Philosophy 3 - The Nature of Mind

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Exam:  12.30-3.30pm, Thursday May 14th 2009.

ESSAY TWO

Answer ONE of the following questions in a paper of 3-5 pages, double-spaced, in a regular font. The paper is due at 9.00am on Thursday April 9th, in your GSIs mailbox in 301 Moses Hall.
Late papers will not be accepted without prior arrangement.
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The first paragraph of your essay must state the main thesis for which you wish to argue in the essay.
The last paragraph must restate the main thesis, summarize the way in which you have argued for it, and indicate any outstanding problems.

1. Explain the idea of ‘spectrum inversion’. Does the possibility of spectrum inversion show that functionalism is mistaken? Does it show that color sensations are epiphenomenal?

2. What is the computer model of the mind? Does Searle's 'Chinese Room' argument show the computer model is mistaken? How, if at all, should it be improved?

3. What does Nagel think the limits are on a scientific understanding of bats? Set out and evaluate his argument. What does Nagel’s claim, if true, show about the possibility of explaining consciousness in physicalist or functionalist terms?

4. How would you explain what Physicalism is? How does Jackson explain what physicalism is? Set out Jackson’s example about Mary. What, if anything, does this example show about the truth of physicalism?

PHILOSOPHY 3: THE NATURE OF MIND
ESSAY ONE

Answer ONE of the following questions in a paper of 3-5 pages, double-spaced, in a regular font. The paper is due at 9.00am on Tuesday March 3rd, in your GSIs mailbox in 301 Moses Hall.
Late papers will not be accepted without prior arrangement.

The first paragraph of your essay must state the main thesis for which you wish to argue in the essay.
The last paragraph must restate the main thesis, summarize the way in which you have argued for it, and indicate any outstanding problems.

1. Descartes has three arguments for his dualism: from the certainty of his knowledge of himself, from what he can conceive, and from the indivisibility of the self. Explain what dualism is, and set out and evaluate Descartes’ arguments.

2. Explain Huxley’s ‘frog’ argument for epiphenomenalism. Does his argument establish the truth of epiphenomenalism? If epiphenomenalism were true, would dualism be true?

3. What does Ryle's 'logical behaviorism' say that a mental state is? Is Putnam's 'Super-Spartans' argument a good criticism of logical behaviorism? Is Putnam's point specifically about pain, or does it apply to mental states generally? Does knowledge of one's own mental states pose a problem for logical behaviorism?

4. Are mental states really brain states? How would you argue for the identification of a particular mental state with a particular brain state? Does the idea that mental states are brain states mean that knowledge of your own mind is really knowledge of your own brain?

5. Is it possible that there are animals with mental states like ours but without brains like ours? If so, does this show that mental states cannot be brain states? What does functionalism say about this?

6. What does functionalism say mental states are? Ned Block thinks that his example of China’s population instantiating the same causal relations as those of your mental life is a problem for functionalism. Is it a problem? Does the example show that there are any particular aspects of your mental life that can’t be explained functionally?