3.20.2005

Lacking want and when: Moken on 60 Minutes

While I consider myself a fan of some of the basic premises of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, I do get slightly irritated when I hear news stories reporting on the dearth or plethora of words in a particular language for a particular concept.
Perhaps Geoffrey Pullum at Language Log said it best :

    Here's some advice. Whenever you hear someone starting to say something that begins with "The X have no word for Y", or "The X have N different words for Y", never listen to them, and always check your wallet to make sure it's still there.

This is, of course, the same Geoffrey Pullum who wrote The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax and Other Irreverent Essays on the Study of Language.

Well, tonight, 60 Minutes had a report on the Moken, a group of people living in and around the Thai and Burmese islands in the Indian ocean. While the story was primarily about how the Moken managed to survive the tsunami, Bob Simon incredulously yet gleefully reported that the language (Moken, Austronesian), lacks words for want and when.
This was vexing on several levels.
First, it feeds into the stereotype of unindustrialized cultures as lacking a sense of urgency and not caring about material possessions.
Second, let's take a look at a few of the quotes:

    And Ivanoff says "when" is not the only word missing from the Moken language. "Want" is another. "Yes, you use it very often," says Ivanoff. "Take that out of your language and you see how often you use it. 'I want this, I want that.'"

This is French anthropologist Jacques Ivanoff, who I hope wasn't playing to the straw-man Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that is so plainly wrong and is being taken out of context.
What does it mean, exactly, to miss a word from your language? It seems to imply that there is a universal collection of words from which languages' lexicons are built which goes agaisnt the well-supported theory that languages package semantic concepts in different ways; languages will almost always lack one-to-one word-to-word mappings with any other language.
Also, are they including bound morphemes or other grammatical constructs in the definition of word? Could the language have an irrealis marker or some way of marking epistemic stance through tense, for example, as a way of indicating that something hasn't happened, but the speaker wants it to? What about a word for hope or need?

Finally, the quote:

    But the Moken don’t seem terribly worried by all this. Perhaps that’s because "worry" is just one more of those words that don’t exist in their language.

feeds into the misconception that lacking a word (whatever word means here) in a language prohibits speakers' conceptualization of the idea. It seems unlikely that the Moken have no concept of desire, or want and is even less likely that they have no concept of time. Lacking the (wh-question) word when says very little about their ability to question temporal aspects of events. English lacks an single WH-word questioning degree or amount so that we have to say "To what degree does ...?" or "How much ...?" Does this say anything about our conceptualization of quantity? Perhaps the Moken simply use the paraphrase "At what time...?"

Taking Geoffrey's quote to heart, I sincerely question the accuracy of Ivanoff or Bob Simon's claims on all levels. Unfortunately, this story perpetuates this grating linguistic myth in the eyes of public and not even for positive ends, such as the drawing of attention to cultural diversity, but rather to corroborate the misconception of unindustrialized island dwellers as not having a care in the world.

At first, I just found the story mildly annoying, but now I'm starting to get a little mad... it's Miller time.

8 Comments:

Jerry Monaco said...

Can you give me a recent book that defends the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and/or can you provide a bit of a defense yourself? I tend to want to go with Pinker on this but I am truly willing to be convinced the other way. I remember when I was a teenager in the 1970's when I was reading anthropologists and linguists in order to discover the meaning of life, (forgive my self-irony) I was largely convinced that Sapir-Whorf was correct. It took me a long time to argue myself out of it but I am still willing to go the other way.

Jerry Monaco

6:34 AM  
Marc said...

Hi Jerry,
Thanks for your question. It gives me an opportunity to talk a bit about a theory of linguistic relativity that isn't the straw-man that is so often put forward in pop-literature.
Off the top of my head, I can't think of a single book that summarizes the neo-Whorfian stance, but Dan Slobin, Michael Tomasello, and Melissa Bowerman have written some excellent papers on the matter.
The basic idea is captured by Slobin's ideas of thinking-for-speaking, thinking-for-remembering, etc wherein ones language does shape certain cognitive processes to some extent.
Some experiments have been illustrative. To wit:
Languages can be categorized (see Talmy) as verb framed or satellite framed according to where motion is encoded as opposed to manner.
English is satellite framed because you say:
- I ran out of the room.
French, verb framed:
- Je sorte la chamber en courrant
(I exited the room running)
Dan did an experiment that showed that speakers of satellite framed languages recall (from a movie clip) manner of motion more than speakers of verb-framed languages.
This suggests that since manner is coded in the language on verbs themselves, that people either pay attention to it more, remember it better or something equivalent.
Another example is when the gender of nouns seem to impact how people conceive of different categories. I don't have the data in from of me, but something to the effect that Germans select pictures of long graceful bridges as prototypical since the gender is feminine while French speakers pick strength as a protypical bridge characterstic because it is masculine genedered. These experiments are controlled by including tons of different nouns.
Also, descriptions of space vary cross-linguistically with English on being used for:
- book on table
- magnet on fridge
- hat on head
Bowerman has discussed how, in other languages, on only refers to cases where there is a verticality relationship. Thus, our cognetive concept on which includes "magnet on fridge" is different than other folks' conception of on - hence language influencing thought. They dso suggest that primitve spatial relations like support, containment, etc are universal.
Finally, Tomasello's work on spatial terms has shown that people who speak languages that have only cardinal diectional systems (N, S, E, W) have better absolute directional ability than others. Put a Guuguu-Yimithr speaker in the middle of a windowless room and they can tell where Nroth is better than a Dutch speaker. This extends into ideas of left and right and other conceptions of space.

These are but a few examples, all with the basic idea that the language you speak does affect your cognitive categories.

I will look up the references when I'm able.

5:51 PM  
Jerry Monaco said...

Marc,

Thanks for the reply.

What you say sounds reasonable and I would like to read the specific papers you reference. My work currently is in the philosophy and history of law and the study of legal concepts. Some of the notions you have mentioned have been used in analysis of legal concepts, which is the reason for my interest.

For an example of an application of cognitive science and linguistics to legal concepts I would suggest, "Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape the Legal Mind" by Gary Minda. Minda uses ideas from George Lakof and othersf, to study judicial interpretation in a specific area of labor law.

A short statement of my view may help you to see where I am coming from. I largely agree with the history in Minda's book but I find it hard to accept the 'science' as science. It seems to me that in these areas Percy Shelley, who pointed out very similar notions of interpretation at the intersection of what we would call today ideology, imagination, language and cognitive 'illusions', has as much to contribute as Lakoff. What I am saying is the following: Something along the lines of what these people say must be the way the human mind/brain makes and shapes patterns and recalls those patterns. But I have been unable to convince myself that these pattern 'choices' are accessible to scientific explanation. Or rather what poets, novelists and artists say about these areas of the mind/brain seem to me more convincing, even more 'realistic', than all attempts so far made by linguists and cognitive scientists.

Please forgive the lack of a fully formed 'theory' here. I have found that in my current writing trying to understand these issues is very important to studying issues in legal studies - the history of the demand for a rule of law, its relation to notions of 'sovereignty, and law as a 'normalization' of a particular society's background violence, interepretation of 'legal rules', etc..

Now to your specific comments. I think that various associations that are somehow 'embedded' in language just happen to strengthen the assoications and memories that are already a part of the mind/brain.

Something personal as an example: For years I have been a fan of memory palaces, probably because I was partially taught by Jesuits in my youth. If one can associate both word and images to specific memories then one can memorize almost anything. What you call 'thinking-for-remembering' seems to me to be a specific example of a memory palace. It is possible that there is something in the structure of language that operates automatically as a kind of memory palace but I am not sure that this is specific to 'language'. In other words if we live in a culture where images of Theseus and the Bull are very common then we will remember variants of this story and stories of bulls better than if we live in a culture where no such images proliferate. What I am saying is that some of these examples from language may have more to do with 'poetic' associations, the workings of memory, etc. than with language-itself. Personally, I often recall the rhythm and images of a poem, for example, before I can recall the actual words. Something like this might be working with how we remember certain actions in the world and associate those actions with language. But I don't see that this is language specific but rather 'memory' specific.

In this regard, I appreciate the tentativeness of your answer when you write, "This suggests that since manner is coded in the language on verbs themselves, that people either pay attention to it more, remember it better or something equivalent."

Please know. I am not a linguist. I started out in physics but have spent most of my working life as an editor and writer. I have read a lot of philosophy of language for the fun of it. My time hanging out with mathematicians and physicists convinced me that these people 'think' differently (by habit), i.e. they have a different 'way of seeing and knowing'' and this 'way of seeing and knowing' that is somehow related to or channeled through their intense study of mathematics. I am being deliberately vague because even though people study these issues a little I really don't think that we know much about how all of this works.

What first brought me to question Sapir-Whorf was my very anecdotal observations of mathematicians. It seemed to me that they did not 'think' in language in the ways that we do and that all of the phenomena that anthropologists attributed to Sapir-Whorf could be also attributed to mathematical thinking. But then why stop there? Why not music or image making, etc. If Sapir-Whorf like phenomena can be attributed to all deeply ingrained human systems, then perhaps Sapir-Whorf like phenomena that occur in language are really a result of something else in the self-organzation of the human mind/brain.

When I got to this point I also decided that these problems are intrinsic when we try to study anything having to do with intentionality. But this is a long story.

Thank your for letting me ramble and getting these notions into words.

Jerry Monaco

P.S. My main blog is at
http://www.livejournal.com/users/monacojerry/
I use blogger.com as a subsiderary blog and because a lot of interesting people, such as yourself, write here.

7:53 AM  
Anonymous said...

"Words are the fog one has to see through."

-Zen saying

1:07 PM  
Tony Marmo said...

In Portuguese ponte is female and yet bridges do not have to be feminine to be prototyppical. Nor are prototypical aviões airplanes masculine, although avião is a male word.

12:47 PM  
Marc said...

Tony,
Your observations are interesting. It would be even more interesting to agregrate a number of Portugese speakers who aren't aware of why they're being tested and give them a number of photographs of bridges and find out which ones they find most prototypical. This sort of judgement is difficult to make with introspection and come through better with blind psychological experimentation.

2:53 AM  
vijaya said...

Dear Marc,
I am a PhD student from India studying at the Cetral Institute of English and Foreign Languages. I am doing a (very prelimnary!) crosslinguistic study of linguistic semantic categories in Hindi (first language ) and English (second language here). More specifically, I am looking at noun dominance in second language (apart from other things). My basic reference is Dedre Gentner's work (e.g. Gentner, D. and L. Boroditsky. 2001. Individuation, relativity and early word learning. In M. Bowerman and S. C. Levinson (eds.) Language acquisition and conceptual development. Cambridge: CUP)
I read your reply to Jerry. I found your comments very helpful.I have a long way to go in reading in the area. I am interested in the references you mentioned to Jerry!
Vijaya

7:35 PM  
Marc said...

Dear Jerry and Vijaya,
I have a new post with some references that you might be interested in reading. To me, these are some of the more convincing articles that I've read concerning the effects of language on cognition. Enjoy!

11:04 PM  

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