FLASH: Many Signs Warlordism Returning to Afghanistan

FLASH 13: Many Signs Warlordism Returning to Afghanistan

Putting together a number of recent stories, one has a clear sense that warlordism is returning to Afghanistan. We are seeing a return of the worst features of the pre-Taliban 1990: unrestricted banditry, looting of food supplies meant for civilians, widespread smuggling of all forms and above all extensive production of opium and heroin.

All of the above have already been reported. The Toronto Globe and Mail (1/2/02) writes that

"As the war in Afghanistan gives way to efforts to rebuild the country, one of the biggest problems -- and biggest economic boons -- is cross-border smuggling.

"Hundreds of Afghan warlords have financed their armies with drug and smuggling operations, and will surely resist political reforms that would derail their gravy train. For ordinary Afghans, working as a mercenary fighter for a warlord can bring in $300 (U.S.) a month or more, which above the annual income of most Afghans."

There are also a number of newspaper reports of widespread opium planting, with the disappearance of the Taliban and the lapse of their effectively enforced prohibition. For example, The London Guardian reported on 12/10/01 that, "With the Taliban gone, Afghanistan's farmers are going back to their old, lucrative ways. In the tribal areas of Pakistan, where most of the opium is processed, prices have plummeted in expectation of a bumper crop." (For my 12/17/01 newspaper story on this, go to "Heroin, Drug Warlords Reappear on Afghan Scene", Article for Pacific News Service, December 17, 2001.)

(For further details see also below at FLASH 5 (A): Pre-1990 Drug Networks Being Restored Under New Coalition?.)

The same warlords accused of overseeing a revival of opium trafficking in Nangarhar province have also been accused of stealing most of the food now coming over the border to feed civilians, according to a story in the San Francisco Chronicle (1/4/02). Banditry, taxes at road checkpoints, and looting are depriving civilians and refugees all over Afghanistan of the food they need if they will not starve to death. For my 12/9/01 FLASH on this, go to my "FLASH 6: Humanitarian Crisis: Deaths from Starvation and Cold in Afghanistan".

The only forseeable remedy for this crisis is the arrival of an international peacekeeping force. But there are abundant signs that the painfully worked out agreement for such a force is breaking down, especially in the north and west of Afghanistan. According to the London Independent (12/31/01) "The warlord Ismail Khan, who runs most of western Afghanistan, stated that no international troops would be allowed into his territory. Speaking at his home base of Herat, he also said the Afghan defence minister, General Fahim, is adamant that any multinational force should only have a token presence and act purely as observers without taking any proactive action."

The New Republic of 12/14/01 has placed the blame for the inadequate peacekeeping force squarely on the Bush Administration:

"The Bush administration shifted its efforts from preventing a peacekeeping force to making sure one was as weak as possible. American officials demanded that the troops be confined to Kabul and its vicinity. They tried to limit the size of the deployment. And they repeatedly insisted that Americans would not take part. In fact, U.S. objections are much of the reason the force won't be fully installed by December 22, the day Hamid Karzai's pre-government takes over in Kabul.

"While the United States has delayed and obstructed, the humanitarian situation has remained awful. In Mazar-e-Sharif, Northern Alliance troops have looted Unicef convoys and ransacked UN food warehouses. The World Food Program says banditry is so widespread that it can't convince truckers to transport food into the country. The International Rescue Committee won't send its staff into Afghanistan because it can't guarantee their safety."

In an interview for the right-wing on-line magazine newsmax.com, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig has also said that "If we are to thwart another round of warlordism and tribal warfare, such as what followed the Soviet withdrawal, and encourage the Afghans to get on with rebuilding their own nation, U.S. assistance, diplomacy and a muscular military presence will be required. In Desert Storm, we had too many troops; in Afghanistan probably not enough for the major commitment we have made."

I have published with Pacific News my own story of 1/4/02 about how, in the absence of a credible US commitment to restore order to Afghanistan, the tenuous post-Taliban coalition may break down altogether.

I do not say all this out of a sense of doom, since the US and UN have in fact made credible and commendible progress towards a post-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan. But I do say this from a sense of urgency: if the Bush Administration does not reverse itself soon and start pushing for an adequate international peace-keeping force, that coalition may be lost in a renewal of banditry and starvation.

I hope readers will feel free to forward this FLASH, and to share their concern with their representatives in Congress.