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FLASH 5 (A): Pre-1990 Drug Networks Being Restored Under New Coalition?

When we look at the Afghan leaders whom the US considers eligible to fill out an interim government, we see that many are figures implicated in drug-trafficking in the 1980s. The BBC compiled a list of these leaders in November 2001. Leading the list was President Burhanuddin Rabbani, whose home province of Badakshan became in the 1990s, while under his control, "the stepping stone for an entirely new means of conveying opiates to Europe, via Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia's Central Asian railway service" (Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, 150). Veteran General Rashid Dostum, in Mazar-i-Sharif, "was suspected of earning huge profits by exporting drugs via Uzbekistan" (Cooley, Unholy Wars, 155).

Of the seven Pashtun leaders named, three (Pir Sayed Gailani and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, and Hazi Bashir) have been linked in the past to drug-trafficking. A fourth, Younus Khalis, is a powerful figure from drug-rich Nangarhar province, and is the man with whom Osama bin Laden made contact in 1996, before offering his riches to the Taliban.

The restored leader of the Shura-i-Mashriqi or Eastern Shura in Nangarhar province, Haji Abdul Qadir (who withdrew from the Bonn leadership conference), became rich in former times as the Afghan source of a drug pipeline involving in Pakistan Haji Ayub Afridi, "the lord of Khyber heroin dealing" (Griffin, 142-43; cf. Cockburn, Whiteout, 267).

Under the headline "US turns to drug baron to rally support ," Asia Times Online reported on 12/4/01 that "Afridi was freed from prison in Karachi last Thursday [11/29/01] after serving just a few weeks of a seven-year sentence for the export of 6.5 tons of hashish."

In the 1980s, according to Asia Times Online, "All of the major Afghan warlords, except for the Northern Alliance's Ahmed Shah Masoud, who had his own opium fiefdom in northern Afghanistan, were a part of Afridi's coalition of drug traders in the CIA-sponsored holy war against the Soviets. Commanders such as Haji Abdul Qadeer, Haji Mohammed Zaman and Hazrat Ali are once again ruling the roost in these areas. These commanders used to be the biggest heroin and opium mafia in Afghanistan's Pashtun belt."

( The Observer reported on 11/25/01 that "Hazrat Ali, one of the new warlords in control in Nangrahar, ran Jalalabad airport in the mid-Nineties at a time when weekly flights to India and the Gulf carried huge amounts of opium to Western markets.")

Other sources add that Afridi's constituencies in eastern and southern Afghan provinces have been revived following the withdrawal of the Taliban, and with them (according to the Pakistan Frontier Post) the heroin labs along the frontier. Jane's Intelligence Weekly wrote on 10/22/01 that in the non-Taliban areas of northeastern Afghanistan "Heroin refineries - generally run by chemists from the Mashriqi region of southeastern Nangahar province - operate under the protection of local commanders." The Mashriqi region is that of Haji Abdul Qadir, Haji Mohammed Zaman and Hazrat Ali.

Hazrat Ali is currently one of the main local commanders directing the ground forces attacking the Tora Bora cave stronghold in search of Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile Haji Mohamed Zaman has complained about the US bombing of villages under his control. A local loya jirga convened under control of Qadir's Eastern shura has requested that the bombing cease.

Asia Times Online speculates that the US, sensing too much Russian influence being exerted on the Northern Alliance, has decided to cultivate support from within the majority Pashtun belt by reviving the old Afridi drug network.

A narrower possibility is that the US struck a deal with Hazrat Ali, allowing him to resume his former drug ties with Afridi in exchange for his collaboration against al-Qaeda. Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistan-born member of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in the L.A. Times (11/12/01) about the importance of securing the cooperation of local warlords in ousting al-Qaeda from its caves: "Now that the Northern Alliance has captured Mazar-i-Sharif, the U.S.-led military campaign soon will test how much of the effort can be entrusted to its Afghan allies on the ground and how much of it U.S. forces will have to take up themselves. The willingness of northern Afghan warlords to wage the grueling ground battles needed to smoke Al Qaeda from its caves will test Afghanistan's historical tendencies to shift allegiances without notice."

But the independent behavior of Haji Abdul Qadir and Haji Mohammed Zaman suggests a third possibility: that the true restorer of the Afridi network may be elements in Pakistan, legitimately concerned by the increasing role played in post-Taliban Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance and Russia.

Overall, what we may be seeing is a revival of the Cold War games in which both the US and Russia sought control of the drug traffic, not just to fund their operations, but above all in order to deny the influence of the traffic to their opponent.

FLASH 5 (B): Developing US-Russian Tensions over Post-Taliban Government

It has been clear that the Northern Alliance has spurned US guidance and listened to its backers in Russia, ever since the Northern Alliance seized control of Kabul in defiance of Bush's public order, and refused to accept a multinational peace-keeping force. After hard bargaining at Bonn, the Northern Alliance has come away with the most important ministries in their control: defense, foreign affairs, justice, and the interior. (See the London Guardian, 12/6/01.)

Eric Margolis argues in the Los Angeles Times on 11/28/01 that "The Russians have regained influence over Afghanistan, avenged their defeat by the U.S. in the 1980s war and neatly checkmated the Bush administration, which, for all its high-tech military power, understands little about Afghanistan.

"The U.S. ouster of the Taliban regime also means Pakistan has lost its former influence over Afghanistan and is now cut off from Central Asia's resources. So long as the alliance holds power, the U.S. is equally denied access to the much-coveted Caspian Basin. Russia has regained control of the best potential pipeline routes. The new Silk Road is destined to become a Russian energy superhighway."

Margolis' pessimistic analysis ignores the extent to which Russia has to fear, as well as hope for, developments in Afghanistan. Its client states in the CIS, above all Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have suffered from serious Islamist terrorist movements funded by drugs. Other secession movements in Chechnya, Georgia, and Abkhazia have been tied in with struggles over the local drug traffic (Cooley, 161).

Control over oil and control over drugs cannot be separated. Just as cold war hawks in Moscow would like to see the oil flow north and the drugs south, so there may still be cold war hawks in Washington who would like to keep the drugs flowing north and bring the oil south.

A hopeful sign is that some in Washington hope to turn from the old Afghan warlords and their drug-financed forces, to a new younger generation of leaders, working towards a centrally financed and controlled army. (See San Francisco Chronicle, 12/5/01.) An even more hopeful development is that most of the old warlords, notably Rabbani, Dostum, and Hekmatyar, have been excluded from the new post-Taliban interim government. This may be why the new government, though it has 17 Northern Alliance members and only 11 Pushtuns, has still been welcomed by Pakistani President Musharraf. (For a gloomier prediction, read Tariq Ali, 11/30/01.)

More disturbing is the news of Ayub Afridi's release, and related stories that old heroin labs are being reopened along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. The drug warriors have not yet exited the scene.

As the head of the United Nations drug control program in Afghanistan has warned (Voice of America, 12/3/01) the country is danger of establishing a drug economy, unless Afghan political leaders form a government that can effectively control opium production. Farmers are already re-planting opium poppy in some parts of southern Afghanistan.

In a story I could find only in the Pakistan Frontier Post, 12/06/01, US DEA Administrator Asa Hutchison has announced, "I've directed our folks to go over to Europe to start building the coalitions to move in an anti-narcotics team after the counter terrorism operation is concluded in Afghanistan," noting that some U.S. officials including Steven Casteel were heading to Britain on Wednesday for talks.

May they have more success than the hapless DEA agents in Pakistan in the 1980s, one of whom later told the Washington Post that CIA officers told them to pull back their operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the duration of the war (Cockburn, Whiteout, 265).