Demonstratives in Soliloquial Japanese

Yoko Hasegawa
University of California, Berkeley

1 Introduction
Language is recognized as an instrument of communication and thought. The research exploring language for communication is enormous, and our knowledge of various linguistic devices for communicating effectively has advanced significantly in recent decades. By contrast, exploration of language for thought and thinking is scarce, with the study of *private speech* in psycholinguistics the notable exception. The Japanese language is equipped with numerous markers of interactional functions that many languages do not have grammaticized, e.g. evidentials, honorifics, interpersonal particles, various pronoun-like elements. For this reason, Japanese has been a focus of attention, especially in the field of pragmatics for many decades. Several years ago, I began to wonder how the Japanese language would look like if such interactional layers were removed, i.e. when it is used to express thought without communicative intent. I then embarked on a study of soliloquy (cf. Hasegawa 2004, 2006a,b).

*Soliloquy* is the utterance of one’s thoughts without addressing another individual. It is sometimes thought of as talking to oneself, inasmuch as many researchers consider that speech and thought are always dialogic, e.g. Bakhtin (1984). That is, even in soliloquy the speaking-self and the talked-to-self always exist, and they invariably mirror normal conversational exchanges. However, there may well be profound differences between these two modes of discourse even if soliloquy is essentially dialogic. If the speaker and addressee are identical, there is no gap or discrepancy in the interlocutors’ background knowledge; therefore, the speaker is not obligated to consider the addressee’s knowledge and perspective, and, as a result, the information structure of soliloquy inevitably differs from normal dialogic conversations. For another example, we could easily speculate on the absence of linguistic politeness in soliloquy because the speaker does not need to consider the possibility of threatening the addressee’s face. Analyzing language used in non-canonical settings can serve to inspire the researcher. I am therefore advocating in-depth investigation of soliloquy as a new approach in pragmatics research.

As an instance of such research, the present study reports an analysis of the *ko-so-a* demonstratives in Japanese as they occur in experimentally obtained soliloquial data. The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief outline of the characteristics of *ko-so-a*. Section 3 explains my experiment design and data selection. Section 4 examines and analyzes the *ko-so-a* tokens in the data and discusses their implications. Section 5 reconsiders the notions of deixis and anaphora, and Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Ko-so-a: The Japanese demonstratives

2.1 Deixis and anaphora

To begin with, brief and tentative definitions of the terms deixis, anaphora, and demonstrative are necessary. Deixis, sometimes referred to as exophora, is the way in which the reference of a linguistic expression is determined in relation to certain characteristics of the speech situation, e.g. the spatiotemporal context. Typically, deictic expressions are used to refer to something visible or audible during the utterance. The meaning of a deictic utterance is thus relative to the situation, and the location of the speaker in time and place normally establishes the deictic center and governs the interpretation of deictics.

Anaphora, sometimes referred to as endophora, is commonly defined as a relationship between two linguistic expressions co-occurring within a discourse, viz. the antecedent and an anaphor. The antecedent is normally a semantically and referentially autonomous expression, whereas the anaphor is a dependent, indexical expression, e.g. demonstratives, third person pronouns, ellipsis. Anaphora is characteristically interpretable solely on the basis of the linguistic context, without recourse to the speech situation.

Demonstratives, a classic example of deixis, constitute a class of words whose primary function is to serve to locate a referent relative to the speaker or to the addressee. They may be used by themselves (pronominal) or with a noun (adnominal).

2.2 Deictic use of demonstratives

In conventional Japanese grammars, the demonstratives are said to encode a three-way distinction, referred to as the ko- (proximal), so- (medial), and a- (distal) series. Deictically, when the speaker and addressee are physically facing in the same direction, the ko-series (e.g. kore (pronominal), kono (adnominal) ‘this’) is used for entities located close to them; the so-series (e.g. sore, sono ‘that’) is used for those some distance from them; and the a-series (e.g. are, ano ‘that over there’) for those even farther away. For example, when directing a taxi driver, one says Koko no kado o magatte kudasai ‘please turn at this corner’ if they are already right at the corner, but s/he uses Soko no kado ‘that corner down the block’ when they have not yet reached the corner, and Asoko no kado ‘that corner further down there’ if the corner in question is still at some distance. Let us call this characterization of the ko-so-a demonstratives the Distance Model.

On the other hand, when the speaker and the addressee are facing each other, the ko-series is used to refer to entities near the speaker; the so-series is used for entities near the addressee; and the a-series for those at a distance from both of them. We will call this analysis the Territory Model. As the term territory suggests, the element of control is also relevant here. Suppose that the mother is washing her son’s back.

(1) S: Okaasan, itai yo.
   ‘Mom, it hurts!’
In this case, the location referred to by the demonstrative in the son’s utterance is a part of his body. Therefore, he is at least as close to it as the addressee is, and yet only so- is appropriate. Because he does not have any control over her scrubbing activity, his back is conceived as being within his mother’s territory. Interestingly, English and Japanese demonstratives function identically in this regard.

The utility of the Distance and Territory models operating according to the alignment and orientation of the speaker and the addressee has been widely recognized. However, Mikami (1970/1992) challenges them by claiming that ko-so-a do not form a triplet, but, rather, they form a double binary: i.e. ko- vs. so- and ko- (including so-) vs. a-. He explains that the fundamental opposition in communicative situations consists of the speaker and the addressee, who divide the metaphorical space into two sub-spaces. This opposition is represented by ko- (the speaker’s territory) and so- (the addressee’s territory). This much is identical with the Territory Model. What differs is that in this framework the concept of a- is totally absent.

On the other hand, when the speaker and addressee face in the same direction, Mikami continues, they perceive themselves together appositional to others. In this framework, the speaker and addressee’s joint territory is expressed by ko-, and the others’ territory by a-. Therefore, in Mikami’s theory, ko- and so- oppose each other, as do ko- and a-, but there is no opposition between so- and a-. He insists that the oppositions between ko- and so- and between ko- and a- are different in nature, and thus these three demonstratives never oppose each other on common ground.

Mikami’s argument is based on the evidence from lexicalization patterns and fixed phrases. That is, there are phrases combining a- and ko- as well as so- and ko-, but never so- and a-.

(2)  a- + ko-  are-kore ‘this and that’, areka-koreka ‘this or that’, achira-kochira ‘here and there’
so- + ko- soko-koko ‘here and there’, sore to kore to wa hanashi ga chigau ‘this and that are different stories’, soo-koo suru uchi ni ‘while doing this and that’

The total lack of the combination of a- and so- is striking and makes Mikami’s theory convincing. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that in the first situation (directing a taxi driver), the opposition between a- and so- is psychologically real. For example, the driver might ask Soko desu ka, asoko desu ka ‘Do you mean..."
there or over there?’ In such a case, the selection is systematic: the closer one is invariably referred to with so-, and the farther one with a-.

### 2.3 Anaphoric use of demonstratives

Kuno (1973) claims that ko- is used only deictically, but that so- and a- can be used either deictically or anaphorically. For deictic usage, Kuno subscribes to the Territory Model. For anaphoric usage, he considers that so- is selected either (i) when the speaker does not know the referent well (i.e. s/he has only indirect knowledge) or (ii) when the speaker does know the referent well (i.e. s/he has direct knowledge) but s/he nevertheless assumes that the addressee does not, e.g. (3a). By contrast, a- is selected when the speaker believes that both s/he and the addressee know the referent well or have shared experience with the referent, e.g. (3b). (The translations of the examples in this paper are all mine.)

(3) a. Kinoo Yamada-san to iu hito ni aimashita. Sono (#Ano) hito, michi ni mayotte komatte-ita node, tasukete agemashita.
   ‘Yesterday, I met a man named Yamada. Because he [that person] lost his way and was having difficulty, I helped him.’

   ‘Yesterday, I met Mr. Yamada. He [that person] is always in high spirits.’

The phrase to iu hito ‘a person named’ in (3a) signals that the speaker believes the addressee does not know Yamada. In such a case, the use of sono is appropriate, but ano is not. In (3b), on the other hand, the absence of to iu hito indicates that the speaker assumes that the addressee has direct knowledge of Yamada. In this case, ano is appropriate, but sono is anomalous.

Kuroda (1979/1992) examined the use of Japanese demonstratives in soliloquy and found examples that counter Kuno’s analysis. He questions (i) whether the deictic and anaphoric uses are fundamentally distinct, and (ii) whether our language use should always be accounted for in terms of communication, in which the presence of an addressee is always presumed. If we subscribe to a communicative explanation, Kuroda cautions, we need to be aware that some characteristics are likely derived from the communicative setting itself, rather than the properties of the expressions under consideration.

In his attempt to define soliloquy, Kuroda acknowledges that it is possible for a second person pronoun, e.g. omae ‘you’, to occur within it, e.g. Omae wa nante baka na koto o shitan da ‘What a stupid thing you [the speaker] did!’ However, he considers this to be pseudo-conversation, not a genuine soliloquy. On the other hand, he considers that doubt is a prototypical activity of inner thought. When one says, Jibun wa hatashite sonzai shite iru no daroo ka ‘I wonder whether I really exist’, one does not presume the presence of a second person who might provide an answer.
In order to examine the demonstratives in soliloquy, Kuroda eliminates the addressee from Kuno’s characterization. Then, for the anaphoric usage, a- can be said to be used when the speaker knows the referent well, as exemplified by (4a), and so- when s/he does not, (4b), as predicted by Kuno.

(4) a. Kyoo Yamada-san ni atta kedo, ano hito to atta no wa ittai nannen-buri no koto daroo.
   ‘I ran into Yamada today. I wonder how many years it’s been since the last time I saw him [that person].’

   b. Yamada-san wa Tanaka-sensei toka iu hito no koto bakari hanashite ita keredo, sono hito wa sonnani erai hito nano daroo ka.
   ‘Yamada was discussing the professor called Tanaka, but I wonder if she [that person] is really so great.’

Regarding the deictic usage, the elimination of the addressee from Kuno’s description (i.e. the Territory Model) results in ko- being used for a nearby entity, and a- for a distant entity, but so- is absent. Kuroda, however, considers that so- can also be used deictically in soliloquy. Suppose that someone has been told that he has a stomach ulcer. He wonders, Sore wa donna iro o shite iru no daroo ka ‘I wonder what color that looks like’. On the other hand, if one morning he feels an unusual sensation in his stomach, he would wonder, Ittai kore wa itsu made tsuzuku no daroo ‘I wonder how long this will last’.

Kuroda concludes that deictic and anaphoric usages of so- and a- are both determined by the speaker’s familiarity with the referent. He then re-labels Kuno’s direct knowledge as experiential knowledge, and Kuno’s indirect knowledge as conceptual knowledge. If one knows an entity experientially, s/he is able to describe it theoretically in an infinite number of ways. For example, I can describe my mother in terms of her age, appearance, health, interests, skills, etc. By contrast, if information about an entity is obtained by some indirect means, e.g. via hearsay or inference, it is inevitably conceptual, or linguistic; i.e. it is information conveyed by some communicative means. For example, if you say to me “My high-school friend Alice called me yesterday,” I acquire the knowledge that a person named Alice, who attended the same high school as you did, telephoned you yesterday, but nothing more.

Kuroda argues that a- is used if one’s knowledge about the referent is experiential, whereas so- is used when it is conceptual. To support this hypothesis, he provides examples including the phrase X no koto da kara ‘considering the nature of X’, which implies that the speaker experientially knows X well. It can therefore naturally co-occur with experiential a-, but it would be anomalous when occurring with conceptual so-.

   ‘I’m waiting for Yamada. I’m sure he [that person] will be late.’
b. Yamada-san o matte-iru no desu. Ano/#Sono hito no koto da kara, kitto okurete kuru desho.
   ‘I’m waiting for Yamada. Considering his usual habits, I’m sure he [that person] will be late.’

Kuroda then presents the following counterexample to Kuno’s analysis:

(6) Boku wa oosaka de Yamada Taroo to iu sensei ni osowattan da kedo, kimi mo ano sensei ni tsuku to ii yo.
   ‘I studied in Osaka with a professor named Taro Yamada. You should study with him [that professor], too.’

Like (3a), the use of to iu sensei ‘professor named’ in (6) signals that the speaker assumes the addressee’s lack of knowledge of the professor; therefore, according to Kuno, sono, but not ano, must be used. However, (6) is perfectly natural, and it conveys the fact that the speaker knows Professor Yamada personally and well.

3 Experiment

Kuroda’s use of soliloquy is insightful, but his data, as well as those of Kuno, are all constructed by means of introspection, which await empirical justification. I thus employed my experimentally obtained soliloquial data for this investigation. In this experiment, 19 subjects (6 males and 13 females, all native speakers of Japanese) each spoke his/her thoughts for 10-15 minutes while alone in an isolated room. They were instructed not to speak to an imaginary person, but rather to verbalize forthrightly whatever came into their consciousness. All subjects were aware that their soliloquies were recorded. This procedure might be criticized as being removed from genuine, spontaneous soliloquy. However, the primary interest of this experiment was to eliminate the addressee(s) as a person distinct from the speaker him/herself. For this purpose, naturalistic and artificially induced soliloquies are not likely to differ significantly.

A total of 2,377 sentences and/or sentence fragments were obtained. Before examining the usage of the demonstratives in our soliloquial data, it is necessary to clarify which occurrences of the words with the morpheme ko-, so-, or a- are relevant to our investigation, because a considerable number of ko-so-a words are at best marginally categorized as genuine demonstratives. I counted only those which can contrast with other demonstratives in the same text. The utterances in (7) exemplify those which were excluded from further consideration.

(7) Examples of excluded ko-, so-, a-tokens
   a. Sono uchi hagaki ka nan ka kakoo kana.

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1 To determine where the boundary between sentences are located, a procedure was developed based on syntactic considerations, the duration of silence, and intonational contours.
‘I think I’m going to write a postcard or something some day soon.’

b. *Ma, mainichi mizu kaeta kara nee. Sore de, ma, san-shuukan gurai motta kanaa.*
   ‘Well, I changed the water everyday. So, well, I think they [flowers] lasted about three weeks.’

   ‘Oh, yeah, Kishi-san. Shall I write something to Kishi-san, too?’

d. *Maa, konpyuutaa wakaran de, are yakedo.*
   ‘Well, I don’t know the computer well enough to say something …’

e. *Demo kore, tatemono no naka hairu to, kaze ga nai kara, nanka sugu atsuku kanjiru na, kore.*
   ‘But there’s no air inside the building, so I immediately feel hot.’

In (7a), *sono uchi* ‘some day soon, (lit.) within that interval’ cannot be substituted with *kono/ano uchi*; it is a fixed expression. *Sore de* in (7b) is also better analyzed as fixed, corresponding to the English ‘so/therefore’. Similarly, *soo da* in (7c) literally means ‘it is so’, but *a, soo da* is uttered when one has suddenly realized some state of affairs, and thus a natural translation would be ‘oh, yeah’. *Are* in (7d) does not refer to any particular entity. Regarding (7e), the interjection *are* is uttered when a speaker notices something unusual. But this subject habitually used *kore* as an interjection, as exemplified in (7e). This use of *kore* appears idiosyncratic to this particular speaker and is not considered further in my analysis. Excluding those irrelevant or marginal cases, I obtained 342 *ko*-tokens, 101 *so*-tokens, and 207 *a*-tokens.

4 Demonstratives in the soliloqual data

4.1 *Ko*-series

Of 342 *ko*-tokens, all but two are clearly deictic.

(8) Deictic *ko*-tokens

a. *A, kono isu choo-raku soo.*
   ‘Oh, this chair looks super-comfortable.’

b. *A, konna no mo arun da.*
   ‘Oh, there’s a thing like this one.’

c. *Anmari koko ni kite sabishii-tte omotta koto nai kedo, koo yatte heya ni hitori de hitorigoto wa ya da naa.*
   ‘I’ve seldom felt lonely since I came here, but I don’t like to be alone this way in a room and talk to myself.’

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2 Mikami (1997/1992) points out that many *so*-words are ‘neutralized’, i.e. no longer demonstratives. Reflecting this fact, most of the excluded utterances in our experiment are *so*-tokens.
The two problematic *ko*- utterances are listed in (9).

(9) Seemingly anaphoric *ko*-tokens
a. *Maa, aarudeko no ii no ga attara, hoshii kedo, maa, kore wa kinagani yaroo.*
   ‘Well, if there’s a good one in the Art Deco style, I want it, but I think I’ll spend more time on this [shopping].’

b. *Getsuyoobi madeni shinakucha ikenai no ga, eeto, a, soo da. E o kaite morau koto to, ato wa nanka atta kana. Aa, soo soo soo, kondo no kuizu no mondai o tsukuru koto. Kore o yattokanakya ikenai kana.*
   ‘What I have to do by Monday is … Oh, yes, I need to have someone draw pictures, and is there anything else? Oh, yes, yes, yes, make the next quiz. I think I need to do this.’

Kuno contends that, when *ko*- appears to be anaphoric, it is actually “indicating something as if it were visible to both the speaker and the hearer at the time of the conversation, and thus it imparts vividness to the conversation” (1973:288). Interestingly, in (9) all of *ko-so-a* could be used, and they would convey different mental states of the same speaker. The speaker of (9a) had been shopping for an ottoman (chair) and was browsing a catalog while recording. In this situation, only *kore*, which refers to ‘the activity I’m engaged in now’, viz. catalog shopping, is appropriate. Therefore, as Kuno remarks, although it might appear anaphoric, this use of *ko-* should be judged deictic. If *sore* were employed, it would indicate that the speaker is thinking about the activity of shopping, and that she is not physically engaged in it at the time of utterance. The *sore* in such a case should be considered genuinely anaphoric. If *are* were used, the situation would be difficult to imagine. One possible scenario would be that the speaker remembers various shopping trips she has made in the past to furniture stores, and the utterance would indicate that she will continue to make such shopping trips. To me, this use of *a*- sounds deictic, rather than anaphoric. We will return to this issue later.

In (9b), the speaker was listing what she needed to do by the following Monday. Again, it seems more appropriate to analyze the *kore* as referring deictically to the specific item on her mental list. If *sore* were used, it would be clearly anaphoric, and the image of pointing to a specific item on the list that *kore* evokes would disappear. Instead, *sore* would then be understood to refer to the list of items itself. *Are* could also be used here and would sound deictic. It would sound like pointing not to the to-do list just mentioned but, rather, to something new that has emerged in the speaker’s mind.

### 4.2 So-series

Regarding the *so*-series, all of the 101 tokens are clearly anaphoric. Although Kuroda’s stomach ulcer episode illustrating the possibility of deictically-used *so*-is plausible, such usage seems extremely rare. This absence of deictic *so-* suggests that the Distance Model (proximal-medial-distal) introduced in Section 2.2 does
not operate in soliloquy. All my recording was conducted in a small room, and yet subjects used a- to refer to entities located only a few feet away, e.g. (10).

(10) Deictic a-tokens

a. **Ano kakejiku wa dare ga kaita no kanaa.**
   ‘I wonder who wrote that scroll.’

b. **Asuko ni Momo-chan to Akane.**
   ‘There’s Momo-chan and Akane [a book title] there.’

Several subjects mentioned a scroll, cf. (10a), that was hanging a few feet from where they were seated. Some used ko- to refer to it, while others used a-. These data support the Territory Model; i.e. so- refers to an addressee’s territory, but, because no addressee is involved, so- is irrelevant. My data also support Mikami’s (1970/1992) theory of ko-so-a; i.e., only a two-way opposition of deixis exists, in this case ko- vs. a-.

Next, the anaphoric use of demonstratives is considered. Subtracting the addressee from Kuno’s analysis, we assume that so- is used when the speaker does not know the referent well, and that a- is used when s/he knows it well. Or, in terms of Kuroda’s characterization, so- is used when the speaker knows the referent merely conceptually, and a- when s/he knows it experientially. Among anaphoric so-utterances, some appear to support Kuno’s and Kuroda’s analyses, e.g. (11), but the majority of them do not, e.g. (12).

(11) Anaphoric so-tokens in accordance with Kuno’s and Kuroda’s analyses

a. **Sankanbi ja nakute, bunkasai ja nakute, aa, namee wasureta. Eeto, oyako, oyako nantoka. Ee, nande **sonna** **kotoba wasurerun yaro. 6-nenkan mainen atta noni.**
   ‘Not a [parents’] observation day, not an open house, oh, I forgot what we called it [a school event]. Hmm, parent-child, parent-child something. How could I forget such [that kind of] a word? We’ve had one every year for 6 years …’

b. **Are wa, a, jekku janai, jakku janai. Sonna namee datta yoona ki ga suru kedo.**
   ‘That one is Jeck? Jack? I think it’s something like that.’

c. **Teepu kiite zenbu kakidasu nante mendokusai na. Soo iu ikikai mada nain kana.**
   ‘To listen to the tape and transcribe it all is tiresome. Isn’t there such [that kind of] a machine available yet?’

d. **Kore wa? Kore wa kirei kamo shirenai. Ee, 1,287 doru? Sore wa chotto.**
   ‘How about this? This might be good. What? $1,287? That’s a little …’

(12) Anaphoric so-tokens not supporting Kuno’s and Kuroda’s analyses
a. Soo da, pasokon ga kowarechatta kara, sono shuuri mo, moshi dekitara, shita shi.
   ‘Oh, yeah, my computer has broken down, so, if I can, I want to fix it [that] too.’

   ‘Japan is small. Very tight. Everyone is stylish, strange and useless. But that might be a good point.’

   ‘I wonder what I was doing at this time yesterday, at 1 o’clock. Oh, yes, I was in the class I need to write that boring research paper for.’

d. … ippai e o kaita kara, ano e o doo shiyou kanaa. … Natsuyasumi ni chotto e no seiri o shita hoo ga ii kamo shirenai. … demo tsukaenai e wa doo shitara ii no kanaa. Demo sutern no wa mottainai kara, un, sore wa dokka ni sutoa suru ka.
   ‘I drew a lot of pictures. What shall I do with them? Should I sort them during the summer? What should I do with the unusable ones? Discarding is wasteful, so maybe I should store them [those] somewhere.’

In (11a-d), we can easily infer that the speakers do not know the referent well or unfamiliar with it. However, in (12a-d) the speakers should have very clear ideas about the referents of so-. In (12a), sono refers to the speaker’s own computer. Similarly, sore in (12b) refers to the penchant for striving to be fashionable, which is the speaker’s own characterization of the Japanese people. Prior to (12c), the speaker complained about a boring term paper assignment in one of his courses, and this sono refers anaphorically to the assignment he was writing. In (12d), the speaker had created many illustrations as teaching materials and wondered what to do with them. The sore refers here to her own drawings. These examples demonstrate that, contrary to Kuno and Kuroda, so- can be used to refer to a familiar entity. I am uncertain at this time whether this phenomenon is specific to soliloquy or whether it is also applicable to dialog. Although a thorough investigation of this problem is beyond the scope of the present paper, it certainly merits due attention.

4.3 A-series
The a-series occurred 207 times, approximately double the frequency of the so-series (101 times). As shown in (13), they often accompany an antecedent, and can therefore be considered anaphoric:

(13) Apparently anaphoric a-tokens
   a. Okaasan rekusasu ki ni itteru yoo datta kedo, demo are wa okkii kuruma da shi nee.
‘Mother seemed to like the Lexus, but it’s a big car.’

b. *Aa, demo ippai e o kaita kara, ano e o doo shiyou kana.*

‘Well, but I drew a lot of pictures. What should I do with those pictures?’

c. *Nee, ima wa reeku taho de nani shiten daro. Tenki ii to ii ne, atchi.*

‘What are they doing at Lake Tahoe? I hope the weather there is good.’

However, *a-* also frequently occurs without any antecedent:

(14) Antecedentless *a*-tokens

a. *Aaa, ashita mo hare, ashita mo harehen kana. Ashita haretara, ano sandaru hako.*

‘Well, tomorrow, I hope the weather will be fine again tomorrow. If it’s fine, I’ll wear those sandals.’

b. *Are, nantetta kana, are. Are, nooryoo basu da, nooryoo basu.*

‘What’s that called, that one? Night sightseeing bus, yeah, night sightseeing bus.’

c. *Kore, are da. Zenmai da.*

‘This is that. A flowering fern.’

The *a*-forms in (14) seem to me to be all deictic, although the referents are not visibly present. It seems that what is going on here is that while the speaker is soliloquizing, a certain entity emerges in her consciousness, and she refers to it deictically with *a*-. These emerging entities in the speaker’s mental space are not linguistic, but likely mental imagery, i.e. quasi-perceptual experiences. In (14a,b), the speaker was apparently referring to the image in her mind of her sandals or a sightseeing bus.

In (14c), the speaker was looking at a magazine. The utterance is of the equational *X is Y* type, wherein *X* is identified visually by the deictic *kore*, and *Y* non-visually by the deictic *are*. Then, the speaker remembered the name of the entity, *zenmai* ‘flowering fern’, and identified it as such.

Significantly, the opposite construal seems impossible in (14c); i.e. *kore* to refer to a mental image, and *are* to an entity that is physically present. This restriction does not change when *kore* and *are* are switched in order (i.e. *Are, kore da* ‘That is this’). There is even more asymmetry. We can use *a*- to refer to an entity that is close to us, but we can hardly use *ko*- for an entity that is far away.

Recall that in Section 4.1 I agreed with Kuno’s view that *ko-* is always deictic even when the referent is invisible. If indeed both *ko*- and *a*- are always deictic, the existence of these differences is puzzling. These facts suggest that even though *ko*- and *a*- are both deictic, they might work in different ways. At present I do not have any feasible explanation for these asymmetricalities.

Our next question is whether (13) and (14) are distinct, (13) being anaphoric and (14) being deictic. To me, both seem to function in the same way, whether or
not the entity is introduced linguistically before the use of *a*-. Because dividing the occurrences of *a*- in soliloquy into deictic and anaphoric is deemed arbitrary, I analyze both of them straightforwardly as deictic. I also speculate that even in conversation *a*- is always deictic, pointing to the speaker’s mental image.

Mikami (1970/1992) has speculated on this possibility, arguing that *a*- is always deictic and refers to an entity at a distance commonly-perceived by both speaker and addressee in either space or time. Arguing counter to Mikami, Kuno (1973/1992) points out that Mikami’s account cannot predict such differences as (3a,b). Furthermore, Kuno questions how we are able to determine whether something is at a commonly-perceived distance. If two people were born in 1960, Kuno continues, can we refer to that year as *ano toshi* ‘that year’? His response is no.

I contend, with Kuroda, that the variant effects of *a*- and *so*- such as in (3a,b), must be accounted for in terms of the act of communication. In this regard, Kinsui and Takubo (1992) speculate that the anomaly of *ano* in (3a) is not due merely to the speaker’s assumption of the addressee’s lack of knowledge of Yamada, but, rather, it is due to its *asocial* nature. Kinsui and Takubo consider the *ano* in (3a) to be anaphoric (with which I do not agree with), indicating that the speaker’s knowledge of the referent is experiential. If the addressee is unlikely to know the referent, they continue, to suggest one’s knowledge as experiential is not only useless, but also alienating. This explanation sounds plausible and valid regardless of *a*- being analyzed as anaphoric or deictic. I consider that in soliloquy as well as in dialog, *a*- refers *deictically* to an image in the speaker’s mind. And unless the speaker can assume that the same image is in the addressee’s mind, using *a*- is pointless.

5 The notions of deixis and anaphora reconsidered

Lyons (1977:672) discusses a case similar to that of (13) vs. (14). Consider:

(15) a. I was terribly upset to hear the news: I only saw her last week.
   b. I know Mrs Smith very well: I only saw her last week.

In (15a), the speaker offers condolences to a friend whose wife has just been killed in a car accident. Lyons determines that both (15a,b) are anaphoric:

Many scholars … would say that the reference of ‘she’ in [15a] is deictic, rather than anaphoric, on the grounds that it involves pointing to something in the intersubjective experience or common memory of speaker and addressee, rather than to something in the external situational context … It is obvious, however, that the notion of intersubjective experience, or common memory, is the more general notion, without which anaphoric reference, as it is traditionally conceived, cannot be explained. (ibid.)
This criticism also applies to my analysis of ko-so-a in soliloquy. That is, mental imagery that I propose in the case of deixis is a more general notion, and such an image is likely to be present even in the process of genuine anaphora. We will come back to this problem shortly. Regarding the distinction between deixis and anaphora, Lyons (ibid. 673) asserts:

Anaphora presupposes that the referent should already have its place in the universe-of-discourse. Deixis does not; indeed deixis is one of the principal means open to us of putting entities into the universe-of-discourse so that we can refer to them subsequently …

It has widely been acknowledged that anaphora can occur without an antecedent, as exemplified by (16). Unlike her in (15a), the pronominal it cannot be used deictically. Therefore, even though there is no antecedent, it in (16) is unambiguously anaphoric.

(16) [A and B turn a corner, and suddenly find themselves face to face with a large dog. A says to B.]
Do you think it’s friendly? (Cornish 1996:19)

Cornish argues that anaphora is not necessarily an intra-textual relationship between two linguistic expressions, but, rather, it serves to access and manage mentally-represented entities within the evolving discourse. Following Lyons, he considers that deixis prototypically serves to shift the addressee’s attention focus from an existing object to a new one that is derived via the situational context. Anaphora, on the other hand, guarantees the continuation of the attention focus already established. He contends that unstressed, low-pitched third person pronouns are always anaphoric regardless of the presence of an antecedent. The speaker presupposes that their referent is salient (i.e. stands out from its background context and is readily accessible to the addressee) at the point of utterance. Such saliency may be sanctioned by explicit prior mention in the cotext (antecedent), by an inference triggered by a given mention, or by direct mutual perception of a feature of the situational context. In any case, anaphora does not work in the cotext or the physical situational context, but works within a conceptual representation in the minds of speaker and addressee where the referent is located and accessed. To support this claim, Cornish (ibid. 25) provides (17):

(17) Le ministre de l’Education Nationale est en vacances. Elle sejournera deux semaines au bord de la mer.
‘The Education minister (masc.) is on holiday. She (fem.) will spend two weeks at the seaside.’

Le ministre de l’Education Nationale is grammatically determined as masculine, but because the referent is female, the anaphor reflects this fact. This
demonstrates that the anaphor is referring not by linking up directly with the antecedent expression *per se*, but via a mental representation induced by its antecedent.

Cornish further claims that the notions of *deixis* and *anaphora* are not mutually exclusive, but, rather, they are interdefining and interdependent discourse procedures. He contends that there is a cline, pure deixis at the one end, pure anaphora at the other, and various degrees of deicticity and anaphoricity in between.

With this new conceptualization of deixis and anaphora in mind, let us now examine whether (13) and (14) can be analyzed uniformly as anaphoric. The result is that, while (13) can be so judged, (14) cannot be analyzed as such. The *sandals* in (14a), for example, had not been established as an attention focus prior to the utterance, nor is there any trigger that induces the referent entity in context or situational context. Its image suddenly occurred in the speaker’s mind. I therefore maintain my claim that all occurrences of *a-* can be used only deictically.

To justify this claim, let us now turn to the consideration of the bound variable reading of demonstratives, where the demonstrative is not referential, and therefore cannot be deictic. Consider this constructed example:

(18) *Watashi ga umareta machi de wa, dono kooen ni mo sakura no ki ga ari,*

* kono/sono/*ano iriguchi wa, torii no katachi o shiteita.

‘In my hometown, every park had cherry trees, and its entrance was like an archway to a Shinto shrine.’

As shown in (18), only *so-* can be used as a bound-variable anaphor. 3 This inability to function as bound variable supports the claim that *ko-* and *a-* are always deictic.4

In this regard, Hoji et al. (2003) draw our attention to an interesting combinatorial restriction. Recall that there are phrases combining *a-* and *ko-* as well as *so-* and *ko-* but not *a-* and *so-*, cf. (2). With an interrogative expression, only *so-* can appear:

(19) *do-* + *so-* dare-sore ‘Mr/Ms/Mrs so-and-so’, *doko-soko* ‘such and such a place’, *soko-kashiko* ‘everywhere’

*do-* + *ko-* none

*do-* + *a-* none

Hoji et al. cite this fact as evidence that only *so-* can function as a free variable.

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3 This fact is also reported by Ueyama (1998).
4 Nunberg (1993) demonstrates that deictics can serve as bound variables. For example, a condemned prisoner can say ‘I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal’ (*I* = any condemned prisoner), or a President can say ‘The Founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court justices’ (*me* = any President). However, it is impossible to use deictics in this manner in Japanese.
6 Concluding remarks

Following a brief summary of traditional analyses of ko-so-a, this paper examined and analyzed their behavior in experimentally-obtained soliloquy data. It was demonstrated that ko-so-a occur frequently in soliloquy, and that interesting differences in their usage exist between soliloquial and dialogic discourses. While they all can be used deictically in dialog, so- is not used deictically in soliloquy. This fact implies that the Territory Model is applicable (i.e. no addressee’s territory exists), but that the Distance Model (proximal-medial-distal) is irrelevant. Deixis exhibits only a two-way opposition in soliloquy: ko- vs. a-.

Regarding anaphoric usage, it has been claimed that so- is used when the speaker does not know the referent well (only with conceptual knowledge), while a- is used when s/he knows it well (with experiential knowledge). My data, however, do not support this distinction; so- can be freely used with a familiar referent.

Ko- and a- occur in soliloquy with or without an antecedent. However, dividing their occurrences into deixis and anaphora according to the presence or absence of an antecedent is deemed arbitrary. Both of them should be analyzed straightforwardly as deictic even when the referents are not visibly present. When a certain mental imagery emerges in his/her consciousness, the speaker refers to it deictically with ko- or a-. I conjecture that this characterization is also valid in dialog.

References