Can there be a Better Source of Meaning than Everyday Practices?
Reinterpreting Division I of *Being and Time* in the Light of Division II

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I. Average versus Primordial Understanding

In Division I of *Being and Time* Heidegger says that “publicness primarily controls every way in which the world and human beings get interpreted, and it is always right” (165). This seems to follow from three basic theses: (1) people have skills for coping with equipment, with other people, and for taking up public roles like student or teacher; (2) to make sense, these everyday coping practices must conform to public norms; (3) these public norms are the basis of average everyday significance or intelligibility. In Heidegger jargon: “The one articulates the referential context of significance” (167). That is, norms tell us what one normally does.

For Heidegger then, as for Wittgenstein, the source of the intelligibility of the world and of human life is our shared, everyday, public practices. But we must beware of concluding from the basis of intelligibility in everyday practices, that, for Heidegger, as for Wittgenstein and pragmatists such as Richard Rorty, there is no superior source of meaning than the everyday; for Heidegger also says that “by publicness everything gets obscured” (165), and adds that Division I of *Being and Time* provides a phenomenology only of everyday average understanding and so will have to be revised in the light of the more “primordial understanding” (212) he describes in Division II.

But how can Heidegger account for a higher form of intelligibility than the public, average intelligibility provided by the social norms? Like Wittgenstein and Rorty, he rejects any of the forms of higher metaphysical intelligibility claimed by philosophers. It looks like for Heidegger, as for Wittgenstein, there simply couldn’t be any higher intelligibility than that provided by our shared everyday practices. As Wittgenstein says, explanations have to stop somewhere, and then we simply have to say this is what we do. Yet Heidegger clearly holds that there is a form of understanding of situations, on the one hand, and of human being, on the other, that is superior to everyday understanding. What could such a more primordial understanding be?

To get a clue, it helps to recall what we learn from Theodore Kisiel’s research into the sources of *Being and Time*. According to Kisiel, the book grows out of Heidegger’s work on Aristotle: Division I elaborates on *techne*, everyday skill, and Division II on *phronesis*, practical wisdom. But just what phenomena do Aristotle and Heidegger have in mind with *techne* and *phronesis*? The way to find out is to let these phenomena show themselves as they are in themselves, so I will take a moment to review, in a very abbreviated way, several stages of skill acquisition. Then I’ll describe what more is needed for a skilled learner to gain practical wisdom—a mastery of his or her culture’s practices. Finally, I’ll suggest
that, at the end of *Being and Time*, Heidegger draws on Kierkegaard’s Christian understanding of being reborn, to introduce an even higher skill than could be understood by Aristotle and the Greeks.

**II. A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition**

*Stage 1: Novice*

Normally, instruction begins with the instructor decomposing the task environment into context-free features that the beginner can recognize without the desired skill. The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of these features.

For example, the child who is learning how to behave appropriately in his or her culture may be given the rule: “Never tell a lie.”

*Stage 2: Advanced beginner*

But as the novice gains experience actually coping with real situations, he sees that the rules don’t work and learns to see meaningful additional aspects of the situation. Instructional *maxims* can then refer to these new *situational aspects*.

The policy “Never tell a lie” will get a child into fights and excluded from important events so, with the coaching of their parents, children learn to tell their friends when leaving their homes that they had a good time, regardless of the truth. Thus, the child learns to replace the rule “Never lie” with the maxim “Never lie except in situations when making everyone feel good is what matters.”

*Stage 3: Competence*

But there are many types of social situations, so children must learn to choose a perspective that determines which elements of the situation will be treated as important and which ones will be ignored.

Thus a young person learns that there are situations in which one must tell the truth and others in which one lies. Although this is daunting, the adolescent has to decide whether the current situation is one of building trust, giving support, manipulating the other person for his or her own good, harming a brutal antagonist, and so forth. If, for instance, trust is the issue, the young person has to decide when and how to tell the truth.

Since such decisions are risky, they give rise to the anxiety that goes with free choice. In the face of this anxiety the learner is tempted to seek the security of standards and rules. For example, if a risk-averse young person decides that a situation is one of trust and so tells a friend more than the friend can bear and thereby loses the friendship, he may decide on the rule, “Never tell more truth than is absolutely necessary.” This rule may prevent new breakdowns in similar situations, but it will also prevent further skill refinement. In this case, it will prevent frank and flexible friendships. In general, if one seeks to follow rules one will not get beyond competence. There is no substitute for taking risks.
But this means there is no way to avoid anxious involvement. Prior to this stage, if the rules and maxims don’t work, the performer could rationalize that he has not been given adequate guidelines. Now, however, the learner feels responsible for his choices, and often his choice leads to confusion and failure. Of course, sometimes things work out well, and the competent performer experiences a kind of elation unknown to the beginner. Thus, learners at this stage find themselves on an emotional roller coaster.

Of course, not just any emotional reaction such as enthusiasm, or fear of making a fool of oneself, or the exultation of victory, will do. What matters is taking responsibility for one’s successful and unsuccessful choices, even brooding over them; not just feeling good or bad about winning or losing, but replaying one’s performance in one’s mind step by step. The point, however, is not to analyze one’s mistakes and insights, but just to let them sink in. Experience shows that only then will one become an expert.

As the competent performer becomes more and more emotionally involved in his task, it becomes increasingly difficult for him to draw back and adopt the detached rule-following stance of the beginner. While it might seem that this involvement would interfere with rule-testing, and so would lead to irrational decisions and inhibit further skill development, in fact just the opposite turns out to be the case. If the detached stance of the novice and advanced beginner is replaced by involvement, and the learner accepts the anxiety of choice, he is set for further skill advancement.

**Stage 4: Expertise**

With enough experience and willingness to take risks, the learner becomes an expert who immediately sees what sort of situation he is in and what to do. In this way, most children grow up to be experts who have learned, among many other things, spontaneously to tell the truth or to lie, depending upon the situation. Most people grow up to be ethical experts responding in what is generally recognized as the right way to a wide range of interpersonal situations.

But although the virtuous person does the right thing according to the standards of the one, this isn’t the whole story. While most of us are ethical experts in many domains such as truthfulness, according to Aristotle a few superior people go beyond ethical expertise. They are admired for their phronesis or practical wisdom. Let us call this stage mastery.

**Stage 5: Mastery**

We have so far seen that, if the learner stays emotionally involved and has enough experience, he will become an expert who responds intuitively to the current situation. That means that the average person is an expert in many domains, from dressing to driving to ethical behavior. As long as the situation remains stable, such expertise does not require constant learning. And, as reflection and observation shows, most experts become satisfied with a given level of success, and stop responding emotionally to each new experience. A few people, however, at least in areas important to them, are never satisfied that
they have done the right thing, even if public opinion assures them it was right. They sense that there is no one right thing to do and that they can always improve.

Such continually anxious experts are never complacent. But, happily, if they brood over their successes and failures, replaying them over and over in their mind, they will reach a new level of skillful coping beyond expertise. Just as the beginner can go on to become aware not just of context-free features but also of meaningful situational aspects, the expert can progress from responding immediately to specific situations to responding immediately to the whole meaningful context. Thus the constantly anxious expert develops a masterful grasp of the whole unfolding activity—a grasp that the complacent expert can never achieve. According to Heidegger, this is the higher skill Aristotle called phronesis, practical wisdom.

Considering some examples can help us see how mastery goes beyond expertise. The average carpenter can be counted on to be an expert who will put wood together in the standard way and hit the nails appropriately for the kind of wood he is using. The master craftsman, however, is responsive to the specific grain of the piece of wood he is using and to the whole situation, both architectural and social, into which his work is to fit. In team sports, the normal expert takes account of the current location of the other players, but there are rare players, such as Larry Bird, who are gripped by the game and are never satisfied with doing the standard thing. They go on to develop a feel for the whole evolving situation in the overall game. Bird thus could respond to possibilities on the court that others couldn’t see.

The same distinction between the expert and the master shows up outside of sports. A colleague of mine, who is generally recognized to be a master teacher, is never satisfied with her teaching. In her lectures she learns from her interactions with the students, and after each lecture replays them in her mind, feeling elated at the moments when things went well and she and the students learned together, and discouraged when a long discussion led nowhere. Colleagues are amazed to find that as she walks about the campus listening to her Walkman she is listening not to music but to her own lecture from the previous year. But she is not giving herself rules for how to avoid mistakes and do better next time; that sort of detachment would lead to a regression to competence. She is simply letting the classroom interactions and the connected emotions sink in. Her brain then takes over and enables her to discriminate more and more subtly different situation; the result is that each year she is an even more masterful teacher.

III. How a Resolute Response to the Anxiety of Guilt Makes Phronesis Possible

But why do some people constantly replay what they have done and let their joy at their successes and sadness at their failures obsess them? Why aren’t they satisfied by knowing they have done what is publicly recognized as the right thing? Heidegger can help us here. He notes in Division I that there is no
right way to act, but that the average way of acting avoids this unsettling fact by doing what everyone agrees is the right thing. Heidegger calls such “lostness in the one” “tranquilized,” and describes it as following “rules and standards” (312).

In Division II, however, Heidegger introduces the anxiety of guilt as a positive corrective to this tranquilized state. Ontological guilt in Being and Time does not mean what guilt normally is taken to mean. It is not a sense of having done something wrong but rather a structural characteristic of all human beings. Guilt is defined as the fact that one is indebted to the norms of one’s culture, but that one can’t get behind this cultural thrownness so as to make these norms explicit and justify them.

There is no reason why our way of doing things is right; it is just what we do. The anxious realization of the ungroundedness of the rules and standards of the public’s average understanding undermines the expert’s complacency. If a person faces the anxiety of ontological guilt he can act with what Heidegger calls resoluteness, which Heidegger defines as “self projection upon [my] ownmost being-guilty, in which [I am] ready for anxiety….” (343).

Thus Heidegger’s resolute individual deviates both from the beginner’s rules and the public’s standards. In Heidegger’s terms, irresolute Dasein responds to the general situation (Lage in German), whereas resolute Dasein responds to the concrete Situation (Situation in German). As Heidegger puts it: “for the one ...the [concrete] Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. The one knows only the ‘general situation’” (346), while “resolute Dasein” is in touch with the “concrete Situation of taking action” (349). We can now see that response to the concrete Situation refers to the broader contextual understanding of the unfolding situation characteristic of the master. Heidegger says in his discussion of phronesis in his 1925 Sophist lectures:

[The phronimos] … is determined by his situation in the largest sense. … The circumstances, the givens, the times and the people vary. The meaning of the action ... varies as well.... It is precisely the achievement of phronesis to disclose the [individual] as acting now in the full situation within which he acts….7

Heidegger adds: “Our concrete interpretation of phronesis shows how actions are constituted in it. Namely in terms of the kairos.8 Kairos is Aristotle’s term for the decisive moment in which the phronimos grasps the whole temporally unfolding concrete Situation. It is “ultimately an immediate overall view of the moment from the point of view of the end of the action in question.”9

Of course the actions of the phronimos are the result of the gradual refinement of what starts out as general responses to the general situation. Mastery grows out of long, involved, anxious experience acting within the shared cultural practices. Thus, in discussing phronesis Heidegger quotes Aristotle’s
remark that “Only through much time…is life experience possible.”\textsuperscript{10} And in \textit{Being and Time} he is explicit that the intelligibility of the (concrete) Situation disclosed by resolute action is a refinement of the everyday:

The ‘world’ which is available does not become another ‘in its content’ nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both being toward [equipment] understandingly and concernfully, and solicitous being with others, are now given a definite character…. [344]

Or, more clearly, given our concern with the one:

Resolution does not withdraw from ‘actuality’, but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost \textit{ability-to-be in the one}.’ [346, my italics]

\textbf{IV. From \textit{Kairos} to \textit{Augenblick}}

Kisiel’s claim that Heidegger’s resoluteness is a working out of Aristotle’s phenomenology of practical wisdom is convincing. But Kisiel’s plausible way of understanding the passages in question is disputed by another group of interpreters who point out that Heidegger’s account of resoluteness is based on his early interest in the account of radical transformation in St. Paul, Luther and Kierkegaard.\textsuperscript{11} These interpreters understandably focus not on the Greek \textit{kairos}, as the decisive moment in masterful action, but on Heidegger’s use of the Kierkegaardian term for radical transformation, the \textit{Augenblick}, translated as the ‘Instant’.

Heidegger would agree with both parties to this dispute. He distinguishes the \textit{phronimos’} understanding of the \textit{concrete Situation} revealed by guilt from what he calls the \textit{limit-situation} revealed by death. He introduces the \textit{Augenblick}: Dasein “gets brought back from its lostness by a resolution, so that both the \textit{concrete Situation} and … the primordial ‘\textit{limit-Situation}’ of \textit{being-towards-death}, will be disclosed as an \textit{Augenblick} that has been held on to” (400). Heidegger adds: “What we here indicate with ‘Augenblick’ is what Kierkegaard was \textit{the first to really grasp in philosophy}—a grasping which begins \textit{the possibility of a completely new epoch in philosophy for the first time since Antiquity}.”\textsuperscript{12}

Clearly there is something crucially important that Aristotle’s account of \textit{phronesis} did not capture. To understand this new level of skillful action introduced by Christianity and first fully articulated by Kierkegaard, we need to return to the phenomena and introduce a sixth stage of skill enhancement.

\textit{Stage 6: World Transformer}

Mastery is as good as one can get in the stages of skill acquisition in a settled domain, but there is a further form of skill that is usually called creativity. Then the skilled practitioner doesn’t merely \textit{intuitively} cope as most of us do when we are experts in a domain, or even manifest a deep \textit{insight} into the
domain as masters do; rather the resolute Dsein has a vision of the skill domain so original that it changes his world. Revolutionary scientists such as Galileo, leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and entrepreneurs such as Ford change their world in this way.

But there are less dramatic versions. Perhaps the clearest examples can be found in sports. In basketball, Larry Bird never went beyond mastery and was recognized as one of the best team players who ever played, but Michael Jordan expressed his style of life in his play. He played basketball not as a team player but as an individual. At first people thought that this undermined the teamwork essential to the sport, but it worked, and that changed the way the game is now played.13

Outside sports, we find the same phenomenon in visionaries who see the possibilities of new technologies. For example, Alan Kay, back in the late sixties when computers filled whole rooms, began to develop the laptop computer with the desktop interface. Kay is interesting because he sees our culture’s normal way of doing things not as sensible and natural, but as purely contingent. He is thus fascinated by history. For example, when working on what he called his ‘dynabook’, the latest version of which is Apple’s “PowerBook,” he read the history of books so as to loosen up what people normally take for granted about them. He was interested in why books are the size they are, how they came, rather late in the game, to have page numbers, etc.

Thus, world transformers somehow sense that the whole currently accepted way of doing things is arbitrary, and have a vision that what is now being done could be done in an entirely different way, which would even change what counted as doing things better. They are often sensitive to the fact that people aren’t doing what they think they are doing. Rather than ignoring or covering up or explaining away such anomalies, they hold onto and elaborate them. Especially if these anomalies reveal other ways of doing things left over from the past.14

V. The Greek Cultural Master vs. the Christian World Transformer

Given the phenomenology of world disclosing, we can now see that there are two totally different levels of skill beyond the expertise described in Division I of Being and Time. As we have already seen, according to Heidegger, anxious, guilty resoluteness—Dasein’s sense of its throwness—makes possible the mastery exhibited by the phronimos who, because he has held onto anxiety, and so no longer takes for granted that the standard public way of acting is “always right,” can go on learning and master whole specific situatons. But, according to Heidegger, the Aristotelian phronimos has not sensed the ungroundedness of the Greek understanding of what it means to be a human being. In fact, the Greek phronimos could, if he had taken Aristotle’s ethics course,15 learn that what one does when one is a Greek expresses the essential rational character of human nature. The phronimos, therefore, although admired for his wisdom, is not fully authentic.
Besides the masterful coping of the phronimos, made possible by a grasp of the concrete Situation in the largest sense, there is a “fully authentic” way of acting made possible by Dasein’s “primordial understanding” of its own way of being. This fully authentic way of acting is a more complete form of resoluteness in which Dasein not only faces the anxiety of guilt, viz. the sense that the everyday norms of its society are thrown rather than grounded and so have no final authority; it also faces the anxiety of the limit-situation of death, where death, like guilt, is given a new “ontological meaning.” In Being and Time, death does not mean an event at the end of one’s life, but rather the sense that my identity and world are ungrounded, and so can be totally transformed. Ontological death, then, is a prerequisite for the possibility of being reborn.

Once we see that there are two phenomena, masterful response to the concrete Situation and radical transformation of the self and world, we can begin to see that Heidegger is distinguishing and relating two basic experiences of the source, nature, and intelligibility of decisive action—the Greek experience of the kairos, arising from a sense of the ungroundedness of public norms, that makes possible masterful coping in the world, and the Christian experience of the Augenblick, arising from a primordial understanding of Dasein itself as ungrounded, that makes possible a transformation of the world.

This enables Heidegger to distinguish two kinds of resoluteness. As he puts it:

We have defined “resoluteness” as a projecting of oneself on one’s ownmost being-guilty ….

Resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its ability-to-be, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and to take it over wholly. [434]

In other words, the resolute phronimos merely experiences the thrownness of everyday norms and so has the sense that they do not provide rules to be rigidly followed nor shared standards of what is right that can guide performance. He therefore gives up a general understanding of the situation and responds to the full concrete Situation. In anticipatory resoluteness, however, anxiety in the face of death frees Dasein from taking for granted even the agreed-upon current cultural concerns. That is, in anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has to be ready at all times to give up its identity and its world altogether. In such an understanding, Dasein manifests “its authenticity and its totality” (348).

This readiness makes it possible for Dasein to change history by what Heidegger calls repetition. Repetition makes a reciprocal rejoinder to the possibility of existence that has-been-there….But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in an Augenblick; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the today, is working itself out as the ‘past’. [438, my italics]
What Heidegger is suggesting here is an original account of cultural creativity. In an instant of decisive action—which, of course, can take years to be carried out—authentic Dasein can take over marginal practices from the past and by making them central in the current context can exhibit a new understanding of the past and a new form of life that can transform his culture’s fate.

Heidegger tells us that fate “is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historisizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen” (435). The most striking example of such a transformation is the Christian experience of Jesus as a world-transformer. We are told that the Jews followed The Law. One was guilty for one’s overt acts. Jesus changed all this when, in the Sermon on the Mount, he said that everyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart. He also said that He had fulfilled the Law and so could practice healing even on the Sabbath. On his new account the Law is only marginal, and what really matters is that one is guilty for one’s desires. Purity, not rightness of action, is required, and in that case one can’t save oneself by will power, but only by throwing oneself on the mercy of a Savior and being reborn.

It might seem that this cannot be a such radical change from Judaism, since the eighth commandment already enjoins one not to covet anything that is your neighbor’s, and coveting is surely a case of desire, not overt action. But Heidegger would point out that if Jesus had not had some basis in the tradition no one would have had a clue as to what he was talking about, so it is important that he take up and make central a marginal practice already in the culture.

As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, an authentically historical individual transforms his generation’s understanding of the issue facing the culture and thereby produces a new authentic “we.” Such a history maker thus goes beyond not only the ethical expertise of his peers, but even beyond the full Situational understanding of the phronimos.16

Since all intelligibility must be grounded in shared everyday practices, however, such a charismatic leader will have to change common sense. Such a world transformer can show a new style and so be followed, as Jesus was followed by his disciples, even though they did not fully understand the meaning of what they were doing. But he will not be fully intelligible to the members of the culture until his new way of coordinating the practices is articulated in a new public language and preserved in new public institutions. So, as Heidegger says, no matter how publicness covers up radical originality, “even resoluteness remains dependent upon the one and its world” (345).

Conclusion

In summary, according to Division II of Being and Time, public, average, everyday understanding is necessarily general and banal. Nonetheless, this leveled, average understanding is necessary in the early
stages of acquiring expertise and as the background for all intelligibility. It is thus both genetically and ontologically prior to any more primordial understanding.

Once, however, an individual has broken out of the one’s reassuring everyday rules by anxiously facing his freedom to choose without guidelines among alternative interpretations of his situation, by repeated risky experience in the everyday world he can become sensitive to the discriminations that constitute *expertise* in the concrete local situation. Then, with further involved experience facing resolutely the anxiety of groundlessness, he can go on to become a *phronimos*, a cultural master, who responds to the whole situation in a broader and deeper way than any expert. Finally, by facing the anxiety of death in anticipatory resoluteness, and so seeing that his identity and that of his culture is ungrounded and could be radically changed, a fully authentic Dasein can disclose an even higher kind of intelligibility. He can take up marginal possibilities in his culture’s past in way that enables him to change the style of a whole generation and thereby disclose a new world.\(^{17}\)

All of this shows that the shared intelligibility of the one, even though it “obscures everything,” can be deepened and even radically transformed but can never be left behind. So the public norms described in Division I are never abandoned, but in Division II they turn out to be the basis of two important positive phenomena—mastery and world-transforming—understood by the Greeks and the Christians respectively, but never dreamed of in the philosophy of pragmatists and Wittgenstinians.


\(^2\)Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 9. Kisiel says: “The project of BT thus takes shape in 1921-24 against the backdrop of an unrelenting exegesis of Aristotle’s texts … from which the … pretheoretical models for the two Divisions of BT, the *techne* of *poiesis* for the First and the *phronesis* of *praxis* for the Second, are derived.”

\(^3\)For a more detailed account see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus *Mind over Machine* (New York: Free Press, 1988), and *The Road to Mastery and Beyond* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
Patricia Benner has described this phenomenon in *From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice*, (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1984), 164.


One might object that this account has the role of involvement reversed; that the more the beginner is emotionally committed to learning the better, while an expert could be, and, indeed, often should be, coldly detached and rational in his practice. This is no doubt true, but the beginner’s job is to follow the rules and gain experience, and it is merely a question of motivation whether he is involved or not. What is important is that the novice is not emotionally involved in choosing an action, even if he is involved in its outcome. Only at the level of competence is there an emotional investment in the choice of action. Then emotional involvement seems to play an essential role in switching the learner over from what one might roughly think of as a left-hemisphere analytic approach to a right-hemisphere holistic one. That amateur and expert chess players use different parts of the brain has been confirmed by recent MRI research. Researchers report:

activity is most evident in the medial temporal lobe in amateur players, which is consistent with the interpretation that their mental acuity is focused on analyzing unusual new moves during the game. In contrast, highly skilled chess grandmasters have more γ-bursts in the frontal and parietal cortices …. These marked differences in the distribution
of focal brain activity during chess playing point to differences in the mechanisms of brain processing and functional brain organization between grandmasters and amateurs.


7 Martin Heidegger, *Plato’s “Sophist,”* trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 101 (my italics). In his *Sophist* course, Heidegger has not yet made a clear distinction between *Lage* and *Situation*. He uses both terms interchangeably to refer to the concrete situation. See, for example, page 102: "out of the constant regard toward that which I have resolved, the situation [*Situation*] should become transparent. From the point of view of the *proaireton*, the concrete situation [*konkrete Lage*] . . . is covered over."


9 Ibid., 134, 135.

10 Ibid., 97.

11 However, in 1924 Heidegger also uses the term *Augenblick* to describe the *phronimos’s* instantaneous insight into the Situation: “in *phronesis* … in a momentary glance [*Augenblick*] I survey the concrete situation of action, out of which and in favor of which I resolve [*Entschliesse*] myself”: *Plato’s “Sophist,”* 114. This reading is confirmed by *Basic Problems*, where the *Augenblick* is equated with Aristotle’s *kairos*, the moment of appropriate skillful intervention. “Aristotle saw the phenomenon of the *Augenblick*, the *kairos*”: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 288. Still, *Augenblick* is also Luther’s translation of St. Paul’s instant in which we shall be changed in a “twinkling of an eye.” So John van Buren says rather darkly and unhelpfully that “Heidegger took the movement that concentrates itself at the extreme point (*eschaton*) of the *kairos* to be the
kairological time that he had already discovered in the Pauline eschatology”: The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 231. To make sense of this we will have to stay close to the two phenomena Heidegger is distinguishing and relating.


13It is important to contrast entrepreneurs, like Ford, and style-changers like Michael Jordan with inventors such as Edison. Ford had a vision of a new form of production that would not try to make perfect cars for the rich like Rolls and Royce, but simple, reliable cars for everyone. His success changed the world. Edison changed the world too, but, even when he invented the electric light bulb, he had no vision of a new style of life it would bring about. He was just seeing what new gadgets he could make. We thus need to distinguish Ford as a world transformer from Edison as an innovator. In sports too there are not only style changers like Michael Jordan, who express their way of life in their actions, but also innovators like Dick Fosbury. Unlike Jordan, Fosbury wasn’t trying to change the high jump so as to better express his sense of the sport; he was only trying to find a way to jump that felt better. He thus changed the technique but not the point or style of the sport.

14We can also return to our examples of mastery to see what they would be like if they were to become world-transformers. A master craftsman, drawing on historical practices such as the love of nature practiced by the Romantics who treated nature as somehow sacred, might sense that the issue for our time is saving the environment. So to resist our current tendency to think of nature as a resource to be used and then thrown away, he might start a movement to make only things that can be transformed and recycled. The masterful teacher might realize that what is most important in education is not course content, but passing on the positive way of facing the
anxiety of thrownness that makes one capable of being a *phronimos*, and of facing the anxiety of death that makes one capable of being a world transformer. She might then draw on the way scientists in their post-doctoral years become apprentices to masterful scientists to change university education so as to emphasize the way teaching assistants learn as apprentices.


16The phenomenon of world disclosing is described and illustrated in Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Disclosing New Worlds* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

17Heidegger sensed that such a fully authentic Dasein’s anxious reinterpretation of what his generation stands for allows him to transform the cultural understanding of his time, but, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger could not yet see how radically a culture’s understanding could be transformed. Only when he had understood that the whole style of a culture—its understanding of being—could change, could he fully grasp what it would be like for cultural paradigms such as statesmen, works of art, gods, and philosophers to disclose new worlds. See Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).