THE INVENTION OF AFRICA

Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge

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I

DISCOURSE OF POWER AND KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERNESS

Colonizing Structure and Marginality

"Lord have pity on us!... "The human race!"
Phyllis exclaimed, stressing the second word in her astonishment. "That's what it says here," Jins assured her. "Don't start off by interrupting me."

P. BOYER, Planet of the Apes.

The scramble for Africa, and the most active period of colonization, lasted less than a century. These events, which involved the greater part of the African continent, occurred between the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries. Although in African history the colonial experience represents but a brief moment from the perspective of today, this moment is still charged and controversial, since, to say the least, it signaled a new historical form and the possibility of radically new types of discourses on African traditions and cultures. One might think that this new historical form has meant, from its origins, the negation of two contradictory myths; namely, the "Hobbesian picture of a pre-European Africa, in which there was no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society, and which is worst of all, continued fear, and danger of violent death"; and "the Rousseauian picture of an African golden age of perfect liberty, equality and fraternity" (Hodgkin, 1957:174–75).

Although generalizations are of course dangerous, colonialism and colonization basically mean organization, arrangement. The two words derive from the Latin word colère, meaning to cultivate or to design. Indeed the historical colonial experience does not and obviously cannot reflect the peaceful connotations of these words. But it can be admitted that the colonists (those settling a region), as well as the colonialsists (those exploiting a territory by dominating a local majority) have all tended to organize and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs.
2. The Invention of Africa

I would suggest that in looking at this process, it is possible to use three main keys to account for the modulations and methods representative of colonial organizing and the processes of colonization. These three concepts are: the reification of the colonizer's mind, the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective, and the colonial social structure, which completely replaces the physical, human, and spiritual aspects of the colonizing experience (see, e.g., Christopher, 1984: 27-87). This structure clearly also indicates the projected metamorphoses envisioned, at great intellectual cost by ideological and theoretical texts, which from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the 1960s have proposed programs for "regenerating" the African space and its inhabitants. A. Cohen thinks that

the great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was brought about, but that Europe began to propagate at a time when it had fallen into the hands of the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry. (Cohen, 1972: 33)

He refers to the second part of the nineteenth century, emphasizing the coexistence of "imperialist" ideology, economic and political processes for extending control over African space, and capitalist institutions which ultimately led to dependence and underdevelopment (see also Mazrui, 1974). In a recent book, D. K. Fieldhouse comments that "only a dogmatist would attempt to state categorically that colonialism was either totally inconsistent with economic development in the dependencies or, alternatively, that it was the best possible solution to stimulating their growth. Colonialism was not sufficiently consistent over time to justify any such sweeping assertions, nor were its objectives sufficiently coherent to achieve any particular result" (1981: 103). Thus, colonialism has been some kind of historical accident, a "largely unplanned and, as it turned out, transient phase in the evolving relationship between more and less developed parts of the world" (1981: 49). This accident, on the whole, according to this view, was not the worst thing that could have happened to the black continent.

Essentially, the argument is not new. It has a history that goes back to the debate of the early decades of this century. In his book, Imperialism: A Study, J. A. Hobson linked the struggle for Africa to capitalism and capitalist search for higher profits from colonial conquests. For J. A. Schumpeter, in 1919, colonialism as well as its cause, imperialism, did not obey logic. It was "non-rational and irrational purely personal inclinations toward war and conquest" that guided "objectless tendencies toward forcible expansion, without definite, utilitarian limits" (Schumpeter, 1951: 83).

Against the Leninist theme of Imperialism, the High Stage of Capitalism (1919), he stated that "a purely capitalist world offers no fertile soil to imperialist impulses... capitalism is by nature anti-imperialist" (1931: 96).

And in a voluminous document full of statistics, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism (1916), Grove Clark demonstrated that colonialism was not only economically irrational but also ruinous for the colonial powers.

On the opposite side, at the risk of being labeled dogmatists, Marxist interpreters accept the essentials of Lenin's thesis. The conception of economic determinism of Marxists such as Samir Amin, Paul Baran, André Gunders-Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein is that if colonialism was inconsistent with economic development, it was at least, since its inception, quite consistent with its own economic interests and objectives.

Accordingly, colonialism should have produced a body of knowledge on the means of exploiting dependencies (Rodney, 1981). It should also have produced a kind of empirical technique for implementing structural distortions by posting four main political prepositions: first, priority given to the industrial revolution over the agricultural revolution; second, the simultaneous promotion of all branches of industry with a preferential approach to heavy industry; third, emphasis on territory and service activities; fourth, preference for exports to the detriment of the total economic system (Amin, 1973). The outcome of these policies was the process of underdevelopment initiated everywhere colonialism occurred. This process can be summed up in three points: First, the capitalist world system is such that parts of the system always develop at the expense of other parts, either by trade or by the transfer of surpluses. Second, the underdevelopment of dependencies is not only an absence of development, but also an organizational structure created under colonialism by bringing non-Western territory into the capitalist world. Third, despite their economic potential, dependencies lack the structural capacity for autonomy and sustained growth, since their economic fate is largely determined by the developed countries (Amin, 1974; Gunders-Frank, 1979, 1980; Wallerstein, 1979). From this last contention, some theorists have quickly hypothesized that if Japan has escaped the predicament of underdevelopment, it is because it is the only non-Western country to have escaped colonialism (Rico, 1974: 315, 60).

It seems impossible to make any statement about colonialism without being a dogmatist, particularly where economic organization and growth are concerned. Different as they are in form and intention, the Marxist and peripheral theories have nevertheless the same focus: overseas territory, totally reorganized and submitted to a Western model (Mumessen, 1981). The first theory considers colonial imperialism as a calculated and inevitable culmination of capitalism. If the latter discounts the planned aspect of colonialism, it still assumes the phenomenon to be a consequence of European industrialization and development, somehow bound to expand overseas. Whatever theory one accepts, the application remains the same, leading
The Invention of Africa

inevitably to what I have called the colonizing structure responsible for producing marginal societies, cultures, and human beings (Emmanuel, 1969; Bairoch, 1971). Therefore, let me make the dichotomy that this structure creates and which is a sign of what I, Sach, calls "eurocentrism." It is a model which dominates our thought and given its projection on the world scale by the expansion of capitalism and the colonial phenomenon, it marks contemporary culture imposing itself as a strictly conditioning model for some and forced deculturation for others. (Sachs, 1983:22; quoted by Bigo, 1974:33, n.5)

Because of the colonializing structure, a dichotomizing system has emerged, and with it a great number of current paradigmatic oppositions: traditional versus modern; oral versus written and printed; agrarian and customary communities versus urban and industrialized civilization; subsistence economies versus highly productive economies. In Africa a great deal of attention is generally given to the evolution implied and promised by the passage from the former paradigms to the latter (Mudimbe, 1986). This presupposed jump from one extremity (underdevelopment) to the other (development) is in fact misleading. By emphasizing the formulation of techniques of economic change, the model tends to neglect a structural mode inherited from colonialism. Between the two extremes there is an intermediate, a diffused space in which social and economic exist define the extent of marginality (Bigo, 1974:20; Show, 1985:33-36). At the economic level, for example, if the relatively low productivity of traditional processes of production (formerly adapted to the then-existing markets and range of trade and exchanges) has been disrupted by a new division of labor which depends upon international markets, then transformation has meant a progressive destruction of traditional realms of agriculture and crafts (Meillassoux, 1975:115). As a second example, one could regard the social disintegration of African societies and the growing urban proletariat as results of a destabilization of customary organizations by an incoherent establishment of new social arrangements and institutions (Turnbull, 1964; Memmi, 1966; Mair, 1975). Finally, if it is the cultural and religious levels, through schools, churches, press, and audio-visual media the colonizing enterprise diffused new attitudes which were contradictory and richly complex models in terms of culture, spiritual values, and their transmission, it also broke the culturally unified and religiously integrated schema of most African traditions (Bimekwe, 1984a). From that moment on the forms and formations of the colonial culture and its aims were somehow the means of trivializing the whole traditional mode of life and its spiritual framework.

Power and Otherness

Marginality designates the intermediate space between the so-called African tradition and the projected modernity of colonialism. It is apparently an urbanized space in which, as S. Amin noted, "skeins of the past, especially the survival of structures that are still living realities (tribal ties, for example), often continue to hide the new structures (ties based on class, or on groups defined by their position in the capitalist system)" (1973:1377). This space reveals not so much that new imperatives could achieve a jump into modernity, as the fact that despair gives this intermediate space its precarious pertinence and, simultaneously, its dangerous importance. As P. Bigo put it recently:

The young nations tightly grasping their original world swallowed up in the whirlpools of international society and disappear forever, somewhat like animal species we try with difficulty and often in vain to protect against the invasion of technical man. (Bigo, 1974:43)

There is no doubt that direct or indirect colonialism always provokes in the countries that experience it cultural constraints, a contamination the more profound as it is hidden. Lifestyles and modes of thinking of the dominant nations tend to impose themselves on the dominated nations. Moreover, they are accepted, even sought after. Models spring up, eliminating heroes for the people who adopt them. (Bigo, 1974:44)

At any rate, this intermediary space could be viewed as the major signifier of underdevelopment. It reveals the strong tension between a modernity that often is an illusion of development, and a tradition that sometimes reflects a poor image of a mythical past. It also reveals the empirical evidence of this tension by showing concrete examples of developmental failures such as demographic imbalance, extraordinarily high birth rates, progressive disintegration of the clanistic family structure, illiteracy, severe social and economic disparities, dictatorial regimes functioning under the catholic name of democracy, the breakdown of religious traditions, the constitution of syncretic churches, etc. (Bairoch, 1971; Bigo, 1974).

In general, troubled by such confusion, social scientists prefer to plead for a reassessment of programs of modernization. No doubt many theories are still to be proposed and plans to be made. Yet one may already understand that this marginal space has been a great problem since the beginning of the colonizing experience; rather than being a step in the imagined "evolutionary process," it has been the locus of paralyses that called into question the modalities and implications of modernization in Africa.

Discursive Formations and Otherness

It is certain that the learned Antille, without being a missaxophone, was not interested at all
The invention of Africa in human beings. He would often declare that he did not expect much from them anymore...

P. Boccali, Planet of the Apes.

The colonializing structure, even in its most extreme manifestations—such as the crisis of South Africa (see, e.g., Sedman, 1981)—might not be the only explanation for Africa’s present-day marginality. Perhaps this marginality could, more essentially, be understood from the perspective of wider hypotheses about the classifications of beings and societies. It would be too easy to state that this condition, at least theoretically, has been a consequence of anthropological discourses. Since Turgot [who in the 1750s first classified languages and cultures according to “whether the peoples [are] hunters, shepherds, or fishermen” (1973:1139, 11372) and ultimately defined an ascending path from savagery to commercial societies], non-Western marginality has been a sign both of a possible absolute beginning and of a primitive foundation of conventional history. Rather than tracing an already too well-known evolutionary hallucination (Duchet, 1971; Hodgen, 1971), let us take a different angle by examining both the issues derived from a fifteenth-century painting and the allocation of an “African object” to nineteenth-century anthropology.

Commenting upon Las Meninas of Velázquez, M. Foucault writes: “The painter is standing a little back from his canvas. He is glancing at his model; perhaps he is considering whether to add some finishing touch, though it is also possible that the first stroke has not yet been made...” (1975:35). The painter is at one side of the canvas working or meditating on how to depict his models. Once the painting is finished, it becomes both a given and a reflection of what made it possible. Foucault thinks that the order of Las Meninas seems to be an example of a “representation” (which) undertakes to represent itself... in all its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being.” Yet in the amazing complexity of this painting there is remarkable absence: “the person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance” [Foucault, 1975:160].

Now let us consider Hans Burckhart’s painting Ecstatic Tribe. Is the painter sitting back contemplating his exotic models? How many? It is not even certain that a model is present in the room where Burckhart is thinking aloud about ways of subsuming particular categories of human beings. The year is 1508. Dürer is still alive. Burckhart is by then a respected master of the new school of Augsburg he has founded. He would like to please the Buggers and Welsers and has agreed to illustrate Erasmus’s Novum Instrumentum. He has travelled overseas (Kunst, 1967). He has carefully read Springer’s diary, has probably studied some clumsy pencil or pen-and-ink sketches, and has decided to draw six pictures of “primitives.”

The first picture of the series seems to represent a family. Let us imagine the painter at work. He has just read Springer’s description of his voyage, and, possibly on the basis of some sketches, he is trying to create an image of blacks in “Greece.” Perhaps he has decided to use a model, presumably white but strongly built. The painter is staring at the pale body, imagining schemes to transform it into a black entity. The model has become a mirror through which the painter evaluates how the norms of simultaneity and his own creativity would impart both a human identity and a racial difference to his canvas. Perhaps the artist is already at work. Yet he has to stop regularly, walk around the model, leave the luminous space before the windows, and retire into a discreet corner. His gaze addresses a point which is a question: how to superimpose the African characteristics described in Springer’s narrative onto the norms of the Italian contrapposto? If he succeeds, the painting should be, in its originality, a celebration and a reminder of the natural link connecting human beings and, at the same time, an indication of racial or cultural differences. It should bear witness to the truth of similitudes, analogies, and possibly even the violence of antipathy. At any rate, Kunst notes that

The nude African depicted from behind conforms to the classical rule of contrapposto expressed in the compensatory balance of symmetrical parts of the body in movement: one shoulder leaning on one leg and the other, raised above the free leg. One guesses that this nude male was copied from a classic model to which the arm awe characteristics, jewelry and woods, of an exotic people still strongly attached to nature (Kunst, 1967:9-10).

It is easy to dismiss my concern about simultaneity in this particular creative process. Am I not projecting a twentieth-century perspective onto the pictorial techniques of the early sixteenth century? The structure of figures is there in the first small painting, treated in a typical way. The fact about simultaneity might just be, after all, only a contemporary hypothesis about the process of establishing links between beings and things from our present viewpoint. Yet it is possible to look for issues stemming from Burckhart’s representation. In effect, we can describe his artistic filiation and his dependence upon the classic ideals of the Renaissance (Kunst, 1967:20). We can also compare the principles of his technique with those apparent in some contemporary works directly or indirectly dealing with black figures, such as Erasmus Grasser’s Moor Dancers (1480), Hieronymus Bosch’s Garden of Delights (1503-1505), Kaifeen the Moor Woman (1532) by Albrecht Dürer, and at the very end of the century, Cornelisz van Haarlem’s Batasha (1594). Speculating about or analyzing the contrasts between white and black figures in these paintings, one could certainly search for a vision which refers to historically conventional explanations—for example, the sense of the characteristics and “the idea of design, that is to say, of expression by means of the pure disposition of contours and masses, and by the perfection and ordering of linear rhythm” [Bry, 1940:165]. The complex play of colors in harmony and opposition, the order of shades between the white and the black, are
The Invention of Africa

obviously based on such intellectual and conscious references. But does not
our understanding of the colorful economies of canvases refer, in a very
insistent manner, to invisible traces?
The contrasts between black and white tell a story which probably dupli-
cates a silent but powerful epistemological configuration. Ex hypothesis it
might simply be a 'simile interspersed with analogies, and sympa-
tathy' tell us how the world must unfold upon itself, duplicate itself, reflect
itself, or form a chain with itself so that things can resemble one
another. They tell us why the paths of similitude are and the directions they
take; but not where it is, or one sees it, or by what mark it may be
recognized' (Foucault, 1971:33-34).

Let us return to Bourdieu's finished painting. The three black figures—a
boy, a man, a seated woman with a baby pressed to her breast—have the right
proportions to one another and to the wider context. All are naked and have
either bracelets around their arms or a string around their necks, clear signs
that they belong to a 'savage' universe (Kunst, 1967:20). The little boy is
dancing, his oversized head turned toward the sky. At the center of the
carroll, the man, presented in clear, strong lines, is staring at a faraway
horizon, brandishing an arrow with his left hand and holding two other
arrows in his right hand. He incursates power, not only because he occupies
the central place in the painting, but also because he is the most well-defined
signifier in this scene. He is the locus of the relationship between the
boy at his left and the woman at his right, depicted with both a touch of
hieratic sense and a slightly instinctive force. At the right, the woman with
the baby is seated on a trunk. She seems to be staring pensively at the pelvic
area of the man. The curves of her body are canonically executed.

The whole picture, in its simplicity and in the balanced rhythms of its
lines, seems to be an elegant and decorative painting. Yet what really
expresses is a discursive order. The structure of the figures, as well as the
meaning of the nude bodies, proclaim the statures of resemblances: in order
to designate Springer's blacks, the painter has represented blackened whites.
This was not rare during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, as a
great number of the drawings of the period reveal. That is the case for
example, of the fifth picture in Raphaël Piperno's 1591 edition of his Rela-
tione del Nuovo del Mondo, representing three 'Italianized African
women, and that of the African king in the frontispiece of J. Ogilby's 1670 book on
Africa. What is characteristic of Bourdieu's painting, as well as in similar
drawings, is their double representation.
The first, whose objective is to assimilate exotic bodies into sixteenth-
century Italian painting methodology, reduces and neutralizes all differences
into the sameness signified by the white norm, which, let us keep in mind, is
more religious history than a simple cultural tradition. In concrete language
this reference meant a 'biblical solution to the problem of cultural differ-
ences [which] was regarded by most men as the best that reason and faith
could propose' (Hodgen, 1971:1254); that is, the same origin for all human
beings, followed by geographical diffusion and racial and cultural diver-
sification. And it was believed that the Bible stipulated that the African could
could only be the slave of his brethren.

There is another level, a more discreet one. It establishes a second represen-
tation that unites through similitude and eventually articulates distinctions
and separations, thus classifying types of identities. Briefly, I can say that in
Bourdieu's painting there are five representational activities: on the one
hand, signs of an epistemological order which, silently but imperatively,
indicate the processes of integrating and differentiating figures within the
normative sameness; on the other hand, the excellence of an exotic picture
that creates a cultural distance, thanks to an accumulation of accidental
differences, namely, nakedness, blackness, coarse hair, bracelets, and string-
of pearls.

In their arrangements, these differences are pertinent signs. Because of the
fundamental order which they reveal, and to which they bear witness, the
virtues of resemblance erase physical and cultural variations, while maintain-
ning and posing surface differences as meaningful of human complexity.
Dessi Velasquez's Juez de París (1668) still actualizes this integrating
reference, whereas major paintings such as Peter Paul Rubens's Study of Four
Black's Heads (1620), Rembrandt's Two Negroes (1657), and Fearnete
Riagad's Young Black (1669) explicitly express and relate to another order.
A new epistemological foundation was then functioning in the West: Theories
of diversification of beings, as well as classificatory tables, explain the origins
The framework of Linnaeus's Systema Naturae (1735) is just one in the
paradigmatic classifications of species and varieties of Homo sapiens (u-
ropeans, asiaticus, americanus, afer) distinguished according to physical
and temperamental characteristics (Cout, 1950:15). It would be too easy to
link it, upstream, to discursive formations about the great chain of beings
and its hierarchy, and, downstream, first to Blumenbach's craniology and,
second, to the general anti-African bias of the philosophical and scientific
literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lyons, 1971:514-85).
Two very different discursive formations—the discovery of African art
and the constitution of the object of African Studies, that is, the "invention" of
Africanism as a scientific discipline—can illustrate the differentiating effi-
ciency of such general classifying devices as pattern of reality, designation,
arrangement, structure, and character. I have already suggested that re-
semblance has been pushed out of Rubens, Rembrandt's and, Riagad's
perceptions of blacks. What is there, given in detailed description, might be
considered as a naming and an analysis of an alterity and refers to a new
epistemological ordering: a theory of understanding and looking at signs in
terms of "the arrangement of identities and differences into ordered tables" (Foucault, 1971:335).

Portuguese sailors brought to Europe the first fetiços, African objects
supposedly having mysterious powers, in the late fifteenth century. One finds
them mostly in well-organized oven cabinets, along with Italian tomahawks or arrows, Egyptian artifacts, and Siamese dancing. Some interpreters do consider them to be signs of a state of barbarism (Hodgson, 1971:164-165). Yet one can firmly state that more frequently they are seen as simple curiosities bought back in accordance with the tenth rule of the traveler observer in the table of Vasari's "Geographia generalis" (1650). One considers "famous Men, Artificers, and Inventions of the Natives of all countries" (Hodgson, 1971:62-68). On the whole, these objects are culturally neutral. Because of their shapes and styles, sometimes a bit terrifying, they account for the mysterious diversity of the Same (Bal, 1965:67). It is not until the eighteenth century that, as strange and "ugly" artifacts, they really enter into the frame of African art.

The black continent was still on the maps a terra incognita, but its peoples and their material productions were more familiar to travelers, students of the human species, merchants, and European states. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, there had been a tremendous increase in the slave trade and a profitable trans-Atlantic economy which involved most of the Western countries. In West Africa, Dahomey was a powerful commercial partner of European traders. The Ashanti empire expanded, dominating the Akans and the Oyo kingdom further to the east and increasing its power as it went. Freed slaves and impoverished Africans were sold by European-sponsored organizations in present-day Sierra Leone. On the east coast, in 1729, Africans expelled the Portuguese from their fortresses in the northern region of Mozambique; and down south, in 1770, there was the first war between Dutch immigrants and Bantu. Two years later, James Bruce, traveling from North to Central Africa, reached the source of the White Nile in the year that Chief Justice Mansfield declared in England that slavery was against the law (Verger, 1968).

In this atmosphere of intense and violent exchanges, fetiches became symbols of African art. They were viewed as primitive, simple, childish, and nonsensical, Mary H. Kingsley, at the beginning of this century, summed it up with an archaic evaluation: "The African has never made an even fourteenth-rate piece of cloth or pottery" (Kingsley, 1965:664). It seems to me that "a process of aestheticization" (Braudel, 1972) took place from the eighteenth century onward. What is called savage or primitive art covers a wide range of objects introduced by the contact between African and European during the intensified slave trade into the classifying frame of the eighteenth century. These objects, which perhaps are not art at all in their "native context," become art by being given simultaneously an aesthetic character and a potentiality for producing and reproducing other artistic forms. Taken in their initial function and significance, might they have created a radical mise en perspective of the Western culture wedded to classifications (Braudel, 1972)? That is precisely an impossible Arts. Are based on criteria, and it is difficult to imagine that these standards can emerge from outside the "power-knowledge" field of a given culture, a field

which, at a historical period, establishes its artistic bible. Therefore it is obvious that fetishes and other "primitive" pieces of art are wonderful because their structure, character, and arrangement demand a designation (Laude, 1979; Wasing, 1969). They are "savage" in terms of the evolutionary chain of being and culture, which establishes a correspondence between advancement in the civilizing process and artistic creativity, as well as intellectual achievements.

At this point, paradoxically, it is a celebration of the African craftsman- ship which confirms my analysis. Admiring the beauty of a "Nago sculpture," the late R. Fry was puzzled:

It is curious that a people who produced such great artists did not produce also a culture in our sense of the word. This shows that two factors are necessary to produce the cultures which distinguish civilized peoples. There must be, of course, the creative artist, but there must also be the power of conscious appreciation and comparison. (Fry, 1945:90-91)

Fry is, I am afraid, utterly wrong. The two factors do not and cannot explain types of cultures. They only constitute a basis for the production of art and its possible modifications over time (see Laude, 1979; Delange, 1967). They cannot completely account for the internal patterns of cultures. At any rate, it is the "power-knowledge" of an epistemological field which makes possible a dominating or humbled culture. From this perspective, the point that Fry makes immediately after has great sense: "It is likely enough that the Negro artist, although capable of... profound imaginative understanding of form, would accept our cheapest illusionist art with humble enthusiasm" (1945:91).

My thesis is confirmed, almost ad absurdum, by R. Jules-Rosette's study of contemporary African tourist art. She defines this art as an "art produced locally for consumption by outsiders" (1984:49) and strongly insists on the paradoxical interaction between its origin and its destination, that is, its production and its consumption.

Although the concept of the tourist art system emphasizes how artisans and these audiences perceive images and convert them into economic commodities, it does not neglect the expressive components of the interaction. Within the system, both images and visual objects constitute sources of exchange between producers and consumers. Although "works have a definite impression of the tourist audience, consumers often have little direct contact with the artists." (Jules-Rosette, 1984:10)

This concept of tourist art implies, in principle, a critique of the classical understanding of art. It also explicitly means a relativization of what the author calls "assumptions about the manner and quality of tourist art productions", namely, its mass production character, the relative inexperience of present-day craftspeople, the collectivization in the artistic production, and the dominance of consumer demand over artistic creativity.
A limpid argument upholds the thesis of the study. Tourist art is both a symbolic and an economic exchange. This can be understood, according to Jules-Rosette, by reference to three models: the traditional African arts that have ceremonial and social significance may and do become objects produced primarily for external trade. Second, there are, in the very being of tourist art, signs of a major tension existing between "folk culture" and " haute culture." Or, as Jules-Rosette puts it: "Folk culture is implicitly contracted with something else— haute culture . . . There is an inherent tension and anxiety of high culture and the profit motives and new reproductive technologies that sustain the growth of the market of popular cultures" (1984:135). As to the horizons of this articulate production, Jules-Rosette insists on the facts of Western reading of African creativity and its propositions for innovations in African workshops.

The international tourist art market depends upon the Western demand for "cultural" souvenirs and girt items and the assumption that they should be procured abroad. The artists and craftspeople utilize this demand as a stim ulus for creating new ideas and technologies to meet the needs of the expand ing market. (Jules-Rosette, 1984:191)

African tourist art and its contradictions is (it is an art? in which sense and according to what kind of aesthetic grid?) are just an ad libitum consequence of the process which, during the slave trade period, classified African artifacts according to the grid of Western thought and imagination, in which absence is a negative category of the Same. It is significant that a great number of European representations of Africans, or more generally of the continent, demonstrated this ordering of otherness. For example, Andreas Schlüter's painting, Africa (1750), is structured upon a complex relation between a nude black woman and a frightening lion standing protectively behind her voluptuous body. The African Allegory (1750) of Jean-Baptiste Terrade, Icaria (1748); Carl Sagan, professor of cosmology at Cornell University, assumed the task of checking the validity of Dogon cosmology. Sagan begins by noting his surprise: "In contrast to almost all prescientific societies, the Dogon hold that the planets as well as the earth rotate about their axes and revolve about the Sun . . ." (Sagan, 1983:81). Strangely enough, rather than using Gribeau and his disciples' documentation, Sagan exploits a certain Temple, who summarized Gribeau's discoveries as: "The Dogonco further. They hold that Jupier has four satellites Delacruz's Algerian Women (1814), and a multitude of other paintings can be read for their implications: traces of something else whisper, slips of color reveal the meanings, and trends of a secret state indicate the magnitude of a new order. These representations are contemporary with the Enlightenment discussions on such aesthetic propositions as "men are born unequal" and such questions as "the place of the savage in the chain of being" (Duclot, 1971; Hodgen, 1971). In the following years, the sagan of exploration begin with J. Power and Otherness

Brace's expedition into Ethiopia in 1770 and Mungo Park's journey to the river Niger in 1795. The novel text which emerges from these expeditions is not fundamentally original (see, e.g., Hammond and Jablow, 1977). It reveals characteristics already well circumscribed and established. The distinction between "savage Negro" and "civil Mohometan," and the commentators on the Africans' indulgence, their unbridled passions, and their cruelty or mental retardation were already there. They formed part of the series of oppositions and of the levels of classification of humans demanded by the logic of the chain of being and the images of progress and social development. Europeans just brought new proofs which could explicate "African inferiority." Since Africans could produce nothing of value, the technique of Yoruba statuary must have come from Egyptians; Benin art must be a Portuguese creation; the architectural achievement of Zimbabwe was due to Arab technicians; and Hausa and Buganda statuary were inventions of white invaders (Davidson, 1959; Lugard, 1902; Randall-Maciver, 1956; Sanders, 1969; Mallows, 1984).

This tendency appears in other fields as well. Two French botanists, A. Chevalier in 1832 and R. Portier in 1840, suggested that the African continent could have been a very early locus of plant domestication (see, e.g., Portier, 1970 and 1962). On the basis of linguistic data, the anthropologist G. P. Murdock expounded a similar proposition and postulated a "Sudanic complex of crops" (Murdock, 1959). These hypotheses were dismissed, and today "by far the most popular view of the origins of cereal-crop agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa is that it was the product of human migration or some form of culture diffusion or stimuli deriving from south-west Asia" (Desmond Clark and Brandt, 1984:111; see also Reed, 1977).

Here is a last illustration. The work of M. Grippe and his disciples in Dogon country has demonstrated the complexity of Dogon astronomical knowledge and its symbolism (e.g., Grippe, 1948; 1952; Grippe and Die terlen, 1965; 1976; Distler, 1941; Heusche, 1983). Carl Sagan, professor of astronomy at Cornell University, assumed the task of checking the validity of Dogon cosmology. Sagan begins by noting his surprise: "In contrast to almost all pre-scientific societies, the Dogon hold that the planets as well as the earth rotate about their axes and revolve about the Sun . . ." (Sagan, 1983:81). Strangely enough, rather than using Grippe and his disciples' documentation, Sagan exploits a certain Temple, who summarized Grippe's discoveries as: "The Dogonco further. They hold that Jupier has four satellites Delacruz's Algerian Women (1814), and a multitude of other paintings can be read for their implications: traces of something else whisper, slips of color reveal the meanings, and trends of a secret state indicate the magnitude of a new order. These representations are contemporary with the Enlightenment discussions on such aesthetic propositions as "men are born unequal" and such questions as "the place of the savage in the chain of being" (Duclot, 1971; Hodgen, 1971). In the following years, the sagan of exploration begin with J.
The invention of Africa

which is not found on Earth. The remarkable fact is that the visible star does have an extraordinary dark companion, Sirius B which orbits it in an elliptical orbit once every 50.2 years. Sirius B is the first example of a white dwarf star discovered by modern astrophysics. Its matter is in a state called "degenerate matter," which does not exist on Earth, and since the electrons are degenerate, it can properly be described as metallic. (Sagan, 1985:83)

How can we explain the Dogon's astronomical knowledge? Sagan has a hypothesis: "I picture a Gallic visitor to the Dogon people... He may have been a diplomat, an explorer, an adventurer or an early anthropologist..." (1985:87). This man has read, or perhaps still has, a copy of Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington's book, The Nature of the Physical World, published in 1928, in which the density of white dwarf stars is discussed.

The conversation turns to astronomical lore. Sirius is the brightest star in the sky. The Dogons regard the visitor with their Sirius mythology. Then, smiling politely, expectantly, they inquire of their visitor what his Sirius myth might be... The white dwarf companion of Sirius brings a current astronomical sensation, the trilater exchange a spectacular myth for a mundane one. After he leaves, his account is remembered, retold and eventually incorporated into the corpus of Dogon mythology... When Marcel Griaule makes mythological inquiries in the 1930s and 1940s, he has his own European Sirius myth played back to him. (Sagan, 1985:88)

All this is sheer speculation. Had Sagan carefully consulted knowledgeable sources (e.g., Griaule, 1948; Dieterlen, 1971; Griaule and Dieterlen, 1965) he would not have confused facts and symbolic levels in order to make his point about a beautiful "full-circle return of a myth." Let us note three facts. First, the orbiting cycle of Sirius B is acyclic and reflected in the celebration of the sign, a ritual introduced by a mythical ancestor of the Dogons, Dyongu Seru. It is celebrated every sixty years; a symbolic period that integrates the fifty years of the revolution of Sirius B (for Dogons, the "year of the fonio") plus ten years which makes the ritual agree with the old Mandé system of number by sixty and with its esoteric symbols (Dieterlen, 1971:25). The last sign ritual took place in 1967 and was filmed by J. Rosch and G. Dieterlen and released under the title La Caverne de Bongo (1969, 35 mm. in color). The preceding signi performance was in 1907, and before that in 1847. "The rite is celebrated under the 'sign' of the 'year of the fonio.'" Indeed, this "companion" of Sirius is the representation in the sky of the little fonio seed..." (Heuch, 1985:142). Second, if one wants to validate Sagan's hypothesis, one should, in fact, demonstrate that a European traveler hurried to the Dogon region just after the 1847 discovery by E.W. Bessell of the smoinoid visual of Sirius. He must have taught it well for the Dogons promptly to integrate it in their myths to the point that it could perfectly function in a set of major founding symbols in time for the 1847 ritual of signi. Third, the preceding supposition seems difficult since the existence of Sirius B was, in Western science, really discovered in 1862 by A. G. Clark. Dogons had already used the symbolism of the fonio in their 1847 and 1878 rituals of signi. Specialties in "oral civilizations" can easily check this. At the same time, they should evaluate the historical credibility and context of Dyongu Seru, who according to Dogon tradition is both the one "responsible for the loss of immortality," and the inventor of the signi cycle (Heuch, 1985; Griaule and Dieterlen, 1965). On the other hand, I see another problem: the Dogons' concept of agadja, a metal which does not exist on earth and which constitutes the nature of Sirion's companion, is strongly linked to the signi mythical cycle. It thus seems to go relatively far back in the history of the ritual, whereas in Western science the hypothesis of the "relativistically degenerate nature" of Sirius B was made for the first time in the 1910s. Most scientists did not then accept the concept, which, by the way, was proposed by an Indian scholar, S. Chandrasekhar.

To conclude this long illustration of an epistemological ethnocentrism, I suppose that now it has become clear how controversial Sagan's hypothesis is. Let us sum up. First, I do not believe that the Dogons got their astronomical knowledge from extraterrestrials. The "bad faith" (in the Satmar sense) with which Sagan destroys the theses and fantasies of E. von Däniken who claims this in Chariots of the Gods (1970, New York) and Gods From Outer Space (1978, New York) makes me suspect that Sagan and von Däniken are probably closer than they suspect. Second, Sagan's way of treating the Dogons well illustrates the power of a will to truth. A metaphor might generalize this case. Let us imagine a teacher who is enclosed in Euclidean geometry. He thinks about, believes in, and writes on the impossibility of non-Euclidean systems. These, in effect, would incarnate the possibility of incredible contradictions such as the intellectual reality of an "extrinsic truth," e.g., a validated demonstration in Euclidean geometry, which would be simultaneously an "extrinsic error," that is, a validated proposition in the logic of a non-Euclidean geometry. As we know, there are such things as non-Euclidean geometries. Thus my metaphor could at least become a symbol: it might not make sense at all to reduce non-Euclidean systems to Euclid's, since the systems spring from radically different postula-
tes and sets of axioms.

In brief, although presented in the second part of the twentieth century, Carl Sagan's hypothesis belongs to nineteenth-century reasoning about "primitives." In the name of both scientific power and knowledge, it reveals in a manifest way what I shall define in the following chapters as an epistemological ethnocentrism; namely, the belief that scientifically there is nothing to be learned from "them" unless it is already "ours" or comes from "us.

Explorers do not reveal otherness. They comment upon "anthropology," that is, the distance separating savagery from civilization on the diachronic line of progress (see Rorty, 1970). R. Thornton claims that "the discovery of Africa was also a discovery for paper. Had the great Victorian travellers not
The Invention of Africa

written anything it would not be said today that they had 'discovered' anything. Strictly speaking, however, it seems difficult to prove in a convincing way that "Livingstone, Stanley, Burton, Grant, Speke and others entered into the enterprise for the sake of the text" (Thornton, 1981:509).

Other students can invoke other motives such as the classical ones of curiosity, courage, generosity, contempt (Killinger, 1973:45). At any rate, the explorer's text is not epistemologically inventive. It follows a path prescribed by a tradition. Expedition reports only establish a very concrete, vivid representation of what paintings and theories of social progress had been postulating since the Baroque period. In what the explorer's text does reveal, it brings nothing new besides visible and recent reasons to validate a discipline already remarkably defined by the Enlightenment (Levi-Strauss, 1973:14-15). The novelty resides in the fact that the discourse on "savage" is, for the first time, a discourse in which an explicit political power presumes the authority of a scientific knowledge and vice-versa. Colonialism becomes its project and can be thought of as a duplication and a fulfillment of the power of Western discourses on human varieties.

The development of anthropology, which up to the very end of the eighteenth century was sought within travelers' narratives, now takes a radical turn. From now on it will develop into a clearly visible power-knowledge political system. As Foucault put it:

"Ethnology has its roots, in fact, in a possibility that properly belongs to the history of civilization, even more to its fundamental relation with the whole of history... There is a certain position of the Western ratio that was constituted in its history and provides a foundation for the relation it can have with all other societies... Obviously, this does not mean that the colonizing society is indispensable to ethnology; rather, intuition, not the parent's attention within the fantastic creature of the doctor, is constitutive of psychoanalytic, but just as it can be deployed only in the calm violence of a particular situation, a transience is produced, to which ethnology can assume its proper dimensions only within the historical worldview—always restrained, but always present—of European thought and the relation to itself... Foucault, 1973:557 speaks more..."

Power and Otherness

material benefits to the mother country" (1967:17-30). On the other hand, it is during this same century that, paradoxically, original interpretations of "savage" were proposed by Enlightenment social scientists (Duchet, 1973). And I quite agree with R. L. Meek that if we look at their work, "what shines out are its virtues rather than its vices, its brilliant intuitions rather than its occasional logical lapses, its adventurousness and novelty rather than its dogmatism" (1967:24-25). To defend this point, Meek quotes Morris Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1968), Benjamin Keren, The Aetz Image in Western Thought (1971), and Sidney Pollard, The Idea of Progress (1958). I may add Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale II (1973) and M. Duchet, Anthropologie et l'iatre au siècle des lumières (1971).

The problem is that during this period both imperialism and anthropology took shape, allowing the reification of the "primitive." The key is the idea of History with a capital H, which first incorporates St. Augustine's notion of providence and later expresses itself in the evidence of Social Darwinism. Evolution, conquest, and difference become signs of a theological, biological, and anthropological destiny, and assign to things and beings both their natural slots and social mission. Theorists of capitalism, such as Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson in England, Paul Lévy-Beaulieu in France, Friedrich Naumann and Friedrich von Bernhard in Germany, as well as philosophers, comment upon two main and complementary paradigms. These are the inherent superiority of the white race and, as already made explicit in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the necessity for European economies and structures to expand to "virgin areas" of the world (Mommens, 1981).

From this point, various schools of anthropology developed models and techniques to describe the "primitive" in accordance with changing trends within the framework of Western experience. These different trends can easily be explained from two angles. The first is an ideological one and concerns the relationship between an individual's projection of consciousness, the norms exemplified by one society, and the social or the scientific dominant group (see, e.g., Baudrillard, 1972:174). On the other hand, mainly since the end of the eighteenth century, natural sciences have served as models for the progressive and worsening implementation of social sciences (Duchet, 1973:259-473). In conclusion, one thinks of those "ideological interests of strata that are in various ways privileged within a polity and, indeed, privileged by its very existence" (Wheeler, 1979:190). On the other hand, Aristotle's invitation to study in being the "plane of Nature" (Animal, I, 1) is mathematized (Veyne, 1984:6). New methodological grids link social facts to physical phenomena. Laws of structural organization and distribution, patterns in individual or collective development, account for historical transformations. The social scientist tends to imitate the naturalist and compresses social behaviors and human cultures into "scientific paragons." These actually remain subsumed by what is defined as the goal of knowledge. Paul Veyne recently made some strong statements about the confusion which comes out of this legacy:
Bunton thought that the fly should not hold a greater place in the concerns of the naturalist than it occupies in nature; on the other hand, he maintained a value relationship with the horse and the swan... But zoology has changed a great deal since then and, after Lassak had pleaded the cause of the lower animals, every organism became interested in the science.

Weber was indignant that the history of the Banu could be studied as much as that of the Greeks. Let us not forget that times have changed, that the Third World and its nascent patriotism... that the awakening of the African people who are taking an interest in their past... it would be a fine time to see that patriotic consideration should be the criterion of intellectual interest and that Africans have more reasons to despise Greek antiquity than Europeans had to despise Banu antiquity. (Veyne, 1984, 63)

At the level of organization of discourses these two factors—the impact of ideology and the model of natural sciences—can serve as guides to the relative epistemological unity of social sciences since the nineteenth century. For instance, it would be easy to draw a parallel between philology and anthropology. We wrongly tend today to consider the former, and particularly its objectives, linguistics, as more scientific than the latter. Morgan's historicism in systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (1871) matches the positivism of Max Muller's Lectures on the Science of Language (1862 and 1864), in which fidelity to August Schleicher's Stammrechnung is integrated with Darwin's general postulations. In the same way, the Wellenlehre which is central in J. Schmidt's work (e.g., Die Verwustungsumgebung der Indo germanischen Sprachen, 1875) is similar to the diffusionist perspective of Ankermann, Frobenius, and Graebner in anthropology. The principles of association and differentiation invoked by Boas and Lévi-Strauss resemble many hypotheses in the philological field. Examples are the "swergrammatik" interpretations of analogs in the evolution of language exemplified by Meyer-Lübke's work, or the perspectives opened by H. Schuchardt's Über die Lautgesetze, in which the major concept—the Sprachmischung—implies the necessity of subordinating general laws, such as those promoted by Darwin's disciples, to the complexity and alterity of the objects described and studied.

I do not mean that there is an unquestionable genealogical dependence or obvious synchronic connection between these theories. It is clear, for example, that Schuchardt deals extensively with multidimensional comparison, while Boas avoids it. In simpler words, I mean that anthropology and philology and all social sciences can be really understood only in the context of their epistemological region of possibility. The histories of these sciences as well as their trends, their truths as well as their experiences, being derived from a given space, speak from it and, primarily, about it. Given that, one also might agree that from the anthropology of Bunton, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot to the most modern studies, such as J. Favre-Saada's study of witchcraft in France (1977), the basic concern of anthropology is not so much the description of "primitive" achievements and societies, as the question of its own motives, and the history of the epistemological field that makes it possible, and in which it has flourished as retrospective or perspectivist philosophical discourse (see Sebag, 1964; Diamond, 1974). Thus ethnocentrism is both its virtue and its weakness. It is not, as some scholars thought, an unfortunate mistake, nor a stupid accident, but one of the major signs of the possibility of anthropology.

Some thinkers, such as Lévi-Strauss, thought that studying a diversity of cultures reduced the weight of ideology and enslaved anthropologists to fight such falsehoods as those about the natural superiority of some races and traditions over others. From this ethical point of view, some scholars have wondered whether it was possible to think of an anthropological science without ethnocentrism (e.g., Leclerc, 1971). It is surely possible, as functionalism and structuralism proved, to have works that seem to respect indigenous traditions. And one could hope for even more profound changes in anthropology, as R. Wagner proposes (1981). But for so far it seems impossible to imagine any anthropology without a Western epistemological link.

For the one hand, it cannot be completely cut off from the field of its epistemological genesis and from its roots; and, on the other hand, as a science, it depends upon a precise frame without which there is no science at all, nor any anthropology.

I distinguish two kinds of "ethnocentrism": an epistemological filiation and an ideological connection. In fact they are often complementary and inseparable. The first is a link to an epistle, that is, an intellectual atmosphere which gives to anthropology its status as discourse, its significance as a discipline, and its credibility as a science in the field of human experience. The second is an intellectual and behavioral attitude which varies among individuals. Basically this attitude is both a consequence and an expression of a complex connection between the scholar's projection of consciousness, the scientific models of his time, and the cultural and social norms of his society. Thus, for example, for the eighteenth century one might think of the differences existing between Goessert, Quatremère, and Helvetius, independently of the context of their interpretations of the stages of evolution (see Duchet, 1971; Merek, 1976). Frobenius and Lévi-Bruhl differ in the same manner, and their ethnocentrism is quite different from that of, e.g., Michel Leiris, Margaret Mead, or Carl Sagan. I could say that the epistemological filiation maintains and sustains anthropology as a system of knowledge and as a developing science; cultural ethnocentrism explains ideological changes and struggles in the history and practice of the social science discipline.

The fact that universal civilization has for a long time originated from the European center has maintained the illusion that European culture was, in fact and by right, a universal culture. Its superiority over other civilizations seemed to provide the experimental verification of this postulate. Moreover, the en-
The Invention of Africa
counter with other cultural traditions was itself the fruit of that advance and the more generally the fruit of Occidental science itself. Did not Europe invent history, geography, ethnography, and sociology in their explicit scientific forms? (Ricouer, 1965:17)

In the colonizing experience, the mingling of these two aspects of ethnocentrism tended, almost naturally, to be complete in both the discourse of power and that of knowledge, so the point of transforming the mission of the discipline into an enterprise of acculturation. And the anthropologist des-
cided to take charge of controlling evolutionary processes: "Anthropology, which used to be the study of things scattered, gradual, and backward, is now faced with the difficult task of recording how the 'savage' becomes an active participant in modern civilization" (Malinowski, 1918;18).

Still, it is clear that since the beginning of the nineteenth century, explorers' reports had been useful for opening the African continent to European interests. Myths about "barbaric splendours," or the "white man's grave" go along quite well with the "tropical treasure house," the promises of the Golden Land or New Orphan, and with the humanization of the slave trade, and for Christianizing and civilizing the Africans (Hammood and Jablow, 1977; Leclerc, 1972).

Theories of colonial expansion and discourses on African primitiveness emphasize a historicity and the promotion of a particular model of history. In other words, Mungo Park's Journal of a Mission (1815) or Richard and John Lander's report (1838) essentially address the same issues that R. F. Burton, V. L. Cameron, H. M. Stanley, and F. D. Lugard spelled out in different words, and on which twentieth-century anthropology focuses. This is the discrepancy between "civilization" and "Christianity" on the one hand, "primitiveness" and "paganism" on the other, and the means of "evolution" or "conversion" from the first stage to the second. From this point of view, it can be said that, for instance, J. Chaillet-Bert's programmatic theory of the steps of colonization (agriculture, commerce, industry, authority) has the same signif-
icance as Lugard's views on the European impact in Africa. What they propose is an ideological explanation for forcing Africans into a new historical dimension. Finally, both types of discourses were fundamentally reduc-
tional. They speak about neither Africa nor Africans, but rather purport the process of inventing and conquering a continent and naming its "primi-
tiveness" or "disorder," as well as the subsequent traits of its exploitation and methods of "regeneration." In a more neutral manner, I would say that this book is epistemologically significant. It convincingly illustrates my two previously described dimensions of ethnocentrism in the social sciences: the pertinence of an individual's projection of consciousness and the perception of a disci-

When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural monopoly, be it history or real, we are threatened with destruction by our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are an "other" among others. All meaning and every goal having disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through civilizations as if through ruins and wrecks. The whole of mankind becomes a kind of imaginary museum: where shall we go this week-end—visit the Anchor ruins or take a stroll in the 'Trees of Copenhagen'? (Ricouer, 1965:17)

In addition to Paul Ricouer's anguished propositions, one should note the still strong anthropological spirit exemplified by N. Barley's small book, Adventures in a Mad Hut (1984). In 1978, Barley decided to turn his attention to the Doways, "a strangely neglected group of mountain pagans in North Cameroon... . They were interesting [for him]: they had, for example, skull cults, circumcision, a whale language, mummies and a reputation for being recalcitrant and savage" (1984:15). The result is a brief memoir which ten years ago would have qualified as arrogrant or, at best, disrespectful of both fieldwork and the peoples described. Between commen-
taries on "their heavily Africanized version of Marianne, the French revolu-
tionary heroine" (1984:17) and the fact that it is "victulious that it should be in Africa that people of different races should be able to meet on easy, uncomplicated terms" (1958:21), one gets intrusive lesions. Among them, the following two sum up the project's scientific interest. About the "whole business" of anthropology, the author states:

Frankly, it seemed then, and seems now, that the justification for fieldwork, as for all academic endeavour, lies not in one's contribution to the collectivity but rather in some selfish development. Like monastic life, academic research is essentially all about the perfection of one's own soul. This may well serve some wider purpose but is not to be judged on those grounds alone. (Barley, 1984:10)

As to the Doways, his adventures in a mud hut gave Barley reasons for believing that "in attempting to understand the Doway view of the world I had tested the relevance of certain very general models of interpretation and cultural symbolism. On the whole they had stood up pretty well and I felt much happier about their place in the scheme of things" (1984:188).

This, wrote a reviewer in The Daily Telegraph, is "probably the funniest book that has been produced this year." The evaluation has since served for public "regeneration." In a more neutral manner, I would say that this book is epistemologically significant. It convincingly illustrates my two previously described dimensions of ethnocentrism in the social sciences: the pertinence of an individual's projection of consciousness and the perception of a disci-

21

plified from the normative perspective of its practice and history; it comments
upon itself from within a paradigmatic cultural model. Barley assumes a magnificent position which allegedly indicates the space of his introspec-
tiveness and his African anthropology: "Face-to-face with Africa, the dil-
The Invention of Africa

...ences between a French botanist and an English anthropologist seem minimal and we talked far into the night" (1984:106).

Thus, we are not only dealing with a potential imaginary museum but with concrete constraints produced by two major orders: a topographical dimension which excludes or recreates the same and the other is expanded, and a cultural order which, in the discursive of what today seems to be a common humanity, indicates clear divisions, subtle frontiers, and sometimes the so-called openings to commonness.

I suppose that it is now clear that the trouble with Barley's text is not its ideological orientation. In fact there seems to be none, least of all explicit one, apart from its superfluous appropriation of a business of "old stories." What it reveals, at the end, is an absolute and almost amoral hypercriticism and a metaphorization of cultural reading. So, for instance, what "European" allies to the social interpretation of "savage" and their "in" to the world. What I mean is that the pace of the streets of Rome like a dowry sorcerer with an unequal social role to everyday activities" (1984:185). Saved from Italian royalties and sent to England by the British embassy in Rome, one of the most important things he remembers in being alien: "an hour after my arrival, I was phoned by one friend who merely remarked tersely: "Look, I don't know where you've been but you left a pillow at my place nearly two years ago. When are you coming to collect it?" In vain one feels that such questions are beneath the concern of a returning prophet" (1984:186). In effect, a topographical configuration accounts for Barley's discourse and a cultural atmosphere might explain his addiction to cream cakes and to anthropology. As to his impressionistic message, it is a strikingly modernized lesson on Conrad's questions in Heart of Darkness: Why is African culture a "barbarous" experience? What is European civilization and in which sense is it different?

The question in the history of African studies and discourses it is therefore important to notice that apparent changes within the dominant symbols have never fundamentally modified the meaning of African conversion, but only the policies for its ideological and ethnic expression and practice. Present-day intellectual categories can allow, as demonstrated by Copans in his periodization, a distinction between travel literature, ethnology, and applied anthropology (Copans, 1971a). Yet it is erroneous to depend on this type of theoretical distinction, which is concerned with differences of ideological policies, in order to distinguish genres of "African knowledge." Travelers in the eighteenth century, as well as those of the nineteenth and their successors to the twentieth (colonial) processors, anthropologists, and colonizers, spoke using the same type of signs and symbols and acted upon them. During the colonial era, these consistently involved reduction of differences into a Western history. This does not imply that Western inventors of an "African genesis" did not distinguish levels and types of interpretations of Africa. The author of Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kulturen, for example, could, in an article on the origin of African civilizations, perceive that the