University of California, Berkeley
Department of Psychology

Psychology 1
Fall 2001

Midterm Examination 2
Preliminary Scoring Key and Initial Feedback

Performance on the exam was very good. On the initial scoring, the average score on the exam was 35.54 out of 50, or 71%. This is actually a little better than my target, which is an average score between 65-70%. We identified three "bad" items: #4, #41, and #42, and rescored them correct for all responses. In addition, due to a typographical error, two alternatives for #29 were identical, B and C. Although we instructed people in Wheeler Auditorium to ignore Option C, some people didn't get the message, and we gave them credit for C as well as B. The mean for the rescored test thus rose to 37.67, or 75%, which is really good.

The percent of the class getting each item correct, and the item-to-total correlation for each item, is provided below. The final version of this feedback will contain short essays on each item.

Correct Answers are Marked with an Asterisk (*)

Be sure you are using a red Scantron sheet.

Fill in the appropriate circles with a #2 pencil only.

Be sure you put your name on the front of the red Scantron sheet.

Be sure you put your Student ID# on both sides of the red Scantron sheet.

Choose the best answer to each of the following 50 questions. Questions are drawn from the text and lectures in roughly equal proportions, with the understanding that there is considerable overlap between the two sources. Usually, only one question is drawn from each major section of each chapter of the required readings; again, sometimes this question also draws on material discussed in class. Read the entire exam through before answering any questions: sometimes one question will help you answer another one.

Most questions can be correctly answered in one of two ways: (1) by fact-retrieval, meaning that you remember the answer from your reading of the text or listening to the lecture; or (2) inference, meaning that you can infer the answer from some general principle discussed in the text or lecture. If you cannot determine the correct answer by either of these methods, try to eliminate at least one option as clearly wrong: this maximizes the likelihood that you will get the correct answer by chance. Also, go with your intuitions: if you have actually done the assigned readings and attended the lectures, your "informed guesses" will likely be right more often than they are wrong.

1. Your ability to do long division depends on _____ memory.

A. episodic

B. working

C. semantic

D. procedural*

91% correct, rpb = .14. Procedural knowledge is knowledge concerning skills, like mathematical skills. Semantic knowledge is knowledge of abstract facts. Episodic knowledge is autobiographical memory. Working memory is like short-term or primary memory, and holds knowledge while it is being used in ongoing cognitive tasks.

2. If you "can't think of it now" but do remember it later, there was an initial failure of:

A. acquisition.

B. retention.

C. retrieval.*

D. recognition.

97%, .08. Temporary forgetting, by definition, results from a failure of retrieval. Similarly, a person's ability to recognize something he or she couldn't recall results from a failure of retrieval. Failures of acquisition (encoding) and retention (storage) are permanent.

3. A group of research participants hears a list of 15 words after which there is a delay of 30 seconds before they are asked to recall the words. During this delay period, rehearsal is prevented. When asked for free recall of the words, the __________ will be affected the most.

A. recency effect*

B. primacy effect

C. memory span

D. long-term memory

54%, .28. In the serial position effect, recall is best for words at the beginning (the primacy effect) and the end (the recency effect) of the list. We know that the primacy effect is due to long-term memory, because it is increased by decreasing the speed of item presentation (providing more opportunity for elaborative and organizational encoding). We know that the recency effect is due to short-term memory, because it is decreased by increasing the retention interval (or filling the retention interval with distracting tasks).

4. In an experiment, subjects are visually presented with words and simply have to pronounce them after they disappear from the screen. Some words are pronounced, only once, others twice, others five times, and others ten times. Later, the subjects are surprised with a memory test, and asked to recall all the words they pronounced. The results of the experiment illustrate the:

A. Law of Exercise.

B. distinction between availability and accessibility.

C. difference between maintenance rehearsal and elaborative rehearsal.*

D. principle of interactive interference.

29%, -.22 (sic!). A bad item. And you know an item is a bad item when people who endorsed the answer the instructor thinks is right did worse on the rest of the exam than those who endorsed a "wrong" answer. Actually, I'm right and the majority is wrong, but the question was just badly written. Sorry. This is a caricature of the Craik & Watkins experiment, which was offered as evidence against Ebbinghaus's claim that repetition strengthens memory, a claim that would have been consistent with Thorndike's Law of Exercise (or Law of Practice). What Craik and Watkins found was that long-term memory was no better after several rote repetitions than it was after only a single rehearsal. Thus, what C&W called "maintenance reherasal" isn't enough. Long-term memory requires "elaborative rehearsal", a point also made by Craik's experiments on "depth of processing" and other illustrations of the Elaboration Principle.

5. A student is presented with a list of word pairs including the pair "stone-chair." According to the encoding-specificity principle, which word would be the best cue for the recall of "chair" on a subsequent task?

A. table

B. furniture

C. charity

D. stone *

81%, .30. This is about encoding specificity. At the time of encoding, the words stone and chair are encoded together. Therefore, stone will be a good retrieval cue for chair, even though it is not normally associated with that word. The cue-dependency principle would predict that table (a close associate of chair) or furniture (a category of which chair is an instance) would be good retrieval cues as well, but encoding specificity gives priority to stone, because that's the way chair was encoded.

6. In a certain verbal learning study, proactive interference was the main cause of forgetting. The study showed, then, that the more lists of material a research participant had previously learned the:

A. better his retention of the newly learned list.

B. better his retention of the original lists.

C. poorer his retention of the newly learned list.*

D. poorer his retention of the original lists.

66%, .39. In proactive interference, memory for an old list impairs memory for a newly learned list. In retroactive interference, memory for a newly learned list impairs memory for an old list.

7. After watching a speech by a famous, ambitious politician campaigning for President, you are most likely to remember:

A. her anecdotes about her summer vacations during childhood.

B. the fact that she stumbled when she was asked why she wants to be President.*

C. the fact that she presented a coherent plan for welfare reform.

D. her anecdotes about the importance of public service.

83%, .20. This was about schematic processing. We would expect a famous, ambitious politician to be able to articulate his reasons for wanting to be President. This guy couldn't. In fact, just this kind of thing famously happened to Teddy Kennedy, Senator from Massachusetts, during his last campaign for President (he soon dropped out of the race).

8. Eyewitnesses are liable to incorporate information from "leading" questions into their testimony. This fact is consistent with the idea that:

A. new information can displace old information from storage in long-term memory.

B. memory is partly based on judgments and inferences about past events.*

C. implicit memories can distort explicit memories.

D. working memory is cue-dependent.

63%, .36. This question refers to the post-event misinformation effect, an illustration of the reconstruction principle. People incorporate post-event information into their memories because their memories are partly based on all available knowledge (and inferences and beliefs) about an event -- not just the information encoded as part of the original memory trace.

9. Research participants are asked to estimate the distance between 1) a city on the East Coast of the U.S. and one on the West Coast and 2) between a city on the East Coast of the U.S. and one in the Midwest. Results will:

A. demonstrate the use of symbolic representations.

B. be that participants take about the same amount of time to make each judgment, and are more accurate for #2.

C. be that participants take about the same amount of time to make each judgment, and are about equally accurate.

D. be that participants take slightly longer for judgment #1 than #2.*

76%, .32. This is about the image-scanning studies and analog representations. It turns out that estimations of geographical distances take time, and the time is proportional to the actual distance between the two points. This finding is taken as evidence that subjects are actually scanning a "mental picture", or image, or analogical representation -- not just making a calculation based on verbal, or other symbolic, knowledge.

10. The normative model for human rationality assumes that:

A. emotions get in the way of logical reasoning.

B. people's choices maximize gains and minimize losses.*

C. employ algorithms to solve ill-defined problems.

D. convert abstract problems into real-world analogs.

90%, .32. The normative model of human rationality assumes that people follow the abstract principles of logical reasoning, statistical inference, and other algorithms to maximize gains and minimize losses in the most efficient way. Concrete problems in the real world are best solved by representing them abstractly. Emotions may get in the way of logical reasoning, but that is an empirical matter not an assumption of normative rationality. Algorithms cannot be used to solve ill-defined problems, but that is a problem with normative rationality and not an assumption.

11. From what you know about hierarchical networks in human thinking, to which of the following questions should it take people the longest to respond yes or no?

A. Is a trout a fish?

B. Is a grasshopper an insect?

C. Is a porpoise a mammal?*

D. Is a robin a bird?

97%, .17. Concepts are arranged vertically in hierarchies with superordinate concepts like animal, basic-level concepts like fish and bird, and subordinate concepts like robin and trout. In such a system, it should take less time to make decisions about adjacent levels of the hierarchy (Is a fish an animal? Is a robin a bird?) than it will to make decsions about nonadjacent levels (Is a robin an animal?).

12. Which of the following is not a problem for the classical view of categories as proper sets?

A. Some categories are defined by a list of features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to identify an object as a member of a category.*

B. Some categories are summarized by multiple sets of defining features.

C. Some category members are better instances of a category than others.

D. Some category members share relatively few features in common with other category members.

61%, .31. In the classical view, category members share defining features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to define the category. Every instance of the category has every defining feature, and any object that has all the defining features is a member of the category. But there are problems for this view of categories: B, the existence of disjunctive categories; C, the problem of heterogeneity (or typicality) among category members; and D, the problem of family resemblance.

13. A big advantage of using algorithms to solve problems is that algorithms:

A. take less time than other methods.

B. guarantee a solution.*

C. take a hierarchical approach.

D. most closely duplicate the way that human experts solve problems in their area of expertise.

93%, .34. Algorithms, by their very nature, are guaranteed to yield the one correct solution to a well-defined problem. But they can take a lot of time to apply. Algorithms may very well take a hierarchical approach, breaking up a complex problem into subproblems, but that is not an advantage. And most people appear to solve most problems by heuristics, not algorithms, because most judgments are made under conditions of uncertainty and most problems are ill-defined.

14. When you use the representativeness heuristic, you:

A. make frequency estimates based on the ease with which things

come to mind.

B. assume that something is typical of its class.*

C. mistake visual images and other forms of mental representations for reality.

D. consistently convert analogical representations into symbolic representations.

86%, .35. Judgment by representativeness is judgment by resemblance. We fall into the gambler's fallacy because we assume that the run will "straighten itself out" and appear more random. Option A defines the availability heuristic. Option C may define a hallucination.

15. Studies of blindsight and automatization study consciousness:

A. by asking the participants in the research to look within and to describe the processes involved.

B. by comparing the processes involved with those of complex computers.

C. by examining what happens in the absence of conscious awareness.*

D. in ways that have little or no relevance to issues about the way or ways that consciousness might be related to behavior.

85%, .27. In blindsight, neurological patients make accurate judgments ("guesses") about the visual properties of objects that they cannot consciously see. In automatization, people behave in an almost "reflexive" fashion without conscious intent or even conscious awareness of what they are doing. In this way, studies of blindsight and of automatization contribute to our knowledge of unconscious processes. Option A, referring to introspection, is also a way of studying consciousness, but it doesn't have anything to do with blindsight or automatization.

16. Once a person has received a psychiatric diagnosis, other people tend to interpret his or her behavior in light of this label. This tendency illustrates the _____ heuristic.

A. representativeness

B. availability

C. simulation

D. anchoring and adjustment*

52%, .28. This question was about the lasting power of first impressions, and thus about the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Once a person has been labeled a "schizophrenic", for example, that label tends to stick even though the acute episode of schizophrenia has remitted. Many aspects of his or her behavior will be interpreted in the light of the earlier diagnosis. And the person may never fully "lose" the diagnostic label. In this sense, the initial diagnosis of schizophrenia serves as an anchor on subsequent judgments about the person. We never adjust sufficiently from this initial impression to take account of later information.

17. When making a psychiatric diagnosis, clinicians often examine a patient for particular signs and symptoms. This tendency seems to illustrate:

A. the self-fulfilling prophecy.

B. the confirmatory bias in hypothesis-testing.*

C. the disconfirmation heuristic.

D. means-end analysis.

82%, .27. If the question is whether a person is schizophrenic, clinicians tend to look for the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. If the question is whether a person is depressed, clinicians tend to look for the characteristic symptoms of depression. In either case, the clinicians are actively searching for new information that will confirm the hypothesis. They don't look for evidence of depression in patients thought to be schizophrenic, or vice-versa -- which would be an example of a disconfirmatory strategy in hypothesis-testing. Clinicians may also treat a patient thought to be schizophrenic in ways that elicit "schizophrenic" behavior from him or her -- but that creation of symptoms through the "self-fulfilling prophecy" is not the same as the search for symptoms that already may exist.

18. A serious objection to the argument that language is a complicated habit is:

A. that vocabulary can be acquired by imitation.

B. children can memorize complex sentences.

C. there are an infinite number of understandable sentences.*

D. that we can apply rules like "I before E, except after C."

43%, .23. Actually, vocabulary learning is probably the best example of language as a habit, though it's not clear how complicated a habit that is. Also spelling rules like "I before E" have a kind of habitual quality to them. But the major problem with the view of language as a habit is that habitual behaviors have been practiced many times, and people, even young children, can use grammatical rules to generate and understand an infinite number of novel sentences, never spoken before by anyone, and still be understood by other speakers of the language. This is the "generative" property of language, and it decisively separates language from mere habit.

19. The number of morphemes in the sentence "He kicked the ball," is:

A. 2.

B. 3.

C. 4.

D. 5.*

86%, .43. A phoneme is the smallest sound unit in a language. A morpheme is the smallest unit of language that has meaning. In "He kicked the ball", there are four words, but five morphemes, because the -ed in kicked represents the past tense.

20. The default or "factory setting" for the Sentence Analyzing Machinery discussed by psycholinguists seems to:

A. expect sentences in which the object of the action comes before the doer of the action.

B. identify function words that let the reader know if there are any propositions embedded within other propositions.

C. assume a "doer first" form of the proposition.*

D. know that there will be distinct pauses between the various phrases of a sentence.

80%, .37. The SAM is essentially a theory about how we understand sentences. The theory hypothesizes that we begin analyzing a sentence by assuming that the first noun phrase ("He", in the sentence in Item #19) refers to the agent of the action represented by the verb phrase ("kicked"), and that the second noun phrase ("the ball") refers to the object of the action. In other words, it assumes that the sentence is in the active rather than voice (e.g., "The ball was kicked by him").

21. Four-year-old Jimmy tells you he "runned fast but falled down." You note that he:

A. exhibits overregulization errors.*

B. is omitting functional morphemes.

C. is communicating using Motherese.

D. all of the above

89%, .40. Young children, in the course of learning the grammatical rules that govern their language, tend to overgeneralize these rules. Overgeneralization is one of the best arguments against language as a habit acquired by imitation and reinforcement, in that Jimmy has never heard an adult say "runned", nor has he been reinforced for speaking this word himself.

22. American Sign Language:

A. is a system of easy-to-comprehend gestures, somewhat similar to what hearing persons use when they play charades.

B. manual version of English, based on finger spelling and supplemented with a few charade-like gestures.

C. is not a true language because it lacks the functional morphemes and grammatical principles that characterize spoken communication.

D. is a language with morphemes, ways of building up complex words out of simple ones, and grammatical rules for combining words into sentences. *

74%, .35. American Sign Language is a real language, just like English or Spanish or Chinese or Hindi-Urdu. It's not simply a set of iconic signs, such as spreading one's arms to indicate size. The ASL gesture for dog doesn't look anything like a dog. And it's not just a gestural version of English either -- it's a separate language with its own set of morphemic gestures, morphological rules, and grammatical rules.

23. Human language can be differentiated from most or all animal behavior because:

A. only humans can communicate with others.

B. the ability to solve problems is unique to humans.

C. animals are unable to emit communicatory sounds.

D. human language has rules for arranging sounds into meaningful combinations.*

92%, .13. Other animals can communicate each other, including vocal communications such as alarm calls. But so far as we can tell, only human language is rule-governed, meaning that there are rules determining how sounds can be arranged.

24. According to traditional personality psychology:

A. behavior is determined by people's internal states and dispositions, such as traits, attitudes, and values.*

B. the situation is as much a function of the person as the person's behavior is a function of the situation.

C. persons, environments, and behaviors are related through bidirectional causality.

D. behavior is largely controlled by features of the environment, especially the social situation.

77%, .36. In Lewin's formula, B=f(P, E), personality psychology emphasizes personal determinants, such as traits and attitudes, while social psychology emphasizes environmental determinants, such as social influence, persuasion, and conformity. B = f(P), and E is largely irrelevant. Traditional personality psychology thinks of traits as causes of behavior, but it doesn't think of behaviors as causes of traits, so it doesn't embrace a concept of bidirectional causality.

25. People are most likely to seek social comparison when:

A. decisions are easy and obvious in order to confirm their choices.

B. decisions are difficult and a situation is not fully understood. *

C. a situation is well understood and social consensus is needed.

D. they have sufficient time to gather information.

90%, .36. When situations are vague, ambiguous, and difficult to comprehend, then we look to others, and especially their behavior, as additional cues to understanding.

26. In a classic study, research participants did an extremely boring task and were then paid either $1 or $20 to tell someone else that it was interesting. When their actual attitudes toward the task were later measured:

A. consistent with cognitive dissonance theory, research participants paid $20 thought the task was more interesting than did research participants paid $1

B. consistent with cognitive dissonance theory, research participants paid $1 thought the task was more interesting than did research participants paid $20*

C. contrary to cognitive dissonance theory, research participants paid $20 thought the task was more interesting than did research participants paid $1

D. contrary to cognitive dissonance theory, research participants paid $1 thought the task was more interesting than did research participants paid $20

50%, .48. A lot of you went for A, which isn't consistent with dissonance theory. Everybody initially thought the task was boring, because the task was boring. Receiving $20 is oversufficient justification for telling a "white lie" that the task was interesting, but receiving $1 is undersufficient justification for the same behavior. That sets up a state of cognitive dissonance, which is resolved by altering one's own beliefs about the task -- by viewing it as more interesting than it actually was, and more interesting than they initially thought it was.

27. The out-group homogeneity effect refers to the observation that we tend to:

A. see all out-groups as having the same set of (generally negative) characteristics.

B. see out-group members as being more similar to each other than are in-group members. *

C. perceive most other people as members of an out-group.

D. see out-group members as having the same characteristics and beliefs as members of our smallest in-group.

79%, .44. People see members of their own ingroup as heterogeneous, but members of outgroups as more homogeneous, than they actually are. This is true regardless of whether the ingroup is a majority, and the outgroup a minority, in the population.

28. Traits and attitudes measured by personality questionnaires:

A. predict actual behavior in specific situations only to a modest degree.*

B. generally depart from the "normal" or "bell-shaped curve" distribution of scores seen on intelligence tests.

C. show generally low levels of inter-rater validity.

D. show more test-retest reliability over long periods of time than over short periods of time.

75%, .30. Personality questionnaires are supposed to measure the personal attributes, such as traits and attitudes, that (according to the Doctrine of traits) in turn cause people to behave the way they do. These questionnaires show high levels of reliability, both inter-rater and test-retest -- the latter especially over short intervals of time. And their scores generally follow the normal distribution or "bell-shaped" curve. However, questionnaires have only a modest predictive relation with behavior in specific situations. That's what Mischel's "personality coefficient" is all about.

29. When making attributions for the behavior of others, people tend to:

A. overestimate both situational and dispositional factors.

B. underestimate situational and overestimate dispositional factors. *

C. overestimate dispositional and underestimate situational factors.

D. underestimate both situational and dispositional factors.

85%, .36. A RESCORED ITEM. Options B and C are identical, and students who took the exam in class were asked to eliminate Option C from consideration.But a couple of students who were taking the exam elsewhere didn't get this information, so we gave credit for C as well. Anyway, this was about the Fundamental Attribution Error, in which people generally overestimate the contribution of personal factors, such as traits, and underestimate the role of environmental factors, such as social circumstances, in the determination of behavior.

30. According to self-perception theory, our sense of self is derived from:

A. direct access to our cognitions.

B. the opinions of others.

C. direct access to our emotions.

D. inferences from observations of our own behavior.*

62%, .26. We usually think of attitudes as causes of our behavior. And we usually think that we know our attitudes directly. However, self-perception theory argues that we infer our own attitudes from observations of our own behavior, just as we infer the attitudes of other people based on observations of their behavior. Thus, in a sense, self-perception theory asserts that behavior causes attitudes: we construct attitudes that are consistent with what we actually do.

31. The James-Lange theory of emotion asserts that feelings:

A. are the awareness of bodily changes. *

B. precede bodily changes.

C. precede behavior.

D. both b and c

77%, .49. Same thing goes for emotion. We usually think of our emotional states as causing our responses to emotional stimuli. In fact, the James-Lange theory can be seen as an early anticipation of Bem's self-perception theory of attitudes. This is because James and Lange argued that our responses to emotional stimuli come first, and our emotional experiences represent our perceptions of our own responses. As James put it, we don't run from the bear because we're afraid. We're afraid because we run from the bear.

32. Pluralistic ignorance refers to the fact that:

A. if nobody knows what to do in an emergency, no action will be taken.

B. when there are a large number of people present, there is a tendency for bystanders to pretend that nothing is happening.

C. when other bystanders do not take action, those present are likely to define the situation as a nonemergency. *

D. in an emergency, large groups of people are easily swayed by a single dominant individual.

82%, .34. In the bystander intervention effect, people are less likely to render assistance if they are with other people than if they are alone. This is because the situation is inherently ambiguous, and each individual looks to the others for cues as to whether it is really an emergency or not. Because everyone is looking to everyone else for cues (because everyone is ignorant, which is where "pluralistic ignorance" gets its name), everybody effectively behaves as if the situation is not an emergency, and so nobody does anything.

33. In an Asch experiment, the target line is 5 inches long but the confederates say the 6-inch line is the one that matches it. The real research participant will be more likely to give the correct answer if:

A. the confederates unanimously give the wrong answer.

B. one confederate gives the right answer (5-inch line) while the rest all say it's the 6-inch line.

C. one confederate wrongly states that the 7-inch line matches while the rest all say it's the 6-inch line.

D. b or c*

55%, .30. A lot of you went for B alone, but it's any departure from unanimity that reduces the pressure to conform. In B, the "ally" gives the right answer, and in C, the "ally" gives the wrong answer, but the important thing is that the consensus isn't unanimous..

34. Laboratory studies indicate that leaders are least likely to be effective:

A. if they are more intelligent and dominant than others in the group.

B. if the task to be performed is clear-cut rather than ambiguous.

C. if they have relatively little authority within the group. *

D. if the members of the group get along well with each other.

79%, .21. This one was almost a tautology: if a leader has little authority within a group, regardless of how much authority he or she has in other groups, he or she is less likely to be an effective leader.

35. A key characteristic of crowd behavior is deindividuation in which:

A. each individual loses his own identity and becomes an anonymous member. *

B. each individual contributes equally to a group identity for the crowd.

C. a panicky response by an individual spreads to other individuals in the crowd.

D. each individual tries to serve her own best interests rather than the best interests of the crowd.

83%, .17. In de-individuation, the anonymity of the individual within a group serves to release all sorts of unusual and maladaptive behavior. De-individuation may well lead to panicky behavior, which can spread to other members of the group but de-individuation is a much broader concept, and doesn't apply only in panic situations. The key to de-individuation is anonymity, and loss of identity, in a group situation.

36. Instrumental behavior

A. is better predicted by values and beliefs than by traits and attitudes.

B. changes the environmental situation in which it occurs.*

C. increases favorable attitudes, even in the absence of substantive contact.

D. cannot control emotional expressions.

67%, .36. Remember how instrumental behavior was defined in the learning lectures: as behavior which is instrumental in bringing about a certain state of affairs. Instrumental behavior is sometimes labeled as "operant" behavior, because the individual operates on the environment in some way. In the context of personality and social interaction, the important point is that instrumental behavior is the mechanism for behavioral manipulation of the environment. All instrumental behavior changes the environment in which it occurs.

37. If people receive similar scores when taking the same test on different occasions, the test can be described as:

A. objective.

B. valid.

C. reliable. *

D. standardized.

63%, .45. Reliability has to do with precision of measurement. A measure which gives a different measurement of the same object every time it is applied is not very reliable (assuming that the object itself is not changing). So, when the outcome of a measurement operation is similar across test-taking situations, we can say that the test is reliable. A test is valid if it measures what it is supposed to measure -- that is, if we can use the measurement to predict something else about the object being measured. Objective tests have objective, as opposed to subjective, scoring procedures. Standardized tests are administered and scored the same way for all individuals who take the test.

38. Within the age range of Binet's standardization group, the average IQ:

A. increased with age.

B. decreased with age.

C. was 100 regardless of age. *

D. could not be determined.

44%, .33. Binet calculated IQ as the ratio of mental age (MA) to chronological age (CA). Thus, the "average" 5-yer-old would be expected to have an MA of 5, and an average 10-year-old would be expected to have an MA of 10, and so forth. Accordingly, the average IQ remains constant. But this doesn't hold after about age 18, the upper limit of Binet's standardization group. MA peaks at about this age, while chronological age continues to increase -- a situation which, if uncorrected, would lead to normal 36-yer-olds to have IQs of 50 (18/36). In order to get around this problem, Wechsler introduced the deviation IQ, in which the performance of each individual is measured against the average for his or her own age group.

39. Studies of changes in intelligence as a function of aging suggest that:

A. both fluid and crystallized intelligence tend to decline with age in adults.

B. fluid intelligence tends to decline with age in adults, but crystallized intelligence does not. *

C. crystallized intelligence tends to decline with age in adults, but fluid intelligence does not.

D. neither fluid nor crystallized intelligence decline with age in adults.

72%, .24. According to Cattell, fluid intelligence is raw intellectual ability, while crystallized intelligence is the "book-learning" acquired through school. Studies show that fluid intelligence tends to decline with aging (during and after middle age), while crystallized intelligence remains steady or even increases.

40. Attempts to teach memory strategies to mentally retarded individuals have had limited success because:

A. these individuals could not learn the usual strategies.

B. memory strategies did not affect recall performance.

C. the learned strategies were not generalized to new task situations. *

D. these individuals preferred to use their own strategies.

68%, .45. Retarded individuals can learn memory strategies, just as young children can learn to perform Piagetian tasks before they have reached their nominal Piagetian stage. The problem in both instances, however, is that the individuals can't generalize from the specific learning situation to new situations. So, they have a skill, but the use of that skill is restricted to the circumstances in which it was originally acquired.

41. The existence of retarded savants seems to support Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences, yet the data from these individuals does not make the strongest possible case for his position because:

A. they are fewer in number than one would expect if intelligences were truly independent of one another.

B. their abilities are often not as extraordinary as they are typically reported to be.

C. both a and b above *

D. neither a nor b above

15%, -.12. A BAD ITEM. A lot of you went for A, which was partially right. Gardner asserts that his multiple intelligences are each independent of the others, because each is supported by a separate and independent "module" in the brain. But if that were really the case, we'd expect to see a lot more savants than we do. Moreover, it turns out that many savants aren't all that savant -- their performance in math or art may look exceptional at first glance, but not after prolonged inspection. So B is right, too.

42. The high correlations between IQ scores for close biological relatives can be interpreted as evidence that:

A. mental ability is affected by genetic inheritance.

B. similar environments produce similar abilities.

C. both a and b *

D. neither a nor b

44%, -.06. A BAD ITEM. This item pretty much split the class between A and C. Close biological relatives, such as parents and children, or children and siblings, are more similar genetically than more distant biological relatives, such as children and their aunts and uncles or cousins. Accordingly, the high IQ correlations for close biological relatives can be interpreted as evidence for a genetic component in IQ. This makes A correct. BUT it's also true that close biological relatives tend to live together in the same household. So we can't exclude the possibility that the high correlations are mediated, partly, by similarity in environment as well. This makes B also correct.

43. In discussing the incremental validity of the Rorschach test and the TAT, your text notes that psychologists:

A. make more accurate inferences about an individual's personality characteristics if they have Rorschach records as well as the individual's case history.

B. make more accurate inferences about an individual's personality characteristics if they have TAT records as well as the individual's case history.

C. are no more accurate in making inferences about an individual's personality characteristics if they have Rorschach and TAT records in addition to the individual's case history. *

D. are more accurate in making inferences about an individual's personality characteristics if they have Rorschach and TAT records in addition to the individual's case history.

52%, .32. A lot of you went for D, but in fact projective techniques add little or nothing to what can be inferred from the case history. They're not nearly as informative as objective test scores. This is what utility or efficiency of measurement is all about. Projectives are expensive to administer, score, and interpret, and they provide very little information in return for the effort. They were an interesting idea, but they just didn't work out.

44. Jerome and Jenny are each given two tests of fearfulness, both rated on a 10-point scale in which zero means no fear and 10 means maximum fear. In the first test, both Jerome and Jenny are confronted with a vicious dog. Here, Jerome's fear-rating is 9 points and Jenny's is 9 points. In the second test, both are about to take a difficult examination. Now, Jerome's rating is 3 points and Jenny's rating is 3 points. These results illustrate:

A. situational effects. *

B. differences in personal traits.

C. a person-by-situation interactions.

D. none of the above

71%, .37. This was about the effect of persons, the effect of situations, and the person-by-situation interaction. Jerome and Jenny each respond the same way to the different situations, but the different situations elicit different amounts of fear in them. Accordingly, there is no difference in fear due to personal traits (Jerome and Jenny respond in precisely the same way to the dog and to the exam), and no person-by-situation interaction (the difference between Jerome and Jenny is constant across the two situations). There is only an effect of the situation, the dog eliciting more fear than the exam.

45. In delay of gratification tests, children who are forced to wait in the presence of highly desirable food "treats" can succeed by:

A. focusing their attention on how the treat feels and tastes when eaten.

B. rehearsing sad thoughts.

C. keeping the rewards in the center of their attention.

D. thinking about the treat as something other than food.*

66%, .34. In delay of gratification tests, some children can wait longer than others, and some environments help children wait longer than other environments do. For example, it's easier to delay when the rewards are not physically present in the environment. But even when the rewards are present, children can increase their delay by engaging in behaviors that effectively put the reward out of sight (a behavioral manipulation), or by thinking about the reward in a way that makes it seem less desirable (a cognitive transformation).

46. Dr. Know believes that people do what they do because of the situation they are in now or have been in previously. Dr. Know is a proponent of the:

A. behavioral approach. *

B. psychodynamic approach.

C. humanistic approach.

D. trait approach.

64%, .34. Behaviorism, like traditional social psychology, is a psychology of the situation. Behaviorists believe that behavior is controlled by cues in the current situation, and by the individual's history of rewards in past similar situations. Psychodynamic theorists believe that behavior results from conflict over internal drives, such as sex and aggression. Trait theorists believe that behavior reflects the individual's particular personality traits. Humanistic theorists reject all these "deterministic" views, and argue that people have a lot of free will to control their behavior.

47. In Freudian psychoanalysis, id is to __________ as superego is to __________.

A. immediate satisfaction; internal prohibitions *

B. conscious reaction; immediate satisfaction

C. internal prohibitions; conscious reactions

D. internal prohibitions; immediate satisfaction

83%, .35. This is about 35% of all you ever have to know about psychoanalysis. The id is the seat of instinctual motives, which strive for immediate satisfaction. The ego is the locus of cognition, by which the person tries to find objects in the world that will satisfy instinctual desires. The superego is the locus of conscience, or the person's internalization of social prohibitions on object choice.

48. The main argument of the neo-Freudians was that Sigmund Freud overemphasized:

A. early social experience.

B. internal conflicts.

C. biological determination.*

D. individual differences.

41%, .32. A lot of you went for B. Both Freud and the neoFreudians emphasized internal conflicts, leading to anxiety, mediated by repression and other defenses. But for Freud the source of these conflicts was the individual's biological drives, as in the sexual and aggressive instincts. The neoFreudians emphasized the origins of conflict and anxiety in the real social world outside the child. Both Freudians and neoFreudians emphasized early social experience as the source of individual differences in personality.

49. "People need more than food and sex. Sometimes the joy of doing something is reward enough." The person who says this is probably:

A. a behaviorist.

B. a humanist. *

C. a psychoanalyst.

D. a neo-Freudian.

68%, .40. See #46, above.

50. Different cultures and ethnic groups can be viewed as occurring along an individualism-collectivism dimension. In discussing this dimension, your textbook notes that:

A. collectivist societies emphasize the needs and values of the family and community over those of the individual. *

B. collectivist societies are less likely to emphasize dependency and obedience in their child rearing practices.

C. individualist societies are more likely to hold children to adult standards of morality than collectivist societies.

D. none of the above

94%, .26. This was pretty much definitional. It turns out that collectivist societies emphasize dependency and obedience, and individualist societies are more tolerant of children's departures from adult modes of behavior.

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