<B>FLASH 29 (3/26/02): U.S. Military Operations Could Destabilize Pakistan

FLASH 29 (3/26/02): U.S. Considering Military Operations Which Could Destabilize Pakistan

According to Stratfor (25 March 2002), `The U.S. military is considering launching ground operations in Pakistan, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan said. Such operations would cause an uproar in Pakistan, where President Pervez Musharraf is already taking precautions to prepare for the inevitable backlash.

`The commander of the American ground forces in Afghanistan said March 21 that U.S. soldiers might need to cross into Pakistani territory as part of the campaign against al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, the New York Times reported. Maj. Gen. Franklin L. Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division did not offer specifics, but suggested that such operations would likely be planned attacks on lines of retreat rather than frantic pursuits across the border.

`Hagenbeck's statement comes amid consistent reports that Taliban and al Qaeda fighters have found sanctuary in Pakistan. It now appears that it is a question of when, not if, overt U.S. military operations will be conducted in the country. Such operations will have a massive impact on Pakistan's internal stability, and the blowback could potentially topple President Pervez Musharraf.

`Hagenbeck noted that operations into Pakistan would only be taken as a "last resort," the Times reported, and would be carried out with the cooperation of the Pakistani government. But the point of "last resort" may be closer than many think.

`Western media organizations are reporting that Pakistan is very much a center of al Qaeda and Taliban activity. The Associated Press says that up to 1,000 Taliban and al Qaeda members, including some of the Taliban's top ministers, have taken refuge there. The New York Times also reported a surge in al Qaeda-related Internet traffic originating from Pakistan's Baluchistan province.'

In further comments restricted to subscribers, Stratfor pointed to the drastic defensive measures Musharraf has ordered to protect himself against backlash, including a reorganization of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, and a reported plan to extend his term as president for another five years through a public referendum, rather than approval from a new parliament. It noted the presence of Taliban supporters in the ISI, and the difficulty of rooting them out.

Stratfor's prediction follows a disturbing report from former DIA analyst Julie Sirrs, in the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin about tensions between Pakistan and elements in the interim Karzai regime in Afghanistan:

In her words, `The relationship with Pakistan has the most potential for tension, given Islamabad's past sponsorship of the Taliban. Karzai attempted to put this past history at least superficially to rest when he visited Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in early February. The Afghan leader stated that "past misunderstandings and misperceptions" between the two countries have been "buried." Shortly thereafter, however, Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni accused Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, of maintaining contact with former Taliban officials who remain at large and helping to shelter Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Ladin. American officials have admitted that bin Ladin most likely escaped to Pakistan, though Washington is evidently unwilling to scour that country for the ex-Saudi fugitive to the same degree that it has Afghanistan.

`Meanwhile, Taliban officials such as former interior minister Abdul Razzaq, who is believed to be sheltering near the Pakistani border in the town of Spin Boldak, and former Taliban finance minister Abdul Kabir have vowed to return to fight in the coming spring. Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah recently warned that the Taliban are reorganizing, noting that the militia's remnants have formed two parties in Pakistan. Furthermore, Haji Zaman, who is involved in fomenting unrest in the eastern province of Jalalabad, is widely believed to be backed by Islamabad. The recent surrender of Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil has also sparked speculation and concern that the former Taliban foreign minister, portrayed as a moderate by the militia's supporters in Islamabad, may be positioning himself for a role in a future Afghan government.

`As a result, Karzai and others in his administration who favor the expansion of international peace keepers throughout the country likely do so not only to ensure their own authority, but also to prevent other countries from exerting undue influence. In this latter category with Pakistan should also be included Iran, though this threat is one which seems to be of far greater concern to American than Afghan officials.'

It seems clear from the two articles that some American planners now fear that both Afghanistan and Pakistan could be seriously destabilized by Taliban remnants in the ungovernable border regions. But the obvious remedy for Afghanistan of an expanded international peace force, or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), now seems unlikely. This makes US military operations more likely.

David Corn, in an AlterNet story of March 22, 2002, reports that:

`For months, Hamid Karzai, the interim prime minister, has pleaded for expanding the international peacekeeping force in his country. Currently, these troops -- about 4500 soldiers from 17 nations -- patrol only Kabul and its environs. As lawlessness and violence mount in other parts of the country, Karzai and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan have appealed for a larger peacekeeping contingent that would cover areas beyond the capitol. A month ago, the Bush White House was considering backing a plan to double the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan -- while the State Department had advocated beefing it up to 25,000 troops -- but then the Bush administration changed direction and said no to bolstering what's officially known as the International Security Assistance Force.

`The United States does not contribute any military personnel to the ISAF, maintaining it is reserving its troops for hunting al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. (Message: we do the fighting; others can keep the peace.) Still, Washington carries much say in determining the size, shape and mission of the peacekeeping force. For example, the Bush administration recently urged Congress to provide $228 million to help Turkey take control of the ISAF from Britain.This was akin to a bribe, for Turkey has not been eager to assume command. And it has not wanted to lead a force that operates outside of Kabul. So to win Turkey over, the United States had to nix the idea of a larger ISAF.'

From sufficient distance, it might look as if the Bush Administration has a ruthlessly efficient long-range plan to expand its troops into countries of Central and South Asia, from Kyrgyzstan to Sri Lanka. Viewed more closely, the Administration looks like a group of inexperienced amateurs who, who having discovered that they have seriously destabilized this area of the world, can think of no remedies except military adventures -- which threaten to destabilize the region even more.

It is clear that some in and near the Administration welcome this expansion in the name of geopolitics and geostrategy. They would do well to remember that in the last century Germany launched two World Wars, inspired partly by what they considered to be their superior understanding of geopolitics. In truth geopolitics can tell us something, but can never be a substitute for the knowledge which comes from history. Germany lost both wars, chiefly by grotesque over-reachings into Asia which seem small, compared to some of the scenarios now being floated for Iraq.