RACE, DISCOURSE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAS

A NEW WORLD VIEW

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The dispute over 1492 is in full spate. We are overwhelmed by an avalanche of arguments between the celebrants and the dissenters. The celebrants are intellectuals of Western European and Euroamerican descent, and the dissenters are intellectuals mainly of indigenous or Native American descent, joined by Euroamerican activists such as Hans Koning, the writer, and Karkkutrick Sale, the environmentalist.

How, the argument runs, is the 1492 event to be perceived? Should it be seen from the celebrant perspective—as a "glorious achievement," a "heroic and daring deed" of discovery and exploration, a triumph for the Christian West that was to liberate the indigenous peoples from their Stone Age, deprived existence without the wheel (Hart 1990)? Or, is it to be seen from the dissenters' perspective—as one of "history's monumental crimes," a brutal invasion and conquest that led to a degree of genocideic extirpation and of still ongoing ecological disaster unprecedented in human history?

Amid the rising clamor, one of the most impressive attempts to reconcile these opposing views has been put forward in a 1991 special issue of Newsweek that was prepared jointly by the magazine's editors and by the staff of the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of Natural History for the Columbian quincentenary exhibition Seed of Change, together with its accompanying publication. The introduction to the issue concluded:

The true story of Christopher Columbus is not the encounter of the Old World with the New: it is the story of how two old worlds were linked and made one. Columbus' voyages changed the entire composition of two continents, revolutionized the world's diet and altered the global environment. His legacy is the "Columbian exchange," the crucial intermingling of people, animals, plants, and
The central question that remains unresolved, however, is whath meaning, for what group, and from which perspectives—celebrants or disenfranchised? Some, like Gregory Cerri (1992), are concerned with deconstructing the "black legend" (a pejorative sign) of Spanish atrocities against the indigenous peoples that the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Iberian states of overseas America had used for propagandistic purposes in their competitive struggle to establish colonies and slave plantations in the Caribbean and the Americas. The principal "meaning" that Cerri attributes to the event and its aftermath therefore reflects this concern, which is one that springs from an essentially Euro-American historical-existential perspective:

"What is there, then, to rescue and preserve "I Love the Conquistadors", sticker, and while the Spanish did commit "terrorist atrocities," if one looks at the world, the Spanish also committed "massacres" that were committed in the sixteenth century, they acted by their own rules, with moderation. Consequently, while the English and French served the Americas, the Spanish exploited the Indians into their society—menaced and sought to provide a philosophically and social foundation for their actions in the New World. (Emphasis added)

As a result, whereas in Latin America "the marriage of blood and cultures created La Raza, the new Mexican peoples who composed most of today's Latin Americans," North America, "where the native were excluded, driven off their land, and eventually hunted down," remained white.

In this context, Cerri continues, sixteenth-century Spaniards "appear no worse than the nations who conscripted them for their wars." Even if Spain "committed terrible deeds in bringing the 'light of Christianity'" to the New World, "history offers no shortage of acts performed in the service of religious, social and political ideals.

From the historical-existential perspective, however, it is irrelevant whether the ongoing subjugation experienced by Native Americans is imposed by white North America or by native Latin America. Rather, as Susan Shawn Harjo (1991) argues, for the native peoples of the Americas what needs to be brought to an end is the entire history of these past five hundred years. Harjo, who is both Cherokee and Muskgog, and is also the national coordinator of the 1991 Alliance (a coalition of Native American groups), outlines the diindictive perspective on 1992. The history that it suffered in, she writes, "led to a feeling of guilt that has left native peoples, and this red quarter of Mother Earth in a state of emergency." For native people, "this half millennium of land-grabs and one-cent treaty sales has been no bargain." As she further implies, the effects of the original severe imbalance of the terms of exchange—which formed the basis of the "seeds of change" and set in dynamic motion—can be seen today in the empirically dispossessed and marginalized situation of the contemporary descendants of one of the partners to that exchange. In the United States, for example, the terms of that exchange have led to a situation that is far from equal. Only about two million indigenous peoples have survived, and even now they only barely manage to do so, despite the surrounding abundance.

"Most of us," Harjo writes, "are in economic survival mode on a daily basis and many of us are working in the middle of the mainstream just reading, writing, and performing the words on the page, and that is what we do, and that is what we are." From this perspective, 1992 was the prelude to a mode of exchange in which "gerritization and exoticism" were traded off for "the benefits of houses, out- class goodies, pickup trucks and microwave ovens." The only possible response to such an event, Harjo suggests, is to bring an end to the initial terms of the exchange and to the history toward which these terms led, by joining together in order "to begin an era of respect and redress, to find a new world beyond 1992."

But can there be, besides these two, a third perspective? Is it possible to go beyond what Gregory Bateson (1960) calls "the old conflicts and the old premises, in which we just go round and round without resolution," that is, beyond the premises of both celebrants and disenfranchised? Can there emerge a new and essentially human view that places the events of 1992 within a new frame of meaning, not only of natural history, but also of a newly conceived survival history specific to and unique to our species, because the history of those "forms of life" gives expression to a third level of hybridity, organic, and—in the terms of the Chicanos biologi- gists Matturas and Varela (1981)—"agentic existence?"

Michel Foucault (1972) has suggested that a history of the specifically human needs to take its point of departure from the differing ways in which each individual and the human group to which he or she belongs represents to himself or herself, and to themselves, the life that they live. The linguist Philip Lieberman (1991) has recently provided us with the outlines of how such a new history could be conceptualized. Lieberman points out that the biological evolution in early humans of the modern supralaryngeal vocal tract, together with the brain mechanisms necessary to produce human speech and syntax, generated a new type of evolution: we developed a cognitive capacity related to our new ability to construct linguistically encoded mental or ethico-behavioral systems. These developments enabled us to induce the modes of behavior that bond us together as groups. In consequence, as I propose here, in place of the genetic programs that regulate the behaviors of all organic species, we developed our own culture-specific programs by which our human beings—cognitive, affective, and actional—came to be role-governed and lawfully regulated.

Lieberman (1991-1973) further argues that, although "the development of human cultures of which mores are the highest forms, has obviously pro- gressed in the last 100,000 years, with slavery, for example, although once univer- sally common to all peoples, having now come to be universally outlawed" (in spite of being practiced outside in a few remaining pockets), and although "we have
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This third perspective is so inviolated within the logic of our present order of discourse and its system of symbolic representations, however, that it tends to be reflexively judged by both celebrants and disidents alike, by the Hebra as well as by the Cetio. Nor is it included as a third perspective in its own right, with the other two, in spite of insightful discussions on the centrality of the entailment of the African ancestors of today's black Americans to the economic development of the post-1492 societies of the Americas and the Caribbean. Yet, as Tom Morganthau (1991) and Susan Miller (1991) have made clear, it is the African-descended (and Afro-mixed) population group who formed, with the other two, at the very origins of the post-1492 Caribbean and the Americas, the integrity triadic model rather than the dyadic social-existential model presupposed by the Harpo/Cetio conflictual perspectives. It was on the basis of this triadic model and its dually antagonistic and transnational dynamic that the new synergizing cultural matrix of the now-emerging world civilization of the Caribbean and the Americas was first laid down.

The basis of this triadic model was itself established some half-century before the voyage of 1492. For, as historian Daniel Boone's (1987:17) emphasizes, Columbus's 1492 voyage cannot be detached from the overall sequence of historical events that began with the Powo's state's departure, during the first half of the fifteenth century, of several expeditions, whose goal was to attempt to find a sea route around the lutheroesvenal Cape Bejador on the bulge of West Africa—a cape that had been projected, in the accounts of the earth's geography given by medieval Christian geographers, as being the sea plus ultra line and boundary marker between the habitable temperate zone of Europe and the inhitable torrid zones. The Portuguese finally rounded the cape in 1441, landing on the shores and in the black green territory of Senegal, and with that landmark setting in motion the reconstruction of mainstream Christian geography that had been based on the authority of the classical dogmas of the ancient Greco-Roman authorities (see Tavani 1991). That first empirical discovery of earlier represented certainties was to be the prelude to Columbus's own challenge to what we shall later define as the categorical models of the earth's geography, as prescribed by the Scholastic order of knowledge of Incredul-Christianus Europe and, therefore by its rules of representation (figure 1.5). For Columbus was to visit the leading fort built by the Portuguese at El Mina on the west coast of Africa in or around 1482, and his empirical experience of the habitability of that torrid zone against the then learned premise of its unhabitability was to lie at the origin of his own grand design (Tawari, 1991).

The central point to note here, however, is that, as the historian Fernández-Armesto (1987) emphasizes, the attraction that had impelled the Portuguese state to round the lutheroesvenal Cape Bejador had been the lure of circum-
wresting, by a newly discovered sea route, the Islamic trans-Saharan monopoly over the rich gold trade. The lighthouses cloud-in world of feudal-Christian Europe had only begun to suspect the existence of the source of this trade in the ostensibly uninhabitable and remote areas, below the Sahara Desert, following on the faded pigmentation of the Islamized African emperors of Mali, Mansa Musa, to Mecca in 1324. News of the prodigality with which he had lavished gold upon his hosts had sent ripples of rumors of unbridled affluence throughout a still-poor and—in relation to the then-still-dominant world of Islam—backward Latin-Christian Europe.

Consequently, the Portuguese landing on the shores of today’s Senegal and their drawing of areas of West Africa into a mercantile network and trading system, on the basis of the exchange of their goods for gold or slaves, were the necessary and indispensable prelude, not only to Columbus’s own voyage but also to the specific pattern of relations of which Creo speaks between Christian Europe and the non-Christian peoples of the world to which Columbus and his crew had newly arrived. This Fernández-Armesto makes clear in his documentation of the pattern of conquest and colonisation that Europe had begun to establish during some two-and-a-half centuries before 1492, with its expansion into the western Mediterranean and then into the eastern Atlantic.

If it was to be Europe’s earlier encounter with the peoples of Neolithic Berber stock in the Canary islands and their conquest and exploration of these people on the assembled “holy” grounds of their idolatries—with their lands being therefore perceived as legitimately expectable (Fernández-Armesto 1987:230-43)—and with this pattern, when extrapolated by the Portuguese to West Africa, being validated by the pope (Medina 1968) —it was to be in the terms of the same system of symbolic representations, related to this original pattern, that two of the events founding to the instituting of the post-1492 Caribbean and the Americas were to be effected. For it was to be within the terms of the same discourse of legitimisation that, first, Columbus would, on landing, at once take possession of the islands at which he had arrived, expropriating them in the name of the Spanish state, while offering in his first report home to ship back some of the indigenous peoples as slaves for sale on the “just” grounds that they were idolaters.

Second, it was also to be on the initial basis of the same mode of juridico-theological legitimisation, that, under the auspices of the slave-trading system out of Africa that had been established by the Portuguese in the wake of 1441, large numbers of peoples of African descent would be transshipped as the substitute slave labor force whose role would be indispensable to the founding of the new societies.

Not only would they be used, as Morgenthau (1991) points out, in the totally disposable, correlative, and unpaid labor force that alone made possible the accelerated economic development of the Americas. They would also play a central role in the instituting of the bases of the new social structure. In this role they would not only serve to free the indigenous peoples from the outright slavery to which many had been reduced in the immediate decades after 1492, when a flourishing intra-Caribbean and Caribbean-mainland slave trade in cofres de indias y indios (heads of Indian men, as in heads of cattle) (Pastor 1988:53-54) and one that had been initiated by Columbus himself, had made the fortunes of some of the founder families of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (Wyther 1994:30). As the initial category whose mode of exclusion differed, based on the hereditary slave status of its members as the only legitimately tolerable population group, they would also generally exclude the principle of similarity or of corporeality that would come to bond, if on the terms of sharply unequal relations, the incoming Spanish settlers with the indigenous peoples. From the mid-sixteenth century on, this principle would come to brand the latter as members of a category whose status was that of beneficiariously free subjects of the Spanish state.

This third population group, therefore, would come to embody the new synthetic construct of Race or of insatiable determined difference that would enable the Spanish state to legitimise its sovereignty over the lands of the Americas in the
postreligious legal terms of Western Europe's now-expanding state system. It would do so by instituting by means of the physical restraint of the group's enslaved lives and labor the eschatological, of, in Cartesian terms, the "moral and philosophic foundations" on which the Spaniards "accepted" the indigenous peoples "into their societies, however rudely."

This sharp contradiction—between (a) the historical centrality of this third population group to the clearly triadic model founding of the post-1492 Americas and the Caribbean and (b) the reflex marginalization of its perspective by most of the major participants, whether clerics or civilians, with respect to the debate over what meaning would be given to 1492 and how we would question as a point of departure from which to elaborate a view of 1492 that encompasses the historical-existential perspectives of the descendants of the conquistadors and the legality free and legally enslaved. What is this question asks, are the rules that govern our human perceptions? What are the processes that do so? How, in effect, do we perceive and know the specific social reality of which we are always participatory subjects and agents? More pertinently, what are the rules that govern the shared and integrating conceptions of the past that we normally or even dissonantly—since our dissonance must necessarily be conched, as Valentine Y. Mudimbe (1988:3) reminds us, in the very terms of the normality from which we discern—hold of the reality in which we participate as actors at the same time as we attempt to observe it, whether as scholars or as lay men and women? So if we now need to put aside once and for all the notion that "Columbus discovered America," saying that only its indigenous people could have discovered it, what rules of perception have enabled the "idea that Columbus discovered America" to remain so central for so long to both the scholarly interpretation of 1492 by a range of European and Euroamerican historians and thinkers (see O'Gorman 1971, i 972, and as well as to the folk perception. In other words, rules that enable those who participate in its celebratory activities to perceive Columbus Day as the day on which "Columbus discovered America" in the teeth of the empirical evidence of what the real-life Columbus did not do to discover, and what he did indeed "discover," were conceived and carried out within a system of symbolic representations that were culturally different from our now-hermeneutically technico-industrial ones.

To answer this question, I have borrowed the concept of "subjective understandings" from the artificial intelligence theorist Jeanne Carson Bell. CarsonBell suggests that, because humans always know and perceive the everyday world in relation to specific behavior-oriented suprasegmental goals and their sets of subgoals or goals, aspects of these perceptual-cognitive processes can be simulated by computer programs that are themselves oriented about such goals. One's these goals therefore determinate what is to be perceived and what is not perceived, with inevitable reference to one single criterion—that of their own realization as such goals. Given that since our human behaviors are invariably oriented in the forms of the specific perceptual-cognitive processes by which we know our reality, then the behavior that we normally display, as well as the empirical social affectivities to which our behaviors, taken collectively, lead, can "give" us access to the specific mode of "subjective understanding" in terms of which we normally, even when disinterestedly, perceive our contemporary socioeconomic reality as well as conceive the past that led to it. Such is the case with our present liberal positivist conception that what Columbus did in 1492 was to "discover" America. This formulation is the basis of my proposed human view of 1492. This view is that both the undoubted "glorious achievement" of the processes that led up to Columbus's realization of his long dreamed-of voyage and the equally undoubted horrors that were inflicted by the Spanish conquistadors and settled upon the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean and the Americas, as well as upon the African-descended Middle Passages and subordinate slave labor force, are to be seen as the effects of Western Europe's epochal shift. That shift—out of the primarily supernaturally guaranteed modes of "subjective understanding" (and, therefore, of their correlated symbolic-representational and ethico-behavioral systems) that had been common to all human cultures and their millennia traditional "forms of life"—was a product of the intellectual revolution of humankind. Elaborated by humankind as well as by monarchical pawns and theologiasts, this revolution opened the way toward an increasingly secularized, that is, degraded, mode of "subjective understanding." In the context of the latter's gradually hegemonic political ethic, not only would the earlier religious-moral ethic then common to all cultures be displaced, but a reversal would take place in which the Christian church, of which the earlier feudal states of Latin Europe had been the temporal and military arm, would now be made into the spiritual arm of these newly emergent absolute states. It was to be the global expansion of those states that would bring into being our present single world order and single world history.

If the symbolic-representational system of Judeo-Christianity has continued to provide the "ultimate reference point" for Western societies, whatever the transformations of their modes of production (see Mudimbe 1988:142) and therefore of their historical "system-ensembles" (Huizinga 1981:54), the political historian J. G. A. Pocock provides us with the key to the process by which Western Europe was to effect its shift from the founding religious forms of the "ultimate reference points" of the Judaico-Christian symbolic-representational or cultural systems to its later secular variants. And where he refers to the first variant as a "Christian herry," it is in the terms of the second as a now purely biologized form of this "heresy" in whose global hegemonic forms, conceptual-cognitive categories, and modes of "subjective understanding" that we all, as humans, would now come to live.

Pocock (1975) points out that the West's epochal shift was to be based on the transfer of the central behavior-regulating "redemptive process" formerly central- ized in the church under the direction of the celibate clergy. That process had been oriented about the other-worldly supraordinate (or metaphysical) goal of attaining to the eternal salvation of the Augustinian sine die and was prescribed to be effected through a life primarily aimed at securing one's spiritual redemption from
the negative legacy of Adidasic Originl Sin, as inscribed in the founding original narrative of the biblical Genesis. It was this process that now transferred together with its earlier goal to that of the new this-worldly goal of the growth, expansion, and political stability of each European state in competitive rivalry with its fellow European states.

The earlier supeordinate goal as encoded by the origin narrative and cosmogonic schema of the Judao-Christian version of the biblical Genesis had served as the ethos-behavioral schema of the feudal-Christian and Renaissance order of Europe. The latter had therefore oriented its systemic ensemble of collective behaviors to its central dogma of "subjective understanding," of that ethos. In contrast, the new behavior-orienting goal of the state, that of the civic society, was conceptualized as a transmedieval this-worldly variant of the original feudal-Christian goal, as well as of its encoding cosmogonic schema. In this transfiguration, the original narrative of mankind's rebellion against Original Sin was no longer interpreted primarily in sexual and therefore basically opposed spirit/these terms, as it had been in the feudal order. Instead it was in terms of mankind's alleged enslavement to the irrational or sensory aspects of its human nature, that the earlier supeordinate goal of spiritual redemption and eternal salvation of the feudal order was replaced by that of rational redemption, through the state as intermedial. This new goal was to be achieved primarily through the individual's actions, as a rational citizen, in ensuring the stability, growth, and competitive expansion of the state. It therefore called for a new behavior-orienting ethos. This new ethos was that of reason of state, a articulation by the discourse of civic humanism and of a mode of political abiding that would take the place of the earlier theocratic absolutism on which the feudal order, as a still supernaturally guaranteed system ensemble, had been based.

In what ways were both the "glorious achievement" and the interhuman atrocities of the aftermath of 1492 to be the Janus-faced effects of the new mode of "subjective understanding" and supeordinate goal of rational redemption of the state, of its new mode of political rationality? As answer to that question, I propose that an economically valid reasoning is to be found as an imperative guide for our action in a present that confronts us with a dimension of change even more far-reaching than the one effect in the context of Western Europe's epochal tran-
arising, not only to take immediate possession of the new lands in the name of
Spain, but also to deal with the peoples of those lands as a population group that
could be justly made to serve three main purposes. One of these purposes was to
expand the power of the Spanish state that had backed his voyage. The second was
to repay his financial backers, as well as to enrich himself and his family with all
the gold and tribute he could extract from the indigenous peoples, even from mak-
ing some of them cioès de indios y indias (heads of Indian men and women),
who could be sold as slaves; in order to support the acquired noble status that was part
of the contract he had drawn up with the Crowns before the voyage (in a psycho-
social status drive that was part of his behavior). His third purpose was to
help accelerate the spread of Christianity all over the world, in time for the Second
Coming of Christ, which he fervently believed to be imminent.

Consequently, Columbus's behavior were not unlike the ritual arts of sacrifice
of the Aztecs. Their behaviors, too, were impelled by an ethos-behavioral system
based on securing what seemed to them to be the imperative goal of “guaraing
the good of the共同体,”7 and to do this by maintaining, as their founding
supreme goal prescribed that they should do, “the flow of life.” Columbus's equa-
ly Jesus-faced behaviors were to be no less prescribed by the emergent
religio-sacral political and mercantile goal of the state, which Columbus would
come to see as the vehicleboth for the spread of Christianity and for the
advancement of its own state. So the Aztecs’s “flow of life” imperative would become for
Columbus and the Spaniards (to the Aztecs’s horror and astonishment) the imperative
of maintaining “the flow of gold.” In an inescapably tangled web of motives, for him
this flow would serve not only to secure the good of the state and his own personal
enrichment, but also to ensure the receptivity of ‘wilds’from its Islamic occu-
piers, in order to prepare the world for the imminent Second Coming of Christ.8

It was in a coming in which many among the new socially mobile merchant/
artisan-cum-improver community (a world in which the nobility was still hege-
monic) fervently believed. This was the category to which Columbus belonged.

The paradox here was that the current of millenarian belief running through
Europe at the time, whose protest was directed at the Scholastic orthodoxy of the
church, was to be an ally of the emerging state. Both favored transforming
the church's goal of an eternal earthly paradise to the Augustinian City of God—a goal that
the new religious currents now set impatiently at a certain date and time as one to
be realized very soon on earth—to the state’s own this-worldly goal of
attaining to a new civic society, that is, Seren City, as expounded in the stability, growth,
and expansion of the modern and essentially post-Christian state (see Pocock 1975).

Nevertheless, this process of transfer, together with its first partial secularization
of the religious suprastructure goals regulating hisiento all human behaviors, was to
be self-effectuated within the terms of the “general upheaval” of the cultural revolu-
tion, both of humanity proper and of its precursor, the movement of Christian
humanism. The apocalyptic millenarian movements were a fringe-component of
this humanities.

In the context of this “general upheaval” (and therefore of the transformation
of the divinely ordained feudal order into the new one of the modern state), Eu-
rope, by means of its return to its inherently stigmatized pagan Greco-Roman sys-
tems of knowledge and learning, was to remake itself anew in all the forms of its
existence. Through the synergistic interaction of a new group of lay (that is, non-
clergy, non-mainstream) intellectuals, including “men of the sea” like Columbus, it
was also to bring in, for all humans, a new image of the earth and conception of
the cosmos (see Obenga 1941; figure 1–2). I shall propose here that this new image
would gradually displace the culture-systemic mode of cognition by which the
subjects of all human orders had known their physical environment only in the
terms prescribed by their modes of “subjective understanding.” In consequence,
each culture’s representation of its physical environment, like that of the feudal-
Christian order, had been made into a function of the ethico-behavioral schemas
by which all humans regulated their respective collectives of behaviors, until the
revolution of humanism made it possible for these representations to be replaced
with a scientific and transculturally verifiable image of the earth and conception of
the cosmos.

Because of the specific terms on which the state transferred to its new, essen-
tially monoculture-political, the energies that had formerly been attached to the
other-worldly goal of the church—thereby changing the earlier imperative of
eternal salvation into that of securing above all else the good of the state as an compet-
tive rivalry with all other European states—all non-Christian peoples and cultures
(Pocock 1977) became perceivable only in terms of their usefulness to the Euro-
pean states in securing this-worldly goal of power and wealth. Consequently,
the collective behavior of Columbus and his view, as well as in all the later Spanish
settlers who proved in aliis 1492 to seek their personal enrichment and new
landed status, would—within the Spanish state’s overall goal of expansion—give
expression to this new goal in exactly the same way as the Aztecs had given expres-
sion to their equally metaphysical goal of maintaining the “flow of life.”

The Aztecs had been governed by the supernaturally ordained goal, prescribed
by their indigenous cosmographic schema, of maintaining the “flow of life” within
a self-justified conception of Nature. This conception had once been common
to all humans, until the defeat of the ruled and dominated Jews in Babylon, had, as
a central intellectual challenge to their conquest and subordination by the mighty
Babylonian and their divinized nature God, Marduk, counterpointed the new cos-
mographic schema of Genesis, where Creator-God—expressed as having created
all the forces of Nature, in the wake of Egypt’s Akhenaton’s first brilliant but
eventually aborted monotheism—had led to the epochal “degodding” of Nature
(Hynes 1987); a degodding that had logically put an end to the sacrifice of humans,
and to which the invading Judeo-Christian of Europe had fallen heir. However,
in spite of their degodding of nature, the Judeo-Christianians had continued to be
no less regulated in their behaviors by the new supernatural goal set by their
monotheistic religion, than had the polytheistic Babylonians by those set by the
divinized natural forces that were their gods. In a parallel manner, the invading Europeans were to continue to be as regulated in their behaviors by their societal culture's superordinate imperative of maintaining the flow of gold and wealth, both for the "good of the state" and for their own personal enrichment, as the imperial Jesuits, whom they deified and displaced, had been regulated by that of maintaining the still-divinized "flow of life." However, the mercantile imperative that drove Columbus cannot be disentangled from his apocalyptic millennial belief in the imminent Second Coming of Christ, which led him to that cornerstone of reasoning that was to break with Scholasticism's arbitrary model of divine creation-a model in which late feudalism's Annotheologized conception of an omnipotent God who could arbitrarily intervene to change the rule governing the everyday process of nature, came rebus naturae (even to "restore virgins after they have been ruined") (Blumenberg, 1985:337), and to posit in its place a new nat-governed model of divine creation. This new model would enable him to call into question the categorical models of feudal-Christian geography—categorical models in which a priori classificatory logic the earth of the Western Hemisphere (as the nonexistent antipodes to a tripartite earth imagined as an island in an encircling ocean) had to be entirely submerged under water.

In his novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, etc., Robert Pirsig (1974) broke with the notion that what Columbus did in 1492 was to "discover" America. He argued instead that re-encountering the schoolbook stereotype Columbus has been made into, we must be aware that whereas today's moon exploration is now "just a hang-up of what Columbus did" since "existing forms of thought" are "adequate to handle it," Columbus's first voyage could only have been effected on the basis of a "root expansion of thought." It was this "root expansion" that enabled him to move outside the limits of the conventional reason of his time, and therefore in Foucault's terms, outside the "gossiped" of the feudal-Christian epistememe or order of knowledge, or, in our terms, outside the feudal-order's symbolic representational system and as mode of "subjective understanding," Pirsig, in further proposing that we, too, are now confronted with the task of effecting an analogous "root expansion of thought," then argued that "any really new exploration" comparable to Columbus's that would be undertaken today, at a time when our "conventional reason has become less and less adequate" to handle our mounting problems, would have "to be made in an entirely new direction," would have "to move into realms beyond reason." 

Asstrom Lenses (1972:390-91) has pointed out, that because of the "technocultural infamy of our present order of knowledge" we fail "to distinguish the purportive aspects of human behaviour (as reflected most clearly in revitalization or millenarian movements) and the unconscious structure in human culture (as reflected in the language and cognitive base of social life) from the non-rational or empiricist processes that shape man directly to animal sources and to ecosystems." So whereas science and technology are mainly relevant to the latter, "they are not the former." In this context, both Obenga and Pirsig's interpretations of the "glorious achievement" aspects of 1492, not only contradict the positivist's purely "technological" interpretation, but also coincide largely, if not forward in more secular and modern terms, with the "epistemological conception" that Columbus himself had of a voyage whose navigational feat for him was inseparable from the countercurrent of reasoning with which he had challenged the paradigms of mainstream geography. In the logic of that geography—"as he himself quoted his scholarly antagonists as affirming—""God could not have placed land there," that is, in the nonexistent antipodes of the Western Hemisphere, where, according to the rules of representation of that geography, the land there would have to have been submerged, at the heaviest element in its Astronomical "natural place" under the sea and the lighter element of water (Thomsdäke 1934:410).

How did Columbus come to "move beyond the reason" of his time and to think contrary truths (as the major Spanish dramatist Lope de Vega's portrayal of him in his 1614 play, The New World Discovered by Christopher Columbus, would dramatize his hero-figure as doing) to those permitted by the still largely hegemons, and divinely guaranteed, Scholastic order of knowledge? Here, the perceptive analysis given by the historian Paulo Fernando Marques-Futine (1980:11-13),...
of medieval Islamic geographic accounts of the nonmonotheistic indigenous peoples of Africa below the Sahara, is illuminating. It uncovers the rules of representation that governed feudal Christianity's orthodox accounts of the earth's geography, as they also governed medieval Islamic geographic accounts of the lands and peoples of Africa below the Sahara. These rules of representation, and the prismatic categorial models of the earth's geography to which they gave rise, were the rules that Columbus would have had to challenge, as the condition of convincing his intended backers of the feasibility of his proposed voyage. That challenge is where we must look for the eponymously valid and human view of 1492.

On Categorial Models: Notions of Order, the Earth Intended for "Life and the Creation of Souls," and the First Poetics of the Printer Nas

The analysis of Moreira-Farias (1980) mentioned above is based on Daniel Sperber's central distinction between two types of human cognition. Sperber defines the first of these as "knowledge of the world as it is." Because its purpose is scientific, it must set out to make logical representations of empirical reality in such a way that they can be independently verified. The second type is the "knowledge of categories." Its purpose is to make use of empirical reality as well as of formal data concerning that reality (data that are meticulously and rigorously recorded), in order to validate the prismatic categorial schema on whose basis each order's mode of "subjective understanding" is secured at the mode of perception and cognition shared by its subjects. It is on the basis of that mode that the subjects of each human order are enabled to experience themselves as symbolic kai or interlexis- tic perspectives. Consequently, because the medieval Islamic accounts of the lands and people of non-Islamic black Africa spring from the logic of this second type of cognition, the operational strategies of their discourse functioned according to rules of representation that formed the current names of some of the indigenous peoples of black Africa, such as Zanj, Habaša, to be made into interchangeable mobile classificatory labels. These labels then served to detach the peoples and lands of ethnically and culturally different "prismatic" areas from the empirical "inhabitants of reality" in order to convert them into "stereotyped images" able to function in the daily descriptive (descriptive) and behavior-prescriptive (deontic) modes that Jean-François Lyotard (1984) has identified as being characteristic of all customary or narrative modes of knowledge. As "stereotyped images," their primary function was to induce the specific mode of perception needed by a culture-specific order, and to thereby orient the prescribed behaviors needed by that order.

In the case of the peoples of black Africa medieval Islamic geography as stereotyped images, they were not only perceivable as a group whose members (including at times even those already converted to Islam) could be legitimately excluded, but also, correlatedly, as the group that served, within the "tragic formal model" of the order's auto-institutional classificatory schema, as the extreme term that embodied the absolute lack of the optimal criterion of being as well as of rationality that defined the medieval Islamic way of life.

In sum, these "stereotyped images" or labels served as boundary markers that represented the transgressive chaos that ostensibly avoided those who either acted outside the limits of the behavioral norms of the order or thought (or perceived) outside the parameters of its mode of "subjective understanding." Thus, their central systemic function of representing, through their total negation, the medieval Islamic's way of life and mode of subjective understanding as being the only possible divinely sanctioned manner of behaving humanly, knowing rationally, and perceiving according to an ostensibly absolute standard of right perception meant that what Moreira-Farias calls the categorial models in which they were encoded as interchangeable labels and stereotyped images were necessarily, in Wittgenstein's first phrase, "unpersuasive to philosophical attack" (see Wheeler 1984).

Because the mainstream accounts of the earth's geography of Columbus's era also still functioned, in spite of the Portuguese voyages, mainly within the same "knowledge-of-categories" mode of cognitive imagination as did that of medieval Islamic's accounts of black Africa's geography, their rules of representation and operational strategies followed a similar logic. The transgressive chaos in medieval Islamic's trad- ing and monothetic way of life and "mode of subjective understanding" had been signified by a binary opposition between (as the extreme ends of a tricadic model) people who traded like Muslims and peoples who—such as the Zanj or the intermediate category of other peoples who traded in a rudimentary manner—did not trade at all and necessarily lived like "beasts," that is, conceptually other peoples like the Zanj, the Habaša. These latter were paralleled in the geographic account of the earth by feudal-Christian geography and its rules of representation, by a binary opposition that also functioned as the extreme terms of a tricadic formal model. This phenomenon was specific to the a prismatic classificatory schema, on whose basis the mode of "subjective understanding," integrating the feudal- Christian way of life, had also been generated. This binary opposition was then inscribed in an ostensibly unbridgeable separation between the habitable areas of the earth (which were within the redemptive grace of the Scholastic's God and His only "partial providence for mankind"), and the uninhabitable areas of the earth (which were outside His grace). Both the torrid zones (such as the lands that lay beyond the bulge of Cape Bojador) and the Western Hemisphere (the allegedly nonexistent site of today's America and the Caribbean) were therefore decisively made into mobile labels, so as to detach them from their "moorings in reality" and to convert them into the "stereotyped images" whose function was exactly the same as that of the Zanj, and the Habaša in medieval Islamic geography. These images indeed served as the boundary markers or the see plus ultra sign of the transgressive chaos that awaited outside the mode of rationality of the behavioral norms and therefore of "subjective understanding" of the feudal-Christian order—in the
same way as, incidentally, the Aztec's "shoeb of the dead" label attached to the ocean also served the same function (see Ikadsd 1951:27). The two boundary markers, Cape Bojagdos (for the toasted 1906) and the Saxis of Gibraltar (or the Pillars of Hercules), had been deployed to represent being outside of God's redemptive grace and outside the behavioral norms of the 647a order itself. Thus, in Duve's great poem Odysea and his crew are punished with shipwreck for having transgressed the arch plus extra habitable/unhabitable signs at the Pillars of Hercules: and for sailing out into the open ocean, spurred on by a vain curiosity. That curiosity drew them away from the only true and worthy goal of sterility and spatiotemporal practice, to the knob of the Scholastics' unown God's "only partial providence for mankind" (Blumenberg 1952:239). As a providence, therefore, it was limited to the habitable temperate zone of the "Eastern" Hemisphere of an earth whose center, both physical and symbolic, was Jerusalem, and whose outside limits were the limits of the feudal order and its symbolic representational system itself.

The theoretical physicist David Bohm (1925) has pointed out that each human order bases itself on a specific notion of order. The ancient Greeks, for example, held that one originated from the earth at the lowest point of the structure or highest levels of perfection. Similarly, the feudal order had mapped its own hierarchy of spiritual degree of perfection onto the physical universe. The criterion of perfection was this area from an ontological division between the clergy at the beeries of the new "life" of the spirit, effected through baptism, and lay men and women as the bearers of the post-Aristotle legacy of Original Sin, who therefore perpetuated the "fallen" and "degraded" life of "natural man." Such a life was therefore constantly in need of the "redemptive process" presided over by the "category of the clergy," who were also the orthodox guardians of a mainstream order of knowledge of which theology (like economics in our today) was the master discipline and "queen of the sciences."

At the level of the order, the series-organizing principle of a represented difference of ontological cause substance between subd and valuable (like ties be- tween dry and hay) was encoded in as a pristonic classificatory schema. This schema gave expression to the physical-spiritual notion of order consisting of the "uncreated" images (as an arc of the earth in which life was impossible because of the excessive heat) and the Western Hemisphere (as an area in which not only had St. Augustine said the waters of the Flood had been gathered up, but also in which, in the terms of Christian-Asianist physics, the more spiritually degraded and heavier element of earth, had to be submerged in its natural place under the element of the lighter element of water). It was only by the intervention of God, that the earth of the temperate zone and Eastern Hemisphere, whose center was Jerusalem, was itself belted by an Aristotelian "unnatural" and Christian "miraculous" motion, as the widespread current belief had it, above its "natural place" below the water (Thorodhke 1954:166). In this way, it was made into that part of a nonhomogeneous earth that alone was providentially habitable for mankind.

At the end of his first letters back to Spain after his landfall, Columbus wrote that his voyage had been one of those "things which appear impossible," yet over which "the Eternal God, our Lord, can give victory to all those who walk in his way." For although he then concluded, "men have talked or written of these lands, all was conjecture, without getting a look at this but amounted only to this, that those who heard it for the most part listened and judged it more of a fable than there was anything in it, however small" (see Morrison 1993:14-15).

In his play, Lope de Vega laid great emphasis on the mockery and derision that Columbus received from all, especially from the king and his experts at the court of Portugal. But in it the Portuguese court chronicler Inmues, whose account of Columbus's dismissal by the Portuguese enables us to see the challenge that Columbus's religious apocalyptic millennium would enable him to make the promise of a nonhomogeneous earth divided habitable/unhabitable earth—and therefore to the rules of representation to which this promise gave rise. As Barros wrote, reporting on Columbus's counterintuition of reasoning:

He came to the conclusion that it was possible to sail across the western ocean to the island of Cipango and other unknown lands. For since the time of Prince Henry, when the Aztecs were discovered, it was held that there must be other islands and lands to the west. For Prince Henry's voyage did nothing on earth out of proportion of there to be more water than land, which was intended for life and the creation of souls. [Añad 41] ... found that Christian colonists' words were empty, for they were based on fantasy, or on such things as Marco Polo's island of Cipango. (Cited in Landstrom 1967:13)

Columbus's readings of Marco Polo's famous account of the East had helped convince him that Asia was only a short distance away from Spain sailing west, and that the voyage was therefore feasible. (Thus, the Caribbean would almost be for him the India Occidentis, the West Indies, and the island of Japan just around the corner from one or another of the islands.) However, the principal "fantasy" with which he would challenge the categorial models of feudal-Christian geographic accords came from two other driving forces. One was his messianic apocalypse fervor. The other, allied to the first, was his psychosocial motivation as a locally born cartographer and occasional merchant to better his social status in the relatively more democratizing order of the postfeudal and monarchical state. The mode of wist based on wistikke prowess had served as the status-organizing criterion that had enabled the mobility of the feudal to legitimize its socially exclu- sive and hegemonic role. However, the rise of the monarchical state had opened up new avenues of social prestige based on a more inclusive mode of wist. One of these avenues was termed, in the contracts handed out by the sovereign, "discovery-and-gain deeds" (that is, deeds and enterprises by which the sovereign could commission an aspiring applicant to find and excavate, in the name of the state, any territories occupied by non-Christian that could militarily con-
Such discover-and-gain deeds had become a new route, therefore, to an acquired mode of nonterritorial noble status, as well as a route to the enhancement needed to support this status.

The power of the first—the apocalyptic millenarian drive—was revealed in the letters-cum-reports that Columbus brought to the sovereigns over a period of several years in order to regain some of the privileges that had, in the wake of his decline from favor, been eroded or not accorded him. These letters reveal that the concept of a “discovery” was specific to the new statute order in the context of a crusading Christianity: specific privileges were granted to individuals of the state (if they summoned the faithful) that were unattached to any portion of non-Christian territory and extrapropolit. The claim to have “discovered” it was thus a form of land-grant within the iner-sacred legal terms of the Spanish monarchy. In addition, the letters make it clear that in Columbus’s view, it had been his own “intellectual” “discovery” of the fact that “God could indeed have placed land there in the West” (one verified by his empirical arrival at this land), that had led the papacy to, in effect, adjudicate to Spain sovereignty over the land and peoples of the New World. Also at this time the papacy saw itself, within its mode of “subjective understanding” them, as legitimated to divide up the territories of the non-Christian parts of the globe, according to the solos the Christian state had first enjoyed at a part of the world hitherto unknown to Europeans, and had therefore “discovered” it. Indeed, the pope had referred to Columbus as his “dilectus filius Christorphorus Colon” (that is, our beloved son Christopher Columbus) and as the one who had “discovered” the lands whose jurisdiction and territorial ownership he was awarding to Spain (Velasquez 1982:269).

But before being “discovered” their existence had to be made “conceptualizable,” for Latin-Christian Europe and its mode of subjective understanding them. From these letters it is clear that, as was also the case in Lope de Vega’s (1614) later dramatic portrayals of him, Columbus, too, saw the greatness of his 1492 feat as lying as equally in the challenge that he had made to the “stressed images” of the main geographical imagination (inspired to do so by divine revelation and the divine Providence) as in the empirical voyage itself. As he insisted again and again in these letters, during the long years that he had tried to put forward his proposal, all those who had heard it, whether learned experts or practical men of the sea, had deemed it a fools (a joke) that there could be land to the west on the land to the Indies, “seeming that God had not apportioned any land to be there” (Por Dios no ha dado al mundo donde Nino). And that therefore such a voyage was “foolish and impossible” (por Dios y imposible). He had to undertake his voyage, for the most part, therefore “against the opinion of all the world,” with only divine inspiration enabling him to stand firm in his contrary truth.

Seeing that the central point he would have to challenge was the premise of the habitable/inhabitable line, and the nonexistence of lands above their ostensible “natural place” when they were not held up above the water by the unnatural motion of God’s miracles and only partly bestowed grace, it was to be precisely the countermass of his religious and apocalyptic fantasy, or countresemogony, that would enable him to call in question the arbitrary model of divine creation that had sustained the feigned image of a nonhomogeneous earth.

The central thrust of Columbus’s challenge was based on his projection of the religious goal of the restoration of Jerusalem to Christianity. It was this goal, he wrote the sovereigns, that had empowered him, although a mere layman and only self-taught, not only to see himself as directly chosen to sail to the Indies—in order to accelerate the captivity of Jerusalem in time for the prophetic end of the world, the Second Coming of Christ, together with the immediate realization of the city of God, with one sheepfold and one flock, on earth—but also to challenge all established “truths” that stood in the way of the new “truths” needed to carry out this mission. As a result, not only had not one of the sciences that he had studied helped him with his voyage, but because his countertruth was one based on divine inspiration and revelation, the accusations heaped against him—that is, that of being unwarned in letters (no dono en letra), being a lay seaman and profane man of the world—as well as the mockery and derision that had been heaped at him during the long years before his voyage, had all been of no account. All such charges could be answered by the fact that the Holy Spirit had filled his mind with “secret things hidden from the learned.” Thus, in carrying out his enterprise of the Indies, neither reason, nor mathematics, nor maps helped him, only divine guidance and the knowledge that because the end of the world was at hand, the proclching of the gospel in many lands in order to ensure the conversion of all sinners in time for the Second Coming, was prophecy that had to be fulfilled: he had clearly the one appointed by God for the task (Velasquez 1982: Watts 1985).

Within the counterlogistic of his apocalyptic millenarian belief in the imminent Second Coming of Christ, and therefore of all the people of the world having to be converted to the Christian faith, Columbus put forward the hypothesis of an earth that had been intended for “life and the creation of souls.” I propose that this was a central part of the wider phenomenon that Frederick Halny (1996) has described as the divine Providence of the voyage. It was the manner by which the intellectual revolution of humanism was effected and our modes of human being thereby eventually devided and reassembled.

This project was to call in question the mainstean order of knowledge of Scho- lasticism, and with it, the arbitrary model of divine creation in whose theocentric system of reference the earth’s geography had been logically represented as being divided between habitable and inunhabitable realms. These realms—one within God’s arbitrarily bestowed redemptive grace, the other outside it—were necessarily nonhomogeneous. At the same time, the universe of the pre-Copernican astrophors had, within the same classificatory schema, been also divided between the spiritually revered celestial realm of the noong heavens and the post-Aristotelian "celestial" terrestrial realm of the nonmoving earth (Halny 1900). Consequently, the representation, before Copernicus, of the unchallengeable s priori
of a nonmoving earth was also in preformation as the same overall tectonic schema based on a physico-spiritual notion of order that functioned to legitimize the state-organizing principle of ahsa about which the feudal order reorganized its structurizing hierarchies. In the same way, therefore, the empirical reality both of the territorial zone and of the Western Hemisphere had been equally subordinated to their roles as interchangeable classificationary latches and "stereotypical images" of the boundary marker between the habitable and the uninhabitable. Consequently, in the case of the latter, this role had preformation, that in lands should be represented as necessarily undergone in its "natural place" as the heavier element of earth, under the lighter (and by implication, more spiritually advanced) element of water. And analogously, the realm of "fallen" natural vice, that is, the byzantium, was necessarily represented as also being cosmologically inferior to the increasing spiritual perfection of the celestial realm. Therefore, lay almanacs were considered insatiable, cognitively impervious, except they adhered to the theological paradigms of Scholasticism.

Tami Blumenberg (1987:179-79) has shown that the binary schema based on the opposition habitable/uninhabitable (as exemplified in the figure of Dante’s shipwrecked Odysseus, "poorly" punished for his breaches of the ner plus ulta sign of the Pillar of Hercules), as well as on the opposition between the terrestrial and the celestial, was generated from the conception of God specific to late Scholasticism. This conception, that of an Armaturized Unmoved Mover, and totally omnipotent God who had created the universe for the sake of His own glory rather than specifically for mankind’s sake, had given rise to a totumvindicum view of the relation between God and man. This relation had become the central premise of the "mode of subjective understanding" of the Scholastic order of knowledge.

In this view of the divine/human relation, the former’s total omnipotence was contrasted with the total helplessness and cognitive incapacity of "natural man" in the fallen heir of Adam’s sin. Consequently, the view that such a God, being able to intervene arbitrarily in the everyday functioning of nature, could thereby alter the rules that governed in accustomed fashion (suum aditus naturae) anytime He chose to do so, had led to two consequences. One of these had been the production of a cosmography and geography whose rules of representation and categorical models had to "verify" the panopticon premise of a founding cosmological divide between the divine/celestial realms and the human/terrestrial (at the level of as- cosmomy), and between the habitable-within-God’s arbitrary power, and the uninhabi- table outside it (at the level of the earth's geography). The second consequence had been that of a generalized "epistemological resignations" with respect to the cogni- tive capacity of "fallen man": being able to come to know the laws that governed the everyday processes of nature. These rules, because they belonged to the realm of God’s absolute power (potentia absoluta), could not be known by a humanist unable to depend upon the regularity of the rules governing nature in order to obtain access to their organizing or axiogenic principles (Halley 1990:218).

However, it was to be precisely this theocentric and arbitrary mode of divine creation central to the Scholastic order of knowledge that was to be challenged by the incontestable revolution of humanism, specifically, by its generalized politics of the progressio—that is, by the counterprogramme to Scholasticism’s theocentric view (Halley 1990:56-57). This premise was that the Creation had indeed been made by God at will of and for the sake of humankind (potestas nos homines). Since by the latter’s defining of the relations between God and man on more reciprocally egalitarian terms, the way had been opened for Copernicus, for example, to move beyond the epistemologically resigned and purely technical calculations of Ptolemaic-Christian astronomy, in order to put forward a new "axiogenic thesis" (Halley 1990:54). The intellectual thrust, that is, which by making possible human inquiry into the organizing principle behind the Creation, would make possible the eventual development of a science of astronomy.

Halley here quotes the counterprogramme of a world created for us that is central to Copernicus’s assertion that, because of his divinely created origin, man could come to know a creation whose processes of functioning were rule governed, because created "for our sake" and bound by that end. As Halley cites Copernicus:

For a long time, then, I reflected on this confusion in the astrological tradi-
tions concerning the derivation of the motions of the universe’s objects. I began to be annoyed that the movements of the world-machine, created for our sake (potestas nos) by the best and most systematic artificer of all, were not understood with greater clarity by the philosophers, who otherwise examined so precisely the most insignificant trifles of this world. (Quoted in Halley 1990:1-3)

Yet this counterprogramme of the potestas nos also was common to the range of humanist thinkers, among these writers such as Ficino and Lorenzo Valla. It was, in effect, the generalization of this process that was to make possible the position of a rule-governed model of divine creation, in which the end or cause of the Creation had necessarily bound the Divine Creator with respect to what the organizing principles of his ostensibly, potestas absoluta (absolute power), would necessarily have to be. In this context, Columbus’s fervent apocalyptic millennial belief in Christ’s imminent return to refulge his kingdom and to do so on an earth that had been divinely predestined for this eventual and yet imminent end, therefore itself formed part of the generalized politics of the potestas nos or counterprogram of symbolic representation. On the basis of such representation, the feudal order of Latin Christian Europe and its supernaturally guaranteed model of "subjective understanding" would be transformed into that of the secularizing and rapidly expanding modern European state, and its new and post-theological mode of "subjective under-
standing." In the context of this revolution in the conception of the relation between God and man, and therefore in the mode of representing being, the apocalyptic and
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Columbus's apocalyptic conviction of a providential destiny for the spread of Christianity to be effected through the vessel of the earthly state and its quest for territorial expansion would therefore impel him to call in question the "categorical models" and "mobile classificatory labels" of the "normal" paradigms of the geography of his time. However, it would be the same dynamic that would also impel him—once he arrived in an appropriate schema for his learned antagonists there should have been no land—to see the non-Christian peoples of his newly found world as "indigenous," within the terms of the emergent state's equally juridico-theological categorical models. He therefore saw their lands and original sovereignty as legislatively expropriable (just as, gamine), and they themselves as even enslaveable, within the overall logic of the mode of "subjective understanding" that was now to be dominating the state, as that which he had challenged had been of the feudal order.

Both Columbus and his fellow-Spaniards therefore behaved toward the Taínos or Arawak peoples as ways prescribed by the term idearium; and therefore, as to a group who were serviceable for securing the well-being of the particularistic state of Christendom. At the same time, this term was represented as if it were the property of the human species itself, and was so believed to be within the logic of the geography of this feudal state, under the label "indigenous." In point of fact, the term idearium was appropriately outside the mode of subjective understanding of Judaeo-Christianity in its feudal variant as had been the term Zanj of medieval Arabic geography. Instead, basic classic cases of the deployment of mobile classificatory labels whose "true" depended on their oppositional meanings within their respective classificatory schemas. I propose here that such schemas are normally unchallengeable because they enable human orders both to enact the role allocations of their social structures (including the division of labor) and to legitimate them as do the state, at the same time as they induce the specific modes of generalized altruism on whose basis they are integrated as dynamic living systems of a unique level of existence—that is, as a hybridity his and his, organic and "language" level, the behaviors of whose subjects are regulated by the narratively instituted "programs" that are the conditions both of humanity, the mode of the non, and therefore of the cognitive phenomenology of defining the human, in other words, the mind.

Columbus would therefore "see" the New World peoples in the way his earlier learned antagonists had "seen" the "uninhabitable" torn zones and the submerged under-water Western Hemisphere. Specifically, he would see them within the triadic formal model of the Judaeo-Christian perception of non-Christians. That is, he would see them in one category of a human population divided up into Christians (who had heard and accepted the new word of the gospel, inflects like the Muslims and Jews, who, although monotheists, had rejected the Word after having been preached the Word (and who were therefore animist Chichis) enemies of Christ, and idleries, those pagan polytheists, peoples who had either ignored or had not yet been preached the Word. 18 Columbus therefore fitted the Taínos or Arawak peoples whom he confronted on October 12, 1492, into the third categorical model, and under the "mobile classificatory label" idearium.

Here, however, the religious classificatory schema would have interacted with the emerging juridical classificatory schemas of the modern state, enabling Columbus to add to category the peoples he encountered in terms of the patterns laid down in the "discover-and-gain" clause of his commissions. Those terms had come to be commonly used in the commissions handed out over several centuries by European sovereigns and other potentates (Washburn 1960). Because they were linked to the psychosocial motivation and commercial imperative that had also impelled his voyage, those terms would powerfully dictate his behaviors toward the newly encountered peoples.

The model for his "discover-and-gain" pattern had been laid down over several centuries by earlier contracts drawn up during Western Europe's mapping and occupying of the eastern Atlantic (that is, the Canary Islands, the Madeira Group, the Azorean (Fernández-Armesto 1987:4-5)). In this pattern, it had become customary for the sovereign of European states to hand out commissions to aspiring discoverers and gainers on the basis of specific contractual terms. In all cases, the reward to the license, in exchange for his deed of expanding the wealth and power of the kingly state, was that of a vice-regal administrative position in the governance of the emporium territory, as well as a percentage of the tax on trade goods and all other forms of tribute. Also, as would be the case for the nascently born in a social structure still motivated about the status-organizing principle of noble blood and birth, and therefore on the warrior deed mode of prowess or virtue that was the correlate of the priestly (see Busman 1987), the new possibility of statutorily commissioned deeds of discovering and gaining now offered the opportunity of a new type of reward—that of elevation to an acquired (rather than purely hereditary and acquisitive) noble status, and to the prestige of its aristocratic prerogatives.
This latter clause on which Columbus insisted was to be one of the two central motivations that drove his behaviour both before and after, as in Adam Smith's (1759) view that parents instil in us by impelling us to seek to realise status within the terms of the "economy of greatness" of our specific orders, thereby inducing us to display those collective behaviors needed by our respective orders, to secure their overall good.

In this context, Lyotard's concept of the duoally descriptive and behavior-prescriptive role of terms, if extended to Moreau-Fiais's concept of classificatory labels and "interrogated images," enables us to see how the specific "knowledge of categories" mode of cognition led Columbus to see the Tainos or Arawak peoples as idols, and therefore, in the still hybridly religious-juridical terms of the classificatory scheme of the emergent state, as well as in the new mercantile order based on these cognitions of his times, would enable him to see and to behave, overall, toward the peoples of these small stateless societies, only in terms of securing the good of himself, the state, and of Christendom.

In other words, Columbus would behave prescriptively within the limits of a master trope whose primary reference was that of securing the well-being of himself and his fellow Christians. At the same time, as the representative universality of his Christian apostolical mission, as well as of the new rule, yet still Judaeo-Christian concept of Man, also enabled him to perceive the well-being of himself and of his fellow Judaeo-Christian, tribal subjects, as if this well-being were isomorphic with that of mankind, including the Tainos/Arawaks (who would pay the price of extinction for this belief), in general.

Here Lieberman's concept of the evolution of our moral behavior can be linked also to the evolution of our models of interhumanistic behavior—to, in effect, the limits of our proper sex, and therefore of the sex for whose sake, and in whose name we act. Whereas the behavior of all organic species, including those altruistic or selfless behaviors essential to their respective modes of aggregation of conspecific society, are genetically regulated, our human actions are dually regulated, that is, both genetically and verbally. At least in our own, animal type, or genetically programmed mode of altruism and therefore, of conspicuousness, is activated, like that of all organic species, only in response to the imperative of helping the narrow circle of those whom we transmit similar copies of our genes to future generations.

However, at the second level, the level, in effect, of the symbolic representational system of our cultural programs, we behave in role-governed response to the more "generalized altruism" that are encoded and induced by these systems, and, therefore, in response to the moral-ethical criteria that they put into play. At this second level, therefore, the imperative to which we respond is that of helping those with whom we are linguistically co-identified, those with whom we are made symbolically conspicuous by our orders of discourse, and their systems of symbolic representation, both of which I shall further propose here, are generated from the templates of the origin narratives that are universally common, to all human cultures, including our contemporary own (Iowa 1985:300-43). Given

that, as I shall further propose, humans as a third level of hybridly organic and language life and therefore as a species, can be made conspicuous with others of the group to which we belong only through these founding narratives. In effect, we are co-identified only with those with whom our origin narratives and their systems of symbolic representation, or cultural programs, have socialized us to be symbolically conspicuous of, and therefore to display altruistic behaviors toward those who constitute the so us on whose behalf we collectively act.

The sociologist D. T. Campbell (1948) also gives a valuable insight into the roles of these founding origin narratives and their systems of representations in the "conditioning and inducing" of our culture-specific modes of "generalized altruism." He points out that humans, although they live in complex large-scale societies like those of the social insects, have not, as primates, been evolutionarily selected to be genetically aggregated on a large-scale basis. Nor are the role-alocating mechanisms specific to our human orders (which decide which groups go to the top of the social structure and which to the bottom), nor those inducing of cooperation, genetically, as they are in the case of organic species, preformed.

Instead, it is our primary and genetically determined mode of primate competitiveness and its correlated "animal-type" mode of instinctual and narrowly exclusivist modes of kinship, that must be overcome by the processes of conditioning effectuated by each order's culture-specific system of symbolic representation—as the mechanisms that can alone induce the artificial modes of effective altruism or empathy and, therefore, the symbolically induced modes of conspicuousness, as the so us in which our complex human orders can alone be based.

Consequently, as Campbell (1982; see also 1972:21-38) further argues, the role of our religious evolutions is to "condition" the subjects of their order, so as to inoculate them tendencies that are in direct opposition to the temptations representing the most part the directly "oppositional tendencies" produced by our instinctual animal-type mode of altruism. Such, indeed, is the role of all our modes of discourse and symbolic representation systems, religious and nonreligious, with the exception of the natural sciences that arose precisely on the basis of their rupture from this role.

Because the truths or modes of subjective understanding of each such order necessarily serve to induce both the mode of interhumanistic symbolic conspicuousness and of the so us on which each human order is based, and are a function, therefore, of the socialization of each order's subject, as well as of the regulation of their modes of perception and correlated behavior, all such "truths" once put into place, must necessarily be not only "impenetrable to philosophical attack" but impenetrable also to empirical counter-evidence. Given that each such mode of "subjective understanding" and of the "truth of solidarity" (Rorty 1982:5), the truth of what it is good for us to believe is itself only a proximate mechanism of what it is good for each forms of life and its mode of symbolic conspicuousness (or specification), and generalized altruism, to have its subjects behave as the condition of its own stable existence and replication as such a specific form of life, or, auto-
portic living system [Francisco Varela 1979]. This can occur even in those cases where they employ the term "subjective understanding" and the limits of the model of abstruse, or of the proper "put" that they impose, have become dangerous and dysfunctional for the individual subjects of their orders.

This was to be true not only of Columbus and the Spaniards, but of the peoples whom they conquered. In fact it is this historical fact, one conceived in the terms of a new cultural history proposed earlier, that can enable us to interpret the Janus-faced paradox of 1492 from a transcultural and therefore human point of view.

What becomes clear from Lipner’s thesis is that although for each human ethnocultural group our narrative inscribed and symbolically induced mode of abstrus used in the ‘proper put’ of the “we” we also normally experience a put such abstruse unknown, our genuine co-identification with those whom our founding origin narratives have defined as the oppositionally meaningful markers of otherwise to the “us.” As for Columbus, the mobile classificationist label idiosyncratic was to the "proper put" of Christendom. As such, the Aztecs-Caribbean peoples legislature for him a "setion of Christendom and the Spanish states’s manifestation—which, as it happened, was embodied in the conversion, or even as converts who could bear witness to the power of the state, to the truth of the faith, and to their respective "economics of gratitude."

Consequently, whatever Certeau calls the moral and philosophical foundations on which Spain would incorporate the indigenous peoples of the continent into its society would be executed only on the basis of the indigenous people’s duality physical and metaphysical group subordination—one in which their lives would be, from henceforth, a function of the realization of the "proper put" of the post-Columbus settlers.

But why were they so integrable? Once again, the issue here has to do with the liminal of a specific mode of symbolic connectivity, the limits therefore of a specific system of symbolic representation and mode of subjective understanding. From as early as the rise of Western Europe’s expansion into the eastern Atlantic and its conquests of the Native peoples of the Canary Islands, the royal secretary at the court of Spain, Hernán de Peçar, had noted that the indigenous peoples had fought with such tenacity and courage as well as military skill that they would have been formidable—of that are the foregroving rivalries between them (Fernández-Armesto 1987:1197-9). These rivalries had enabled the Spaniards to use one faction as their allies in order to defeat the others, one by one. As Richard Rodriguez (1992:47-50) recently points out, although Mexico’s fierce anti-Spanish nationalism led it to refuse to raise a public monument to Hernán Cortez, this nationalism also led us to erase from its historical memory any suggestion of the documented fact of the “complicity of the other Indian tribes in overthrowing the Aztec Empire.”

Yet, seen from a transcultural perspective, the symbolic representation system instilling of the tightly knit models of lineage-ethnic identity (models of identity grounded in their cosmogonic schema and origin narratives) that was at the root of these disastrous group rivalries. From here the paradox was that this system, which, within the terms of their own autotechnic cosmogonic schemas, had provided the building blocks of the economic flowering of the large empires such as those of the Aztecs and the Incas, had also set unbridgeable limits to the degrees of intercultural behaviors that would have enabled the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean and the Americas to unify against the invaders—that is, by positing the "good” or "proper put” of all the indigenous peoples (the "inulin" in the Spanish terminology), as the primary focus of their loyalty, rather than the “put” of their lineage-ethnic unit.

Here a parallel point must be made with respect to the third population group: the peoples of Africa and their equally inerrunal and traditional lineage-ethnic models of identity and modes of the "proper put.” If African ethnologists, like Mexican nationalists, have attempted to erase the fact that some of the peoples of Africa were active participants with the Europeans in effecting the slave trade and disenchancing slaves to the New World, their antagonists, Eurocentric historians, have twisted them with trying to erase all memory of the fact that, in their words, "Africans sold Africans."There were, of course, no "Africans" then. Indeed, it is only within the "mode of subjective understanding" of liberal humanism that "Africans" could have existed. Rather, here too, the traditional lineage-ethnic model of identity, and what the historian Joseph Miller (1976) calls the "particularistic worldview," or in our terms, mode of subjective understanding, to which this model gave rise, served to make it legitimate for one’s co-identified group to sell and enslave, normally, the members of those who were outside the affective limits of their "proper put.

Faced with this, how specifically pervasive was the idiom of lineage-identity that the first slaves sold to the Europeans were, as Miller (1976:71-72) points out, all taken from the specific social category that was defined as legitimately enslaved—that is, those who were termed, within the logic of the Congolese symbolic-representational system, lessthenmen—men and women. These were men and women who, because they had fallen out of the protection of their own lineages (in which metaphysically normal being was ever possible), had come to be represented—as had been the Zanj for medieval Islam, and as the category of the Naga and Naga who would come to be perceived by the Europeans within their cultic—specifically representational system as the only legitimate enslave category—outside the limits therefore of the real "us.”

Consequently, if the numerous peoples of the West African states and arcophilous societies were no more able to see and experience each other as conceptions and interrelational kin-related “African,” given the system of symbolic representa-
primary focus of their loyalty, and if, in addition, the indigenous peoples were no more able to see each other as complicit and interrelatedly called "Indians" within the logic of their equally lineage-centric system of representation and its related mode of subjective understanding, Columbus and the run of Spanish settlers were to be no more able, within the logic of their monocratic statal model of identity and its system of symbolic representation and mode of subjective understanding, to see and behave toward the indigenous peoples (even after the latter's conversion to Christianity) as subjects of the Spanish Crown and fellow Christians who shared equality in the greater or rather the state or of Christendom.

If at first the stereotyped image of "sudano" that had regulated Columbus's own behaviors toward the indigenous people had, in the beginning, been the obstacle to a more inclusive conception, it was soon to be replaced with a new "stereotyped image" based on the Aristotelian concept of natural slave. This concept was generated from a new and powerful symbolic construct that would come to take the place in the now-sculpturing Jesuitic-Chinese cultural system, that religion and the sanctification of the surpassing tradition of the hierarchical order, order of the frondal-Christain order, one that had been based on the principles of insite.

The new symbolic construct was that of "race". Its essentially Christian-hereditary passage of the similitude of human species was to provide the basis for new metaphysical notions of order. Those notions provided the foundations of the post-1492 polities of the Caribbean and the Americas, which, if in a new variant, continue to be legitimated by the nineteenth-century colonial systems of Western Europe, as well as the continuing hierarchies of our present global order. Such legitimation takes place within the mode of subjective understanding generated from a classification scheme and its categorical models, which, mapped onto the range of human hereditary variations and their cultures, would come to parallel those mapped onto the colonial zone and the Western Hemispheres before the voyages of the Portuguese, and thus of Columbus.

Historian Anthony Pagden (1981) explains why this symbolic construct would, in Cero's terms, be the "social and philosophical foundation" on whose "terms of exchange" the sociocultural construct of the post-1492 polities of the Caribbean were originally laid down. He points out that as the Spanish state began to naturalize the institutions of its new empire, it was no longer content to remain dependent on a system of legitimation based on terms that still conceded temporal power to the papacy. A natural slave of justice were therefore called from 1512 onward, comprising both royal jurists and theologians. These jurists would make use of Aristotle's Poetics in order to replace the theological mode of legitimation that had granted sovereignty to Spain on the condition that it carry out the work of evangelizing the peoples of the New World and of converting them to Christianity. In the place of the category of the inferiors, the justia adapted the category of natural slave from Aristotle, in order to represent the indigenous peoples as ones who were by nature diffent from the Spaniards. This difference was one expressed in degrees of natality, with the symbolic-cultural distance between the two groups being seen as an internally determined difference. This difference, they then argued, made it clear that the "Indios" had been as intended by natural law to be "natural slaves", as the Spaniards had been also intended to be natural masters. Once the right of Spanish sovereignty had been located in "the nature of the people being asservded" (Pagen 1982:19), a "knowledge-of-categories" system of discourse would set out to represent all the cultural differences that had been geopolitically and socioenvironmentally determined, as part of a "stereotyped image" of innate differences predetermined by Natural Law. This was the image put in play in Shakespeare's The Tempest (II, ii), where Miranda accuses Caliban of belonging to a "Vile race" who "good natures" could not "be able to be with." It is at this juncture that the tradietical mode of what has been called the racial caste hierarchy of Latin America based on the ideal of mestizaje (Rodriguez 1993:34) was first laid down.

Natural slaves are not like civil slaves, who can be bought and sold, but are legal free whatever the de facto brachial of the law. Although attached to the Spanish settlers as remunera servus, the Indies and Indies, unlike the negro and negroes, had a moral and philosophical claims on their natural masters, however temporarily. Even now, in the formulations of the theologian Vitoria that followed soon after, and that set out to interpret the natural slave formula within a more Christian framework, a reconfiguration took place. The Indies, Vitoria argued, while potentially as rational as the Spaniards, nevertheless could not enjoy the use of their reason only potentially, as in the case of children. As "nature's children" to the Spaniards' "nature's adults," the new system of symbolic representation ran, they were a people who, while free vasals of the Crown, had to be kept under the wardship or tutelage of the Spaniards, just as children were kept under that of their parents (Pagen 1982:104–4).

For this legitimation to be congruent, the indigenous peoples could therefore no longer be made into a totally disposable slave labor force. And since the land-labor ratio in which the conqueror was in such excess supply called for a totally disposable slave labor force, the transported slaves of African descent, who, in the new statically determined statistical model were defined as civil slaves and therefore as legal merchandise, would now function as the only legitimately enslavable group of the three.

The construct of a by nature/Natural Law difference was also used in the case of negro and negroes, if its tandem with a biblical system of representation. On the basis of their literal descent, they, too, were represented as illegitimate slaves. As the descendents of the biblical Ham and the inheriters of his curse, it was clear that they were also "disobedient by nature" and intended by Natural Law to be controlled by their slave masters, the Spaniards. This "stereotyped representation"—which detached them from their "moorings in reality" and allowed them to be perceived and treated as legislatively indelavable—not only constituted their actual enslavement, but also created the empirical conditions in which the moral and philosophical foundations of the post-1492 polities would be laid down.

The central point in this context, however, is that the tradietical mode between
free men and women, "nature's children," and civil slaves, was now legitimated on an essentially religious premise of the onomography of the human species. This premise was still encoded in the white/nobiwite, and the European/a-nomogenemic line, just as the premise of the onomographic earth and universe had been encoded in the habitable/unhabitable and void/unvoidal lines. Although the Portuguese and Columbus's voyages, as well as those of de Soto and Ponce de León, had initiated the destruction or those last, their empty signifying slots were to be reoccupied from thence by two variant population groups within the context of a nomogenemic image of the human, on whose basis Western Europe was to secularize all human existence in the terms of what Foucault called its "figure of Man."* 

* Jacob Poulant (1985:3) points out that this secularization was instigated, among other discourses, by that of anthropology. This discourse emerged in the sixteenth century as a constant of Western Europe's expansion into the Americas, as well as into areas of Africa and Asia, and served to reconstitute the original "True Self" of the Judeo-Christian model of being (for which all non-Christian were necessarily the Non-True Self) in its first, partly secular form. This form was that of the true Rational Self of "Man," who was now endowed in the subject of the expanding state, the episcopal region, within which represented Human Other were the nominally "savage" and irrational peoples of the Americas. Although the latter were represented as the Other to Man conceived of as the Rational Self, the "disobedient-by-nature" category of the civil slave (that is, the negro and the negro were represented as the Other to both; and they were pictured as ambiguous on the chain of being of the new notion of order based on degrees of rationality (in place of the earlier degrees of spirituality) between the status of the human, as the special creation of God, and that of the totally non-rational animal species. As with Columbus's behavior that were prescribed by the otherness of the Indians, so the behaviors of the Spanish settlers—who were represented in the new discourse as "savages"—as the human people to the less human of the indigenous peoples represented as a "native" and secondary mode of humanity—were designed both to maintain the displacement and subjugation of the indigenous peoples and to make the new racially organized "civil slave" category into a mere tool and instrument for the social realization of the proper use of all peoples of Spanish descent, whether peninsulares or creoles. It was within the structure of this social hierarchy that the racial caste hierarchy of Latin America would now emerge. In this hierarchy, the differing degrees of mixtures were designated as more human the more they bred in the European and bred out Indies and Natives, while the latter category came to serve as the new plus addr sign of rational human being, as the Cape Bojador or Pillars of Hercules that had marked the outermost levels of God's redemptive grace and only partial providence for mankind. The millenarian dreams of Columbus's "one sheepfold and one flock" had been based on the limits of a proper use that had non-codiscovery represented its own culture-specific Judeo-Christian and European state use, if it were the use of humanism in general. Others could therefore only be the lack of this, infedels or savages. As this True Self was secularized into the first secular model of being, "Man," these others were to be transformed into its lack, that is, into natives and, most absolutely in the nineteenth century, into the nomogenetic nature and its extreme form of Otherness, the siger. This term, which reduces the human to pure object, was to become central in the wake of the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century. As Jacob Poulant (1965) further points out, the True Self of the original Judeo-Christian model of being was (in the wake of the intellectual revolt of liberal humanism) reconstituted in terms of the new narrative of evolution (as well as, in our terms, of the new biocultural notion of order that was now mapped onto human hereditary variations in place of those of the physical universe of Christian-Feudal geography and astrology). In this shift, all people of African descent (as well as Africa itself, its culture, way of life, and so on) were now elaborated by the discourse of nine-teenth-century anthropology, as well as by a related complex of discourses, into the "stereotyped image" and ostensibly empirical referent of a represented non-evolved, and therefore, genetically inferior, human Other. These discourses were all to function according to the same rules of representation as those that Moses-Pasta has shown to be at work in the contemporary Western geographic accounts of the peoples and lands of black Africa, that were given by the geographers of medieval Islam (as see Madubike 1998). So rigorous are these rules—since they are, as Wittgenstein points out in another context, a function of our "forms of life"—that when Professor Ivan van Sestma challenges the tacit assumption that peoples of ancient Africa could not have made voyages to this continent before Columbus, even though other non-white groups are admitted, if still rarely, to have done so, what he will be up against, are rules of representation that are as much the condition of our present "forms of life" as were those that predetermined that the motor races and the Western Antipodes had to be uninhabitable as a function of the institutional of the feudal order. If, as Alain Chais (1946) has shown, the same rules of representation were also at work in the systemic signifying representations by means of which the "forms of life, history, and cultures of all colonized peoples, because represented as the Native Other to the figure of "Man" (now conceived of as the cognitive and optically evolved and selected mode of the True Self), Edward Said (1978) would later reveal the same rules of functioning to be at work in representations of the peoples of Islam as were at work in the representation of the native zone and the Western Hemisphere by feudal-Christian geographers before Columbus's voyage. Feminist scholars have revealed the same role-governed stereotyping to be at work, and in the same terms of opprobrium, in the representation of women as have, recently, gay liberationists with respect to the stigmatisation of homosexuality. Thus, the path toward that truly new exploration—one able, as Piriya, challenged, to effect a dimension of change that can parallel that of Columbus's move beyond the conventional reason of his time—now opens before us.
As the biologist Riedl and Kaplan (1984) point out, the cognitive mechanism specific to the human species, the mechanisms to which we give the term "mind," is only "the most recent step in a continuum of cognitive processes as old as life on this planet." Because these processes are therefore the "least tested and refined against the real world," it is only with the natural sciences that any true "victory" has been won in the ongoing "testing and refining" of the human-cogni-
tive capacity against the real world. This point enables us not only to put forward an ecumenically human interpretation of 1932—one that can place it as an event in the context of a "vaster notion of history" (Jameson 1991), one that should propose, that can be conceptually the notion of the human cognitive mechanism in the process of its "testing and refining of itself against the real world"—but also to grasp the contours of the new path, as well as the dimensions of the challenges confronting us.

Therefore, in our new world view of 1992, both Columbus and later Coperni-
cus's "root of expansions of thought" would, within the wider context of the political and cultural revolution of humanism, in time make possible that mutation at the level of human cognition that led to the rise of the natural sciences. This in turn led to the autonomy of such cognition (that is, outside its earlier role as an imperative function of verifying each order's mode of "subjective understanding") with respect to the earth and physical reality in general. However, if the wakening of this autonomy would gradually dispel the notions of a nontuttorogenic earth and universe, both of whose were ultralines (habitable/uninhabitable, colonial/terres-
trial) had served to encode the physico-spiritual notion of order on whose ontocen-
cal "categorical models" the feudal order had mapped both the role allocating mecha-
nisms of its order and the representations that served to stably induce the mode of intraterritorial symbolic specificity that integrated it, the new order of the secularizing modern state would map its own role-allocating mechanisms and uni-
fying code of symbolic specificity onto a new notion of order. This new notion was to be based on a by-now trifling difference between Europeans, on the one hand, and peoples of indigenous descent, on the other. That difference was represented as having ostensibly been ordained by God's intentions, as reflected in the Book of Nature, and specifically, in the ordered differential design of the or-
ganic species, and rational man was, as the effect of a separate divine creation, irredeemably divided.

Within the context of the intellectual revolution of liberal humanism in the nineteenth century, however, Darwin's On the Origin of Species would shatter the "knowledge-of-categories" accounts of the created origins of all organic species, including man, and utterly demolish the argument from divine design on which the earlier notions of order and social hierarchies of the preindustrial ordered orders had been based.

However, in the same way as in the aftermath of Columbus's arrival in the new world—where his perception of the indigenous peoples and cultures as "sabotodes" and "sabotones" had legitimated his epistemizations of their territories to the Span-
ish state, his endangerment of some of them, and relentless extraction of gold from all—the same paradox would emerge in the aftermath of Darwin's winning of that second "true victory." That paradox was that although as humans we would gradu-
ally come to secure our autonomy of cognition with respect to organic nature and thereby with respect to the biological basis of our enculturated humanness, both the pure biologization of such colonial forms of being together with the putting in place of a system of representation instituting a bioevolutionary notion of or-
der—one mapped on to the range of human hereditary variations, instead of, as earlier, on the physical and organic universe—logically led to the enact-リング of a new we the idea line that W. E. B. Du Bois was the first to identify and define as the color line (1903).7 Like its medieval counterpart that is the habitable/uninhabitable, colonial/territorial line mapped onto the physical universe and that had served to absolutize through the aesthetics of a nontuttorogenic earth and universe that it was inscribed, the feudal order's ostensibly immutable status-organizing principle of race based on the allegedly also divided nontuttorogenicity of ontological substance between the hereditary line of noble descent and those of the nonnobles (whose ethnic Other was the peasant), the color line has come to serve a parallel function for our contemporary world-sytemic order and its nation-state units. For as the line that was now mapped onto the empirically differentiated physig-
ermonic features of human hereditary variations, within the terms of our contempo-
rary mode of "subjective understanding" as generated from the origin narrative of evolution that had been made to reoccupy during the nineteenth century, the ear-
lier slot of Genesis (Exod 18, 1, 21), the color line had come to inscribe a preeminent, if in different terms, to that which had been encoded in the feudal Christian order, by the line of caste that had been mapped onto the physical universe as well as onto the geography of the earth. This premian is that of a bio-
evolutionarily determined difference of genetic value substance between our evolu-
tionarily selected human hereditary variation and therefore eugenic line of descent (the line of descent within given genetic Gases), and a series, to varying degrees, of its nonese-
lected and therefore dysgenic Others. This conception, as it is inscribed in the white/nonwhite global-sytemic hierarchies, is nevertheless anchored in its ex-
tense form, on the white (marginalized peoples of Indo-European descent) and the black (peoples of wholly or of partly African descent) opposition, with the latter hereditary variation or phenomenon coming to reoccupy the earlier signifying place of the earlier territorial and Western Hemispheres, within the logic of the contempo-
rary globalized and utterly secular variant of the Judaeo-Christian culture of the West. Where the earlier temperate/tropical, "Eastern/ Western Hemispheres oppo-
sition had served to normically absolutize the represented status-organizing prin-
ciple of race, that of the white/black opposition now serves to absolutize the "pre-
sent" genetic status-organizing principle to which we have given the name class.

In other words, by making conceptualizable the representation, in the earlier place of a line of noble hereditary descent, of a borderline selectively line of eugenic hereditary descent, the symbolic construct of "race" mapped onto the color line.
has served to react a new status criterion of eugenics on whose basis the global bourgeois legitimizes its ostensibly biovoluntarily selected dominance—as the alleged global bearers of a transnational and transrasal line of eugenic hereditary descent—over the global nonmedium (or "working") classes, with its extreme Other being that of the "jolliers" and "horrour" underclass, who have been supposedly discarded by reasons of their genetic deficietiy by the Mahlasian "iron laws of nature."

In consequence, where the color line prents ebiovoluntarily determined differential and degrees of genetic value between human hereditary variances—whether these defined as "race", "class", "ethnicity", "religion", "nation", "economic bloc", or "ways of life"—has since the nineteenth century served to enable the stable functioning of the status-organizing principle or criterion about which the "six" hierarchies of our contemporary world-systemic order, as well as those of its nation-state units, have organized themselves, the deep-seated belief in the genetic nonhomogeneity of the human species, and therefore in the immutability of "race" as well as in the innately predetermined value differential of "class" that it analogically founds, has come at a high cost. As the underside of the nineteenth and twentieth century's remarkable and dazzling achievements, this belief system has been responsible for not only for innumerable atrocities that were to climax in Auswitz, but also for a sociosystemically produced series of taging inequalities. Nowhere more pronounced than in the still-ascribed and largely impoverished situation of the descendants of the slaves/Hausan Others, whether indigenous or of African and Afro-mixed ex-slave descent, these inequalities are graphically expressed in the illogic of the present 20/80 ratio of the global distribution of the world's resources. This ratio, as the Base (1993) 1996, 1993 also presently seen, was and it is currently correlated with the color line as the problem of the twenty-first century. Just as the Jana-faced nature of 1942 cannot be understood outside the incomparable nature of the "true victorians" that we have been with respect to our autonomy of cognition as a species, so it is with the Jana-faced nature of our world of 1992. Because the mutation by which we have gradually come to secure the autonomy of the mode of cognition specific to our species in the wake of the voyage of 1492 has been only partial, and its true victory therefore remains incomplete, the completion of that first true victory is necessarily the only possible encomemoration of 1492. Such a completion would call therefore for another such conceptual move into a "real beyond beyond"—one able to take our present mode of reasoning itself, and its system of symbolic representation and mode of subjective understanding that orient the perceptual matrices that in turn orient our behaviors—as the object of a new mode of inquiry.

I propose that such a "move beyond reason" has already begun, even if still marginally so. It began in the context of a "general upheaval" whose dimensions were, and will be, a far-reaching as that of the intellectual evolution of Christian humanist and humanists out of which Columbus and Copegniach's challenge to the representation systems and cultural models of geography and autonomy was to be effected.

This parallel "general upheaval" of our time was the one that began during the 1950s and 1960s, born out of the conjunctural phenomena both of the anticolonial movements (the uprising of the intermediate category of the nonwhite colonial native) and their challenges to the structures of the global world order that had been put in place over the centuries in the wake of 1492. In this context, the black Civil Rights movements that followed on the Montgomery bus boycott and the collective refusal, by the extreme category of an ostensibly disselected Others, of its prescribed apartheid and categorial (that is, toed zone, Western Hemisphere) role and place, triggered a sequential series of such movements by other nonwhite groups, including, centrally, that of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. These later would now begin the process of co-identifying themselves, transhistorically, as, self-defined, Indians. It was to be their counterperspective on 1492, as a perspective arising out of, and developed in the new area of Native American studies, that would, for the first time, challenge the "sterotyped images" of the official account of the "Columbus-discovered-America" legend of 1492, a legend that represented as transculturally "true" (rather than as only culture-specifically so) has served, since the fourth century, as a central variant of the "evolutionary" origin narrative of "Progress" founding to our present technico-industrial order. Hence the paradox that their question "How could Columbus have discovered America, when we were here first?" has the same resonance for our times as Columbus arguing against his learned antagonists—that yet, indeed, God could have put land three in the Western Antipodes? In fact He had—had for his.

With their challenge to the "sterotyped images" of their ancestors and therefore of themselves as a "passivized" object waiting to be "discovered" by the only subjects of history, the American Indians have changed the monology of the fourth into the collectively dialogic of the fifth. Moreover, they have begun that collective deconstruction of the system of symbolic representations that are insti- tuting of our present "forms of life" and of its model of being "Man," whose extreme human Other is the black or "nigger" (Paradigm 1987). The origin of this deconstruction is to be found not in the neoliberal humanist piet of modernization of the 1950s, but in the pioneer of a new paper that began with the "general upheaval" of the 1960s. These, given that, it is the peoples of African and Afro-mixed descent who have paid the greatest price for keeping in being this system of symbolic representations and its model of being and behaving, made to serve as they have been, in the extreme term of the nineteenth-century sociological variant of the formalistic model of medieval Islam and feudal Christian geography; and analogically therefore, to the Zanj as the "sterotyped image" of an ostensibly autosic removermolded mode of the human, outside the realm of bioevolu- tionary genetic selection, its "Grace." As in the case of the feudal geography's representation of the toled zone/Western hemisphere, therefore, and in that of medieval Islamic geography's Zanj, so the rules of representation of the historical
If the function of that earlier represented nonhomogeneity was indeed to suggest that the culturally and institutionally determined status hierarchies of the feudal order—including its role-allocated division of labor, and, therefore, the status-organizing principle of caste about which these hierarchies had autopsychologized themselves—were based on an ontological difference of substance between clergy/monk; the present represented nonhomogeneity of the species functions to the same effect. In other words, the culturally mediated status hierarchies of our global order and its nation-state subunits, as well as their role allocation/division of labor, and their represented genetically determined status-organizing principle encoded in Du Bois’ "Color Line," is as, ostensibly, evolutionary and therefore eternally determined, as is the genetic/racial difference of degrees of genetic perfection (eugenics) between our present model of being (and therefore of behaving) and its antonymous human Other between the middle-class-model of being "Man" and its nigger Other. Consequently, if the torrid zone and the Western Hemisphere had served as the site plus sign and marker of the outside of God’s redemptive grace, the physiognomy, black skin, way of life, culture, historical past of peoples of Africa and Afro-mixed descent has to be represented consistently as the liminal boundary marker between the inside and the outside of the ostensibly genetically determined and evolutionarily selected mode of "normal being" encoded in our present model of being (Poussin’s) "Figure of Man." In this context, the stereotyped physiognomic, cultural, and historical image of the peoples of the black diaspora can be seen to play a central race-type role in a powerful rhetorical strategy. This role is designed to suggest that two nouns, man and human, in which the latter similarity of their "morpho-analytic and segmental-phonological structure" is apparent, also share the same meaning (Velasco 1990:47). Therefore, the culture-relative term Man—as the despsychologized inscription of the human being evoked out of the Judaeo-Christian origin narrative and its cosmographic schema that had given rise to two variant models (the first hybridly religio-sectual and specific to seventeenth-century Europe, the second now purely secular and global in its scope), and that is therefore a member of the class of all possible conceptions of the human—is represented as iconomorphic with the class itself, that is, with all of the class's myriad modes of being human genetic to our uniquely hybrid (fish and lagoon) species. This misconception then functions strategically to absolutize the behavioral norms encoded in our present culture-specific conception of being human, allowing it to be posited as if it were the universal of the human species, and entailing thereby that all actions taken for the sake of the well-being of its referent model continue as species whose function is the exact analogue of the function played in the feudal order by the represented nonhomogeneity of the earth and the cosmos.
sociolinguistic one, was called in question by Pope John Paul II, in his recent audience with the Amazonian Indians, when he spoke of the "violence of globelessness" in which land-hungry immigrants to the Amazon Basin have been trapped as were the Amazonian Indians themselves, in a "picture of pain."¹⁹

It was in the overall context of this systemic misrepresentation and its effects that the uprising of black America against its imposed empirical segregation and lack of voting rights, as well as against its torn zone/Women Hemisphere signifying liminal Others—would merge with the ongoing anticolonial movements around the globe; and, therefore, with the multiplicity of challenges by subject colonized peoples to their respective native (if not quite native) roles of signifying Others. In this emerging of movements, the slogans of the political and literary-aesthetic movements of black America—that is, "black power," and "black is beautiful"—would have had the same resonance for the categorical models and conventional social reason of our times as Columbus's cartographer's recognition during his visit to Elmina on the coast of West Africa, that the torn zone was not simultaneously but rather serially populated (poppulata) would have had for that of the orthodoxy "knowledge of categories" geography of his.²⁰ While it was to be precisely at the historical conjunction of the anticolonial and black Civil Rights movements that Franz Fanon, the black Francophone Caribbean psychiatrist and pro-Algerian political activist, because situated at the crossroads of both, was to be enabled to make a parallel anagogical thrust to those made by Columbus and Copernicus and, also, within the frame of a parallel "general upheaval"—that of the 1660s to 1720 of the earlier intellectual revolution of humanisms, and its then-empowering poets of the preuces era.

For where Columbus and Copernicus had been compelled to dispute the theocentric premise of Scholasticism's arbitrary model of divine creativity—the first as the condition of his voyage, the second as that of his new assumption—and to thereby propose a "new image of the earth and conception of the cosmos" (Oreagh 1997), Fanon would find himself as compelled to dispute liberal humanism's biocentric premise of the human as a natural organism and autonomous subject that arbitrariness regulates its own behaviors. And to do this as the condition of his newly projected image of the human. In consequence, where the biocentric premise of our present epistemology represents the individual human subject as a genetically defined (and therefore autistic) agent who, in accord with his "natural" feelings, rationally and therefore arbitrarily decides how to feel desire, prefer, choose, and therefore how to both know and act upon its social and physical reality, Fanon was to call this premise and its mode of "epistemological resignation" sharply into question. On the basis of his empirical experience as a practicing psychoanalyst, with both his "native" colonial and his black Caribbean patients, Fanon proposed instead—in his Black Skin, White Mask (1958) a radically new and rule-governed model of our human behaviors. Using as his psychoaffactive data the regularity of the reflexly antithetic behavioral responses of his patients, he sought to identify the transindividual and systemic organizing principle that lay behind both the reflex and antithetic nature of these behaviors.

Fanon noted the extent to which all native and colonized subjects had been conditioned to experience themselves as if they were, in fact, as essentially infernal as the hegemonic "learned discourse" of contemporary scholar ostensibly represented them as (otherwise as those of Columbia's times had as negatively represented the torn zone/aptitudes). In his interactions with his black patients, he also became aware that he was witnessing this anthropogenic reaction in its most extreme form. It would therefore be on the basis of the dependable regularities of his black patients' reflex aversion to the see play when any of their own physiognomic features that Fanon was to make a parallel "thrust to that made by Columbus and Copernicus on the basis of these three counterpoetics of the preuces era. Against the "epistemological resignation" of orthodox Freudian psychology, which sought explanations for his patients' behaviors in the ostensibly individually autonomous psyches (or if not purely autonomous, merely familial and/or situational ones), Fanon sought to relate the "alteration of affect" that led to these behaviors, to a specific society-situational organizing process that had, in turn, induced the "alteration of affect" itself.

Fried, and Fanon, had placed the emphasis on the individual. He had therefore broad the discipline of psychology on an ontogenetic perspective. But "inside every ergon there is a sivylia" (Fanon 1964:10-15). The problem of the black man and of the colonial native's self-aversive reactions was clearly not an individual problem. Rather, it was that of the processes of socialization by which alone these patients could have been inhabited as such reflexively self-aversive subjects. The organizing principle of which the behavioral aberration was a low-chance definable effect was therefore that of the mode of the subject, of which the empirical individual subject was, and is, normally (as the condition inherent of his or her accepting its role as such a mode of the subject) a heteronomously acting, thinking, and feeling expressions. This way to even the price of this was the "alteration of affect" played out by Fanon's patients in a function of realizing selfhood in the terms of our present ontological model of being, that of Foucault's "Man." This was also the price paid for the "alteration of affect" displayed by all nonblacks, for whom, too, the African physiognomy, culture, way of life, and traditional modes of rationality have come to signify, as they had been discursively instilled to do, the ontological limits and not plus ultra, of "barely human being. The central mechanism at work here, therefore, was and is that of representation. Its role in the processes of socialization, and therefore, in the regulation both at the individual and at the collective levels of the ensemble of behaviors—effective, aesthetic, and perceptual—salient. For it is by means of the attribution of representation alone that each human order and its culture-specific mode of empirical reality can be brought into being as such a "form of life" and third level of human, and therefore language-existence. What Fanon recognized was the central role played in our human behaviors by our always linguistically constituted criteria of being (that is, our human alone, represented work). For it is on the template of these masks/criteria and the governing codes of symbolic life and death (the only life that human live, as Peter Winch [1964] insists), which they express, that all individuals can be socialized as
the condition of their realization not only as culture-specific subjects, but also as ones able to experience themselves as symbolically composite with the other members of the "we" with whose they are narratively/linguistically bombarded as they are biologically programmed to be.

Descartes had, in the wake of the original poetry of the poetes nor by which the premise of the lawful dependency of the functioning of the processes of nature had been secured, redefined that poetry by keeping the premise of lawful dependency while suggesting that, because these lawfully dependent rules were not necessarily providential for human sake, then knowledge of the rules that govern these processes could enable us to alter them to more directly suit our purposes (Blaessnberg 1987: 206-10). Here the experience of Fanon with his collocated "naive" and black patients, and with his recognition that our present model of being Man was not necessarily providential for the sake of his black, nor indeed of his "native" patients, opens us onto a parallel proposal.

What Fanon had revealed was that, given the criticism of our present mode of being—one of generic perfection encoded in the middle-class ideal as epitomized in the Greek ideal type—Tunisian physiognomy (see Moses, 1992), according to which his black and nonwhite patients had been socialized to desire "being" and encoded as one that called for their reflexly self-aversive response to their own physiognomy as the condition of the condition (re-plication of this condition) that of Man, had been a rule-governed response. That is, it was one based on a misperception induced by the "stereotyped images" by which their physiognomic features (as the Zanj Other to the Indo-European physiognomic features) had been represented within the terms of the conceptual models that constitute the overall mode of subjective understanding that integrates our contemporary order. Since, like all other subjects of the order, their patients would also have been socialized to know, that is, to misperceive their own physiognomic features in the specific terms of the system of symbolic representations enacting our order of the subject as well as its mode of integralistic nation-state complicity; and thereby of our contemporary "way of life." So the notion of a "stereotyped images" of feudal-Christian geography had served to induce in the subjects of the order an aversion to voyaging into the negatively marked and antonomic regions of the earth, with the reality of these regions therefore having to be "detached from their moorings in reality" in order to serve the behavior-orienting function imposed upon them, the equally negatively marked physiognomic features had also to be detached from their "moorings in reality" for the same end: to induce their bearers, like all the other subjects of the order to be aversive to their own physiognomy as the nega-

tively marked conceptual Other boundary to our present bourgeois conception of "normal" human being.

Fanon's patients' "aberration of affect" would therefore also have to be linked to an "aberration of cognition," parallel to that of the "knowledge-of-categories" geography of feudal-Chinese Europe and of its theocentric model of arbitrary divine creation that the generalized poetry of the poeti apr of the intellectual

revolution of humanity had been compelled—as had Columbus at the level of the geography and Copernicus at the level of autonomy—to call into question: at the same time that they called in question the overall system of symbolic representations and mode of subjective understanding enacting the model of being of the feudal-Christian subject; and, therefore, of its governing code of spirit/flesh symbolic "life" and "death," or sociogenetic principles.

Like all such governing codes or models of being whose sociogenetic principles take the place, as its analogous, of the generic principle for organic species, and thereby serve as the determinant of our order-specific human behavior (once, that is, they have been inscribed by their founding narrative of origin and expressed in our social institutions), the interest of our present middle-class model of being Man in its own stable replication as such a model logically takes precedence, within the discursive logic of our present "form of life," or the interests both of the flesh-and-blood individual subject and of the human species as a whole, together with, increasingly, that of the interests of all other nonhuman forms of life on this planet. Yet, historically we have had little knowledge with respect to the function of these principles and of the rules that govern them. Thus, the task before us will be to bring into being a new poetics of the poeti apr. Such a new poetics would, in the wake of Fanon's formulations, have to engage both in a redif-
finition of the relation between amori individual men and women and in the socializing processes of the systems of symbolic representations generated from the codes that govern all human purposes and behavior—incorporating all of those present globally hegemonic culture, as at present institutionalized about in its model of being "Man."

Such a new poetics, if it is to be put forward as the poetics of a post-1960s poeti apr will have to take as its referent subject (in the place of our present referent of the bourgeois mode of the subject and its exception of the individual), that of the amori individual human subject. With such a shift, the criterion of it "for the sake of all" will now necessarily be (in the place of that of the global middle classes, whose well-being, because they optimally embody the criterion of our present mode of the subject has hitherto taken precedence over the well-being of the human, as well as over that of its planetary habitat itself) that of the flesh-and-blood human species; as a well-being measurable only by the well-being of each individual subject, and therefore of what Gandhi termed the "last man," the least, in our present order, of us all.

Such a poetics, as the expression of the universalistic conception of the poeti apr, will therefore, in the wake of Fanon, look for the explanation of our human behaviors not in the individual psyche of the ostensibly purely bio-ontogenetic subject, but rather in the process of socialization that institutes the individual as a human, and therefore, already sociogenetic subject. Fanon's call for a sociogeneticic of the "aberration of affect" displayed by his patients would therefore also enjoin that call for a diagnostic deciphering of the system of symbolic representations and their narratively instituted orders of discourse, by means of whose unity system
of meanings the processes of socialization are effected, and the subjects of each order, and thus "forms of life" brought into existence.

Such an approach based on the concept of a human history as the history of how we represent the life that we live to ourselves, as the condition of living in that modality, would take our origin narratives—including those that Miss Lansdau (1997) has recently analyzed as our own founding narrative of evolution, which now takes the place of Genesis—to be central to any inquiry into the processes by which our behaviors are as lawfully dependably regulated in the earth and the cosmos come to be for Columbus and Copernicus on the basis of their respective versions of the portents of the popular use, and in new, rule-governed model of divine creation.

Also, by being our new approach on the premise of an equally rule-governed model of human auto-institution as a trial and hybrid (that is, law/age) level of existence, we would be able to counterpropose, against the conventional iconic "epistemological resignations" of the postmodernism for whom, as in the case of Proust (1995) it is impossible for us to have knowledge of our social reality, the limited of our specific culture's self-understanding, that such knowledge and outside these limits, is possible. Given that, it is these narratively instituted cosmogonies whose "stereotyped images" and unitary systems of meanings, together with the signifying systems that they encode, functions to regulate in the culture-specific "good/evil" terms of each order's sociopolitical or governing code and, as the biologist Dautelli (1982) was the first to argue, the biochemical or opaque reward system of the brain. And if in doing so they thereby themselves regulate the genetically determined mechanisms that regulate the behaviors of all organic species (Goldberg 1982), show the taking of the "stereotyped images" of our present species of meaning (including that which Herklots 1947) was the first to identify as the "myth of the Negro past") as the point of departure for an inquiry into the narrative and rhetorical strategies by which the regulation of the biochemical mechanisms that are extrinsic and induce our culture-specific ensemble of behaviors is effected, should provide an opening onto the gaining of such knowledge outside the limits of our present culture's self-conception.

Dautelli proposed that the biochemical or opaque reward systems, by means of which, as Candide Peart would also propose later, the members of each organic species are induced to display the species-specific behaviors needed to ensure their own individual well-being or procreative success at the same time that they, together, ensure the survival and perpetuation of their species-specific genome, are, in the case of humans, everywhere regulated by discursively instituted systems of behavior-directing meanings, which, he proposes, should be called "opinions of the people discerners," after Marx (1968); see also Goldberg 1988. This is because, he argues, the process of social cohesion (Proust's imperative of solidarity) can be induced in humans only by means of the semantic-biochemical correlations that are performatively enacted (as in the case of "stereotyped images") by the "array of nodal metaphors" of our orders of discourse, both imaginative and the-

tercital. These correlations function therefore to induce the supracellular goals or purposes instituted the criteria of being that govern our behaviors today, just as they governed, in their differing modalities, both the behaviors of Columbus and the Spaniards and those of the Araucans (Tinibs) when they first confronted each other on that October day.

As a species, we are now to govern consciously, and therefore contemnuously, the narratively instituted purposes that now govern us, we must set out to open a path, as the only possible human commensuration of 1992, that can open us onto the securing of a new "true victory"—one as directed at the winning of the autonomy of our cognition with respect to the social reality of which we are always already subject-laborers, as that first party had made possible that of our cognitive autonomy with respect to physical reality; and after Darwin, with respect to organic reality.

The outline of what would be a possible approach to the effecting of a "second root expansion of thought" has perhaps been put forward best by Heneg Pagels. Pagels (1984) argues that the emergence of the new sciences of complexity will have as their most dramatic impact the narrowing of the gap that at present exists "between the natural and the human world." As their impact enables us to begin "to grasp the management of complexity, the rich structures of symbols, and perhaps consciousness itself," it is clear "not only that the traditional barriers—barriers erected on either—between the natural science and the humanities cannot forever be maintained", but also that such an ensue of their hitherto plus altae line will be the indispensable condition of completing, in my own term, the hur- rito incomplete "true victory" of 1949.

That is, a completion imperative to the closing of the dangerous gap that now exists between our increasing human auton- omy with respect to our knowledge of the physical and organic levels of reality, and our lack of any such autonomy with respect to knowledge of our specifically human level of reality, and, therefore, with respect to the rules that govern the individual and collective behaviors by which each such mode of reality is brought into existence and regulated, including our contemporary behaviors that are no less heteronomously, because equality culture-systemically ordered, than were those of Columbus and the "Idolators" whom he confronted on that world-fearful day October 1492.

With this erasure of the line between what Sterber/Moraves/Fassiat define as "knowledge of the world as it is" (scientific knowledge) and "knowledge of cate-
gories" (knowledge within the terms of each culture's self-conception, or the cul-
tural knowledge of our contemporary humanities and social sciences), a new image of humanity, will, as it did during the Italian Renaissance, "emerge in the future as science and art intersect in their complementary spaces". At the same time, on the basis of the new image, we shall be enabled to make the "narrative order" of our "culturally constructed worlds," together with their "order of human feelings and beliefs, subject to scientific description in a new way" (Pagels 1988).

It was on the basis of this new image of a homogeneous earth that was made
possible by his apocalyptic millenarian contestatory vision (against the orthodox theocentric view of an abstract model of divine creation) of a nature made for us, and we are to make good the void left in us by the "order of the earth." The scientific description in a new way. If not the order of our human behavior given the necessary consequences that were to follow, both in the immediate wake of Columbus's landfall in the Americas and until today, for the two population groups (the savages and colonists) who, as the first major groups to be drawn into the expansive system of the West, were to find themselves categorized as inhuman idles and so on and so forth, toward as beings outside the limits of that first proper view, and who were therefore to find themselves trapped by the partial and incomplete nature of the "true victory" (that of our increasing cognitive autonomy with respect to our knowledge of the physical and biological levels of reality through the mediums of the natural sciences, on the one hand, and through the lack of this "victory," with respect to any such autonomous knowledge of the rules governing our human behaviors, on the other), to which the terms of that first poetic of the proper vis had led.

This was the case until the general upheaval of the mid-1600s made possible a new opening—that of the collective change made to the symbolic representational systems and their "stereotyped images" by which we have hitherto unconsciously woven our insubstantial webs of the Self and their innumerable Others. For it was to be in the context of this generalized challenge that Franz Fanon would propose, against our present iconoclastic natural-institutional and thereby arbitrary model of human behavior, a new conversatory image of the human. It was one in which, because human subjects, is the expression of the developmental process of both ontology and sociology, cannot pretend, as they are imagined to do within our present order of knowledge, the symbolic representational modes of socialization specific to each culture's "form of life," and conceptions of being, their/our behaviors must therefore be a culture-systematically and lawfully dependably ordered (socius socius culture) as were and are those of a nature "made for life and the creation of souls" (souls souls nature).

"Nature could not have put things so out of proportion" and "the turns navigable," Columbus argued as he moved into a realm beyond the conventional mean of his time. "Besides ontology, there is sociology." Fanon proposed, as he too, moved, beyond that of ours.

Notes

1. For aspects of the ongoing debate cited here, see, among many others, Tono Marti-

2. The initial perspective has been put forth by, among others, the Association of American Indian Artists, Koppckt congressional (1990), and Hans Koenig (1976, 1990).

3. See the Fall/Winter 1995 special issue of Newsweek magazine. The issue was
titled and was carried at a higher level of consciousness and a higher level of sensibility and of the world. It was carried jointly by the editors of the magazine and the staff of the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of Natural History who were in charge of the Columbus centenary exhibition "Seeds of Change." See also the catalogue that accompanied the exhibition (Vine and Magdoff 1991).

4. These points were made by the Group of ten in the Monroe Declaration, formulated at the Monroe Symposium Approach to the Year 2000 and published in the New York Times, October 10, 1991.

5. See Wardrop (1978:8a) for a discussion of James Cameron's concept of "goblin trees" in the meaning of both human and "artificial" intelligent behaviors.

6. Note, also, that this conception served to absolutize the state-cognitive principle of Aztec imperial society. See León-Porceli (1990:10).

7. For the series of edited in which Columbus has the capacity to interpret the proposal, see Vinita (1994).

8. See Blumberg (1983), especially pp. 218-226, where he shows the process by which—through the discourse of Hobbes and others—the discourse of theological absolutism (which has been a function of the role of spiritual redemption and of the economy of salvation) had been transformed into that of the new discourse of political absolutism. This latter had been, I propose, a function of the role of spiritual redemption on which the presbyterian state had been based. Although he does not use these terms, Blumberg also shows how, through the Medieval concept of a law of population, the discourse of cosmic absolutism (and therefore of the role of spiritual redemption) had, in turn, displaced, replaced that of political absolutism with its own discourse and, therefore, the purely political ethical ethic with that of a purely romantic ethic. I have also developed this argument in more fully in Wintner (1983).

9. See Wintner (1984:13), which points out that Bartolomeo da Casta, in defending the rationality of the Aragones act of sacrifice, asserted by some 350 years, Columbus's point with equal to the functioning of our models of "subjective understanding." As he argues at the debate held in Villardisp with respect to the justice or not of the conqueror: "Clearly one cannot prove in a short time or in a few words to islands that is to sacrifice men to God is contrary to nature. Consequently another anthropologist our human sacri- fices continues just for making war against certain kingdoms. . . For the rest, to sacri- fice innocent for the salvation of the communals are not opposed to natural, is not something abhorrent and contrary to nature, but is an error that is in its origins in natural reason itself."

10. This point is made by Pauline Muir Wintner (1984) in a seminar on the reli- gious and apocalyptic millenarian insights of Columbus's enterprise of the Indies.

11. With respect to the imperative nature of their symbolic bonding processes for humans, see Wright (1988:197-98).

12. See also Adam Smith (1986). I use the concept of his, especially at a culture-specific European form of each human culture's behavior-orienting criterion of spiritual behav- ior. I have made this criterion, after Fanon, that of the "socio-ontological" principle, which is the analogical, at the human level of life, of the code of inclusive fitness that functions at the level of organic life as a behavior regulating principle based on the single criterion of