crime.”
The dairy farmer said: “the dairy cow did.”
The dairy cow said: “Grass did.”
The grass said: “My mom did.”
The mother of grass (motherfucker) said: “Sun (Fuck).”]

C. The political joke overtly expresses anger towards an untrustworthy Chinese government that disguises the truth and speaks up for the criminals, disregarding the public’s safety and the health of victims. One joke, for example, reveals that the Chinese government is responsible for concealing the scandal:

C1
你们俩被抓了,好可怜啊!但为了救三鹿,你们俩就只能忍辱负重了,三鹿是获过国家科技奖的,你知道花了多少钱那,要是三鹿被处理,那只母狗得咬出多少人那!你们俩是代人受过,就忍一忍吧!要是害怕想尿尿,你们俩就喝三鹿!
[It’s a pity you guys are arrested but, to save Sanlu, you have to keep your mouth shut and take the blame for...]

Sanlu Dairy Online Jokes
the crime. Sanlu was awarded the Nation’s Technique Prize, which involved a lot of money being spent for that honour. If Sanlu were sentenced, imagine how many people would be implicated, how many scandals would be opened up by that bitch? So, keep quiet and be the fall guy! If you’re afraid of pissing too much in prison…just drink Sanlu milk!

Another joke, satirizes both Sanlu and the "One family one child" policy proposed by the Chinese government:

C2

三驴子好啊，多负责任的“民族企业”啊，为了实现计划生育这项基本国策，在前面的没有完成计划生育指标的情况下，开发了这种可以在短期内减少婴幼儿数量（死亡）·长期可以控制下一代生育（肾脏都伤了，他们的生育能力都下降了）的特效药：“奶粉+三聚氰胺”，而且还给财政带来了可观的税收。【Sanlu is great! It remembers its responsibilities. Because the ‘one family, one kid’ policy was not very successful in the past, Sanlu invented a plan to reduce the infant population quickly, and control the birth rate for the long term: milk + melamine. This great new product could make a big financial profit, so we should support this kind of national enterprise, introduce it to the whole country and the whole world, promote it, and then we’ll reach the goal of decreasing the population in this planet to 1 billion in the next 50 years!”

Although some jokes and parodies do not directly criticize the Chinese government, they employ the Sanlu event to satirize Chinese athletes, such as Liu Xiang and the Chinese Male Football Team sponsored by the Chinese government, or the 29th Olympic Games held in China. In doing so, they express resentment toward the Chinese government. These jokes are also categorized under the rubric of “political joke,” for example:

C’1

喝三鹿牌奶粉，当残奥会冠军
[“Drink Sanlu milk: you’ll be a hero in the Paralympics.”]

C’2

鹿是奶站的责任
奶站是奶农的责任
奶农是奶牛的责任
奶牛是草的责任
草说它喝了河里的水
小河说中国男足来洗过脚
中国男足说我们喝三鹿长大的

[Sanlu said that the dairy station did the crime.
The dairy station said it was the responsibility of dairy farmer.
The dairy farmer said it was the responsibility of dairy cow.
The dairy cow said it was the responsibility of grass.
The grass said it was because it drinks the water in the river.
The river said the Chinese male football team had washed their feet in the river.
The Chinese male football team said they are raised by the Sanlu milk.]

Besides the above jokes, there is also a parody of the theme song of the 29th Olympic Games—“You and Me” sung by Sarah Brightman and Huan Liu—which criticizes Sanlu Milk for causing infant kidney stones.
D. The familial joke mainly focuses on the relationship between a stepmother and her stepchildren, in which the stepmother is portrayed as wickedly abusing her stepchildren by feeding them Sanlu milk. This subset also refers to the relationship between a mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, for example:

D1
三鹿奶粉, 后妈的选择.
[“Sanlu milk: the choice for stepmothers.”]

D2
甲: 张嫂· 三鹿奶粉不能喝阿· 有毒! 你家还有吗？
乙: 我也刚知道了啊· 还剩三袋· 不敢给孩子喝了· 给婆婆当早餐了！
[“A: ‘Aunt Zhang! Did you hear that Sanlu milk is not safe, but contaminated? Do you still have some?’
B: ‘I just realized this. I have three more cartons! I won’t feed my children with this milk anymore. I’ll feed it as breakfast to my mother-in-law instead!’”]

In addition to these four main subsets of Sanlu jokes, there are others that do not fall into the above categories. Most of them are parodies of famous television advertisements, for example: E1 今年过节不送礼· 送礼就送三鹿奶 [“No other gifts this year, Sanlu milk only.”]. This slogan imitates the well-known nutrient Melatonin, used to treat insomnia. The parody implies: if you drink Sanlu milk, you will sleep forever. E2 鹿奶粉· 奶粉中的战斗机 [“Sanlu milk, fighter of the milk powders.”]. This slogan imitates a China-based cell phone company, “Bird.” It attempts to assert its dominance over the Chinese market and to “kill” foreign products, thus its name as “fighter.” Sanlu milk now tries to kill its consumers and so is regarded as the fighter milk powder. E3 三鹿, 一切皆有可能! [“Sanlu, anything is possible!”]. It indicates that if you drink Sanlu milk, you shouldn’t be surprised if you find something unusual, abnormal or poisoned. E4 我们的目标是: 立石! [“Our goal is: Stone!”] This slogan imitates a Crest toothpaste advertising campaign. Crest’s advertisement promises to make consumers’ teeth strong, claiming, “Our goal is strong!” Sanlu milk fossilizes consumers’ kidneys, thus their goal should be “stone.” E5 三鹿明天见！三鹿呀· 天天见！[“Sanlu, see you next day! Sanlu, with you everyday!”]. This slogan imitates an advertisement for a China-based cosmetic called “Dabao.” In the original Dabao version it (Dabao) is both the name of a person and the product. The slogan indicates that the product is the very thing you need in your everyday life, rather than a person. By replacing “Dabao” with “Sanlu” (milk), the slogan’s meaning becomes: “Sanlu milk is a product for consuming every morning so, after drinking, you may say ‘see you,’ but the kidney stone it produces will follow you everyday after. E6 三鹿广告做得好, 不如三鹿结石好!ger!”]. This slogan imitates a China-based fridge manufacturer, “Frestech.” E7 不喝寻常奶! [“A totally different milk!”] This slogan imitates a China-based apparel company “Meters Bonwe.” This parody means it actually is not milk, but poison.

As I have mentioned above, the jokes of this subset are all parodies of well-known advertisements which appeared in mass media sources like television and also newspapers and the Internet. These parodies thus express great resentment toward the mass media, portraying it as unreliable. Accordingly, I feel that it is
reasonable to categorize them as a subset—the “anti-media joke.”

**Why Do People Tell Sanlu Jokes?**

In folklore, the telling, performing and transmitting of items are meaningful, rather than aimless. Therefore, the question to be asked is: Why do people tell Sanlu jokes?

Before seeking the answer to this question, perhaps what should be first addressed is why people tell jokes? Many disciplines, including folklore, psychology, sociology and anthropology, provide clues. Steve Linstead claims:

> Humour is a complex and paradoxical phenomenon which reflects many of the difficulties which are experienced by investigations in other areas of social life. Is it, for example, a device utilized by individuals for coping with uncertainty, exploring ambiguous situations, releasing tension or distancing unpleasantness? Or does it owe its genesis to social structures, and the contradictions and paradoxes within them? If so, does it subvert these social forms, support them or accommodate them? Does it depend on a social group for its definition as humour? (Linstead 1988, 123).

According to Linstead, humour is a framework for “non-real” or “play” activity, an aside from normal discourse which not only allows for the exploration of new ideas in situations of uncertainty or unfamiliarity, but also performs a boundary function of both internal and external lines, identifying groups in terms of membership and acceptable and competence behaviors. Moreover, humour can function as a coping device to release tension, allay fear, forestall threat, defuse aggression or distance the unpleasant. Finally, humour may represent an implicit contradiction, paradox or “joke in the social structure” in an explicit way (Linstead 1988, 142).

Applying these ideas to the Sanlu joke cycle is illuminating. The nation-identity jokes can be explained as establishing a border between the Chinese and the people of Western countries, as well as between the Chinese and the Japanese. In marking a boundary, this kind of joke draws attention to differences between Chinese and foreigners in terms of their foodways. Although the Chinese originally dreamed of “catching up” with those in developed countries by diet assimilation, the gap between Chinese and foreigners is actually widened by drinking Sanlu milk. The most extreme example of this irony is in joke A3, which refers to the Chinese and the Japanese. In the minds of many Chinese people, the progress of Japan is associated with milk. where the government advocates: “A cup of milk makes a nation strong” and forcefully pushed a “milk plan” beginning in the 1950s, with the aim of encouraging a taller and stronger population. It seems that the increased energy of the Japanese has resulted in a more prosperous Japan. To catch up with developed countries, Chinese parents followed in the footsteps of the Japanese and fed their children milk. When the top Chinese milk powder was discovered to contain poisonous chemicals, the event greatly affected the Chinese public. Underlying this great disappointment is the Chinese desire to make China strong by challenging the “dominance” of developed countries, and to express their opinions
in their own voice. These goals were undermined by Sanlu, which devalued the Chinese dream of being stronger and more independent. Thus the joke plays the role not only of scorning Sanlu, but also of re-emphasizing the distinction between Chinese people and foreigners, a gap that should have been transcended by milk consumption. In this sense, compared with the strong and healthy image of foreigners, especially Westerns, the image of damaged Chinese people actually serves to reconstruct Chinese nationality. Although the approach may seem somewhat enigmatic to foreigners, non-Chinese prefer to accept a weak and damaged Chinese identity than a prosperous nation with great energy.

As for sexual and political jokes, their function is different from that of national-identity jokes. In the social environments of ancient and modern China, sex and politics were and are taboo topics within public discourse. Joking is a means to discuss these taboos because it is not considered to be serious and is therefore free from repercussions. Tragedy can also provide opportunities for joke-making. As Dundes and Hauschild note, “nothing is so sacred, so taboo, or so disguising that it cannot be the subject of humor. Quite the contrary, it is precisely those topics culturally defined as sacred, taboo or disguising which more often than not provide the principal grist for humorous mills” (Dundes and Hauschild 1988, 56). That is why many jokes are spontaneously created when tragedies occur, like the events of Challenger III or Chernobyl. According to researchers, these jokes allow for the release of public grief; joking transfers tears into laughter (Simons 1986; Smyth 1986; and Kürti 1988). Although a joke can relax people’s tensions, as will be discussed later, it is also noteworthy that in different cultural and social contexts, jokes are told and function in different ways in varied communities, even if they are all thought to serve as a social alleviation.

What are the underlying meanings of the familial joke? In general, jokes as a genre not only subvert the social structure, but also support it by transmitting social norms and concepts through everyday tellings. The familial jokes here focus on two negatively portrayed familial relationships: the relationship between stepmother and stepchild (D1), and the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law (D2). In Chinese culture, the stepmother is always depicted as a wicked woman who treats her stepchild badly. An example is the portrayal of the stepmother in the Chinese Cinderella story “Yeh-shen.” Although the nature of the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship is not as fixed as the former, it is also frequently represented negatively in much Chinese folklore. Sometimes the mother-in-law is described as a wicked woman who torments her daughter-in-law, while sometimes the role of antagonist is reversed. While these negative depictions are not unique to China, and to a large extent may be considered universal, some characteristics distinguish the Chinese representations. The uniqueness actually lies in the form chosen by the Chinese to represent these relationships: milk scandal jokes. Thus, the unresolved question is: why are these social issues and familial relationships expressed by the Sanlu milk jokes?

Finally, how do the anti-media jokes work? Superficially, this kind of parody
is common in our everyday life and, most of time, it is just for fun. But if all the objects of parody were well-known China-based enterprises, the parodies must have been intentional. As mentioned above, parodies in this subset focus on famous China-based brands. The question here is, why was the Sanlu scandal the target for dissatisfaction with the mass media? Is the belief that the mass media hid the truth of the scandal the only reason for the jokes’ popularity?

Published studies provide many perspectives on the meanings of jokes that might help elucidate this discussion. Though many of these studies offer insights into Sanlu jokes, however, they fall short of explaining the whole story.

Milk: Food as a Cultural Metaphor
According to Simoons, food plays a central role in Chinese life, which leads:

many to characterize the Chinese as having a food-centered culture. Not only are they wide-ranging in their choice of foods, but concern with the excellence of food is found in all segments of society and is reflected in the common greeting “Have you eaten already?” Indeed some have noted that food is not only a common topic of conversation, but often the dominant one” (Simoons 1991, 14).

Thus, to a large extent, to understand the Chinese, China or Chinese culture, food is key. As a well-developed food system, Chinese foodways are not static but variable and willing to adopt cuisines from other cultures and traditions, in which process exotic food always conveys particular social meanings about Chinese culture and society.

In most parts of China milk was not a traditional Chinese food. In historic periods, some minority groups living in remote Northwest China consumed milk, but in many ways, these people were not historically considered “Chinese.” To differentiate their foodways from those minorities, many Han Chinese believed milk was inedible or food for the lower classes. In modern times, especially the late 20th century, however, milk has been popularly accepted by most Chinese people, having been influenced by Westerners’ heavy consumption of dairy products. For many Chinese, milk and other dairy products are symbolic of Western culture or, at least, of non-Chinese culture, while soy juice and other soy products are regarded as indigenous Chinese food symbols (Simoons 1991, 458-462). Because milk is a “Western” thing, it is easier for the Chinese public to accept Sanlu-related jokes and transmit them freely. People may think that milk is something that belongs to “others,” and this allows them enough distance to be comfortable in telling jokes they may otherwise find offensive. As a result, the Sanlu jokes become an acceptable vehicle for the discussion of several taboo topics, such as sex and politics, as well as sensitive issues like the relationships between stepmothers and stepchildren, or mother-in-laws and daughter-in-laws. Thus, unlike many scholars who propose that new technologies like cyberspace create online democracy and freedom for Chinese people to discuss sensitive topics (Day and Schuler 2004; Tai 2006; Zhou 2006), I would argue that it is the topic of Sanlu milk itself which enables such discussions. The topic has actually transformed the criticism of a Chinese prod-
uct into a protest about Western culture or, at least, a criticism that is disguised as a gesture of protest and intended to be ironic. Accordingly, the nature of these jokes releases tensions by reducing the capability of the Chinese government to regulate the Internet.

Although it is not deeply rooted in Chinese culture milk is, nevertheless, an important part of the contemporary Chinese food system. In addition, the Sanlu group that produced the tainted milk is a top China-based company, and it was the Chinese local government that attempted to keep the public in the dark. In this sense, to identify milk as a symbol of Western culture was not to deny the damage done to the reputation of the Chinese government as a result of its mismanagement of the Sanlu scandal. Confronted by all this shameful behavior, a disappointed Chinese public sought to channel its anger. Joking about the Sanlu group and both Chinese central and local governments became an effective release. And yet, while many Chinese people are critical of politics in China, in accordance with Chinese tradition, the public does not usually portray its government as totally untrustworthy. To most Chinese people the government, and the central government in particular, is their system of support. If they criticize the government too intensely, they will lose their sense of nationalistic hope. At this point the dilemma the Chinese public face is how to express their rage and keep their hope, and avoid irritating the government.

In this sense milk, as a Western food, provides people with a convenient scapegoat which shifts blame away from the Chinese government which some feel bears most of the responsibility for the crime. The Sanlu Group’s contaminated “milk” and the attempt made by Chinese local government to keep this contaminated milk contained (by concealing the truth), can be transformed into a critique of “contamination” by the West and an argument for “containing” the invasion of Western culture. In this transfer, the Chinese local and central governments become the protector of the nation whose aim is not to injure “her” citizens, but to fight for them and for their culture and traditions. That is to say, because milk is seen as the signal representative of the Western foodway and a representative of Western culture, the contaminated milk symbolizes the rejection of Western culture in contemporary China. Based on the above interpretation, the jokes are much more easily accepted by the Chinese public who are willing to see their government as innocuous. Beezley presents a similar interpretation in his research of Mexican political humor in which, he claims that those political jokes:

gives one the strength beneath the yoke of being Mexican, not the rage to throw it aside. Laughter renews the courage to live with reality, rather than the bravery to dream of new worlds” (Beezley 1985, 223).

As a symbol of Western culture, milk offers many Chinese the freedom to talk about sex. In the minds of many Chinese people, the West represents a place where open and free sex takes place, even between strangers. Because in the Chinese language, “milk” is pronounced as /nai/, which means not only “milk,” but “breast,” it is easy and natural to connect milk to sex, especially premarital or
extramarital sexual relationships.

In both ancient and modern China, breast milk is normally fed to infants; it is thought to be healthier and more nourishing. Moreover, feeding infants with breast milk is regarded as reflective of the intimate relationship between mother and child. In the case of Sanlu milk, infants were fed formula by their parents rather than the recommended breast milk; these “mean” mothers are easily equated with stepmothers who abuse their stepchildren. Additionally, in China the Western family is not thought to be as intimate as the Chinese family. Western families are thought to be united by money and benefits rather than by love and friendship, characteristics that bond Chinese families. These associations help explain why tainted milk can be linked to negative familial relationships.

Lastly, it is the role of milk as a symbol of Western culture that makes Sanlu jokes a means by which to criticize the mass media. According to Willie Smyth, “the Challenger jokes serve as vehicles for expressing public sentiment about the media’s treatment of the disaster, and about the media’s expectations of the public as mourners” (Smyth 1986, 256). Following their Western peers, the Chinese public employed Sanlu milk jokes to criticize the Chinese mass media, which disregarded its obligation to speak for the public and its responsibility to be the “fourth estate”, as its Western counterpart is.

Conclusion
After the Sanlu tainted milk scandal, the Chinese public used Sanlu jokes as a means of expressing its resentment towards Chinese domestic corruption in some parts of their governmental system. These jokes dramatically and superficially emerged as a rejection of Western culture. The jokes, however, also provided a forum in which to settle or ease the political pressures of the Chinese government on its people. According to my observations, although the Sanlu jokes were transmitted online, which greatly broadened the range of receivers and accelerated the speed of transmission, they actually functioned in the same ways as traditional jokes. A thorough understanding of Chinese social and cultural contexts is essential for understanding the implications of these widespread jokes.

Notes
1. In Chinese the pronunciation of “strong” is the same as that of “stone”.
2. In Chinese, ernmai / ərnmai/ is a lover of a man who has a wife already, but his wife doesn’t know about her. The term literally means “two breasts”. Additionally, in Chinese, the written word for “breast” and the pronunciation of “breast” is the same as “milk”.
3. The cost here refers to male ejection since only a woman, who has just given birth to a child, is able to produce milk. The fresh milk here indicates the sexual desire of the man.
4. In Chinese, Sanluzi means “three donkeys,” which it is a derogatory nickname used by countrymen of Northern China to scorn stupid people.
5. The Chinese Male Football Team performed very poorly in all of their matches in recent years and behaved rudely in the Beijing Olympic Games. For the past two decades, the team has been a target of public ridicule.
Web Texts


Wanqiangdemao (Staunch Cat) [pseud.]. A Should-have-not-be-joke Joke on the responsible person of Sanlu Milk. Nanjing Forum of Sohu Club. Entry posted on September 18, 2008.

http://club.sh.sohu.com/r-nanjing-309233-0-0-0.html. [accessed November 14].


Web Videos


Works Cited


Mr. Mu Li’s paper on online Sanlu dairy jokes is an interesting case-study of the contemporary Chinese humor that spread on the Internet as a reaction to the scandal caused by tainted milk powder in China in 2008. It is yet another example of a wider phenomenon, which traditionally has been called “black” or “gallows humor” (Obrdlik 1941-1942). The publication of this paper is especially important as it provides readers with an insider view of the tragedy in its specific cultural context; also, through translation and explanation, it helps those who, like me, do not speak Chinese to appreciate the witicism and word-play of these jokes, and to compare them with other instances of black humor.

Yet, as usually happens, the weak sides of the paper are an extension of its strong sides. Although Mr. Mu Li alludes to some previous research on the humor of various disasters (for example, Challenger, Three Mile Island and Chornobyl) he does so only superficially to say the least. Thus Yvonne Milspaw’s interesting paper is not addressed at all in his discussion, although it figures in the works cited (Milspaw 1981). The same can be said about the studies of other cultural traditions in general. As a result, the author mistakenly attributes some international themes solely to Chinese culture, such as the centrality of food, the feeling of the particularly intimate climate of family relations in this specific culture versus the cultures of the Other, and even the problematic relationship between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. All these motifs can easily be identified with many other cultures as well. In fact, according to Tangherlini’s study of Danish legend tradition, interaction with the Other encompasses three main categories: 1) sexual contact which poses threats to the fertility of the group; 2) attempts to spoil the food of the group; 3) attempts to kill, to maim, or to hurt the members of the group, and to pose threats to the existence of the group as a whole (Tangherlini 1995, 36). All of these categories are also relevant to gallows humor, especially when the disaster can be seen as being produced by the Other, whether he, she, or it is a monster, an enemy in war, an evil elite, a minority group, a colonizer, or so on.

Furthermore, while reading Mr. Mu Li’s paper, I lacked information on the tradition of joking in Chinese culture, especially the factors that affect transmission. The fact that Sanlu jokes spread only on the Internet is surprising to a person like me who grew up in the Soviet Union, where oral jokes were extremely popular among friends (although the parents, who had witnessed Stalin’s purges, were always on the alert and taught children not to repeat at school what they heard at home). Whereas jokes about the Three Mile Island disaster occurred in both in oral form and printed on T-shirts, cups, and ashtrays for commercial purposes (Milspaw 1981, 62), Chornobyl jokes were mostly transmitted orally, even in cases where they imitated commercials.
The reason for this is quite understandable: there was no Internet in 1986, at least not for the Soviet lay public, and the use of jokes as actual commercials was unthinkable in the USSR because of censorship and the lack of private business (Fialkova 2001; Fialkova 2007, 94-95). But, in the post-Soviet countries and the English-speaking world, folklore on the Internet functions as either an extension of oral tradition or as a new subcategory that developed within the Internet. In the latter case, the jokes have special characteristics that derive from the focus on reading and typing, visual perception, and being forwarded (Alekseevskii 2010; Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2001; Weissman-Dvir and Mendelson-Maoz 2007). However, the Sanlu jokes quoted in the paper do not possess any such characteristics which would make them inappropriate for oral transmission, and yet, according to the author, they spread only on the Internet. But why they were unpopular in oral discourse remains unclear.

Another interesting problem surrounding disaster jokes is that some disasters produce a large number of jokes while others do not. Here I would like to address the case of the scandal about the non-dairy Remedia powder that occurred in Israel in September 2003 and which, in some ways, mirrors the Sanlu scandal in China. This soy-based baby formula was produced by a German company—Milcherwe Westfalen EG (Humana GmbH)—and supplied to the Israeli firm Remedia. The formula powder was developed especially for Israel according to strict kosher food regulations because some ultra-religious Israelis prefer soya-based powder in order not to interfere with meat meals. In 2003, Humana changed the formula and stopped adding vitamin B1 (thiamine). Although senior officials in Remedia were aware of this change, not only did they do nothing about it, they did not even change the tins’ labels. Large quantities of the new formula arrived in Israel between April and June 2003. The shipments were released by the inspectors of the Ministry of Health without being properly checked. As a result, by September three children had died from beriberi, a kind of malnutrition which is typical of Third World countries and which has not been seen in Israel for a long time. More than twenty other infants were seriously impaired (Editorial The Jerusalem Post May 6, 2008). Senior officials from the Ministry of Health tried to avoid any responsibility for the disaster and placed blame solely on the private company Humana (Zarchin and Azoulay 2008).

Although the Remedia scandal had clear potential for producing jokes similar to that of the Sanlu scandal,—German-made food of the Other, infant-death as a result of manufactured food instead of breast-feeding—they appeared only sporadically. They were not recorded by the Israeli Folktales Archives (IFA) and only two of them were found on the Internet. I have highlighted the word ‘Remedia’ in the Hebrew originals:

What can be worse than a pile of dead babies? What can be worse than the fact that
the one beneath the pile is alive? What can be worse than the situation that the living baby must eat his way out for himself? Maybe the fact that all of them are already rotten? No, it’s the fact that the child has already eaten Remedia and is not hungry... ³

A granny cooked Remedia. She gave it to Kutsi, to Putsi and to Mutsi⁴ and no one remained.⁵

The scarcity of material makes definite conclusions difficult, yet I would like to mention that my daughter, Lilia Datshevsky, remembers the former joke from her early school years, when it was transmitted orally. At that time, which preceded the scandal, the joke lacked the last line concerning Remedia. To my mind, the scarcity of Remedia jokes results from the fact that the tragedy affected a relatively small number of babies, the tins were removed from the shops, and the press actively informed the public about the events. Jokes are more often produced in a situation of uncertainty when fear and the lack of reliable information make the stress unbearable for a large group of people. This was the case with the Chornobyl disaster, which in many ways more closely resembled the Sanlu disaster than the Remedia scandal did. For instance, accounts of the Chornobyl disaster described it as the result of negligence over the “peaceful atom” which was meant to improve the life of the people. The Soviet authorities tried to silence the catastrophe. They forced people with children to participate in May Day demonstrations in Kyiv [Kiev], where all of them were exposed to radiation. Information leaked out because of Western radio stations, and only then was it partially released by the Soviets. The press was unreliable and nobody knew for certain what to do. Radiation was known to affect food safety, sexual functions (possibly causing impotence), and to cause mutation and death. However, unlike the Sanlu case, all food, including traditional dishes, became contaminated. This difference notwithstanding, there is amazing resemblance between some jokes about the two disasters. Compare, for example, Chinese joke D2 about feeding a mother-in-law with Sanlu milk with the following joke from my Chornobyl collection:

“Граждане, граждане! Покупайте яблочки! Яблочки спелые, наливные, чернобыльские…”

“Бабка, а бабка! Ты зачем продаете радиоактивные яблоки, да еще и говоришь, откуда. Никто ведь не купит.”

“Покупают, милый, покупают. Кто для тещи, кто для начальства...У каждого свой резон” (IFA 18676, Fialkova 2007, 103)

[“Grazhdane, grazhdane(Citizens)! Buy apples! Ripe apples, juicy...from Chernobyl.

“Babka, babka (Old woman)—why are you selling radioactive apples and, what’s more, saying where they’re from? Nobody will buy them.”

“Many people are buying, dear, they certainly are buying. Some for their mother-in-law, others for the boss...everyone has a reason”] (Fialkova 2001, 191).

The mother-in-law in this joke is meusa, that is, the wife’s mother, and the conflict is between her and a son-in-law. Yet it
does not mean that the relationship between a daughter-in-law and her mother-in-law is any better. The distinction is genre-based. The wife’s mother is a comic figure in jokes, while the husband’s mother—свекровь—is either a wicked character or a victim in ballads.

Concluding my brief response, I would like to stress again the importance of cross-cultural comparisons in particular case-studies. It will help us to see the borderlines between the specific and the universal, and to not confuse the two.

Notes

1. Chornobyl is the Ukrainian name of the town known in Russian and other languages as “Chernobyl”. In my own text I use the Ukrainian name of the town and, when quoting others, its Russian name.

2. An interesting aside is that the absence of milk and the use of soya in Chinese cuisine has not only attracted many New York Jews to Chinese restaurants but has even contributed to the creation of the new identity of modern New York Jews (Tuchman 1992).

3.http://www.elsf.net/showthread.php%3Fp%3D8903300+%D7%91%D7%99%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA+%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%94&cd=9&hl=iw&ct=clnk&gl=il joke 6, Accessed 24.05.2010)

4. Kutsi, Putsi and Mutsi are common terms of endearment for babies.


Works Cited


Aronovich, Esti. No date. Shel mi ha-zizi haze le-azazel. [Whose tits are these, to hell with them.] Haaretz Online, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=502826&contrassID=2&subContrassID=13&sbSubContrassID=0 (Accessed 24.05.2010). In Hebrew


When the top-selling infant formula milk in China was found to be tainted in such a way as to cause kidney stones in infants, it soon became obvious that behind the company’s seemingly stellar reputation lay the greed of “fraudulent businessmen” and “corrupt government.” Subsequently a considerable array of jokes and mocking Photoshopped images appeared online, developing into the material upon which Mu Li has based his study.

Li’s comprehensive overview of the jokes surrounding the Sanlu tainted formula milk scandal is a very welcome addition to the dearth of folklore studies available in Western languages on East Asian jokes. This study also provides valuable insight into occasion-focused joke cycles (on which there has been somewhat more research) such as those following the Challenger explosion (Goodwin 1989; Ellis 1991), Chernobyl (Kurti 1988), Harrisburg (Milspaw 1981) and September 11th (Kuipers 2005; Ellis 2003).

Inherent in the material, however, is the difficulty implicit in translating something as culture-specific as jokes, as the actual incongruities, so necessary for the jokes to function, do not quite hit the right spot. The connotations and allusions, unless explained, fall flat. As Oring puts it “A joke will be successful only if the listener can identify and access the background knowledge relevant to the conceptualization of an appropriate incongruity. At root is the basic linguistic knowledge without which verbal humor cannot proceed” (Oring 1992, 6). The author has, however, done a good job in bringing to the reader, as clearly as possible, the cultural context from whence the jokes sprang. Although, at times, the multiple layers of meaning in the jokes make them slightly difficult to follow.

Li examines the forms of the jokes he retrieved, and arranges them into subsets: national identity jokes, sex jokes, political jokes, familial jokes, and anti-media jokes. From an outsider’s perspective, it is of great interest to see heretofore foreign joke patterns emerging, being repeated, and turning around to poke fun at different elements of these patterns.

The national identity jokes focus on, as Li explains it, the Chinese experience of dreaming to catch up with its Western and Japanese counterparts yet, in the process of doing so, having Sanlu devaluing it and finding that the gap is actually widened. He argues that “Although the approach may seem somewhat enigmatic to foreigners, non-Chinese prefer to accept a weak and damaged Chinese identity than a prosperous nation with great energy.” (31)

Milk imagery is also strongly connected to the idea of the West because, as Li explains, the word for “milk” also stands for “breasts,” leading to thoughts of sex and promiscuity that are frequently associated with Western culture. However, in the familial jokes category, another interesting trend emerges. Most of the familial jokes seem to focus on the stepmother–stepchildren relationship, a trend he later explains by informing us that feeding formula milk instead of breastfeeding is equated to bad mothering, calling up the imagery of the evil stepmother and giving rise to stepmother jokes. Thus, since
Western families are also perceived as not being as close or as loving as Chinese families, those who seek out compatibility by formula milk drinking are also seen as moving towards more impersonal familial relations. By assigning formula milk the representative power of the West, this connection draws the blame away from the Chinese government.

In the jokes, Li also encounters considerable parodies of the mass media, which is a strong correlation to the jokes collected in the wake of September 11th, presumably to a large extent due to the media’s part in covering up the tainted formula milk scandal. In his analogous discussion of the jokes following the demise of Princess Diana, Christie Davies argues: “The flourishing of jokes about specific shocking events, in the last thirty years or so, is a product of the rise of the mass media, and in particular of television and of the direct, dogmatic and yet ambiguous and paradoxical way in which accidents and disasters are presented to the public by the media” (Davies 1999, 254).

Li illustrates a thought-provoking point and provides a good insight for future research, by explaining formula milk as a cultural metaphor; he argues that in order to understand Chinese culture, one must be aware of food as the key. He convincingly argues that formula milk is a foreign product inundated with cultural significance, as a symbol of the Western other. Being a foreign, Western thing, makes formula milk an all the more acceptable target for joke traditions as it belongs to the other, a status which gives it distance and safety and makes it an “acceptable vehicle for the discussion of several taboo topics”. (32) This argument is significant because of the implication that, rather than the internet being a free zone of sorts and hence allowing for the distancing necessary for transmitting dubious jokes, it is the subject itself that allows for the anonymity needed to transmit the jokes.

My only reservation about this piece would be that there is not a comprehensive discussion of the contexts from which the jokes were retrieved. Frequent mention is made in the article of the jokes being “online” or “widespread on the internet, especially on Chinese websites” but, in the absence of any discussion of the websites cited in the bibliography, it is difficult to picture the precise social surroundings of these postings. Hence, when the question “Why do people tell Sanlu Jokes?” is posed by the author, the reader can not help but also wonder what people tell them, and when and where?

Works Cited


The Mythical Ghoul in Arabic Culture

Ahmed Al-Rawi
Rustaq College of Applied Sciences, Sultanate of Oman

Abstract
For a long time, the idea of the ghoul preoccupied the lives of many people from different cultures and religions. Though the ghoul has origins as old as the Mesopotamian civilization, Arabs were largely responsible for popularizing it. Because Islam incorporated this being in its doctrine, the ghoul remained a source of fear and mystery in the Arab culture.

Peter M. Holt and Ann Katherine argue in The Cambridge History of Islam that Islam came about as a ‘revolt’ and as a ‘protest against’ the old Arabs’ beliefs, but that it could not change all their existing convictions. Instead, it ‘integrated’ some old practices like the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca (1997, 17). This study argues that Islam could not change the belief in supernatural beings such as genies and ghouls, because they were an integral part of Arab culture. This essay sheds light on the Arabic origins of the Arabian Nights and suggests possible written sources for some tales as a complement to existing arguments that certain tales were orally transmitted and later written down. In relation to the ghoul, the paper also discusses the fact that some Arabian Nights tales contain Islamic elements and motifs, and feature plots that are clearly similar to older written accounts found in various Arabic books. This work traces its evolution from the past to modern times in an attempt to give an overall understanding of the ghoul, and an idea of how and why its concept changed from one culture to another.

The Pre-Islamic Ghoul

The earliest records of Arabs document their activities in Mesopotamia, providing evidence that the nomads of Arabia were always in direct contact with the more “advanced” people of Mesopotamia, mainly for the purpose of trade. This contact produced cultural exchange between the two peoples, mostly in terms of life style and borrowed words. In ancient Mesopotamia, there was a monster called ‘Gallu’ that could be regarded as one of the origins of the Arabic ghoul. Gallu was an Akkadian demon of the underworld ‘responsible for the abduction of the vegetation-god Damuzi (Tammuz) to the realm of death’ (Lindemans). Since Akkad and Sumer were very close to the Arabian deserts, Arab Bedouins in contact with Mesopotamian cultures could have borrowed the belief in the ghoul from the Akkadians.

Before discussing different ideas of the ghoul, however, I will examine the ghoul’s general depiction in a pre-Islamic context to show that the Arabic ghoul is older than the religion of Islam. In some old Arabic works written before Islam, ghouls were regarded as devilish creatures. al-Mas’ūdī (c. 896- c. 957) referred in Murūj al-Dhahab to the older books written by Ibn ‘Ishqq and Wahb Ibn al-Munabbih, who tackled the old Bedouins’ myth of creation. Arabs before Islam believed that when God created genies from the gusts of fire, He made from this type of fire their female part, but one of their eggs was split in two. Hence, the Quṭrub, which looked like a cat, was created. As for the devils, they...
came from another egg and settled in the seas. Other evil creatures, such as the Mârid,\(^3\), inhabited the islands; the ghoul resided in the wilderness; the si’lwah dwelt in lavatories and waste areas; and the hâmâh\(^4\) lived in the air in the form of a flying snake (1986, 171).

al-Qazwînî (c.1208-c.1283) mentioned a different description taken from an old Arabic source, which says that when the devils wanted to eavesdrop on Heaven, God threw meteors at them,\(^5\) whereupon some were burnt, fell into the sea and later turned into crocodiles, while others dropped onto the ground and changed into ghouls (1980, 236). Such descriptions cannot be found in Islamic texts. For instance, Abû ‘Uthmân al-Jâhiẓ (c. 775- c. 868), who compiled many popular beliefs in his book al-Ḥaywân (The Animal), wrote that commoners thought that the devil’s eyes were upright as in images taken from the Bedouins (1969, 214), whose ideas lived on for almost two thousand years.

As for popular tales, several stories dealing with the ghoul circulated before Islam. For instance, ‘Umar Bin al-Khaṭṭāb (c. 586-644), the second Muslim Caliph, was known as the man who killed a ghoul in the desert when he was traveling to Syria. After stopping him, the female monster asked the man: ‘Bin al-Khaṭṭāb, where are you heading?’ The Caliph answered: ‘This is not your concern,’ and the ghoul turned its head completely around in order to frighten him (Ibn Manẓūr vol. xxvii, 269-70). Knowing the evil intentions of the monster, Bin al-Khaṭṭāb raised his sword and killed it by striking it between its shoulder and neck. When he returned to the same place after few hours, however, he could not find the ghoul there (Ibid.).

In addition, Abû Asîd al-Sa’đî mentioned the story of Arqam Bin Abû al-Arqam in which a ghoul appeared and kidnapped al-Arqam’s, son who was on a desert journey. The ghoul, disguised in the form of a woman, carried the boy on its back. When they saw al-Arqam’s friend, the woman pretended to be the boy’s attendant (al-Wâqidî 1984, 104). This story emphasizes the well-known deceitful and wicked character of the ghoul. In folktales, motif (G443.2) ‘Ogre abducts woman’s children...’ (El-Shamy 1995, 149) is similar to the account given above. In general, the Pre-Islamic ghoul is known as a devilish female creature that intends to inflict harm on travelers and is able to change its form. In most cases, the ghoul is defeated by striking it with a sword.\(^6\) The following section discusses how the ghoul has been associated with Islamic practices.

The Islamic Ghoul

When Islam firstly spread in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, it succeeded in changing many old customs, such as ending the habit of burying recently born baby girls and preventing women from marrying more than one man at a time. It could not, however, change other ideas such as the belief in the ghoul or the si’lwah (si’lah).\(^7\) Prophet Muhammed mentioned the ghoul in several of his sayings, but later Muslim scholars had conflicting views about the authenticity of these sayings, as some negated the ghoul’s existence and others confirmed it. Despite the rational voices that rejected the existence of this mon-
Mythical Ghoul in Arabic Culture

ster, many Arabs (especially Bedouins) narrated tales and recited poetry that featured or mentioned the ghoul. Since this creature originated in the desert, it was particularly popular there from the pre-Islamic period until present time. However, the legend spread to the Arabs’ urban areas and became part of the culture there, which suggests that the Bedouins’ beliefs were very influential, and in some cases formed the very fabric of the Arab society. As mentioned earlier, Holt and Katherine’s argument that Islam could not change all the old beliefs of Arabia is valid in the case of belief in the ghoul.

Prophet Muhammed himself was said, in many instances, to comment on or confirm the existence of ghouls. For example, Ismâ’îl bin ‘Umar Abū al-Fidâ’ (?- c. 1372) mentioned in Tafsīr Ibn Kathîr that ghouls were the ‘demons of genies’, and cited the following famous incident: When the Prophet met his companion Abū Dharr in a mosque, the Prophet advised Abū Dharr to pray in order to be saved from the mischief of the devils of humans and genies. Abū Dharr was surprised to hear the Prophet confirmed the existence of creatures such as these, which the Prophet identified as ghouls (1980, 306-8).

In another anecdote, Abū Ayūb al-Anṣârī asked the Prophet’s advice because some ghouls used to eat from his dates store at night. The Prophet told him to say the following: ‘In the Name of God, answer the Prophet of God’. al-Anṣârī followed the advice and the ghouls promised not to return. The next day, the Prophet informed the man that they lied. His prediction was accurate. The Prophet then advised al-Anṣârī to recite the ‘Āyat al-Kursî’ (Throne verse) from the Holy Quran, which proved to be useful in getting rid of the ghouls (Abū al-Fidâ’ 1980, 306-8; al-Tirmidhî n.d., 158; al-Kūfî 1988, 94; al-‘Asqalânî 1959, 159; al-Naysâbûrî n.d., 519). Abu Asîd al-Sa’dî, another of Prophet Muhammed’s companions, had a similar experience (al-‘Asqalânî 1959, 489) though in this version the ghouls themselves gave advice on how to rid humans of their harm.

To sum up, according to the Prophet Muhammed, ghouls are the demons or enchantresses of genies that hurt human beings by eating or spoiling their food or by frightening travelers when they are in the wilderness. In order to avoid their harm, one can recite a verse from the Holy Quran or call for prayer since they hate any reference to God.

Other Muslim scholars like Abî al-Sheikh al-Aşbahânî (c.887-c.979) described the ghoul or si’îlah as a kind of a female demon that was able to change its shape and appear to travelers in the wilderness to delude and harm them. He narrated the story of Ahmed al-Dabbâgh’s father, who went once on a trip and took a risky road that was known to be frequented by ghouls. After walking for few hours, Ahmed al-Dubbâgh’s father saw a woman wearing a ragged dress lying on a bed above hung lanterns used to illuminate the place. When she saw him approaching, the woman started calling on the man to attract him; however, he realized that she was a ghoul, so he recited the Sūrat Yâsîn from the Holy Quran. As a result, the woman
put out her lantern lights and said: ‘Oh man, what did you do to me?’ Hence, he was saved from her harm (1987, vol. v, 1652) (Motif F491.10) en-Naddâhah ‘the she-Caller’ was described as a ‘female spirit who calls people by name and then leads them astray’) (El-Shamy 1995, 130).8


Though the sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammed seem to contradict one another,15 many Muslim scholars believe that ghouls used to exist before Islam. For instance, Abû Asîd al-Sa’dî (cited above) commented after narrating a story involving a ghoul that ‘ghouls lived at that time [before and at the beginning of Islam], but they perished later’ (al-Wâqidî 1984, 104). Yûsuf al-Anaafî shared the same view, stating that ‘God could have created this creature, but later He removed its harm from human beings’ (n.d., 268). According to the writings of these scholars, the Prophet Muhammed states ghouls no longer exist because God has rid humans of their mischief.

In brief, Islam tried to direct the people’s way of thinking to the one omnipresent God as the creator and mover of all things and did not acknowledge that there were other forces involved in controlling the universe. Conflicting views about the existence of ghouls, however, imply that Muslim scholars were still struggling to balance the widespread popular beliefs taken from Jahiliyya era (before Islam) with the new ideas of the Islamic doctrine. In order to understand the further influence of the ghoul on the Arab culture, this essay will analyze the popular beliefs expressed in different books written after the emergence of Islam.

**Arabic Culture**

Medieval Arabic culture is mainly reflected in literary works, especially poetry. However, there were other outlets by which writers expressed their views of their culture such as books of history, science, and philosophy. For instance, the Arab encyclopedic writer al-Jâhiẓ wrote about the types of animals and other creatures in al-Ḥaywân. He said the ghoul was believed to attract travelers by setting fire at night; subsequently, the travelers would lose their direction. (Motif G0412.3 ‘Ogre’s (ogress’s) fire lures person) (El-Shamy 2004, 1073). al-Jâhiẓ elaborated by saying that people viewed the ghoul as a type of genie, and the si’lwaḥ was the female genie if she did not change (tataghawal) or become a ghoul by deluding travelers. If a genie changed its shape and harassed travelers, it would become a she-devil or ghoul (1969, 195). In fact, al-Jâhiẓ confirmed the continuous belief in the ghoul and added a strange conviction popular among Arabs: the si’lwaḥ would die only by one mighty blow from the sword because if
two strikes were directed to it, it would not expire until one thousand blows follow (1969, 233 and 235). On the other hand, Yūsuf Ibn ‘Abdulbâr al-Qurṭubī (c.978- c.1071) considered the abovementioned view one of the Arab Bedouins’ legends, and the author harshly criticized al-Jâhiẓ for citing such a popular belief and accused him of being ‘foolish’ (1982, 177). Nevertheless, this belief was widespread. The best example is probably the Arabian Nights, which contains many other popular convictions dating back to the medieval times (Perho 2004; Shosha 2004). Also, Silvestre de Sacy stresses that there are Islamic elements in the composition of the Arabian Nights (Sadan 2004, 44). When Antoine Galland (1646-1715) first translated the Arabian Nights into a European language, he mentioned in the preface that the stories ‘must be pleasing, because of the account they give of the Customs and Manners of the Eastern Nations’ (1718, ‘Preface’). Furthermore, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762) compared the strange scenes and items found in Turkey with what she read in the ‘Arabian Tales’. Montagu reminded her sister by saying: ‘You forget… those very tales were written by an author of this country, and (excepting the enchantments) are a real representation of the manners here’ (1992, 157). Despite the fact that the Arabian Nights was only a fictitious work, Galland and Montagu considered it an accurate representation of the Arabic and Islamic culture instead of viewing it as a receptacle of some popular old beliefs.

Indeed, The Arabian Nights abounds with references to the ghoul and some of the ideas cited above. For instance, in Richard Burton’s translation of the ‘Story of Prince Sayf Al-Muluk and the Princess Badi’a Al-Jamal’ in The Thousand Nights and a Night, a man and his fellows were taken by a ghoul to its cave, but they managed to blind its eyes with hot rod and smite it with ‘the sword a single stroke across his waist’. The ghoul cried out: ‘O man, an thou desire to slay me, strike me a second stroke’. As this man was about to hit it again, his fellowman said: ‘Smite him not a second time, for then he will not die, but will live and destroy us’ (1886-8, vol. 7, 361). This tale corresponds with al-Jâhiẓ’s account of how to kill a ghoul by striking it once; apparently such a belief had not faded away from Arabic culture despite the fact that many centuries elapsed between al-Jâhiẓ’s time and that of the Arabian Nights composition. Muhsin Mahdī confirms that certain storytellers of the Arabian Nights transformed some anecdotes found in the books of history into fiction. For instance, al-Mas‘ūdī recorded an account similar to the tale of ‘The Hunchback and the King of China’ in the Arabian Nights (1995, 165-6). The following tale further suggests the link between factual written accounts and fictional tales.

In a story cited by al-Aṣbahānī and narrated by Zaid Bin A’slam, two men from Ashjja’ tribe wanted to provide a bride with her wedding outfits, so they went on a trip to an area where they saw a lonely woman. Upon seeing them, the woman said: ‘What is your need?’; the men replied, ‘We want to provide a bride with her needs’. The woman said she could assist in this business if the two men promised to come back to her.
So they made their promise. When they finished their business, the two men returned to the lady. She said: ‘I will follow you in your journey’. They made her ride on one of their camels until they reached a sand mound where the woman stopped and said: ‘I have some business here’, suggesting that she wanted to relieve herself. Unexpectedly, the woman remained behind the mound for an hour; thus, one of the two men went to check, yet he was delayed, too. When the other man climbed the mound and looked, he was shocked to see that the woman was lying on the man’s belly and eating his liver. As a result, the man ran as fast as possible to escape from this woman, but she glimpsed him and followed his trace. After stopping him, she said: ‘What is wrong with you?’. He replied: ‘There is an iniquitous devil among us’. Despite the harm she inflicted on the other man, the woman gave advice on how to avoid her mischief by supplicating and mentioning God. The moment the man did what he was advised, a fire fell from the sky and ripped the woman in two, so he thanked God for killing the si’lwh (1987, vol. v, 1671-2). This tale is somehow similar to those in the one narrated by Ahmed al-Dabbagh’s father cited above, which gives an idea of the possible source of this Arabian Nights tale. In general, the moral of such tales is to show God’s supremacy, which is far beyond the power of this naive monster. In addition, there is a recurrent notion that ghouls show up along desolate roads asking for help. They usually ask for a ride on a camel or horse with other passengers until they reach a proper place to stop and carry out their hideous plans.

Another popular aspect of the ghoul is the belief that it can change its shape; for instance, Antoine Galland translated a tale from the Arabian Nights entitled ‘The Story of the Vizier that was Punished’ (1798, 77-79), in which an ogre, the Western equivalent of the si’lwh, explains: ‘The Lady was a Hogres, wife to one of those Savage Demons, called Hogres, who stay in remote places, and make use of a thousand wiles to surprise and devour passengers...’ (1798, 78). The portrayal of the ogre in this story is the typical Arabic cultural concept of the ghoul that changes its shape and usually becomes an attractive woman in order to kill human beings. Again, al-Jâhiẓ
referred to this trait in the ghoul in his book *al-Haywân*, as mentioned earlier.

Other fallacies about the ghoul include the belief that it has ‘cloven feet similar to that of a goat’, according to al-Mas‘ūdî (1986, 170) or closer to that of an ‘ass’ (al-Manâwî 1945, 318). There was also the cultural practice of hanging a paw of a rabbit around one’s neck for the protection from the offenses of genies and the evil fires of the si’lah (al-Işfahâni 2004, 316-7). Furthermore, Arabs believed that ghouls resided in islands, for instance, al-A’drîsî (c.1100 – c.1166) mentioned that there was an island called ‘the si’àlî’ (she-ghouls) where certain creatures that looked like women lived, having long fangs and bright eyes like lightening. There was no difference between the males and females except for their genitals and their dress, which was made of tree leaves (1866, 53). Furthermore, Ibn Sa‘īd al-Maghribî (c.1213–c.1286) said that there were almost 100 small islands called ‘the ghoul’ wherein black naked people lived and spoke an indistinct language (1970, 130). In the Arabian Nights, many references to the ghoul correspond with the above description. For instance, Lane and Burton narrated the ‘Story of Fourth Voyage of the Es-Sindibad of the Sea’ (Lane 1865, 35-49; Burton 1886-8, vol. vi, 34-48) in which Sindibad traveled from Basrah and saw many islands, but nearly drowned when he was shipwrecked. Sindibad managed to swim with some of his comrades to an island by using a plank from the ship. On the shore, they saw a high building and walked toward it. Standing near the gate, a group of naked savage men ran toward them and took them all to the King. Those naked men were the ‘Magian people’ and their king was a ‘Ghul’ (1886-8, 36). Whoever came to their island were required to eat a certain kind of food, but unlike his fellows, whose minds were ‘stupied’ and ‘state became changed,’ Sindibad could not eat. Then Sindibad’s fellows were given cocoa-nut oil until they became very fat and stupid after which they were roasted and presented to the King. However, Sindibad succeeded in escaping especially after learning that the Magians eat raw human flesh.

Finally, the ghoul was thought to have magical powers by possessing human bodies. Some Western travelers to Arabia in the nineteenth century documented such a popular conviction; for example, in *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah* (1893), Sir Richard Burton pointed out that Arab Bedouins followed traditional medical practices based on superstitions because they interpreted rabies as: ‘a bit of meat [that] falls from the sky, and that a dog eating it becomes mad’. If a man was bitten by such a dog, his fellows must ‘shut him up with food, in a solitary chamber, for four days’; however, if he continued barking like a dog, they would ‘expel the Ghûl (demon) from him, by pouring over him boiling water mixed with ashes’ (1893, 389). In other words, the Bedouins believed that the ghoul could possess a man’s body and make him mad. Until this day, many Arabs believe that genies can take over a man’s body if he does not practice his religion in a proper way; hence, violent means are used by the cleric to exorcize the evil spirit. In her study of popular Islam (unorthodox reli-
gious practices), Gerda Sengers mentions the *zar* as an exorcising ritual well known in Egypt in modern times. The *jinn* (genies) and *Asyad* (demons) are believed to be responsible for ‘clothing’ (possessing) one’s body, and the main method of driving these supernatural beings away from the body is by reciting certain verses from the Holy Quran (2003, 23-4). On the other hand, in Burton’s account, Arab Bedouins think of the ghouls as a kind of genie that possesses one’s body instead of being an animal-like creature, denoting that this monster has retained its old ethereal character mentioned in Islamic texts.

Apart from the abovementioned tales, many comparisons were made in Arabic poetry between ghouls and human beings in order to describe an ugly woman, a forceful man, or an evil trait. For instance, ‘Âşim Bin Kharwa’ah al-Nahshâlî disparaged his wife saying:

> She is the ghoul and the devil put together…,

> Whoever accompanies the ghoul and the devil is depressed,

> Even genies seek God’s protection upon seeing her. (Hâshim 2001, 813)

The ghoul was used in many Arab proverbs to denote different meanings; for instance, it referred to a repulsive human being with a horrible looking face: ‘Uglier than a monkey, uglier than a pig, uglier than a ghoul’ (al-Naysâbûrî, 129) or ‘uglier than the devil’, which referred sometimes to the ghoul’s repulsiveness (al-Jawzî 1983, 63). al-Qazwînî pointed out that Arabs stressed the ghoul’s ugly features. However, even if they did not see a ghoul, mentioning its name in poetry and tales brought fear to listeners (1980, 387).

In brief, the Arabs understood the ghoul to be an ugly female demon that intends to harm travelers and even to kill them in some cases. It has the ability to change its form and become a beautiful woman to attract men or even to mate with them. The ghoul’s description is close to that of a predatory animal that has fangs and cloven feet, and combines features of the snake, goat, and ass.

Since Islam clearly dictated that its followers use their rational judgments in assessing matters, there were many Arab writers, particularly those belonging to al-Mu’tazilah (Recluses) school, who negated the very existence of the ghoul because they relied on reason in analyzing different cultural and religious issues. For instance, al-Jâhiẓ, who was one of the al-Mu’tazilah members, offered a logical explanation for the myth of the ghoul. He said that if a man sought solitude in the desert, he would be confused, distracted, unfocused, and would start seeing the small thing as huge. He might also perceive the invisible, hear the inaudible, and view minute matter as utterly magnificent and big (1969, 150). In other words, the desert heat and fear caused by darkness and loneliness could make any man hallucinate and see illusions. A young person, for instance, who grew up with ghoulish stories that were part of his culture, might go alone to the wilderness at the dead of night and become delusional at the sound of the first owl cries and voice echoes. Sir Richard Burton’s interpretation of the ghoul fell
along similar lines. In his translation of the ‘Story of Fourth voyage of the Es-Sindibad of the Sea’ (1886-8, vol. vi, 34-48) in *The Thousand Nights and a Night*, Burton explained the word ‘Ghul’ as ‘an ogre, a cannibal’ and said: ‘I cannot but regard the “Ghul of the waste” as an embodiment of the natural fear and horror which a man feels when he faces a really dangerous desert’ (1886-8, 36). Finally, Hasan El-Shamy suggests that one’s ‘life space’ contains an amalgam of ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ worlds. ‘If a child is told that wolves swallow “kids” whole and live in old tombs, then as association is established between wolves and these acts and objects; for the child, this is what wolves “really” do’ (1999, 7).

al-Jâhiẓ further elaborates by saying that after remembering the hallucination, a man would possibly write poetry or narrate tales about seeing this monster, thus making other people believe in its reality more than before. If that man was a natural liar and habitually exaggerated and overstated matters, he would claim to have seen the ghoul or talked to the šī’lwaḥ (1969, 150). Others might pretend that they killed the šī’lwaḥ or accompanied it or even married it. al-Jâhiẓ stressed that some of those liars would be tempted to continue misleading others if they encountered naïve commoners who did not question or doubt such tales and who could not distinguish between reality and fantasy (1969, 151). Carl von Sydow classifies such accounts as memorates because they deal with a belief in superstition like stories of ghosts (Green 1997, 92-3), and El-Shamy mentions similar motifs (A2909) ‘Origin of jinn [genie]: generated by hallucination caused by sensory deprivation’ and motif (F1043.1) ‘Hallucinatory experiences from sensory deprivation’ (1995, 58 & 143). In brief, the accounts mentioned above suggest that human beings imagine fearful creatures such as genies and ghouls because of the old fanciful stories they have heard. These supernatural creatures will become more real and will ‘materialize’ when people with feeble minds are frightened or in a state of exhaustion.

Furthermore, the Arab philosopher Abū al-‘Alâ’ al-Ma’arrī (c.973-c.1057) stated in *Risâlat al-Ghufrrân* that some Arabs ‘lied about the ghoul’ (1988, 244); he stressed that ‘whatever was contrary to reason must be a myth’ (1988, 223) such as the story Ta’abbaṭah Sharran. Another Arab writer who objected to the popular beliefs in ghoul was al-Jawzī (c.1116-1196). In his book *al-A’dhkyâ’* (The Bright Ones) al-Jawzī tells the story of a brave and strong man called al-A’drra’ in the city of Kūfah. al-A’drra’ heard once that there was a ghoul near one of the remains on the outskirts of the city and decided to investigate the matter because he believed that ‘the devil and the ghoul were only illusions’. After riding on his horse at night, he suddenly saw a fiery creature decreasing and increasing in its size. As the horse panicked, the man was forced to walk, and he followed the trace of fire to a cellar located under the remains. The man felt his way along the narrow corridors because it was very dark, and when he reached its end, he caught a person. Astonished, al-A’drra’ found out that the fiery shape was only a black woman, so he swore to kill her if she would not speak the truth. Instead,
the woman asked a question: ‘Are you a genie or a human being? I have never seen anyone else braver than you!’ The man discovered that the lady was a slave serving a family in Kūfah who ran away and stayed in the remains. In order to survive, the woman had the idea of terrifying travelers by using a stick, a candle, and a piece of cloth. She used to hold the candle in one hand and the stick in another and place the piece of cloth over the stick. By moving them all, she managed to create an illusion of a glittering indistinct creature. Then she would do the same without the stick to fool the people by showing that the creature changed its size. For two decades the woman was able to use this same trick to frighten travelers, who would throw their luggage and run away. After learning her story, the man took the woman to her owners, and travelers were no more harmed by the alleged ghoul (2001, 107).

Finally, ‘Abdul Qâdir al-Baghdâdî (c.1620-c.1682) cited the Arab poet Kâm-il, who wrote: ‘After viewing the fellows of my age, I found no true friend who could stand by you at times of need/ I have known then that the impossible matters are three: the ghoul, the phoenix, and a faithful friend’ (1979, 136). These lines of poetry have become proverbial in Arabic language, which suggests that many Arabs believe that the existence of the ghoul is a mere illusion. In brief, rational interpretations of the fallacy of the ghoul in Arabic culture, there is another type of ghoul called shiqq. In the following section, I will present an analytical discussion of this devilish beast because of its importance in understanding the ‘other side’ of the ghoul.

shiqq

Several Arabic sources referred to the shiqq or nasnâs which literally meant ‘half’ and ‘only one half is visible’ (Marzolph & Leeuwen 2004, 535). In folktales, the ‘person with half a body’ and the ‘one-sided man’ are well-known motifs (F525) and (F525.1) (Thompson 2002; El-Shamy 2004, 163). In pre-Islamic Arabic accounts, there was the famous story of ‘Allqumah Bin Ṣafwân Bin Umayah al-Kinâni who once rode a donkey and went during a clear night to Mecca. He reached a place called Yahūman where he met the shiqq carrying a sword; however, they both fell dead at the end of the fight (al-Qazwīnī 1980, 237; al-Dimīrī 1978, 601-2; al-Jâhiẓ 1969, 206-7; al-Zamakhsharī 1976, 379-80). After Islam, the shiqq remained alive in the minds of the people who believed in its existence. For instance, al-Jâhiẓ said that this creature was known to be ‘a kind of genie appearing to travelers to kill them either by frightening them or by beating them’ (1969, 206). However, the shape of the shiqq was peculiar because it had only ‘one eye, one hand, and one leg’. al-Qazwīnī further clarified that the shiqq was ‘a devilish creature which looked like a half human’ (1980, 237). In the Arabian Nights, ‘The Story of the Sage and the Scholar’ referred to nasnâs, denoting that this was a common belief held by Arab people.
In spite of the pre-Islamic origins of shiqq, Arab Bedouins held this creature as part of their popular beliefs for many centuries since Charles Montagu Doughty (1843-1926) referred in *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (1888) to it. Doughty’s traveling desert companion mentioned that there was a genie type with ‘horrible’ looks; ‘certain of them have but one eye in the midst of their faces’ (1964, 17). Doughty met an Arab Bedouin who swore that he saw a ‘ghrôl’ or ‘ghrûl’ in the desert and provided the following description:

[It had] ‘a cyclops’ eye set in the midst of her human-like head, long beak of jaws, in the ends one or two great sharp tusks, long neck; her arms like chicken’ fledgling wings, the fingers of her hands not divided; the body big as a camel’s, but in shape as the ostrich; the sex is only feminine, she has a foot as the ass’ hoof, and a foot as an ostrich. She entices passengers, calling to them over the waste by their names, so that they think it is their own mother’s or their sister’s voice.... (1933, 53)

Doughty considered these tales ridiculous, saying that ‘no man, but Philemon, lived a day fewer for laughing’ (1933, 53) at such stories. Nevertheless, Hasan El-Shamy classified tens of Arab folktales that belong to 327B (The Dwarf and the Giant) in which Nuşş-nuşaiş (Half) and Ḥdaydūn were the main characters (2004, 1001). Also, motif (G415.1) ‘Ogress poses as man’s sister and invites him to live in her house’ (El-Shamy 2004, 1073) is similar to the account mentioned above. Again, the legend of the half person has not faded away in the popular imagination, though the one mentioned in folktales is rather friendly and carries human features unlike the devilish shiqq or nasnâs.  

To sum up, the ghouls is very popular in the oral tales of Arab Bedouins. As a proof, Western travelers who visited the Arab region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries referred to this monster mainly when they encountered the Bedouins. However, when Antoine Galland translated the *Arabian Nights* in the eighteenth century, he claimed that the ghoul mentioned was of Arabic origin (Al-Rawi 2009). The following section discusses the way Galland changed perceptions of the ghouls in the West by attributing it to the Arabic culture.

**Galland’s Contribution**

In his translation of the *Arabian Nights*, Galland tried to give an authentic rendition of the Arabic work, but he deviated several times by deleting and adding many details. Among the details he introduced about the ghoul, one can be found in volume 11 in ‘The Story of Sidi Nouman’ (1798, 78-9). Galland mentioned that ghouls were male monsters that in ‘want of prey, will sometimes go in the night into burying grounds, and feed upon dead bodies that have been buried there’ (1798, 81). In addition, he introduced the morbid character of Amīna. Though she was newly wed, Amīna preferred to accompany the ghouls in the graveyard at night. In the Arabic culture of the time, no such character existed, which indicates the liberty this French translator took in his translation (Al-Rawi 2009). According to the Ox-
ford English Dictionary, the word ‘ghoul’ nowadays means an ‘evil spirit supposed (in Muslim countries) to rob graves and prey on human corpses’ (1989). This inaccuracy is clearly an effect of Galland’s translation, which was not a faithful rendition of the Arabic original word (Al-Rawi 2009). Unfortunately, other works followed Galland’s new description of the ghoul without further inquiry. For instance, the famous orientalist William Lane (1801-1876) suggested the ghoul ‘applied to any cannibal’, as a creature that ‘appear[ed] in the forms of various animals, and in many monstrous shapes’ so as to ‘haunt burial-grounds and other sequestered spots; [and]… feed upon dead human bodies’ (1987, 42; 1860, 227). This description corresponded with Galland’s account. Lane did not cite any Arabic reference to support his claim; instead, he referred to Galland’s translation of the Arabian Nights rather than original Arabic sources. Lane also contradicted his own work because he never described the ghoul in such a manner in his book An Arabic-English Lexicon, in which numerous Arabic references were used (1980, 2311).20

Furthermore, in his classification of Arab folktales, Hasan El-Shamy mentioned motif G20 ‘Ghouls. Persons eat corpses’ and its subtypes by referring to Victor Chauvin (1995, vol. i, 144). However, the latter only cited Galland’s ‘Sidi Nouman’ tale as evidence of his claim (1902, vol. vi, 198). As in Lane’s case, Chauvin and subsequently El-Shamy depended on Galland’s ghoul. Ultimately, Galland embellished the ghoul with a new feature that became a standard description of this creature in the West.

In an attempt to investigate the origins of Galland’s idea of the ghoul that digs graves and eats corpses in Arabic sources, it is necessary to compare his description with some Arabic references to a certain animal that has similar characteristics. In old Arabic writings, the only account similar to Galland’s ghoul is found in the popular description of the hyena. al-Dimīrī (c. 1341-c.1404) mentions that hyenas ‘are fond of digging graves due to their great appetite for eating human flesh’ (1978, vol. i, 641). Also, al-‘Aiṣāmī (? –c. 1699) cited anecdotal evidence of an event that occurred in Mecca in 1667, in which a hyena-like animal came close to an ass, so some men traced it. The animal ran to a nearby house and injured the woman living there. As a result, the men killed the animal and called it ‘ghoul’ because they did not know what it was (2007, vol. iii, 51). This tale suggests the proximity with which people viewed the two creatures. Furthermore, J. E. Hanauer documented several stories about the superstitious beliefs in animals among Jews, Christians, and Muslims during his journey to Palestine in the late 19th century. According to the Arab belief, if the hyena is ‘not content with digging up and devouring dead bodies’, it would ‘often bewitch… the living and lures them to [its] den’, and it is believed to appear to ‘the solitary wayfarer, rub against him endearingly and then run on ahead’. According to Hanauer, this person becomes, ‘instantly bewitched’ and would follow the hyena ‘as fast as he can till he gets into the beast’s den and is devoured’ (1907, 271). In folktales, Muhawi and Kanaana believe that the hyena is ‘traditionally
linked with supernatural forces, its effect on human beings being considered similar to that of possession by the jinn’ (1989, 43). Also, El-Shamy classifies motif (B14.5) ‘Ghoul (ogre) as hybrid of jinnyyah and hyena’ (1995, 104) which corresponds with the idea cited above. As the hyena is well known to eat carcasses and produce some semi-human sounds like crying and laughter, it can be easily confused with the ghoul. The above mentioned accounts are almost identical with the description of Galland’s ghoul since he could have heard a similar account from Arab friend, Hannâ Dhiyâb who inspired the orphan tales in the Arabian Nights, or read somewhere about the belief in hyenas in the Arab world and applied such a description to the ghoul. In Arabic culture, the ghoul is still alive, making its appearance in its different spectrums and retaining its old features, as discussed below.

The Ghoul Today
The belief in the mythical ghoul is still widely spread in the Arab world up to this day, particularly among elderly people. In almost all Arab countries, the ghoul is viewed as a monster that eats human beings and is used as a means of instilling fear inside children’s hearts. Many modern stories rewritten and adapted from old Arabic folktales deal with this monster, whose description resembles the one mentioned in this work. For example, the Palestinian writer, Amīl abbī, published a story called Sarâyâ Bint al-Ghoul dealing with a girl called Sarâyâ who was kidnapped by a ghoul and was imprisoned in his palace. Later, her cousin searched for her and managed to rescue her (Motif G0440.1 ‘ogre abducts woman (maiden)’ and motif G0500 ‘Ogre defeated’) (El-Shamy 2004, 1073 & 1074). Another Palestinian, Jamīl al-Salḥūt, published a story for children called al-Ghoul portraying a small girl called Khadījah who dreamt of the ghoul after hearing its horrible description from her grandmother, so she urinated while asleep due to her excessive fear. When she narrated the dream to her teacher at school, the grandmother was criticized for narrating such old legends. Furthermore, the famous Egyptian film actor ‘Ādil Imâm starred in al-Ghoul (1981) in which he appeared as a journalist trying to discover the truth about a fearful and cruel tycoon who harmed people and exploited them. The ghoul in this film referred to a hideous person due to his ugly behavior, as is the case in old Arabic proverbs. In the following section, a more empirical discussion of the ghoul is made in an attempt to understand how this creature came to exist in Arab people’s lives.

Alternate Account
In view of the details given earlier, ghouls can merely be real human beings carrying birth defects. The mouth of the ghoul is believed to have the shape of a cat’s, or what is now medically called a ‘cleft lip’ and ‘cleft palate’. In addition, a ghoul is thought to have deformed legs or hands that look like that of an ass which is medically called ‘ankyloactilia’, and it has hair covering a great deal of its body. In fact, many children around the world are born with such defects every year due to environmental factors and genetic flaws (Carinci et al. 2007, 2). If one
takes into account the fact that pregnant women in the desert lack basic nutritious food and that Arabs, until this very day, commonly practice intermarriage within their tribes over many generations, one can conclude that the ghoul is a child with serious birth defects. After giving birth, the mother might be forced to part with her child due to his/her congenital birth deformities. As a result, the child would be ostracized from his/her tribe and would seek the desert as a refuge because superstitions played an important role in the lives of Arabs before Islam. Hence, the Arabic stories that mentioned a marriage taking place between a human being and a si’alwah can be true in view of the above mentioned assumption. In brief, the ghoul could be a real human being born with severe birth defects, compelling him/her to reside in the wilderness to avoid other humans who would naturally loathe and fear horrendous and ugly creatures.

Conclusion
The mythical ghoul of Arabia has preoccupied the Arabs for several centuries and will certainly remain a source of inspiration for some writers and a cause of fear for many children. One of the main reasons behind its fearful character is its mysterious nature since there is no unified agreement about its features; the ghoul is thought to be a kind of devil, genie, enchantress of genies, devilish genie, and spirit. However, most accounts mention this monster as an ugly and harmful female creature. In all cases, the belief in such a supernatural being is still solid mainly among uneducated people who are plagued by ghoulish tales from their early childhood until their death. What is striking is that the ghoul refuses to fade away from the imagination of some people regardless of the great passage of time and the various cultures and religions it has encountered.

Notes
1. There are plenty of Arabic words whose origins are derived from the old languages of Mesopotamia. For instance, the Arabic word ‘harem’ that is associated with women stems from the Akkadian word ‘Harimtu’ which means ‘sacred prostitute dedicated to the godhead’ The ending ‘u’ is usual in such an old language that was deleted in Arabic. As for Ghoul, the Arabic root of the word is ‘ghâl’ which means ‘kill’; hence, the Akkadian word ‘Gallu’ explains the etymological connection.
2. According to Ibn Durayd (838-933), the Quṭrub is the male ghoul (1987, 1121).
3. The Mārid is a type of a devil whose name means ‘rebel’ because it has rebelled against God (al-Zubaydī 1998, 165).
4. For the detailed meaning of hâmah, see note (11).
5. The Holy Quran contains a verse that describes the devils eavesdropping on Heaven in order to overhear God’s angels; thus, meteors are thrown at them (al-Ṣâfât (7-10) 446).
7. The two words are used interchangeably to refer to the same creature; however, the si’lwaḥ or si’lah is always feminine.
8. The Western beliefs in the spirits of the
wilderness, Joan the Wad, Jack o' the lantern, and will-o'-the-wisp are similar to the description of this ghoul.

9. 'adwâ or infection here means transmission of diseases. Before Islam, Arabs thought that the mythical animal şifr could be transmitted like a disease from one person to another (al-Nawawī 1971, vol. xiv, 215; ‘Abdulwahâb n.d., 373). The other interpretation, according to al-Nawawī, was that the Prophet stressed that diseases could not be transmitted to other people without God’s will (1971, vol. vi, 325).

10. Arabs before Islam used to believe in tatayur or portents. If any traveler attempts to leave somewhere, he/she has to check the signs by letting a bird fly before the journey takes place. If it goes to the right side, it is a good herald, whereas the left side is a bad omen, so the traveler must postpone the whole trip.

11. Before Islam, Arabs believed that the predatory bird hâmah or the owl had a very bad omen. If such a bird dies near someone’s house, the house’s owner should expect that one of the residents will die. In addition, Arabs believed that the bones of the deceased or their souls would turn later into predatory birds as one way of incarnation; as a result, the Prophet emphasized the falsity of the mythical basis of such a belief (al-Nawawī 1971, vol. xiv, 215; al-Mâlikī 1994, 342; ‘Abdulwahâb n.d., 378; al-Dimîrî 1978, vol. i, 226). Until this day, the owl is viewed as a bad omen by many Arabs. In addition, the hâmah was believed to be a worm leaving a man’s skull if he was killed without being avenged. It would circle around the man’s tomb saying: ‘water me’, asking for vengeance. Jews in Arabia used to think that the hâmah would circle round a man’s tomb for seven days before departing (‘Abdulwahâb n.d., 379). Hasan El-Shamy assigns for the hâmah motif (E0451.9.1) ‘hâmah ceases to appear when revenge is accomplished’ and motif (E0473.2) ‘ghost of murdered person in owl-form that cries for revenge’ (2008, 114), but he classifies the hâmah as part of the ‘Soul’ or ‘Self’ section instead of being a subheading of ‘Zoological Supernatural Beings’ since the hâmah was believed to be an animal-like creature.

12. bântû meant pain in the stomach that could infect other people (al-Tamîmî 1967, 199; al-Sajistânî n.d., 520), and sometimes it would infect livestock cattle (‘Abdulwahâb n.d., 379). Furthermore, it was believed to be the other name of şifr, which was one of the months in the Islamic calendar. Though Arabs believed that there were sacred months during which fighting was prohibited, some used to change the rules of war each year. They would sanction the war once but might allow it the next year according to their interests. The Prophet banned this practice (al-Tamîmî, 197-8). In addition, al-Sajistânî mentioned a third explanation of the word bântû saying that Arabs used to regard şifr as an ill-omened month and the Prophet corrected that view (n.d., 18).

13. Abû Sâdât al-Jazrî (c.1149 –c.1209) mentioned that şifr was a kind of a serpent that inhabited the stomach and used to sting a man when he felt hungry (1979, 35). In this way, Arabs explained hunger pangs as şifr stinging them. In folktales, El-Shamy classifies a similar motif (G328.1) as a ‘serpent inside man’s body eats all his food’ (1995, 148). In fact, şifr can be simply a tapeworm, a kind of helminthiasis, that usually infects, due to contaminated water or food, the digestive tracts of human beings, wherein it grows rapidly and reaches sometimes several meters in size.

14. naw’ was the old belief that meteors or ‘falling stars’ would certainly bring rain. The Prophet emphasized that the falling stars had no effect, but it was God’s will that could bring rain and generate the wind (al-Ţabarî 1984, 208).

15. Other Muslim scholars believed that prophet Muhammed did not negate the existence of ghouls; instead, he only said that
they had no power to change their shapes (al-Kūfī 1988, 311; al-Nawawī 1971, vol. xiv, 217; al-Sīūṭī 1996, 239; al-‘Asqalânī 1959, 159; al-‘Abbâdī 1994, 292). al-Burrūsī (?- c.1918) elaborated by saying that ghouls could not delude people or change their visages, but the enchantresses of genies, the si’lwah, could if it encountered genies (1911, vol. iv, 450).  

16. In Myths of Babylonia and Assyria, Donald A. Mackenzie described the widespread belief in Babylonia that some sick people were thought to be possessed by a devilish creature. ‘It had therefore to be expelled by performing a magical ceremony and repeating a magical formula. The demon was either driven or enticed away’ (1910, 234).  

17. al-Jâḥiż said that the place was called azmân wall instead of Yaḥūmân.  

18. al-Qazwīnī referred to another devilish creature called Dilhâb that appeared in the shape of a human riding on an ostrich. It lived in sea islands and ate outcasts who were driven by the sea after being shipwrecked. Also, it was reputed to have a shrill cry that would make any person faint upon hearing it (1980, 237).  

19. Surprisingly, the Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung (1875-1961) reported during the summer of 1920 that while he was staying in an old farmhouse in Buckinghamshire that he saw a weird creature appearing, particularly at night. Aside from the other descriptions given, Jung stated: ‘[I] opened my eyes. There, beside me on the pillow, I saw the head of an old woman, and the right eye, wide open, glared at me. The left half of the face was missing below the eye. The sight of it was so sudden and unexpected that I leapt out of bed with one bound, lit the candle, and spent the rest of the night in an armchair’ (1977, 323-4). Similar to al-Jâḥiż and Burton’s explanations of the ghoul’s existence, Jung interpreted this apparition as a hallucinatory experience due to exhaustion, fear, and recalling memories of a particular lady. Jung commented on the sounds he heard in the room saying that they were ‘probably not objective noises, but noises in the ear which seemed to me occurring objectively in the room. In my peculiar hypnoid state, they appeared exaggeratedly loud… My torpor was associated with an inner excitation probably corresponding to fear’ (1977, 325).  

20. Lane referred in Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians and Arabian Society in the Middle Ages to the Arabs’ superstitious belief in ‘Ghools’, ‘Seałáh’, or ‘Saałáh’ and said that there was no foundation in their belief. In a chapter called ‘Demonology’ in Arabian Society, Lane said at the end: ‘I must beg the reader to remark that the superstitious fancies which it describes are prevalent among all classes of the Arabs, and the Muslims in general, learned as well as vulgar’ (1987, 46). Lane’s observation could be partly right because he wrote his works at a time when the majority of the people were uneducated, and the Bedouins’ tribal customs and beliefs were widely spread in the society due to many centuries of regression.  

21. al-Dimīrī further says that Arabs make comparisons between humans and hyenas to refer to ‘an ugly looking woman from debased origins or an old witch’ (1978, 644).  

22. In medieval Europe, a child born with mental or physical disorder was mainly ‘viewed as evil’. For instance, when Martin Luther heard about such a child, he recommended that he ‘be disposed of by drowning’ (Eberly 1991, 228 & 231). In a recent medical study conducted on Nigerian women giving birth to children suffering from cleft lips and palate, seven out of sixteen women interviewed from the Yoruba ethnic group believed that ‘evil spirits’ were behind their children birth defects. Eight of those women considered spiritual healing the only method of treatment (Olasoji et al. 2007, 304).
Works Cited


Doughty, Charles M. 1933. Travels in Arabia Deserta, With a News Preface by the Author, vol. i. London: Butler & Tanner LTD.


Galland, Antoine, trans. 1718. Arabian nights entertainments: consisting of one thousand and one stories told by the Sultaness of the Indies, ... Translated into French from the Arabian MSS. by M. Galland, ... And now done into English. vol. i. 5th ed. London: Andrew Bell.


Green, Thomas A. 1997. Folklore: An Encyclopedia of Beliefs, Customs, Tales, Music, and Art, vol. i. California: ABC-CLIO.
Ahmed Al-Rawi


**Arabic Works Cited**


This article will contribute significantly to the study of the Arab culture and will be of immeasurable value to scholars in the fields of folklore, sociology and anthropology. It is an overall understanding of the ghoul and traces its evolution from the past to modern times in an attempt to give an idea of how and why its concept changed from one culture to another. The article adeptly deals with mythical figure of the ghoul in Arab cultural and literary life since the Jahiliyya until the modern period. The author correctly maintains that this mythical figure will certainly remain a source of inspiration for some writers and a cause of fear for many children (and adults). I would like to stress here that even modernist and avant-garde Arab writers utilized (and indeed, still utilize) the ghoul in their literary and poetic works in order to convey their political and social message in a hidden and sophisticated manner.

This is brilliantly evident in the writings of the prominent Palestinian novelist, Emil Habibi (1922-1996), in which the collective Palestinian culture is inscribed as much in the naturalistic account of mundane events as in the flight into fantasy and imagination. In his Sarâyâ bint al-Ghoul (Sarâyâ the Ghoul’s Daughter, 1992), an impressionistic semi-autobiography, Habibi evokes the image of the Palestinian fairy-tale heroine Saraya, a mystical figure which captivates the narrator imagination. His quest takes him into Arab myth, his own personal past and the collective psyche of the Palestinians. By using a network of inter-textual references to the image of the Ghoul in Arabic culture, Sarâyâ becomes an allegory to the lost Palestinian identity and the author’s yearning to his childhood.

Indeed, the article’s conclusion that the ghoul refuses to fade away from the imagination of some people regardless of the great passage of time finds in Habibi’s (and other Arab writers’) literary works a striking validation.

According to popular belief in the Middle East, the ghoul approaches men, women and adult children and then kill them. One of the arguments, in this paper is that Islam could not change all the old beliefs of Arabs when one thinks of the ghoul. Although Prophet Muhammad mentioned the ghoul in several of his sayings, but later Muslim scholars had conflicting views about the authenticity of these sayings as some negated the ghoul’s existence and others confirmed it. At any case, Arabs are practicing some methods in order to ward off the ghoul: one should say loudly the name of God- Allah, or bism Allah al-Raman al-Rahim. It is worth noting that the Qur’an refers to the attributes of God as God’s “most beautiful names” (al-asmā’ al-ḥusnā), they are traditionally enumerated as 99 in number. Some of the folk say phrases from the Holy Quran, mainly ayat al-Kursi:

“Allah! There is no god but He, the Living, the Self-subsisting, Eternal. No slumber can seize Him nor sleep.
Allah is the One who habitation is in all the heavens and on earth. Who is there can intercede in His presence except as He permitteth? He knoweth what (appeareth to His creatures as) before or after or behind them. Nor shall they compass aught of His knowledge except as He willeth. His Throne doth extend over the heavens and the earth, and He feeleth no fatigue in guarding and preserving them for He is the Most High, the Supreme (in glory)” (Quran 2:255).

Doctrinal Islam and Folk Islam

Amira El-Zein
Georgetown University
USA

Ahmed al-Rawi argues at the beginning of his article that “Because Islam incorporated this being in its doctrine, the ghoul remained a source of fear and mystery in the Arab culture”. Al-Rawi erects his whole article on the basis of incorrect contention for which he fails to provide any support.

To be “incorporated...in its doctrine” as the author claims, the ghoul should have been mentioned in the official source of Islam, the Qur’an. This is not the case. The jinn and two of their sub-species, namely marid and ifrit, are the only kinds of spiritual entities mentioned in the Qur’an. Thus, although the belief in the concept of the jinn is not one of the five tenets of Islam, Islamic doctrine requires belief in their existence. This, however, is not the case for the ghoul.

As for the Hadith (the Prophet’s acts and sayings), those that pertain to the ghoul are problematic and unreliable, which the author acknowledges. Also, the Hadith is not sacred in the same way as the Qur’an. The latter is the Word of God per se for Muslims, but the Hadith is not. It remains the words of a human being, even if that human being is a prophet. The only thing that is truly central in the faith of a Muslim is the belief in the words of the Qur’an. Thus, if the ghoul is not mentioned in
the Qur’an and the references in the Hadith are questionable and contradictory, how can it be considered doctrine?

This misapprehension is a result of the author’s greater confusion between Arabic folklore and Islamic doctrine. The ghoul belongs to Arabic folklore, both Muslim and Christian, and thus is not specific to either doctrinal Islam or Islamic culture in general. A lot of the medieval Arabic sources that the author mentions are simply compendiums of anecdotes, stories, and citations from previous sources. They do not belong to folk Islam per se, but neither do they belong to doctrinal Islam.

Furthermore, al-Rawi misinterprets the most important text of Arabic folklore, namely, the Arabian Nights. Let me offer the following four points. First, he refers to Silvestre de Sacy to contend that “there are Islamic elements in the composition of the Arabian Nights”. But since Nights was written in the Islamic empire between the ninth and eighteenth centuries, it is a truism to assert that they contain Islamic elements and that they have “elements going back to medieval times,” as the author writes.

Second, the author should have used more recent scholarship to confirm the Islamic identity of the Arabian Nights rather than depending on the opinions of Europeans, such as Silvestre de Sacy, who wrote centuries ago. Along the same lines, one wonders why the he didn’t use the more recent translation of the Nights by Husain Haddawy (1990) instead of the outdated translation by Richard Burton (1886-1888)?

In fact, al-Rawi’s article is filled with references to the Orientalist corpus including works by Richard Burton, Antoine Galland, and Silvestre de Sacy. Instead of revisiting or questioning the Orientalists’ contentions on ghouls, however, he simply takes them for granted, and even follows in their footsteps. As a third point, I would like to closely follow al-Rawi’s text to illustrate some of the ways in which it simply re-hashes Orientalist views. To begin the section entitled “Arabic Culture” he writes:

When Antoine Galland (1646-1715) first translated the Arabian Nights into a European language, he mentioned in the preface that the stories ‘must be pleasing, because of the account they give of the Customs and Manners of the Eastern Nations’ (1718, ‘Preface’).

Here, the author accepts Galland’s assertions without probing them. Is it true that the Nights’ stories give an “account…of the Customs and Manners of the Eastern Nations”? (ibid). Shouldn’t al-Rawi scrutinize Galland’s assumptions? How could these folk tales be representative of the manners and customs of various whole nations? Isn’t Galland generalizing about the East? What did Galland know about the customs and manners of the East? He never traveled to any Arab country. It was from his desk in Paris that he wrote about the East. His only contact was an Arab Christian from Aleppo who happened to be in Paris at that time.

Al-Rawi, however, is not satisfied with just one example form the Orientalist corpus. After Galland he cites Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, de Sacy and Burton all of whom, he believes, were accurate in their interpretations of Arab superstitions.
He seems to be unaware of the dangers of accepting the opinions of others without scrutinizing them. He seems to completely ignore the groundbreaking work of the late Edward Said, precisely entitled *Orientalism* (1978), which has forcefully demonstrated how the same Orientalist writers that al-Rawi cites in his article created a hegemonic discourse that de-valued rich and fundamental cultures, peoples, and religions into an array of demeaning stereotypes.

His incorporation of these sources is not superficial; it is an outgrowth of his basic methodology. Throughout the article al-Rawi proceeds in a similar manner, first citing a Western source and then compiling anecdotes from Arabic sources in order to prove that the Western source is correct. This lack of a critical stance toward sources is rife throughout the piece. For example, he writes:

Peter M. Holt and Ann Katherine argue in *The Cambridge History of Islam* that Islam came about as a ‘revolt’ and as a ‘protest against’ the old Arabs’ beliefs, but that it could not change all their existing convictions. Instead, it ‘integrated’ some old practices like the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca (1997, 17). This study argues that Islam could not change the belief in supernatural beings such as genies and ghouls, because they were an integral part of Arab culture.

But Holt and Katherine’s assertion deserves some analysis. Is it true that Islam couldn’t change old customs and thus integrate them? Most importantly, why did Islam keep some of these customs and reject others? What are the arguments used by these two scholars to convince us that Islam integrated the ghoul in its beliefs? What are the sources they used to back up their thesis? In keeping with his flawed methodology, the al-Rawi again merely cites a few stories from the Arabic *corpus* and then quickly concludes that, “As mentioned earlier, Holt and Katherine’s argument that Islam could not change all the old beliefs of Arabia is valid in the case of belief in the ghoul”.

Fourth, in addition to al-Rawi’s uncritical acceptance of Western sources, he also asserts that, “The following tale further suggests the link between factual written accounts and fictional tales”. But, this statement shows a misunderstanding of folkloric texts, such as the *Nights*, which went through a lot of variation during their circulation. It is almost impossible to say that a tale “suggests a link between factual written account and fictional tales” because the tales of the *Nights* were written over a period of almost eight centuries and kept changing form and content until printing appeared in the Arab world. The tales of the Nights were transformed through time by the narrative oral act and thus could not possibly accurately reflect factual accounts.

**Works Cited**


Gifting the Bear
and a Nostalgic Desire
for Childhood Innocence

Donna Varga
Mount Saint Vincent University,
Canada

Abstract
This article examines twentieth and twenty-first century adult relational interactions with the teddy bear toy. It describes the association between the teddy’s mythological origins and its infusion with a commoditized sentimentality that provides adults with a nostalgic return to an imagined personal and social time of childhood innocence. This analysis further details how the ‘gifting’ of teddy bears to adults and children in response to social or personal crises denies possibilities for meaningful human interactions and social change.

Imagine a child holding tightly onto a teddy bear. The bear’s face wears a comforting smile; the child’s shows openness and peacefulness. This is an iconic image that from the early twentieth century has symbolized the toy’s assumed protective innocence shielding the otherwise vulnerable innocent from real or feared harm. The line drawing shown here, from a 1920 children’s picture book, reflects this illusory simplicity. Produced by instilling emotional labor in adult products (Hochschild 1983, 160), this commoditized compassion is constitutive of the adult teddy bear culture that by the 1920s, privileged the toy as a redeemer of individual human frailty and of human social failings. Unlike children’s fantasy, the dominant beliefs and values of this adult culture are governed by an emotive sentimentality that depicts the teddy bear as possessing real feelings toward humans. Thus, as a result of the creation of the teddy bear as emotive subject, the ideology of teddy bear culture sees the
personal sacrifice of superfluous material goods as both all that is necessary and sufficient for the personal and social restitution of humanity.

This article provides a socio-cultural history of that transfiguration and of its relationship to the activity of teddy bear gifting: the provision of teddy bears as a means for alleviating the alienated emotional self. Adult teddy bear culture is identified as an outcome of the late nineteenth-century symbiosis of child-animal nature in popular and scientific culture. Over the first half of the twentieth century, the ideologies of the child as young animal and animals as sentient beings became embodied in the teddy bear, which, in turn, became representative of white childhood innocence. From the second half of that century and continuing into the twenty-first, the toy was further imbued with social, emotional, and material capacities of transformative love.

Examining the mythology of the teddy bear’s origins and the infusion of the item with a commoditized sentimentality reveals how it has become possible for the teddy to be reified as therapeutic artifact, and for its gifting to become an act of social justice seen as equivalent to donations of food, clothing, and financial aid. It can be tempting to dismiss or mock adult reverence for the teddy as nothing more than kitsch, but Ehrenreich (Ehrenreich 2001, 43-53) has warned of the ways that the all-encompassing nature of kitsch in the lives of women suffering from breast cancer is built upon a social alienation that celebrates passive social interaction in place of real social change. Similarly, Sturken’s Tourists of History, explains that the teddy bear’s cultural promise is to, by its presence alone, “make us feel better about the way things are,” (Sturken 2007, 7) to quell the possibility for anger, rebellion, aggression, or hate against personal and social conditions. Coupling its socio-cultural history to the analyses of Sturken and Ehrenreich, I argue that the gifting of teddy bears, a commercialized relational artifact, is a practice that inherently replaces real social and political engagements with a dehumanizing relationship to things.

The Birth of an Icon

Happy birthday, teddy bear
It’s been 100 years.

Happy birthday, teddy bear
We’re glad that you are here
(Pell 2002).

The origin of the teddy bear toy and its value as ambassador of love is situated within a mythological outcome of a November 14, 1902 hunt, when President Theodore Roosevelt is deemed to have freed a bear that had been roped for him to kill. In different tellings, the captured bear is variously described as “old”, “young”, “sick”, or, according to a 1926 magazine article, as “only eighteen inches tall” (Crenshaw 1926, 62). The narrative also places the event as being on the last day of a failed hunting venture during a break in border negotiations between Mississippi and Louisiana. Some accounts characterize Roosevelt as being an unenthusiastic participant in the hunt who takes the captured bear as a White House pet; at other times, the President is said to have taken the bear to a zoo or taken the bear’s pelt to the Smithsonian for preservation.
The year 2002 was celebrated in North America, Europe, and Asia as the 100th birthday of the origin of the teddy bear. In Mississippi, this anniversary was even marked with a resolution designating the teddy bear, or teddy, as the official state toy with the legislature stating that “the stuffed bear toy, appropriately named the ‘Teddy Bear,’ evolved and continues to be a universal symbol of love, comfort and joy for children of all ages” (Mississippi Legislature 2002). In the resolution’s wording, President Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt is reconstituted as bear sympathizer, a soft-cloth child’s toy becomes a humanitarian ambassador, and Mississippi, a state with a long history of violence, is constructed as the source of this empathetic creature.

Frank Murphy’s children’s book, The Legend of the Teddy Bear further buttresses the legitimacy of this narrative by explaining that while, “many legends are based on fiction…the story of Theodore Roosevelt refusing to shoot that bear…is based on fact” (Murphy 2000, no page). Murphy blends hagiography with patriotism by claiming that Mississippi and Louisiana, “wanted this great and fair man to settle an argument about a boundary line” (Ibid). He propagates the President’s folkloric status by denoting him as akin to the common man, while at the same time being “adored” by “the people of America” (Ibid). In reality, Roosevelt was of Fifth Avenue old New York stock who had not yet established a Presidential reputation, given that he had only succeeded to the office in September 1901 upon the shooting death of President McKinley, and towards whom there were widespread feelings of dis-gruntlement (Dalton 2002; Watts 2003).

Murphy’s text and illustrations accentuate the fear and suffering of a captured cub, roped by the neck with two dogs at bay. Roosevelt, though toughened by life in the outdoors, displays a benevolence that belies the hunting discourse of his time:

Some of the men in the president’s group cornered a young bear. Barking dogs surrounded the frightened bear, as the men roped and tied it to a tree...The frightened bear clawed at the rope, trying to free itself. The bear whipped his head back and forth. Its back feet kicked up clouds of dust and dirt. Teddy looked down at his rifle and then...laid it on the ground. He shouted out to his men, “Stop badgering that bear! It is helpless. Let it go!” (no page)

The key points of this and similar stories for both children and adults are: hunters other than Roosevelt capture the bear; Roosevelt, disgusted by the act, orders its release; the bear escapes unharmed. The variations on this myth are globally disseminated through the Smithsonian, popular publications and websites for adults, children’s picture books, and scholarly histories of Theodore Roosevelt. These have been successful in displacing real knowledge of Roosevelt’s hunting behaviors with fictitious reminiscences of him as a selfless animal protector. This substitution has been a necessary component of teddy bear culture; it provides the model for love to be transferred from human to bear, which is then imagined as being reciprocated by the bear, through its lifeless representative in the form of the teddy bear, to humans.

The actual events of the hunt need repeating here not only to counter the proliferation of inaccurate accounts, but also because the facts provide context for an-
alyzing gifting behavior. On November 14, 1902 Roosevelt was engaged in the first day of a bear hunt in the canebrakes of the Mississippi Delta. It had been planned weeks in advance by Roosevelt as a holiday to recuperate from the taxing endeavors of resolving the anthracite coal strike that had paralyzed the Eastern seaboard (President’s Trip 1902, 9). According to Holt Collier, the esteemed African American hunter who was the party’s guide, Roosevelt insisted on being the first to kill a bear (Buchanan 2002, 167). This could not be guaranteed if the hunters were to follow the dogs, as the Delta terrain made it impossible to herd the bear toward a specific hunter. Roosevelt was, therefore, positioned in a blind, stationed in an open area where Collier assumed a bear could be driven out (Ibid).

Select journalists who had been allowed to the hunt site, and who published identical stories in the Washington Post and the New York Times provided an account of the events. It was reported that Roosevelt returned to the camp when it appeared that the bear would not be flushed until late in the day, but, in Roosevelt’s absence, the bear emerged at the spot where he had been placed (One Bear Bagged 1902, 1; One Bear Falls Prey 1902, 1). The bear, having been chased into a water hole, attacked and killed one of the hunting dogs. Collier, who later expressed exasperation with Roosevelt’s desertion of his assigned post and thus failure to prevent the ensuing mayhem, acted to save his remaining dogs by clubbing the bear with his rifle. He then tethered the comatose animal to a tree so that Roosevelt could have his kill (Buchanan 2002, 170). Roosevelt declined, probably because his political enemies would have used his shooting of an unconscious bear against him. A fellow hunter attempted to kill the bear by knife, but his lack of skill only caused the animal further torment; so Collier finished the task by stabbing the bear through the heart (Buchanan 2002, 171-2). The carcass was taken back to camp where it was deemed to have been an adult weighing 250 pounds and the body was consumed over the next couple of meals, with a paw roast for Sunday’s dinner (Quiet Day in Camp 1902, 1).

The day after the story about the hunt was published, the Washington Post ran, on its front page, the cartoonist Clifford Berryman’s depiction of the President refusing to kill the bear (Berryman 1902a, 1). In it the animal’s captor, shown as a white rustic in place of Collier, struggles to keep his grip on a rope wrapped tightly around the bear’s neck. The bear, instead of being unconscious, pulls strongly back with eyes suggesting fear. Roosevelt carries a Winchester and has a full cartridge belt around his waist. The hunt knife that was tucked into his belt was not primarily for skinning or self-defense, but for killing animals by hand, the preferred technique of the socially elite hunters of the period.

Post readers would have been aware of the details of the bear’s death from the previous day’s article. Roosevelt’s predilection for killing wild animals was also well known. For these reasons as well as the softly ironic style of Clifford Berryman, the Post’s star political cartoonist, the public would have been able to understand the cartoon and its “Drawing the Line in Mississippi” caption as a derisory commentary on the President’s
accusations of extravagant hunting practices by others, while himself engaging in excessive animal slaughter.¹

What happens at this point in teddy bear history is as wrapped in confusion and mythology as the tale of the 1902 hunt. According to teddy bear lore, the cartoon stimulated Rose Michtom, co-proprietor of a New York novelty store, to create and sell a home-stitched, stuffed toy bear modeled on Berryman’s cartoon. It was, supposedly, a quick seller, prompting her to make more which also speedily sold. Rose and her husband then reportedly exchanged letters with President Roosevelt requesting, and getting permission, to name the toy the “Teddy bear”. Its subsequent popularity resulted in the formation of the Ideal Toy Company and the mass production of teddies. While this tale acts to perpetually heighten the homespun and entrepreneurial Americana version of the origins of the teddy bear’s manufacture, most of it is probably false.

Another possibility, that is probably closer to the truth, although it remains marginal to teddy bear culture, is that the toy is based on Johnny Bear, the title character of nature writer Ernest Thomson Seton’s 1900 story of that name (Seton 1900). Seton was one of the most admired of the new-style nature writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His stories, written for adults but also shared with children, were the first in English non-fiction to present the perspective of wild animals as having moral, psychological, and emotional lives that are as meaningful as those of humans. He and like-minded writers were powerful influences on the growing penchant to understand the wilderness and its inhabitants as having an inherent worth that could be shared with humans rather than exploited for economic gain (Lutts 1990, 30; Nash 1982, 147-148).

It is most likely that the earliest stuffed toy bear to arrive on the American market was created by Steiff, the German felt manufacturing company.² In early 1903 it presented such an item at toy fairs in New York and Leipzig. It was a rod-jointed toy, the appearance of which was based on the European brown bear (Maniera 2001, 25-6). Rather than being a replication of Berryman’s image, this bear was an extension of the company’s line of soft-cloth wild animal toys that was developing from, and encouraging, a growing public market for this type of children’s plaything.

Regardless of who sewed the first teddy-like bear, its idealization as human-animal child was manifested in the period’s adult popular culture, including Seton’s story about Johnny Bear.

From Wild Bear to Innocent Teddy
After Berryman’s publication of “Drawing the Line” he included an insouciant bear in his next cartoon about Roosevelt’s same hunt. In this one, a bear sitting atop a hill observes the hunting party leaving the area carrying exhausted and dead dogs; one hunter drags behind him a live bear around the neck of which is a tag that reads, “Back to the Zoo”; the bear on the hill holds a newspaper with the taunting headline, “HOW CAN YOU BEAR TO LEAVE ME!” (Berryman 1902b, 1). Berryman continued to regularly use the bear imagery (which he referred to as Bruin) in his political cartoons, often shown in tandem with Roosevelt and for a number of years as a critical comment on Roosevelt’s hunting practices.
However, the antics of Bruin are more clearly aligned with the taunting bear, as opposed to one being helplessly dragged away. 3

Adult readers of the *Washington Post* were so enthralled with Bruin that its appearance made Berryman a celebrity. The National Press Club subsequently requested the November 16 cartoon for display and archival purposes. Berryman could not locate it, (it had likely been discarded), so he drew it anew (Mullins 2002, 43). The actual date of the new version remains obscure, but it likely took place between 1903 and 1906. The differences between the first and the second images are notable. In the new version the bear hardly resembles the real thing; it is small, wide-eyed, and vulnerable. Its size makes it of no use as meat and of no danger to humans. Roosevelt is less a svelte example of the strenuous life and more a portly sport hunter of his social class sans hunting knife. In this drawing Berryman reproduced what had become a favored re-imagining of the outcome of the November 14 hunt, with Roosevelt as the bear’s savior, and the animal as a young, quivering creature.

In teddy bear culture the second version of “Drawing the Line in Mississippi” is invariably cited, including by the Smithsonian, as the original, with the reimagined captive bear’s appearance proof that it stimulated the creation of the Michtom’s teddy toy, and with its title demonstrating Roosevelt’s demand for the animal’s release. Such has helped sustain the mythological relationship between Roosevelt and the bears – the real one and the toy. It preserves the belief of a spontaneous generation of the teddy bear from the original 1902 *Washington Post* cartoon (and a regeneration of the real, killed bear), and replaces Berryman’s original challenge to Roosevelt’s hunting practices with reverence. This historical amnesia in relation to the cartoons is a purposeful deceit, given that the correct dating is provided in many popular writings about the teddy bear, but then immediately ignored. Those who engage in this reconstruction of historical memory appear to be fulfilling a public’s nostalgic desire for a personal and social time of innocence, and perhaps to liken one’s self – through teddy bear gifting – to the fabled Roosevelt.

In 1906 the bear toy really was refashioned by the Michtom enterprise with its production of a cuddlier and more infantile version. Rods were not inserted into the body and its appearance was babyish – with chubby limbs, largish head, low-set wide-spaced eyes, round torso, soft coat, and small hump (Maniera 2001, 25-26). This restyled bear incorporated the latter nineteenth-century conceptualization of an animal-child symbiosis that arose out of the new nature writer literature and child development theory (Varga 2009a).

By the second half of the nineteenth century, white childhood was being popularly defined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seventeenth-century argument as a period of moral innocence, an idea amplified by theological assertions that white children were “angels incarnate” who had “entered this world with the innocence and sanctity of heaven still clinging to them” (Calvert 1992, 104-105). In the realm of visual culture, the eighteenth-century painterly equation of “childhood with innocence and with nature” was, in the nineteenth century, pop-
ularized by the production of prints of idealized child portraits (Higgonet 1998, 49, 51). The belief in white childhood innocence was given scientific credence in the late nineteenth century by the child study authority, G. Stanley Hall (Ross 1972 309-340) through the application of recapitulation theory to human development. The theory posits that individual development is a successive passage through the evolutionary phases of one’s race, with infants and young children being at a stage of unenlightened morality analogous to animals (Gould 1967). The uniting of the sublime wild and innocent childhood discourses created, by the final years of the nineteenth century, a belief in a natural kinship between animals (especially young animals) and children that gave to both a consciousness that was superior to that of adult humans (Varga 2009b). The outcome was an archetype of a white childhood naturally innocent of impiety in thought and action and physiologically marked by chubby limbs and wide-open eyes.

Commodification, mass production, advertisements, and children’s literature quickly established the Michtom model of the teddy bear as a nursery toy, and its child-like form was ensconced in material and social culture. This included its 1907 inscription on infant spoons (Teddy Bear Baby Spoon 1907, 27), and inclusion in an advertisement for children’s breakfast cereal (Toasted Corn Flakes 1907, 48). Its imagery was replicated by other producers of toy bears and in most children’s stories with a bear character. Its idealization of innocence was featured as the piano music for *Teddy Bear’s Two-Step* (Bratton 1907) renamed with lyrics added in 1932 as *Teddy Bears’ Picnic* (Kennedy 1932).

While the early twentieth century’s cult of innocent childhood expanded the range of soft-cloth children’s toys to other animal characters (Varga 2009a), the teddy bear was imbued with an exceptional status. It was not just an item of childhood pleasure, but, early on, was thought capable of safeguarding children against adult vagary. As such, the teddy is singular in its function of maintaining the innocence of children and of childhood. In addition, it provided early nineteenth century parents and other adults with an object they could give to children as a means of vicariously satisfying their own emotional needs to experience the world as new and joyful as if through the eyes of the wondrously innocent child (Cross 2004).

The teddy’s role as protective agent of childhood innocence is a central element of children’s stories from 1907. In that year the widely popular *Ladies’ Home Journal* provided a fictional story about an ill mother who buys her young son a soft-cloth bear (Taylor 1907, 11, 76). The boy’s father mocks his son’s interest in the toy as effeminate, resulting in their estrangement. When the mother dies the child is bereft of companionship, and he seeks out the bear for comfort. The boy’s need overcomes his father’s derision, and they are reunited in a melodrama of sorrow and love: “Father’s arms swept around them and gathered them into his queer lap….’Poor old man!’ he was whispering over and over. ‘I’ll try hard, Boy. Oh, my God, but try hard, little chap!’” (Taylor 1907, 76). The bear looks on, winking in triumph. The story’s publication in a popular adult magazine suggests that the teddy was accepted by middle class adults as a guardian of childhood – at least in a fictionalized world – and as a
therapeutic agent of emerging twentieth-century consumer capitalism” (Lears 1994, 250).4

Another of the earliest teddy gifting stories was a 1911 tale about a well-to-do child who gives her small bear toy to a destitute girl who had expressed a desire for one just like it (Oldmeadow 1911, 78-79). An unknown man who had witnessed her generosity rewards selflessness by in turn giving her a teddy for Christmas, with this one being “almost as big as herself” (Oldmeadow 1911, 78). Extending the toy’s protective status beyond its original owner and the bourgeoisie provided a moral lesson to children of that social class: giving a teddy to poor children would bring happiness to the destitute, and result in an exponential material return.

The teddy as a cultural signifier of the symbolic comforts of childhood, home, and family was further commercialized during various social crises of the early twentieth century. After the 1912 Titanic sinking, Steiff produced black mourning bears; these were part of a window display at Harrods and for sale (Cockrill 2001). During World War I, pocket-size teddy bears were produced for sale as charms to be given as gifts to soldiers being deployed (Maniera 2001). Still, for most of the first half of that century, the teddy was primarily considered a child’s plaything and a storybook character whose status of childhood innocent did not generally encompass adults.5 This would change in the 1950s.

Nostalgic Innocence

I should like to bury something precious in every place where I’ve been happy and then, when I was old and ugly and miserable, I could come back and dig it up and remember. (Waugh 1945, 24)

The cultural importance of the teddy was dramatically transformed as of the mid-twentieth century, to being an item of adult idolatry. This was stimulated by the rising popularity of psychoanalysis with its notable reference to the teddy bear as a commonplace transitional object that because of its unchanging and passive form was used as a tool of comfort and security for children as they learned to understand themselves as separate from their mothers (Winnicott 1953, 89, 91). In the face of psychosocial alienation within capitalism, the teddy, as a mother-substitute, became an adult fetish. Retreating inward to find solace, the toy could be spoken of as having a therapeutic value for adults, of being considered, “a leavening influence amid the trials and tribulations of life” (Henderson 1962 as quoted in Maniera 2001, 144).

The post-1950s expansion of commercial nostalgic production enhanced adult interest in teddies (Moran 2002). An increased availability of entertainment products and discretionary income heightened the anxiety of an adult consumer culture “fearful of the future and alienated from the past” from which “they found refuge in the mystique of childhood…defined and experienced through consumer culture” (Cross 2004, 27, 15). Teddy bears produced for, and marketed specifically toward, adults were stylized after those from the earlier decades of the twentieth century (Cockrill 2001). These bears were neither toys for adults, nor simply a reminder of times past. Instead, the teddy was intended to provide a real
transcendence of time and space, a material means for bringing back as lived adult reality the supposed simple and innocent times of an undefined era of a bygone childhood.

In the early 1980s the teddy as a solution to the nostalgic desire for childhood innocence was given substantive impetus by the American and British television broadcast of Evelyn Waugh’s book, *Brideshead Revisited*, from which the opening quote to this section has been taken (Waugh 1945, 45). The program made a celebrity of Aloysius, the teddy bear companion of the adult, Lord Sebastian Flyte. In addition, Flyte’s implicit homosexuality, unacknowledged in mainstream teddy bear culture, made the artifact an icon of the gay community. In the 1980s, giving teddy bears to AIDS sufferers was a means for extending contact in an indirect way to the forbidden bodies of the ill and the dying. Originally these were personal gifting, but, by the end of the decade, they had become an essential part of the growth of AIDS activism (Harris 1994, 55-6). The commodification of AIDS teddies was also a means for challenging straights to see the disease as a killer of innocents.6

The collectors’ and popular magazine, *Teddy Bear and Friends*, has been one of the initial and foremost solidifiers of teddy bear culture. Established in 1983, the magazine and its followers have been supportive of a lifestyle normalizing the adult adoption of fantasized childhood hegemony. This includes the creation of terminology that defines its beliefs, the meaning of which is obscure to those unfamiliar with the culture— for example: arctophiles are lovers, that is, fans, of teddy bars; a hug is a collection of teddy bears; artist bears are handmade limited edition teddies; bearapy is teddy bear-facilitated mental health intervention.

By the last years of the twentieth century its most adherent adult fans considered the teddy a sentient being indistinguishable from human childhood and this idea has been reproduced within children’s culture. The 1994 children’s book, *When the Teddy Bears Came* (Waddell 1994/1998) provides further evidence of the adult view of teddy bears as, at the very least, no different from that of children, and, perhaps, of even greater sentimental value. In the story, a newborn human baby, who remains genderless and nameless, is gifted with one teddy after another. In contrast to the baby’s status, each teddy is gendered and named. Alice Bear, Ozzie Bear, Sam Bear, Huggy, Rockwell Bear, Dudley Bear, and Bodger Bear are wide-eyed furry infants with whom Tom (the baby’s brother) has to compete for family space on the sofa. In the final pages, the teddy bears’ and human infant’s needs are deemed equally worthy of struggle for space and attention: “And that’s what they did. When the new baby came to Tom’s house they all took turns taking care of the bears…and together they all looked after the baby” (Waddell 1994/1998).

The expansion to adult popular culture of the desire for the teddy to be a child is illustrated by a 2010 television commercial for Snuggle Dryer Softener Sheets. A teddy bear has been the product’s ‘spokes-bear’ since at least 1984, denoting familial comfort by its expression of both the “wondrously innocent” and “cute” of post-industrial consumer society (Cross 2004). The 2010 advertisement shows a young white woman who
Donna Varga

has just taken laundry out of her drier, kneeling down with hands stretched out toward a digitalized Snuggle teddy. The bear toddles toward her, arms stretched forward, eyes wide and bright in anticipation of her comforting hug.

While advanced capitalism has heightened individual expectations for personal fulfillment, the failure of those needs to be met through material consumption and the “split in society between personal relations and anonymous social relations” (Zaretsky 1976, 10) has left people devoid of a satisfying inner emotional life. The ownership and exchange of teddy bears is an act intended to mediate between feelings of being alone and unloved, and the desire to receive and give love. Its extension through teddy bear gifting is an individual and collective attempt to integrate a personal life with effective communal relations. However, the basis of teddy gifting culture in the commercialization of emotions, with its emphasis on the individual’s personal feelings and inner needs, causes it to replace political action and reinforce the very conditions of subjective and social alienation.

Gifting as Therapeutic Innocence

Gary Cross has persuasively argued that the cultural construction of a wondrously innocent child has provided adults with assurance that by their participation in children’s culture they too can be sheltered from life’s difficulties and made emotionally whole. Within this context resides the expectation that the teddy bear is capable of transforming human lives. Hundreds of organizations exist for the purpose of collecting donated teddy bears and providing them to children who have experienced a mass disaster or a personal tragedy. Innumerable human illnesses and conditions have a teddy bear mascot, often adorned with an emblematic colored ribbon. Emergency personnel carry teddies about to give to children and adults who have experienced trauma. Such activities of teddy bear gifting are based on a belief in the toy’s capacity for transcendent love that creates for recipients a fanciful pleasure-filled childhood. The internet site, Teddy Bears for Hope, explains this in rhetoric comparable to spiritual belief as being an inexplicable phenomenon: “There’s just something about a Teddy Bear that’s impossible to explain. When you hold one in your arms, you get a feeling of love, comfort and security. It’s almost supernatural” (Teddy Bears For Hope).

Website solicitations by teddy bear organizations are also often patterned after televangelist ministries, for example:

Every donation to Teddy Bears for Hope will help send brand new teddy bears to children around the world who will benefit from their love and comfort. Donations of all amounts are accepted and appreciated in order to provide hope to as many children as possible.

(Teddy Bears for Hope “Donate”, bold in original).

Pictures of forlorn children who are without teddies and smiling children with teddies, along with stories of happiness returned, support a belief in the object’s transformational possibilities.

Gifting was initially manifested as a spontaneous and sporadic placement of teddies on coffins of young children or at sites of the deaths of young people (Grider 2006, 256-257). The 1995 bombing
of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City brought about a mass expression of memorializing in protest against the attack and as a means of conveying emotional kinship with victims and their families. A variety of material goods were brought to the scene, each in some way a personal expression of human intimacy. These things, which included teddy bears, were favored television images and were repeatedly shown along with melodramatic music, footage of the bombing’s aftermath, and a photograph of the attempted rescue of the infant, Baylee Almon.

The spectacle encouraged such an onslaught of teddies that despairing city officials pleaded with the public that, “no more cuddly stuffed teddy bears be sent”; that, “they are beyond teddy bears” (Knapp 1995, 5). Their appeal went unheeded. Items of various kinds kept arriving and were finally incorporated into the city’s memorial project (Sturken 2007, 117-118); by 2009 there were 60,000 items (Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum). That the teddy is the official representative of all, having been named in 1995 as the National Memorial’s “symbol of comfort,” bespeaks of the desire for an object to fulfill a desire for love to conquer despair. It is the lone “being” gracing the Memorial Holiday Ornament – a Christmas tree decoration showing a teddy bear seated on a Memorial chair, and similar looking teddies are sold at the Memorial store (Ibid). It has been named Hope Bear, and schools borrowing the Memorial’s peace education Hope Trunk receive a certificate, “proclaiming your school a Hope Bear school,” and get to keep the toy (Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum 2008, 2).

Two years after Oklahoma, the car crash death of the United Kingdom’s Princess Diana resulted in a manic outpouring of grief about her demise, and anger at the British Royal family for what was perceived as its poor treatment of her. Mounds of teddies were placed outside her one-time London home, Kensington Palace, with personal notes attached, and were tossed along with flowers onto her passing funeral motorcade. The Oklahoma and Princess Diana episodes foretold the monstrous dimension teddy gifting was to take. In 2001 hundreds of thousands were sent to New York City, Washington, and Pennsylvania after the September 11 terrorist attacks. That of these, 100,000 were provided by the Oklahoma City Memorial archive (Strauss 2001) reveals that the burden such questionable donations place on aid workers had been substituted, in public service memory, with a desire to believe in the toy’s capabilities of magically reversing time. By October 2001 there was a concern that a shortage of teddy bears would further traumatize children. One of the founders of Operation Teddy Care reported that, what with the needs of Oklahoma City, Kobe, postal workers (because of anthrax), hazardous material workers, police and rescue workers – all of whom “need the comfort of a teddy bear” – “traditional sources of large donations of the toys are ‘maxing out’” (Workman 2001).

After 9/11, as in Waddell’s story discussed earlier, the bears kept arriving. In 2004 planeloads were sent to East Asia after the December Tsunami. In 2005 they arrived in New Orleans on the tail of Hurricane Katrina. In 2010 they were travelling to earthquake-ravaged Haiti. Name a social, health or environmen-
tal disaster and the teddy follows, including to Africa for children born with AIDS. Christ’s Light began sending the toy in 1983 to such afflicted infants after a request by aid workers for, “the comfort of the human touch and a teddy bear, so the dying AIDS orphaned babies would have the company of a toy as they wait for death, all alone by themselves, in white metal cages [cribs]” (An AIDS Orphan Solution). The quotation is presented on the website without any sense of irony about the attempt to replace the dearth of social contact with a material object.

Faith in the teddy bear’s presence to make everything better, and at the same time provide donors with the personal satisfaction of having effected change is expressed in the following response to September 11:

My children are too young to donate blood and we could send money; but we wanted our children to have something tangible to do, so we thought if we could send a teddy bear, a child could hold on to that in their time of grief and healing and maybe find some comfort. (as quoted in White and Cowan 2001)

For those wishing for a more confident assurance of redemption from alienation, HolyBears™ are available for purchase at www.holybears.com. The extensive line includes the pink and hopeful, “How can a young person stay pure?” Sweet 16 HolyBear. Each HolyBear comes with a bible-shaped tag on which is written a gospel verse pertaining to the item’s focus. The one for Cooking HolyBear is John 6:35: “Then Jesus declared, ‘I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty.’” Testimonials on the HolyBears website that proclaim the profitability of the products for retailers and fundraisers exemplify the limitations of buying and gifting a material commodity to satisfy real emotional needs while at the same time attempting to make a financial profit or rectify a gap in social services. (Deerlake Design “Cooking HolyBear™”; “Sweet 16 9 Inch HolyBear™”)

The supposed redeeming effect of the teddy bear to return one to childhood and spiritual innocence has also been formally incorporated into therapeutic programs. An example is Adult Children Anonymous, a self-help group for adult children of alcoholic and dysfunctional families. It uses the teddy bear as mascot, with a call to empowerment voiced by its TeddysRule logo (TeddysRule). The teddy bear image is found on all its web pages; teddy bear nights are celebrations of a member’s one-year anniversary in the program and members can receive various certificates that include the toy’s image. The explanation by the organization for its use of the teddy bear is that it represents an, “acceptance of the fact that some of our less functional behaviors can be traced back to the parts of us that didn’t quite grow up and the role we begin to play in reparenting ourselves, meeting needs that weren’t met earlier and developing new and better life skills” (Ibid). It is a poignant attempt to meet the desire to recapture a lost childhood, or to create one that never existed.

One of the most commercially successful items of the nostalgic teddy bear industry is Spinoza© the Bear Who Speaks from the Heart,™ as a companion to institutionalized, vulnerable populations. This teddy comes embedded with a tape
cassette or CD player for listening to Spinoza’s songs for developing self-esteem and self-love. Spinoza’s retailers argue that his “gift” is in providing comfort, companionship and love in lieu of family or paid caregivers (Ibid). Spinoza comes with a full line of audio, visual and material products and instructional books for their use with all ages and varieties of dependencies. “His” audio recording, Good Friends, has been lauded as providing a person with Alzheimer’s confidence in one’s self through its message of being, “accepted just the way he/she is” (Spinoza Bear). Facility staff have reported that residents, “will tell the stuffed animal their thoughts and feelings because there just isn’t anyone else they feel they can talk to” (Cutler 2004, 10-11). Notwithstanding the comfort that Spinoza brings, it subsequently infantilizes its adult recipients and promotes acquiescence by them of their condition, and of its gifter’s toward the shortage of alternative, stimulating human interactions.

Despite Spinoza’s lack of interactive responsiveness, its promotion as meaningful support personnel raises moral and ethical issues. Sherry Turkle poses important questions about the use of interactive robots for supportive companionship and assisted living in relation to resolving emotional alienation. She asks:

Do plans to provide relational robots to children and the elderly make us less likely to look for other solutions for their care? If our experience with relational artifacts is based on a fundamentally deceitful interchange (artifacts’ ability to persuade us that they know and care about our existence) can it be good for us? Or might it be good for us in the “feel good” sense, but bad for us in our lives as moral beings? [. . .] These questions ask what we will be like, what kind of people are we becoming, as we develop increasingly intimate relationships with machines (Turkle 2006, 3, emphasis in original).

The Limits of Symbolic Love

If teddy bears ruled the world,
Oh my, what a wonderful place.
Everyone would be happy.
There would be a smile on every face.
(Miner 1997)

The teddy bear brings melodramatic pleasure to adults because it exists for the purpose of returning the supposed gift of human love received from Roosevelt on that terrifying day in the 1902 swampy canebrake of the Mississippi Delta. In its role as redeemer, the teddy retains the paternalistic function of its presidential namesake. This questionable message is assumed by adults to be an acceptable response to social injustice. One example, of many, of its transmission to children and thereby its cultural acceptance and reproduction, is found in the 2002 illustrated book, The Teddy Bear (McPhail 2002). This story tells of a young boy whose teddy, when it is left behind at a restaurant, is thrown into the trash. A homeless –nameless – man finds the teddy. During the night he sleeps with it in dumpsters, and during the day cradles it in his arms on a park bench. One day the man leaves the teddy on a bench, “while he looked for something,” Ibid) and the little boy finds it. Joyously, he and his family retrieve the bear. When they see the homeless man approaching they quickly move away; but when they hear his child-like “wailing” (Ibid) for the bear, the boy runs back and gives him the teddy. The man
Donna Varga

is comforted, as an infant would be, taking up the toy with a smile and hugging it. The final illustration shows, without intended irony, the man stopped along the park path with the teddy bear in one arm, and bag of belongings in the other, evaluating the worth of items in a garbage can. The not-so-implicit message, given that the adults have avoided contact with the homeless man, is that he, and others of his ilk, can be emotionally content with a teddy bear in place of real human contact.

The emotional bond of enthusiasts to the artifact’s function as an emissary of hope is considered by them as neither a personal preference nor a culturally-produced phenomenon, but as inherent in the object. Its devotees regard the teddy as being, “a truly international figure that is non-religious and yet is universally recognized as a symbol of love and affection” (as quoted in Maniera 2001, 144). Thus, adults project meanings onto the teddy as having real affective possibilities, for instance by, “providing hope for children worldwide…one teddy bear at a time” (Teddy Bears for Hope). The outcome for individuals is an alienation of the emotional self as well as a disunity at the level of social interactions (Seeman 1959).

Through magical thinking the teddy bear has become a proto-human infant the presence of which alleviates suffering. Teddy bear gifting provides a sense of personal benevolence and bestows upon its adherents a state of mystical innocence. This inducement of self-representation through the commercialization of emotions (Longman 1992, 112) results in a metaphysical transcendence of, rather than confrontation with, the realities of an alienated life. In wrestling with the problem posed by a teddy bear culture that confuses thingness with humanity, we need to answer the question, “If teddy isn’t there, does anyone care?” with Turkle’s admonishment that, “simulated feeling is never feeling. Simulated love is never love” (Turkle 2006, 2). Notwithstanding the importance this soft-cloth toy has for many persons’ emotional and personal lives, teddy bear culture denies the very essence of human relationships desired by its members.

**Notes**

1. While there have been arguments that the caption and drawing refer to Roosevelt’s stance against lynching, with the neck-roped bear representing African Americans. However, there is more evidence against than for this argument; in fact, Roosevelt maintained that African American males were prone to engage in rape, that lynching was a suitable punishment, and that taking a leadership role against it would only destroy his political career (Sinkler 1972, 420; 430-34). In addition, Berryman’s cartoon oeuvre caricatured African Americans.

2. Steiff began producing stuffed wild animal toys from 1880. However, at the time it produced the first stuffed toy bear its primary manufacturing product was still felt (Pfeiffer 2005; Varga 2009a).

3. Berryman’s “Bruin” has not yet been properly historicized. Its popularity as a political and social interpreter indicate that it was more than a likeable comic character, but was afforded significance as a cultural authority along the lines of what Lear’s has identified as the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries’ elevation of “simple and childlike rusticity” (Lears 1994, 57) to a therapeutic lifestyle. Lear’s analysis provides key insights for understanding how Berryman
could determine the viability of transforming Bruin, within two months, of its origin, from being a wild adult bear, to a human-like cub without its losing, and perhaps its even gaining, such authority, especially through its relationship to Roosevelt. The link between Lears’ denoting of American therapeutic culture of that early period, and the therapeutic culture discussed in this paper has still to be worked out.

4. This teddy bear story is also interesting because of the period’s emphasis on the need for white males to demonstrate hypermasculinity that would protect the white “race” from degeneration (Bederman 1995). Theodore Roosevelt was an exemplar of the “strenuous life” devoted to countering what he deemed to be the deleterious effects of sentimental femininity on white boys, especially those of the social elite (Lears 2009; Roosevelt 1900, see especially Chapter X, “The American Boy”).

5. This does not mean that adult popular culture was devoid of teddy bear imagery (see, for example, Hillier 1985) but these were primarily in the form of comic foil that extended the long history of bears in sites of entertainment (Brunner 2007) to satiric association with Roosevelt, rather than as the serious contender for adult emotional intimacy that they would become, and that they already were in childhood culture.

6. The symbolism of the teddy bear within AIDS activism is more complex than can be discussed here and is deserving of its own article.

7. Of course, not all persons who are recipients of such “gifts” are comforted by them, and the practice can be absurd. For instance, I have been advised about the experiences of workers at community homes for adults with developmental challenges, who upon being presented with teddies on the sudden death of a resident, were surprised and discomfited, rather than comforted by the action. However, a lack of positive responsiveness by “non-believers” does not eliminate the existence of a teddy bear culture as discussed in this paper. The distribution of the toy regardless of its propriety demonstrates the extent to which teddy bear culture has become a normative and bureaucratic practice by some emergency personnel and agencies.

Works Cited


One Bear Falls Prey to President’s Party. 1902. *New York Times*, November 15.


NewProducts/dolls_stuffed_animals.htm (accessed January 25, 2009)


On an overnight layover in London at a hotel near Heathrow airport, I took a needed walk after an eight-hour flight. In this placeless landscape, I happened upon a soaking wet teddy bear affixed to a mesh fence on a bridge at the airport’s entrance. Instantly, I knew I was in the presence of a memorial—someone had perished at or near this spot, or perhaps on a flight that originated from, or was bound for, Heathrow. Indeed, I found “We miss you, Micky!” scribbled in black marker on the fence nearby. An unmistakable symbol of specialness, this teddy bear infused an otherwise dreary, run-of-the-mill site with sentiment.

Donna Varga’s piece offers a way to comprehend how it is that a plush bear would become such a readily recognizable symbol of loss and object of comfort with her historically informed analysis of the making of this icon of sentiment and sentimentality. We learn from her about the muddled origins of the teddy bear story and the making of it into a modern myth whereby President Teddy Roosevelt’s actions are rendered magnanimous in the journalistic accounts of a particular hunting trip in 1902. But, it was when the soft, cuddly bruin subsequently was brought under the auspices of factory production that the mythological status of the teddy bear transformed into a negotiable symbolic currency. As the features of the plush toy became standardized by mass production, so too did its association with childhood innocence, taking on, as Varga notes, a kind of protective aura as it became a gift given to soothe children (and others) during crises. Varga’s analysis here opens up interesting avenues of inquiry into thinking about the relationship between commodity, mythological production and consumption. It also points the way to considering how narratives may become congealed, transformed, or preserved in material forms; shared and exchanged on a large scale only when mass produced.

In the same instance, unfortunately, the perspective brought to bear on the role and place of the teddy bear in emotional life evinces a myopic view of what commodities and promotion can and can’t do and what people

---

Responses

Daniel Thomas Cook
Rutgers University-Camden
USA
can and can’t do with them. Strewn throughout Varga’s essay are strong statements—unsupported with evidence or that appeal to a reader’s sense of likelihood—regarding how the teddy bear was received and what it has meant to children and adults over the course of the century. For instance, the reader is told that the teddy provided parents with an object they could give their children to satisfy “their own emotional needs to experience the world as new and joyful.” As well, children learned “moral lessons” from the extension of the teddy bear’s protective status. In the end, Varga asserts, the teddy bear has been made into an object of therapeutic culture as in, for instance, the way it was used as part of the emotional comfort extended to AIDS patients and to those affected by the Oklahoma City and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

My concern with these interpretations has little to do with their truth value or the extent to which they reflect some reality. No doubt, the teddy bear has taken on iconic status, infused perhaps with a good measure of therapeutic power. The concern I have, rather, centers on the way that Varga presents these (and other) uses and meanings of the teddy bear as singular, primary, and essentially exhaustive of the object’s uses and meanings. In laying out the historical trajectory of this cultural object as becoming an increasingly unified, shared public symbol of comfort, Varga presumes to know/theorizes the place of the teddy bear in the everyday emotional life of people in their less public, more local contexts and settings. This theoretical extension is made possible by an adherence to a clearly present but unstated belief that, once commercialized, an object retains some kind of taint that renders inauthentic most any practice associated with it.

Varga thus sees the teddy bear primarily and ultimately as an artificial symbol-object that “replaces real social and political engagements with a dehumanizing relationship to things.” It is artificial because it was borne of, and exists in, the realm of commercial goods and commodity production. She reads acts of children and adults alike to offer the teddy bear as a gesture of comfort (or sympathy or communion) as evidence that they understand it to have magical powers which, in the end, “results in a metaphysical transcendence of, rather than confrontation with, the realities of an alienated life.” The elisions and presumptions made here are manifold. It is entirely plausible that many who gift the bear understand very well in their own terms that “it” is not “magical” in itself, but that it is the gesture, the very expression of sentiment to known and unknown others—a shared, known icon—that constitutes the social magic of human relationality. That the bear was at one time a commodity need not completely preempt the meaning and intent of actions made with it.

In seeing sentiment that is expressed with commercial products as inauthentic and co-opted, Varga thereby forecloses analysis right at the point when it could yield important insights. Work by Appaduari (1986) and Kopytoff (1986) on the social biography of things suggests that something produced as commodity need not retain that status and can be transformed by the social lives and social processes in which it is embedded. As
well, Douglas and Isherwood (1979) and Zelizer (2005), in their own ways, demonstrate how social relations and social uses of things can frame goods which are then not necessarily trapped in semantic confines of their original production.

To be sure, it is important and necessary to retain a critical stance with regard to the interests and forces of commercial production. One need not be Pollyannaish about the power and reach of capitalism when advocating for multi-vocal, polysemous readings of commercial goods and related practices. A critical stance, however, that also theorizes social actors as merely duped by capital and who cannot see through the haze of commodity fetishism does not assist in extending understanding because it does not engage with the local, grounded hows and whys of material and symbolic consumption. I do not know the details of what inspired those to memorialize Micky at Heathrow with a teddy bear, but I certainly would not presume their gesture and sentiment to be artificial because their chosen symbol once had economic exchange value.

**Works Cited**


Donna Varga’s “Gifting the Bear and a Nostalgic Desire for Childhood Innocence” expands upon her earlier work on the development and social history of the teddy bear toy, as it appears in “Teddy’s Bear and the Sociocultural Transfiguration of Savage Beasts Into Innocent Children, 1890–1920” (Varga 2009). Here, however, she goes much further. Varga analyzes adult attachment to the stuffed animal, provides us with some theories as to the nature of that attachment, and ultimately states that the “gifting’ of teddy bears to adults and children in response to social or personal crises denies possibilities for meaningful human interactions and social change.”

Overall, the essay provides much food for thought. The material on late nineteenth and early twentieth century concepts of “animal-child symbiosis” that Varga provides serves the essay well, and she substantiates this exposition with close analysis of relevant literature and illustrations. These sections contribute to a growing body of work on the changing views of the child and the concept of childhood innocence. Also of interest is Varga’s explanation of how the image of Teddy the president became wedded to the image of teddy the soft toy, both of which seem to have fanned the flames of each other’s public appeal, particularly in the United States.

Furthermore, her essay pays particular attention to the phenomenon of using teddy bears to commemorate national tragedies. I am encouraged to see this topic receiving scholarly treatment, as this memorial practice seems to be a lightening rod: its ability to bind some people together during crisis seems equally matched by its ability to repulse others. Varga’s essay is representative of how the practice appears to the observers in the latter group.

I would like to address two issues that come up in the reading of Varga’s essay: the question of “culture[s]” in the context of teddy bear use and the question of causality with regard to various factors that influence the use of the teddy bear. As someone involved in both cultural studies and folkloristics, I would enjoy seeing the topic that Varga names “teddy bear culture” expanded upon further. For example, does the essay’s phrase “teddy bear culture” apply primarily to North American bear owners, to all English-speaking owners, to all teddy bear owners exposed to capitalism anywhere, or to an actual subculture that varies its practices according to region?

If there is such a thing as “teddy bear culture,” in the sense of a subculture of doll collectors who own, buy, display, repair, alter, make, give, and promote teddy bears, then there will be even more material to explore in the future. Varga offers proof of it being a self-sustaining folk group by listing some in-group terms used among English-speaking adherents. In-group jargon, as Alan Dundes notes in his work helps members affirm group identity and helps create awareness of who is, or is not, part of the group (Dundes 1989, 30-31). Such terminology
exists within any folk group, as I note in my own work on different groups of doll owners. My book *Doll Culture in America* (under development with University Press of Mississippi) shows that there are many Americans who creatively express their identity through the medium of dolls (including soft toys like teddy bears) and that they constitute a thriving and diverse subculture.

In addition, examining teddy bear practices from the point of view of material culture studies or folklore would mean accounting for the first-person insights of members of that culture. That, in turn, would mean spending time in the field, as I have, talking to actual teddy bear owners. When one talks to teddy bear owners in person and reads their own accounts and documents closely, one finds that “teddy bear culture,” as interpreted by those who practice it in the United States, places great emphasis on person-to-person relationships.

I would venture to say that teddy bear owners number among the most socially active, as well as socially aware, of doll group participants. In one set of circumstances mentioned in the essay, for instance, 9/11 drives focused heavily on raising funds for victims’ families (*Teddy* 2002, 12; Clay 2002, 144). In this case, Marianne Clay writes, *Teddy bear* web sites and mailing lists “whose topics are normally restricted to bears” were “filled with prayers, outpourings of sympathy and support, queries and reassurances about the safety of friends, and news of candlelight vigils, bear giftings, and relief efforts. In places where phone service became difficult, online bulletin boards provided the best way for some people to assure family and friends of their safety” (Clay 2002, 144). Note that “bear giftings” take only a subordinate role in the outpouring of support. In other words, as other doll collectors, doll groups, and group-related writings I’ve studied over the last few decades have stressed, whatever doll a group emphasizes becomes a means for interaction, a portal for human contact. The contacts that doll people have with each other, which originate in the practice of their hobby, can turn into sources of practical and emotional support.

This essay, as well as Varga’s prior work on teddy bears, provides a start to addressing the actual practices of teddy bear culture(s). Future treatments will be even more helpful if readers could see teddy bear cultures, especially with regards to the memorial use Varga describes, placed in comparative context with folk practices, such as mourning rituals, as examined by folklorists. When placed in that broader context, the material culture aspect of teddy bear use may come across as less alarming. If the *mementi mori* habits of nineteenth century New England, for example, had been taken up by the mass media and mass production techniques of the last twenty years, might we have seen piles of synthetic hair embroideries left by Ground Zero instead?

My point is that this essay opens the door to additional intriguing possibilities when examining the teddy bear phenomenon, beyond that of the influence of Teddy Roosevelt as a paternalistic “redeemer” of nature-children. Varga spends time discussing the power of the media with a close eye towards the myriad ways popular and political culture fed on each other at
the time. But prying into media history a little further, if we take into account the amazing growth of media power in Western societies from the turn of the century onward, coupled with the West’s growing ability to distribute the first generation of mass-produced soft toys across multiple borders, we can ask what the effects of these forces were on any mourning ritual with the power to comfort large numbers of people.

Regarding the question of causality, tracing the power of the teddy bear back to its namesake’s influential tale represents only part of the story. If the Roosevelt-as-redeemer story had, in fact, given birth to the peculiar staying power of the teddy bear, as Varga argues, then how should we regard the examples of British and German teddy bear culture sprinkled throughout the essay? Teddy Roosevelt would have been seen as much less of a “redeemer” outside of America.

While most of the popular and literary sources cited in the essay are American, the impact of the first mass-produced soft toy came from Germany. The Steiff family’s application of a short pile plush fabric to assembly line production changed everything. As Wendy Lavitt’s *American Folk Dolls* (1982) and Max von Boehn’s *Dolls and Puppets* (1956 [1929]) demonstrate, soft playthings have been made and cherished by children in the West and elsewhere long before mass production, but the Steiff family’s innovation was to take what was once a private artifact and put it on public display in stores and catalogs in multiple countries (Cross 1997, 8). The Steiffs were influential in four ways: in introducing plush animals into mass production, in popularizing soft toys that could be used by either boys or girls at a time when children’s playthings were segregated by gender, in enabling the toys to hold expressive poses, and in hitting upon one animal form that struck a cross-cultural, cross-gender, and more highly anthropomorphized note than any other (Pfeiffer 2005, 17-59; Cross 2004, 54; Cross 1997, 95; Calvert 1992, 117).

In fact, the details of the production history of the teddy bear make me wonder about the chain of causality set up in Varga’s essay. While no original bears have survived (the original string joints were too weak), Steiff does have records that show the development of the bear from a fierce to a babyish persona. Some of these documents predate the Michtoms’/Ideal’s involvement. For instance, Mary Hillier, Günther Pfeiffer, and Leyla Maniera trace the development of Richard Steiff’s design for Bär 55PB, known then as “Petsy” (short for Petz [Bruin]), to the life study sketches Steiff drew while he was still an art student in Stuttgart before the turn of the century (Maniera 2001, 26-27; Hillier 1985, 21-22; Pfeiffer 2005, 10-13). Hillier claims that Steiff was influenced by one particular bear from the pre-Roosevelt era, a performing bear who would wave at children, and who was trained by one of Steiff’s acquaintances (Hillier 1985, 22). The original, somewhat fearsome, Steiff bears were whittled down from the original large bear on wheels in the late nineteenth century, to the more familiar, anthropomorphized bear kingpin skittle in 1892, to the hump-backed, long-armed, string-jointed initial 1902-03 design, and finally to the more “friendly,” less wild-looking 1905 disk-jointed design (Pfeiffer 2005, 8-9, 13, 16, 46, 50-52; Maniera 2001,
So, if a German company, Steiff, began developing an anthropomorphized soft animal design before Roosevelt went on his famous hunting trip, could there have been multiple forces at work in imbuing the teddy bear “with exceptional status,” as Varga writes?

Therefore, the supposition of a single trajectory of influence and the limited approach to the study of teddy bear owners was where the essay faltered for me, as a reader. I agree that overuse of teddy bears in lieu of person-to-person caregiving would be inappropriate. But singling out such practices as entirely representative of certain folk groups, if we agree to designate “teddy bear culture” as a set of folk groups rather than a malaise, does not provide a complete picture. As cultural critics, folklorists, and anthropologists so often do, perhaps we might step back and take into account that teddy bear users may constitute their own folkloric groups, and therefore acknowledge that these users might carry out folk practices at variance to what might be expected for citizens of North America, Germany, or the United Kingdom. By so doing, we can observe that, like any folk entity scattered among different countries and regions, there is no one type of “teddy bear culture.” In closing, I look forward to reading more from Donna Varga, especially as she makes new discoveries about the culture(s) of the teddy bear. I thank her for this welcome attention to important facets of material culture as they present themselves through the use of soft toys.

Notes


2. The metal rod design was an intermediate, short-lived design from 1905.

Works Cited


In Wonder Women: Feminisms and Superheroes, Lillian S. Robinson focuses on the development of female characters in comic books, a genre of literary text that has been slow to gain recognition as a medium of cultural expression and slower still to be examined through a critical lens (2). Adopting a feminist position, she argues that the stories of female superheroes in the genre “transgress [the] use of mythological sources, borrowing from various traditions and creating new ones in order to tell different stories about gender, stories that come closer to the universe of belief than do masculine (and masculinity) adventure comics” (6). The book sets the creation and evolution of various female superheroes against a background of other factors, varying from political to personal. However, Robinson orients the book’s format around a discussion of specific eras in the development of the original female comic superhero: Wonder Woman. Utilizing a critical feminist perspective to interrogate the comic book genre allows the author to tease out the effects of social movements on the development of the comic heroine while simultaneously lending itself to appropriate interjections of the author’s own experience as a lifelong reader of comic books. Chapter titles even “Chronicle” comic conventions. Combining these elements creates an illuminating analysis of the impact of female heroes on the genre.

Describing her lifelong love affair with comics, Robinson reveals that she began reading comics shortly after the introduction of the Wonder Woman character. Her combined personal and professional interest in comics lends itself to the use of a variety of sources in the construction of the book, ranging from Judith Butler to pop culture artifacts. Much of her evidence also comes directly from the comics themselves, giving readers a plethora of primary sources to add to the discussion. Accordingly, the book is presented in a format that makes it accessible to a variety of readerships: Robinson’s critiques are sound and relevant, appealing to a scholarly audience; however, her easy writing style and anecdotal evidence make this book an enjoyable read for a non-scholarly audience as well.

Just as important as critical analysis and empirical evidence to Robinson’s book, is the author’s ability to situate herself as a consumer of comics during different periods of their production. Robinson believes that her subjective imprint on the analysis cannot be erased and should be laid bare—especially since she is a participant in the history she discusses. Instead of treating this as an obstacle, she proclaims her interpretive stance as participant by opening the book with an article, written previously, entitled “Looking for Wonder Woman.” This passage, and the threads of subjectivity that are continued on for the duration of the book, allows readers to extrapolate the author’s intentions and cultural position for themselves and gives them more opportunity to glimpse how Robinson reads comics as literary texts. Robinson recounts her own experience with comic
books as a young reader during Wonder Woman’s primordial development, a position returned to and reflected upon throughout the book. This is the position that colors Robinson’s analytical moves, and deserves special attention if the book is to be properly understood.

In addition to examining Robinson’s own developing perspective, the overall genre is examined from a feminist perspective. The tension between domesticity and empowerment in a modern capitalist society, a tension Robinson reflects on in her own life, is a tension which must be confronted by all comic heroines, and which is crystallized by Wonder Woman. In the post World War II era, Wonder Woman’s alter ego, Diana Prince, did not appeal to Robinson, a result of the writer’s vivified rejection of the notion that womanhood meant a life of domesticity and a loss of the heroic aspects of the feminine wartime identity. Instead, as a child Robinson focused on the physical prowess of the heroine, and her identity as an Amazon with Olympian roots (1). While the creator of the series took great liberties with the Greek mythology, reconceptualizing its rhetorical force in a manner better adapted for the comic audience, the evocation of the Amazon credo created a more compelling character than the bespectacled Diana Prince. While the author felt the empowerment of Wonder Woman, her fear that cultural norms would eclipse of the female hero and force her into the assigned gender roles, gives the book a personally as well as culturally reflective nature.

Moving beyond the characters, Robinson also conducts an overview of the industry itself, though it is secondary to analysis of the female heroines. The comic book industry has been shaped by the conventions of capitalism; as such, the primarily motive for producing comics is profit. There are instances to be found throughout the text in which the industry’s quirks and conventions are considered, along with an analysis of the individuals who played key roles in shaping comic genre. According to Robinson, capitalism’s influence resulted in ideological shifts of American comic culture, represented by the feminine heroes in three different eras. Robinson takes the reader through the ebb and flow of social influences that dictated the progression of lead female characters between these periods. For instance, in the 1970s, comic storylines are set in a contemporary American society with modern sensibilities, but the storylines do not explain how the world evolved to that state. This artistic choice makes the stories appeal to a broader audience, generating profit, but it does not give adequate attention to the many decades of struggle for equality that had taken place beforehand in American society.

Wonder Woman’s ideology is one of female empowerment, a shift exemplified by a 1973 Ms. magazine cover (82). Wonder Women starred on the cover with a banner advocating: “Wonder Woman for President.” Robinson attributes this event to the rise of feminism as a social movement, which, in a sense, made the movement a profitable one, and which made comic books marketable to a new audience, females.

However, it would have been appropriate if Robinson had done more work to specifically analyze the culture of the creators themselves, as well as the
reviews Reviews

comic industry’s motivations for its artistic and practical decisions. Also not given enough consideration in the book are the stylistic and visual aspects of the comic universe. The author takes little time to examine these aspects critically, and does not give an adequate weight to the visual aspects of constructing comic book narratives. The book does not discuss technique, point of view, or change in style, although some work is done on the evolving figure of the female superhero, including some analysis of costume.

While the book is lacking in certain kinds of analysis, it still adds to the conversation of pop culture in general, offering a strong feminist perspective on the comic book universe and its capitalistic influences. So, in spite of this issue, Wonder Women offers a concise introduction to the world of the female hero, and the variety of foes she encounters, be they supernatural or sexist.

Alisha Eastep
University of California, Berkeley
USA


Names like Lonnie Holley, Bessie Harvey, and J.B. Murray will ring familiar to anyone who follows the market for outsider, self-taught, twentieth-century folk art, which has risen in popularity since the 1960s. This growing interest has been largely fueled by a contemporary art world that has tended to discuss this work beneath a museum spotlight and on top of a pedestal; a context which has typically painted them as images of rurality, isolation, and exceptional anomaly. No Space Hidden departs from this trend by weaving these artists and their work back into their local contexts. The authors, Grey Gundaker and Judith McWillie, consider these artists alongside thirty other men and women living mostly in the southern United States, who manipulate found objects and materials within the space of their yards. Through a combination of collected stories, interviews, photographs, and scholarship from over twenty years of research and personal relationships, the authors present a group of artists who challenge notions as to where, how, and when art is made. The effect is one of critical redress, to “draw attention to precisely what much contemporary art discourse is unable to do, that is, to address concerns that have motivated much of the art African Americans in and out of the South have made for their homes and communities” (25).

Judith McWillie is professor of art at the University of Georgia, and she collaborates once again with Grey Gundaker,
anthropology professor at the College of William and Mary. *No Space Hidden* takes an approach to material culture as a lens into African American spirituality, folklore, and conceptions of art that is similar to the 1998 edited volume *Keep Your Head in the Sky: Interpreting African American Homelands* (University of Virginia Press, 1998), to which Gundaker and McWillie both contributed chapters. Immensely readable and substantive, the book argues for persistent ways of seeing and knowing that are akin to African and Christian traditions, but which are now made legible in a twentieth-century vernacular through assemblages of cast-off objects like light bulbs, hula hoops, painted tree roots, lawn chairs, and cement blocks.

Gundaker and McWillie focus on a particular kind of bricolage practice with space and material: yard work. As they explain in the opening chapter, the authors deliberately choose the term “yard work” over other categories, such as “folk art environments” or “vernacular landscape design,” for its polyvalency. It is used to denote aspects of performance and activity within the yard that not only transcend mere expression or adornment, but which function to communicate spiritual truths about life and the human condition. To establish a continuity of yard work practice, Gundaker and McWillie integrate first-hand interviews with scholarship on both folklore and African history, particularly the work of Robert Farris Thompson, and with slave narratives from various sources, including the Federal Writers’ Project. Despite the inclusion of African sources, it is not the authors’ goal to construct a transatlantic history of yard work practice, but rather to understand the ways yards function symbolically to map relations among matter, spirit, and human emotion. This goal is reflected in the book’s division, which alternates between portfolios that present a bulk of the yards and the stories of their creation, and corresponding chapters that sketch out the larger historical and cultural continuities between these projects. Gundaker and McWillie diligently balance their attention between the materials and the process, the individual and the communal, current yards and “longstanding cultural integrities” (xv).

The result is a somewhat sprawling book that relies heavily on the attentive reader to interpret and connect practice with meaning. The first three sections lay a foundation for understanding the metonymies, symbolism, and signs operating within African American yards by introducing a lexicon of objects and their meaning along with a discussion of “kinds of land and what happens there.” (79) Many of these terms and principles, such as border use, safety zones, reflective surfaces, wheels and watching figures, reappear later in the book. But what initially appears to be repetitive (and potentially excessive) becomes a vehicle for introducing and reaffirming the material metalanguage operating within these featured yards. By equipping the reader with a vocabulary for interpretation and then allowing the oral histories to stand on their own—which, in themselves, often resist the organizing principles of the book—Gundaker and McWillie try to frame a living culture rather than reify a group of objects.

*No Space Hidden* is thus a comprehensive volume that also leaves many ends open for readers to form “their own critical evaluations of the author’s voice along with the information the source contains” (xiv). Implicit in this method is not merely a call for reader response, but a plea for deeper consideration of each subject’s voice and the moral
imperative expressed in their worldviews. As the many examples attest, the “spirit of African American yard work” is one of justice, respect, positive transformation, safety, creative possibility, talent, and hope. The featured stories of Eddie Williamson and Bennie and Elizabeth Lusane, as well as the final chapter on heavenly glory, express this theme in ways that are particularly compelling.

Readers looking for a visual resource or collectors accustomed to the glossy pages of conventional art books may be disappointed by the black and white snapshot photographs, some of which have poor resolution, that make it difficult to visualize the actual nature of these spaces (nineteen color plates are thus a helpful inclusion). Nonetheless, one ought to consider this a boon for McWilliam and Gundaker’s overall project, which eschews objectification and instead looks at how practices of yard work sustain the lives of their makers. Thus, No Space Hidden is like a visitors’ guide that will serve as a useful point of departure for casual readers as well as students of anthropology, folklore, geography, and art history. But, the book’s greatest strength is the resiliency of its subjects. After being introduced to these practitioners, readers just might be moved to embark on their own driving trip through these towns and neighborhoods. With eyes now conditioned to see, they might spot an unusually populated yard, step out of their cars inquire after their makers, and to become more like neighbors than tourists..

No Space Hidden was the 2007 winner of the James Mooney Prize for anthropological scholarship, awarded by the Southern Anthropological Society.


It was not her experience studying abroad in France, but rather her move to the Midwest for graduate school that made Jocelyn Donlon keenly aware of the bits and pieces of her life in southern Louisiana that she had previously taken for granted. Her experience – the startling recognition of difference in a mirror, but a close difference that seems more like oneself than an exotic other – provides her rationale and sets the tone for Swinging in Place, an investigation of the porch in Southern American culture that is both the rigorous academic project of a capable scholar and the documented self-discovery of a Southerner.

While Donlon cannot offer a narrative of the architectural evolution of the porch, as there is, unfortunately, not enough surviving evidence upon which such a narrative could be built, she does offer a survey of the predominant theories regarding its origins. Noting that such structures as the balcony, veranda, and portico existed in Europe before the colonization of the Americas, she points out that they certainly did not serve the same social function as the American porch. Rather, it was the breezy stoops built by the peoples in West Africa, whom the Europeans brought in chains to the Americas, which are most likely the closest spiritual ancestors of the porch. Thus, while little can be said for certain about the evolution of the porch, Donlon comes to the very reasonable conclusion that it is most certainly a “creolized” (15) design.

Elaine Yau
University of California, Berkeley
USA
Swinging in Place is not an architectural history, however. Rather, it examines the porch as a liminal space, as “a transitional space between public and private spheres” (13) that Donlon makes the focus of her project. She uses de Certeau’s distinction between “space” and “place” to make her case, arguing that the porch is at once a “configuration of positions” that has been dictated by the dominant culture (the “place”) and yet it is also “composed of intersections of mobile elements” which make it possible for individuals to “resist societal regulations” (the “space”) (25).

Though she does not use theatrical terms per se, for Donlon the porch is very much a stage. As a location where an individual can perform his or her own identity to the community or the community can direct the performance of an individual’s identity, the porch then becomes a venue in which hegemony and resistance are both built and quashed, where action is both scripted and improvised. In fact, it is this “modulating between spheres yet resting in neither” (25) which led Donlon to choose “Swinging in Place” as her title and to state her thesis thus: “Porches, front and back and side and other, are powerfully constructed ‘places,’ liminally situated between indoors and out, where people must work to reconcile the demands of a family, the norms of a community, and the desires of individuals – all of which are coherent by a social and political context – to create an individualized ‘space’ for themselves” (160). It is no surprise then, that Donlon spends the majority of her book investigating the many selves that are “in negotiation with the community” (159) on the porch, by looking at how the space-place of the porch provides a setting for the construction of gender, race, class, sexuality and generation in her South.

To look at these numerous selves being constructed on the porch, Donlon makes use of not only a multitude of texts, but also many kinds of texts. Drawing from William Faulkner and Gloria Johnson, her grandmother’s longtime neighbor, just as readily as from Victor Turner or Michel de Certeau, she puts voices into conversation that might not usually be seen as talking to one another. In fact, it is Donlon’s extensive catalogue of personal narratives, collected from friends, family, students, strangers, and even herself, that serves as the textual bedrock of her investigation. Given the porch’s nature as a stage where stories are both told and made, it seems wholly appropriate.

Her choice to put literary texts and personal narratives on par with more theoretical works is likely to rub some the wrong way. Admittedly, I found myself doubting what credibility a lengthy literary analysis of a scene from Their Eyes Were Watching God could offer a study that is, more or less, an anthropological analysis. However, after seeing how Donlon ties art and anthropology together, not only did she generally convince me of the wisdom of such an approach, she made me reconsider why I might have thought art and anthropology to be mutually exclusive to begin with.

That said, I do not buy her argument that she can effectively counterbalance her face-to-face fieldwork (which was predominantly conducted with people living in southern Louisiana) by “providing examples from novels set in
other parts of the South” in order to “[increase] the representation of different cultures” (26). While I certainly agree that “a fictional narrative can offer stories that real people may be hesitant to tell a folklorist face-to-face or to document in a letter” (27), I do not think literary analysis can be rendered commensurate to face-to-face interviews. Rather, I think analysis of literary texts engenders a more organic understanding of the porch in southern culture by refusing to stay only within the disciplinary lines academia has drawn in the sand. What is so exciting about Donlon’s approach is that she does not try to depict the porch as some kind of object that stands alone, or even an object that could be fully captured in one portrayal; rather, she tries to see how the porch lives in, and is shaped by, different contexts.

Claiming that the heyday of the porch ran from roughly the turn of the twentieth century into 1960s/70s, Donlon says that the “death of the porch” is due in large part to the widespread incorporation of air conditioners into the southern household, although changing gender roles, television, and rising crime rates are important factors as well. Nevertheless, Donlon’s narrative is not overshadowed by the melancholic sense of loss that pervades many folkloristic projects. Maintaining that the porch “remains integral to a southern identity” (19), she closes the book with a chapter looking at how people, particularly young people, are finding the old place of the porch to be a space for something new.

Donlon spends the better part of her introduction recounting memories of her grandmother and describing the porch at her grandmother’s house. Her grandmother’s porch became so central to Donlon’s evolving sense of self that she says “[I] cannot separate my grandmother’s porch from my family” (11). Honest about the emotional attachment she feels for the porch, Donlon describes how she has worked to keep nostalgia in check as she writes. Such a clear admission of how much the author, and the author’s writing process, are knit up in the subject being written about is not only refreshing, but actually far more truthful than those fictions which suppose authors can somehow stand apart from the subject that they are examining. Certainly, she looks with a scrutinizing eye, one that takes care to not be blinded by sentiment, but Donlon’s work is ultimately a labor of love; her rigor brings her to a more complex appreciation of something she has always loved. May we all be so fortunate in our work.

Sean O’Neil
University of California, Berkeley
USA
One can see and feel a place in a physical sense, but each place also carries an “overload of possible meanings” and presents an “assault on all ways of knowing” (Hayden, Dolores. 1995. *The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History.* Cambridge, MA: MIT, 18). In *The Idea of North*, Peter Davidson provides just such a perspective on place, as both tangible and deeply meaningful. However, rather than focusing his analysis on any particular locale, this book examines the concept of north itself from a variety of perspectives. North is impossible to locate precisely, in part because its location and meaning vary by culture and by individual. Instead it is presented as “always a shifting idea, always relative, always going away from us” (8). To the painter Eric Ravilious, north was Iceland and the arctic regions of the world; to Ovid, north was Bulgaria; and to the contemporary poet, Simon Armitage? Why, north is right ‘here,’ in his home in West Yorkshire, England. North is seen as a direction, a feeling, a place that is usually other than “here,” that is both real and imagined. For some, north may call to mind remoteness, loneliness, desolation, exile, and melancholy. Yet, just as readily, north may invoke adventure, savage and austere beauty, purity, freedom, and the possibility of the unknown, all expanding outward to the distant horizon. All of these ideas of north, and more, are culled from Davidson’s intensive, cross-cultural survey of art, literature, film, myth, and personal experience. The end result is a fine work that communicates the depth and range of meanings that have come to be associated with this concept.

The main portion of the book is organized into three sections: Histories, Imaginations of the North, and Topographies. Each of these sections examines ideas of north as embodied in a particular set of media or forms (although these overlap somewhat from chapter to chapter) We are told that the materials selected for inclusion were considered to be “particularly indicative or representative” (19) of each category rather than comprehensive or randomly selected—an understandable method given the scope of the work. Despite this selectivity, the reader is indeed given a wide range of materials to consider. The first section of the book provides “a history of ideas of the north, from… archaic Greece, through the medieval and renaissance periods of speculation and cartography, to… the nineteenth century” (19). The following section on “Imaginations of the North” focuses more closely on the ways that ideas of north have been captured and portrayed by artists, writers, and film-makers, while the final section examines more specific topographies of the north ranging from Canada, the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, China, and Japan. Along the way, the reader is treated to analyses of materials of striking diversity. We are presented, for instance, with Icelandic sagas where dead spirits sing gustily in their open barrows, Sámi tales about wizards who sail across the seas on a bit of enchanted bone, works of art that purposely exploit and confound the similarities between ice and snow, the (post)industrial landscapes of Britain,
Reviews

and accounts of a dry Japanese river bed which divides this world from the next, and where one can hear the sobbing of ghostly children. Despite this great diversity, all of these materials express some concept of the north, and contain many similar, if often competing, themes (e.g. north as the place of death, north as a source of truth, etc.).

No work is without its faults of course. Two shortcomings in particular detract from the overall contribution of the text: one conceptual and one practical. First, Davidson offers no concise thesis. The main theme seems to be that the idea of north moves people to extremes. However, Davidson does not provide any more specific arguments that could contribute to the scholarly effort to understand the relationship between people and place. For instance, why is north a powerful concept? Is it something intrinsic to the properties of a round planet, shortages of daylight, and cold weather? Or does it have to do with something inherent in the human condition, where areas and others far removed are considered otherworldly or inhuman? The book seems to imply both explanations without ever directly stating them. The second shortcoming of the book is more practical: it lacks a bibliography and, worse, an index. This makes it exceedingly difficult to consult the book once one has finished reading it, a particularly vexing issue considering the scope of sources detailed within it.

Despite these issues, The Idea of North is a powerful and impressive piece of scholarship. The northern places included here range from the “real” (e.g. Scandinavia), to the fictitious (e.g. Nabokov’s Zembla), to the mythological (e.g. the Hyperborea of the Greeks). But since the north is both real and imagined, perhaps the importance of distinguishing between real and unreal places is not so great after all. As Yi-Fu Tuan (2001. Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.) reminds us in his classic study of place, Europeans once firmly believed in the reality of both a paradise on Earth and (of particular relevance to Davidson’s book) a Northwest Passage, despite repeatedly failed and often disastrous efforts to find them. None of these failures dissuaded the belief in these places, however, since “[s]uch places had to exist because they were key elements in a complex system of belief” (Tuan 2001, 85 - 86). Thus, the idea of north is itself influential, is itself a motivating principle of social and cultural significance, regardless of whether that idea is coupled with an actual, physical location, and regardless of whether any two people agree on any particular location as northern in character. Davidson’s work helps the reader appreciate this reality for what it is.

Jeffrey S. Debies-Carl
University of New Haven
USA

In a small village in the woods of northern Russia, memory – stretching across a broad collective landscape – functions as the glue binding a culture together over time. Karl Marx wrote, “The tradition of all of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.” (Quoted in Paxson 2005, 8). Margaret Paxson’s Solovyovo: The Story of Memory in a Russian Village, spanning “seventy years of totalitarianism, and the hundreds of years of brutish exploitation,” brings that weighty past into the present and shows how memory frames life in a small northern Russian village (346). Diving deeply into her research (17-1/2 pages of bibliography and 10 years of fieldwork) and into the lives and stories of her informants, she produces a text that will appeal to academics and non-academics alike. Paxson mines the memories of the small cluster of farmers that make up Solovyovo, revealing herself as an empathetic researcher. Using in-depth participant observation and interviews, and following an overarching metaphor of “the landscape of memory,” she expresses how memory becomes translated and reinscribed across time.

By setting the village of Solovyovo in space and time through the memories of its inhabitants, Paxson shows how social memory is enacted in stories, religious practice, social organization, commemoration, and the symbolism of space. “Death laced the corners of their stories,” she writes (29); this landscape of memory is a view of past events (the return of a soldier, the death of Stalin, the destruction of a church) through present eyes. But also, as Paxson says, memory casts the present into the future to be rendered anew by individual choices and societal changes. Paxson’s idea of memory is an act of persistence defining cultural identity.

Through Paxson’s extended metaphor of “the landscape of memory,” Solovyovo becomes a place of power and social memory spanning the centuries from the tsars and feudal landlords; to Bolsheviks and civil wars; to collectivization and socialism; and to perestroika and open markets. Held in memory and reified in ways of acting socially, we learn that memories are never free from their historical context, even if that context is rooted not in truth, but in a reconstruction of it. Moreover, Paxson points out, memories have agency; they are acts. Memories are ways of knowing and producing meaning. While streets can be renamed; faces and facts can fade away; photographs can be altered; and stories can die with people, memory cannot be “idealized away.” Nor can it be erased by the gulag or by the “market’s invisible hand.”

Narratives of the past govern the behavior and belief of today, their patterns affecting social organization in vivid and accessible detail. From the “radiant past” - when revolutions were fought, wars and famine came and went, death crept in, ghosts and phantoms dwelt in the beliefs of the religious, and when marriage and birth renewed and reified a collective narrative – memory creates a bridge to the equally far off “radiant future.”
Like a person in America reminiscing about those ubiquitous “way things were,” when times were easier and people were nicer, the people of Solovyovo idealize their “radiant past” – when people were equal, close-knit, and cooperative, and when relationships were better (97). From this “radiant past” comes the idea of svoi. Opposed on the one hand to greed, a desire for personal wealth, svoi (“being one’s own” or “belonging to”) also stands in opposition to foreignness, the quality of being a social outsider. As such, the villagers, who both exist outside of and are affected by the new market economy, are mistrustful both of money and external forces. One villager, for instance, remembers the happiest time of his life as being during the great famine of 1947, because “it was as if there was some kind of inspiration in life then” (95). “Regardless of the hard life,” he recalls, everyone’s “mood” was better (95). Paxson’s view across the landscape of memory benefits the reader at the root of village life by taking us into the village, into the villager’s homes and into their lives.

A portrait of social memory in this region of the world is particularly relevant after the collapse of communism, because of widespread assumptions about the speed of change in the transition from Soviet Union to Russia. The unpredictable – but more known and more studied – world of Moscow is very far from that of rural Russia, yet the social fabric of Russia cannot be understood without including all of its social stratum.

By exploring the narrative landscape of Solovyovo, Paxson weaves an intricate ethnography of the memory of these descendants of Eastern Slavic farmers. This memory is primarily a memory of survival: survival of a people, of a way of life, of beliefs, and, above all, of memory itself. This memory of survival in the non-stop toil of a “harsh and unsuited land” for agriculture can sometimes yield some surprising results. For instance, this memory lends force to a critique of freedom. For the residents of Solovyovo, freedom is the opposite of what we think of in the West. There is no freedom (svoboda) without discipline, says one woman, indicating that “frameless” freedom is dangerous because it threatens to undermine the social order. Now, after Gorbachev, this woman states, “Anyone does whatever he wants. Anyone can steal from whomever. Anyone can kill anyone anywhere.” (113). For the people of Solovyovo, this new unrestrained freedom is the companion of social disorder, a critique which draws its force from the memory of the “radiant past” before the fall of the Soviet Union, when the social order was intact and the community’s freedom was not limited by the freedom of individuals.

As any scholar knows, proper and meaningful translations of words are imperative to an accurate and deep understanding of thought and action. Words and phrases, especially in Russian, almost never translate verbatim. Their meaning is hidden somewhere else; one must have a deeper knowledge of a culture to grasp its concepts and context. Paxson did her work and knows her area of research. She offers deep and accurate descriptions of the village and its people, and knows that a deep understanding of the meanings of words, phrases, and their uses – their local uses – is necessary to grasp the concepts that she’s presenting.
This is a brilliant ethnography. Drawing on an immense body of theoretical literature, Paxson writes like a novelist, yet forgoes nothing to the discerning academic. The book is visually stimulating, rich in ethnographic detail, and yet is well-written and engaging.

Eric O’Connell  
University of Southern California  
USA
Call for Papers

*Cultural Analysis* encourages submissions from a variety of theoretical standpoints and from different disciplines, including (but not limited to) anthropology, cultural studies, folklore, geography, media studies, popular culture, psychology, and sociology. We seek submissions for the following sections: research articles and review of works (books, films, exhibitions, websites, etc.). All submissions should follow the *Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition*. Please check our website or email us for complete submission information.

*Cultural Analysis* is made possible by generous contributions from:
The Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities
The Associated Students of the University of California, Berkeley
The University of California, Berkeley Graduate Assembly

*Cultural Analysis* is not an official publication of the Associated Students of California. The views expressed herein are the views of the writers and not necessarily the views of the ASUC or the views of the University of California, Berkeley

ISSN 1537-7873